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Abstract 
This thesis considers when it will be appropriate to regulate charities and other civil 
society organisations and how this might best be accomplished. 
The first part of the thesis is a critical analysis of the constitution and functions of 
organised civil society. It argues that it is inappropriate to use legal and financial 
definitions as the basis of regulation and instead defines the sector by reference to its 
structure and functions. In relation to structure, the characteristics of volunteerism, 
independence, organisation and non-profit distribution are evaluated and adopted. In 
relation to function, it argues that whilst there is no single over-arching purpose of 
organised civil society, sector activity can be conveniently divided into eight 
overlapping categories. These are critically evaluated with reference to sociological 
theories of civil society. 
The second part of the thesis builds on the preceding analysis to develop a theory of 
civil society regulation. Traditional economic and social justifications for regulation 
and their relevance to organised civil society are considered. The thesis argues that 
there are six specific justifications for the regulation of civil society organisations: (i) 
preventing anti-competitive practices, (ii) controlling campaigning, (iii) ensuring 
trustworthiness, (iv) co-ordinating the sector; (v) rectifying philanthropic failures; and 
(vi) preventing challenges to organisational quiddity. The analysis concludes with an 
examination of the relationship between organised civil society and the other sectors 
and between civil society's constituent parts. In particular, the thesis argues that, in 
terms of structure and function, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between the 
charitable sector and wider civil society. 
The final part of the thesis considers the implementation of this theory, It provides a 
comparative analysis of the institutions which might be charged with regulating the 
sector and an evaluation of the regulatory strategies available to them. 
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A. NATURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
This thesis is concerned with the regulation of charities and organised civil society. 
Civil society is the label given to the loose collective of organisations that operate 
outside the public sector, the private market and the family unit. Broadly speaking, 
these organisations exist to carry out those social functions that other sectors 'either 
avoid ... or take 
for granted'. ' In practice, this translates as a sector that is 'dedicated 
to community benefit or social purposes'. 2 It is engaged in a diverse collection of 
activities ranging from those which benefit society as a whole, through to those which 
are useful to socially disadvantaged minority groups. Charities form a subset of wider 
civil society. They are engaged in the same broad functions as the rest of the sector, 
but are distinguishable from other civil society organisations by their pursuit of 
specific purposes, in specific ways, which are approved by the state and rewarded with 
certain fiscal and other benefits. 
(1) Historical Development of Civil Society 
It is impossible to say with any degree of certainty exactly when organised civil 
society as we understand it today came into existence. Some have suggested that it has 
been a continuous presence throughout history, albeit one which was often not 
explicitly recognised. 3 There is certainly evidence of civil society activity in ancient 
Greece and Rome, with collegia - organisations formed for common social pursuits 
among other purposes 4- dating back 'earlier than recorded history'. 5 So far as the 
' Gassler, R., The Economics of Nonprofit Enterprise: A Study in Applied Economic Theory 
(Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America, 1986) at 13. 
2 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and the 
Wider Not-For-Profit Sector (London, HMSO, 2002), para 2.12. 
3 See for example Levitt, T., The Third Sector: New Tactics for a Responsive Society (New 
York, AMACOM, 1973) at 49. 
4 The Oxford Latin Dictionary defines the collegium as a 'guild, club, society, fraternity (of 
men belonging to the same trade or having some common tie or interest)' (Glare, P., Oxford 
Latin Dictionary (Oxford, Clarendon, 1968) at 350). 
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United Kingdom is concerned, the roots of organised civil society are often found in 
two medieval institutions, one ecclesiastic and one secular: the Church and the guild. 
From the twelfth century onwards, 6 the Roman Catholic Church - and later, following 
Henry VIII's repudiation of papal supremacy in 1534, the Church of England - was 
routinely engaged in the provision of social welfare. At the outset of this welfare 
provision, the Church was very much part of the state, being a 'temporal authority 
rivalling the secular state' 7 and with the majority of its activities being funded by 
taxation, and so it would be inaccurate to label this civil society activity. However, the 
position gradually shifted over the centuries and the Church came to lose much of its 
governmental character. 8 Taxation gave way to funding through voluntary donations. 
The end result was an organisation which operated outside the private market but 
which no longer fell comfortably inside the public sector, and which relied upon the 
philanthropy of its wealthy adherents to fund its social purposes. At the same time that 
the Church was acting as the main provider of social welfare based on philanthropy, 
the guilds were carving out a similar niche for themselves based on the principle of 
mutuality. Descended from warrior fraternities, these began as social groups 'bound 
together by ties of rite and friendship, offering mutual support to ... members', 
9 and 
carried out functions ranging from the provision of burials to the economic assistance 
of their poor members. 10 During the twelfth century these were superseded by trade- 
based craft-guilds, " which continued to provide mutual aid for their members but 
which also engaged in broader social activities, such as the foundation of hospitals and 
schools, 12 providing a secular alternative to the Church for philanthropists. 
5 Duff, P., Personality in Roman Private Law (Cambridge, CUP, 1938) at 103; noted in Black, 
A., Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thoughtfrom the Twelfth Century to the 
Present (London, Methuen, 1984) at 3. 
6 Following a papal decree of Gregory IX approved by the 4th Lateran Council in 1215. See 
Jones, G., History of the Law of Charity 1532 - 182 7 (Cambridge, CUP, 1969) at 3; also 
Chesterman, M., Charities, Trusts and Social Welfare (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1979) at 11. 
7 Chesterman, above n6 at 11. 
8 Although the Church of England remains established at the time of writing. 
9 Black, above n5 at 3. 
10 Black, above n5 at 4. 
1 See generally Black, above n 5, Ch 1. 
2 Chesterman, above n6 at 13. 
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By the reign of Elizabeth 1, organised civil society was firmly established in the social 
fabric and its significance was recognised by the state. The Court of Chancery 
recognised the charitable use (and later the charitable trust) as a means of making gifts 
to charitable causes, granting the device privileges which were not accorded to private 
uses and trusts. ' 3 In particular, charitable uses were exempt from the rule requiring 
certainty of object 14 and the rule against perpetual duration, 15 and they also fell outside 
statutory and common law limitation periods. 16 The preferred status of charitable gifts 
was given a statutory footing at the turn of the seventeenth century with the Statutes of 
Charitable Uses 1597 and 1601 (the latter being a redrafted version of the former). 
The latter remained in force until 1853 and continues to form the basis of modem legal 
charity, as all charitable purposes must fall within the 'spirit and intendment' of the 
activities listed in its Preamble. 
(2) Civil society in the 21st Century 
Today, organised civil society is 'abundant and thriving'. 17 It consists of a wide 
variety of institutions including schools and universities, churches and other 
ecclesiastical associations, pressure groups, hospitals, eleemosynary organisations, 
mutual societies, social enterprises, trade unions and local community organisations. It 
is estimated that there are between 500,000 and 700,000 civil society organisations in 
total in the United Kingdom, ' 8 and whilst there are no statistics available for the sector 
as a whole, it is reckoned that 'general charities'19 alone have a combined workforce of 
over 3.5 million staff and volunteers, 20 and a combined annual income of over 00.6 
billion. 21 
13 Though note that the courts were not always motivated by a desire to encourage charitable 
giving when doing so: see below Ch 2 at nn 51 - 54 and associated text. 14 Moggridge v Thackwell (1802) 7 Ves 360; Mills v Farmer (1815) 1 Mer 55. 
" Goodman v Saltash Corporation (1882) 7 App Cas 633 at 642 per Lord Selborne. 
16 See e. g. Attorney General v Christ's Hospital (1834) 3 My &K 344. 
17 Levitt, above n3 at 60. 
18 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2, para 2.10. 
19 General charities consist of all registered charities excluding 'non -departmental public 
bodies and quasi non -governmental organisations ... and financial institutions allocated to the 
corporate sector in national accounts' (Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2, para 2.22). 
20 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2, paras 2.22 - 2.33. 21 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2, para 2.22. il 5.6 billion of this represents actual 




At a general level, regulation means 'any form of behavioural control, whatever the 
origin'. 22 Within the legal context, the term is sometimes accorded a similarly broad 
definition, referring to 'the whole realm of legislation, governance and social 
control'. 23 However, the academic study of regulation as a discrete field, a 
collaboration between the disciplines of law and economics, is concerned with a 
narrower definition. In this context, regulation is generally taken to mean the 
'sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are 
valued by a community'. 24 The aim of the sustained and focused control is to: 25 
direct or encourage behaviour which (it is assumed) would not occur without 
such intervention ... [and in doing so] correct perceived deficiencies in the 
market system in meeting collective or public interest goals. 
As will become apparent throughout the thesis, this definition needs some refinement - 
for example, regulation may be carried out by more than one public agency; or it may 
take the form of self-regulation, whereby the regulated sector keeps its own house in 
order. Nevertheless, this definition serves as a useful starting point. Accordingly, this 
thesis is concerned with the sustained and focused control of the organisations that 
constitute civil society, with the aim of correcting perceived deficiencies that prevent 
the sector from maximising its usefulness to society. 
C. CIVIL SOCIETY AND REGULATION 
The regulation of organised civil society, and more specifically the charitable sector, 
has a long heritage. In England and Wales, 26 the Court of Chancery, and later the 
22 Ogus, A., Regulation: Legalform and economic theory (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) at 
23 Majone, G., 'Introduction' in Majone, G. (ed. ), Deregulation or Re-Regulation? Regulatory 
Reform in Europe and the United States (London, Pinter, 1990) at 1. 
24 Selznick, P., 'Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation' in Noll, R. (ed. ), Regulatory 
Policy and the Social Sciences (Berkley and LA, University of California Press, 1985) at 363. 
Cited in Ogus, above n 22 at 1. See also e. g. Baldwin, R., and Cave, M., Understanding 
Regulation Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford, OUP, 1999) at 2; Majone, above n 23 at 1. 
25 Ogus, above n 22 at I-2. 
26 In the context of charity law, references throughout this thesis to England should be taken to 
include Wales as well. 
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Chancery Division of the High Court, 27 recognised charitable uses at least as far back 
as the second half of the fifteenth century, 28 and prior to this the ecclesiastical courts 
upheld bequests adpias causa. 29 The first Charity Commissioners were provided for 
in 1597 by the same Act which gave charity law its statutory footing, 30 with the current 
Commission being established in 1853 31 and the Attorney General's jurisdiction to 
enforce charitable uses by way of 'information' - the precursor of the modem relator 
action - was firmly entrenched as a method of enforcement by the end of the 
seventeenth century. 32 These three institutions - the courts, the Charity Commission 
and the Attorney General - continue to be chiefly responsible for regulation today. 
Whilst the past thirty years have seen the study of organised civil society develop into 
a field of research in its own right, 33 little academic attention has been focused upon 
the issue of regulation. In spite of this, a number of jurisdictions - in particular 
England, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland and South Africa - are currently in 
the process of introducing or reviewing existing systems of regulation. Another, 
Australia, recently implemented minor reforms. 34 The law relating to charities in each 
of these jurisdictions has developed from the English system, although, before the 
reforms, England was the only country among them with a sector-specific regulator in 
the Charity Commission. 
27 Following the Judicature Act 1873. 
28 See Jones, above n6 at 7. 
29 Although jurisdiction was not simply transferred from one to the other: the ecclesiastical 
courts continued to entertain such bequests into the fifteenth century (see Jones, above n6 at 
5). 
" Statute of Charitable Uses 1597; replaced four years later by the Statute of Charitable Uses 
1601. 
31 Charitable Trusts Act 1853, ss I-8. Under the current law, it is the Commissioners 
themselves, rather than the Commission, who are charged with regulation (Charities Act 1993, 
s 1). However, the defacto position is that regulation is carried out by the Commission: see 
below Ch 6 nn 74 - 77 and associated text. 32 See Jones, above n6 at 55. 
33 At the time of writing, there are several journals (e. g, International Journal ofNot-for-Profit 
Law (www. icni. org, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 1998 onwards); Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly (Thousand Oaks and London, Sage, 1989 onwards); Voluntas 
(New York, Kluwer, 1990 onwards)) and university departments (e. g. in the UK the Centre for 
Civil Society, London School of Economics founded in 1987 and the Institute for 
Philanthropy, University College London, founded in 2000; also the Centre for Civil Society at 
UCLA and the Centre for Nonprofit Management at Trinity College, Dublin) dedicated to civil 
society research. 
34 Accordingly, whilst the focus of this thesis is on civil society more generally (see generally 




In England and Wales, the current legal reforms began in 1998 when the Charity 
Commission, the non-ministerial government department which is responsible for 
determining the charitable status of organisations according to the principles laid down 
in caselaw, commenced a review of its register of charities to ensure that the legal 
concept of charity reflected (i) the popular understanding of charity 35 and (ii) the 
'changing social and economic circumstances' since the Statute of Charitable Uses 
four centuries before. 36 The review was undertaken in response to a report of the 
Select Committee on Public Accounts, which identified the accuracy of the register of 
charities as an area of concern 37 and accused the Commission of failing to use its 
regulatory powers 'to anything like their full potential' . 
38 Following a series of 
consultation papers, the Commission issued new guidance on a variety of issues, 
ranging from the recognition of new charitable purposes and the modernising of 
existing charitable purposes, 39 to questions of more general regulatory concern . 
40 This 
35 Charity Commission, RRP The Review of the Register of Charities (London, Charity 
Commission, 2001), paras 23 - 24. 36 Charity Commission, above n35, para 4. See generally Mitchell, C., 'Reviewing the 
Register' in Mitchell, C. and Moody, S. (eds. ), Foundations of Charity (Oxford, Hart, 2000). 
" Select Committee on Public Accounts, 28th Report for 1997 - 1998 Session: Charity 
Commission - Regulation and Support of Charities, para 26. 38 Select Committee on Public Accounts, above n 37, para 5. The Select Committee's interest 
in the regulation of the charitable sector is itself symptomatic of an increased political 
awareness of organised civil society which emerged during the 1990s. This was largely the 
result of New Labour's desire to distance itself from both the market-oriented politics of the 
Conservative Party and the state-oriented politics of 'old' Labour (see e. g. Blair, T., The Third 
Way: New Politicsfor the New Century (London, Fabian Society, 1998)), which Kendall 
suggests was, in turn, influenced by an increase in quantitative research and associated policy 
documents focusing on the sector (see generally Kendall, J., 'The Mainstreaming of the Third 
Sector into Public Policy in England in the Late 1990s: Whys and Wherefores' (2000) 28 
Policy and Politics 541 esp at 546 - 551,555; also Kendall, J., The Voluntary Sector (London, 
Routledge, 2003), Ch 3). 
39 At the time of writing these are Charity Commission, RRIa: Recognising New Charitable 
Purposes (London, Charity Commission, 200 1); RR2: Promotion of Urban and Rural 
Regeneration (London, Charity Commission, 1999); RR3: Charitiesfor the Relief of 
Unemployment (London, Charity Commission, 1999); RR4: The Recreational Charities Act 
1958 (London, Charity Commission, 2000); RR5: The Promotion of Community Capacity 
Building (London, Charity Commission, 2000); RR9: Preservation and Conservation (London, 
Charity Commission, 2001); RRIO: Museums andArt Galleries (London, Charity 
Commission, 2002); RRI I. - Charitable Status and Sport (London, Charity Commission, 2003); 
RR12: The Promotion of Human Rights (London, Charity Commission, 2003); RR13: 




led to concerns that the Charity Commission was effectively redefining charitable 
status and hence acting outside its statutory remit. 41 At the start of the review the 
Commission stated that: 42 
in the exercise of our powers to recognise organisations as charitable for the 
purposes of the Register we act in a way which seeks to predict the approach 
which would be taken by the courts if the charitable status of the particular 
organisation was being determined by the courts. Accordingly we do not have 
the power to change the law beyond that empowered by the court ... 
However, whilst the Charities Act 1993 charges them with maintaining the register of 
charities 'in such manner as they think fit', 43 and also with removing from the register 
44 
any organisation 'which no longer appear[s] to the Commissioners to be a charity' , 
the Act is silent as to whether the Commissioners have the authority to second-guess 
the courts in this fashion. Furthermore, whilst the Commissioners have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the High Court in relation to charity proceedings, 45 this is specifically 
limited to designated administrative purposes as opposed to matters of substantive 
charity law. 46 
In light of these limitations inherent in the review of the register, in 2002 the Prime 
Minister's Strategy Unit published its own consultation paper on the legal and 
regulatory framework of the charitable 'and wider not-for-profit sector'. 47 Its 
recommendations included the following key refonns: (i) the statutory redefinition of 
the criteria for charitable status, replacing the existing four heads of charity with ten 
40 Charity Commission, CC60: The Hallmarks of an Effective Charity (London, Charity 
Commission, 2004); RR6: Maintenance of an Accurate Register (London, Charity 
Commission, 2000); RRT The Independence of Charitiesfrom the State (London, Charity 
Commission, 2001); RR8: The Public Character of Charity (London, Charity Commission, 
200 1); RR 14: Promoting the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Charities and the Effective Use of 
Charitable Resources for the Benefit of the Public (London, Charity Commission, 2004). 
41 National Council of Voluntary Organisations, Charity Commission Review of the Register: 
NCVO's Response to the Draft Frameworkfor the Review (London, NCVO, 1998). 
42 Charity Commission, above n 35, para 18. 
43 Charities Act 1993, s 3(l). 
44 Charities Act 1993, s 3(4). 
45 Charities Act 1993, s 16(l). 
46 Namely the creation of schemes for the administration of a charity (s 16(l)(a)); the 
appointment and removal of trustees (s 16(l)(b)); and certain property transactions (s 
16(l)(b)). 
47 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2. 
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new 'purposes of charity' and compelling charities to demonstrate public benefit in 
their pursuit of these purposes; 48 (ii) the creation of two new legal forms - for 
49 
charities, the 'charitable incorporated association' , and 
for social enterprises, the 
ýcommunity interest company' (iii) the introduction of self-regulation of fundraising; 50 
(iv) the piloting of quality control through 'performance indicators and 
benchmarking'; 51 and (v) the re-branding of the Charity Commission as the Charity 
Regulation Authority. 
A number of these proposals have been carried forward by the Labour government. 
Legislation establishing the community interest company was enacted in September 
2004,52 and, at the time of writing, a Charities Bill is before the House of LordS. 53 The 
Bill makes a number of key changes to both charity law and the regulatory framework 
in which charities operate. In relation to charity law, the Bill replaces the existing four 
heads of charity - the relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the 
advancement of religion and other purposes beneficial to the community54 - with 
twelve purposes comprising amended versions of the existing heads, 55 plus eight new 
ones: 56 the advancement of health or the saving of lives; 57 the advancement of 
citizenship or community advancement; 58 the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage 
or science; 59 the advancement of amateur sport; 60 the advancement of human rights, 
conflict resolution or reconciliation, or the promotion of religious or racial harmony, 
equality or diversity; 61 the advancement of environmental protection or 
48 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2, para 4.18. 
49 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2, para 5.44. 
50 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2, para 6.32. 
51 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2, para 6.40. 
52 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, Part 2. 
53 The Bill was placed before the House on 21 December 2004 and its second reading took 
place on 20 January 2005. 
54 Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [ 1891 ] AC 53 1. 
55 Under s 2(2)(a) of the Bill, the 'relief' of poverty will become the 'prevention or relief of 
poverty. 
56 Although all but two of these are existing charitable purposes that currently fall under the 
fourth head: see below Ch 5 at 182. 
57 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(d). 
58 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(e). 
59 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(f). 
60 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(g). 
61 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(h). 
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improvement; 62 the relief of those in need; 63 and the promotion of animal welfare. 64 it 
also abolishes the presumption of public benefit in relation to the relief of poverty, the 
advancement of education and the advancement of religion. 65 
In relation to the regulatory framework, the Charity Commission's role as regulator is 
66 
consolidated , and 
it is given a detailed mandate with regard to its regulatory 
objectives and general functions. 67 Currently, the Commission has a fairly non- 
specific general function, namely 'promoting the effective use of charitable 
resources', 68 which has meant that its attempts to modernise the charitable sector, such 
as the review of the register, have sometimes met with accusations of lack of 
legitimacy. 69 Under the Bill, the Commission will have five primary objectives of (i) 
ensuring public confidence in the sector '70 
(ii) promoting awareness of the public 
benefit requirement, 71 (iii) ensuring charities comply with their legal obligations, 72 (iV) 
facilitating the 'economic and social impact' of the sector 73 and (v) ensuring the 
accountability of the sector to 'donors, beneficiaries and the general public'. 74 The 
other key feature of the Bill is the creation of a Charity Appeal Tribunal to hear 
appeals from certain decisions of the Commission, including those relating to 
registration or removal from the register of charities. 75 
62 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(i). 
63 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)0). 
64 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(k). 
65 Charities Bill 2004, s 3(2). 
66 The offices of Charity Commissioner are abolished (Charities Act 1993, sI A(l) inserted by 
the Charities Bill 2004, s 6), and their 'property, rights and liabilities' are transferred to the 
Commission, which is established as a corporation (Charities Bill, s 6(4). 
67 Charities Act 1993, ss I B, I C, inserted by the Charities Bill 2004, s 6. 
68 Charities Act 1993,1(3). 
69 See Mitchell, C., 'Reviewing the Register' in and Mitchell, C., and Moody, S., (eds. ), 
Foundations of Charity (Oxford, Hart, 2000) at 198. 
70 Charities Act 1993, s IB(2) and (3), inserted by the Charities Bill 2004, s 7. This is 
currently what the Commission believes is its regulatory function (see Charity Commission, 
CC2. - Charities and the Charity Commission (London, Charity Commission, 2002), para 4) 
although there is no statutory authority for this. 




75 Charities Bill 2004, s8 and Sched 4, Table, Col 1. 
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(2) Other jurisdictions 
Australia 
Reform of civil society regulation in Australia began in 2000 with the creation of the 
Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations, which was set up at 
federal level to determine whether the existing laws, based on the English model of 
76 
charity, were 'appropriate to the modem social and economic environment'. The 
Inquiry's report, 77 published the following year, recommended a series of reforms 
including (i) redefining public benefit to include a requirement of altruiSM; 71 (ii) 
extending charitable status to self-help groups; 79 (iii) abolishing the requirement that 
charitable purposes must fall within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble to the 
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601; 80 (iv) reconstituting the four heads of charity as 
seven separate purposes; 81 and (v) establishing a regulatory agency to administer the 
charitable sector. 82 The first four of these recommendations appeared in the federal 
Charities Bill 2003, but the Bill was dropped in May 2004 due to lack of 'clarity and 
certainty' in the drafting. 83 However, although the four heads of charity remain in 
place, statutory provision has been made for the extension of charitable status to self- 
help groups and closed religious orders, 84 effective I July 2004. There are no plans to 
establish a regulatory agency, which has already been described as a 'fatal flaw' in the 
reforms. 85 
76 Prime Minister of Australia, Press Release, 18 September 2000. 
77 Charities Definition Inquiry, Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and 
Related Organisations (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2001). 
78 Charities Definition Inquiry, above n 77, recommendation 7. 
79 Charities Definition Inquiry, above n 77, recommendation 8. 
8' Charities Definition Inquiry, above n 77, recommendation 11. 
81 Charities Definition Inquiry, above n 77, recommendation 13 
82 Charities Definition Inquiry, above n 77, recommendation 26. 
83 Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, Final Response to the Charities Definition 
Inquiry, Press Release No 03 1,11 May 2004. 
84 Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004, ss 4,5. 
85 McGregor-Lowndes, M., 'Australian Charity Law Reform Proposals' [20021 IJNL 




In Canada, the Report of the Panel on Accountability and Governance in Canada's 
Voluntary Sector suggested in 1999 that a task force of state and voluntary sector 
representatives be established to formulate a modemised concept of legal charity. 86 
This task force published its final report in 2003,87 which recommended a general 
overhauling of the regulatory regime and mooted the creation of a Charity Commission 
along the lines of the English model. 88 In the Federal Budget 2004, the government 
announced plans to implement many of the recommendations in the report using the 
model of an enhanced Charities Directorate. 89 
Ireland 
Following a report from the Law Society, 90 the Irish government published a 
consultation paper in December 2003,91 which called for responses to three general 
proposals: (i) a statutory definition of charity based on the common law definition but 
with 'greater clarity'; 92 (ii) the creation of regulatory body for charities based on 
similar lines to the English Charity Commission; 93 and (iii) the creation of a register of 
charities to be maintained by the regulator. 94 The report which followed this 
86 Voluntary Sector Roundtable Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary 
Sector, Building on Strength: Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada's 
Voluntary Sector (www. vsr-trsb. net, Voluntary Sector Roundtable, 1999). 
87 Voluntary Sector Initiative (Canada) Joint Regulatory Table, Strengthening Canada's 
Charitable Sector (Ottawa, Voluntary Sector Initiative, 2003). 
88 Above n 87 at 133. The task force also put forward three alternative regulatory models 
(namely (i) an enhanced Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency, the body with 
responsibility for determining charitable status for tax purposes; (ii) an enhanced Charities 
Directorate working alongside a voluntary sector agency which would advise the directorate 
on policy; and (iii) an enhanced Charities Directorate working alongside a Charity 
Commission, with the latter responsible for all aspects of regulation except 'compliance 
monitoring and auditing' (at 130)) but did not prefer one model over the others: see generally 
above n 87 and Ch 7. 
89 Delivered 23 March 2004. See Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 2004 
(Ottawa, Department of Finance Canada, 2004) at 175 - 176; also at 349 - 364. 90 Law Society of Ireland's Law Reform Committee, Charity Law: The casefor reform 
(www. lawsociety. ie, Law Society of Ireland, 2002). 
9' Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, Establishing a Modern Statutory 
Frameworkfor Charities (DCRGA, Dublin, 2003). 
92 Above n 91 at 7. 
93 Above n 91 at 8-9; also 15 - 16. 94 Above n 91 at 13 - 14. 
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consultation, released in September 2004,95 notes that the majority of responses were 
in favour of all three proposals, 96 with the creation of a register of charities receiving 
unanimous support. 97 
New Zealand 
In 2001, the New Zealand government published the discussion document Tax and 
Charities, 98 which considered a range of reform options relating to the definition of 
charity and the tax breaks available to charities. This was followed the next year by 
the report of Treasury working party, which recommended the creation of a Charity 
Commission based on the English model. 99 Pursuant to this, a Charities Bill was 
presented to Parliament in March 2004.100 
Scotland 
In 2001, the Scottish Charity Law Review Commission (McFadden Commission) 
undertook a whole-scale review of charity law in Scotland. 10 I The Commission's 
report recommended (i) the establishrnent of a regulatory agency, again along the lines 
of the English model, which would be charged with determining charitable status, 102 
and maintaining a register of charities; 103 and (ii) a new definition of charity based on 
public benefit, non-profit distribution and independence. 104 The Scottish Executive 
95 Breen, 0., Establishing a Modern Statutory Frameworkfor Charities: Report on the Public 
Consultation for the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (DCRGA, 
Dublin, 2004). 
96 Breen, above n 95 at 7,23 and 26. 
97 Breen, above n 95 at 26. 
98 Inland Revenue Department Policy Advice Division, Tax and Charities 
(www. taxpoticy. ird. govt. nz/publications/files/taxprivdd. pdf, Inland Revenue Department 
Policy Advice Division, 2001). 
99 Treasury Working Party, Report by the Working Party on Registration, Reporting and 
Monitoring of Charities (www. treasury. govt. nz/charities/report-wprrmc. pdf, New Zealand 
Treasury, 2002). 
1')0 The Social Services Select Committee considered the Bill and in December 2004 
recommended that it be passed with amendments. 
101 Scottish Charity Law Review Commission, Charity Scotland The report of Scottish Charity 
Law Review Commission (www. scotland. gov. uk/justice/charitylaw/csmr/csmr-OO. htm, Scottish 
Charity Law Review Commission, 2001). 
102 Scottish Charity Law Review Commission, above n 101, recommendation 1. 
"' Scottish Charity Law Review Commission, above n 101, recommendation 16. 
104 Scottish Charity Law Review Commission, above n 101, recommendation 2. A fourth 
criterion - that a charity be 'non-party political' - would seem to be inherent in the 
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responded in the short term by establishing the Office of the Scottish Charity 
Regulator as an executive agency of the Scottish Executive Development Department, 
to regulate the sector on a temporary basis and oversee the implementation of a new 
regulatory framework. The Charities and Trustee Investments (Scotland) Bill was 
introduced to the Scottish Parliament on 15 November 2004, and proposes to re- 
establish the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator as an independent statutory body 
along the lines of the English Charity Commission; 105 however, in the interests of 
uniformity, 106 a new definition of charity will be based on the twelve purposes 
contained in the English Charities Bill. 107 
South Africa 
Finally, we can briefly note that the South African Law Commission lists the 'legal 
position of voluntary associations' as a project 'currently receiving attention'. 108 
However, no consultation paper has emerged at the time of writing. 
(3) Common Themes 
There are a number of common themes running through the reforms outlined above: all 
focus almost exclusively on the charitable sector as opposed to wider organised civil 
society; all are concerned with ensuring that the definition of charity reflects 
contemporary social need; and all except England are concerned with establishing new 
sector-specific regulatory agencies. However, what is most striking is the fact that all 
requirement of independence (Scottish Charity Law Review Commission, above n 101, 
recommendation 2; para 1.42); the reason for making this a fourth criterion appears to be for 
emphasis, as the report recommends removing the ban on political purposes per se (paras 1.52 
- 1.54; recommendation 6). "' Charities and Trustee Investments (Scotland) Bill, s 1. 
106 See Scottish Executive, Draft Charities and Trustee Investments (Scotland) Bill. - 
Consultation (Edinburgh, Scottish Executive, 2004) at 9. 
107 Charities and Trustee Investments (Scotland) Bill, s 7(2). Although the purposes in the Bill 
are clearly influenced by the English reforms, they are not, in fact, identical to those listed in s 
2(2) of the Charities Bill 2004. As well as some purely linguistic differences (cf 'the 
advancement of citizenship' and 'the advancement of civic responsibility'), there are two 
noteworthy distinctions: (i) the fourth head under the English Bill is 'the advancement of 
health or the saving of lives', whereas the Scottish equivalent is simply 'the advancement of 
health'; and (ii) the tenth head under the English Bill - the relief of those in need - is replaced 
in the Scottish version with two separate heads relating to the provision of accommodation (s 
7(2)0)) and the provision of care (s 7(2)(k)). 
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the reform proposals have been made on the assumption that regulation of organised 
civil society - and more specifically, regulation of the charitable sector - is justified. 
None of the reform bodies takes a step back to consider whether this is indeed the case, 
and to ask itself what a flourishing civil society might achieve, and 
whether regulation will enable this. Instead, they simply consider the form that 
regulation should take. 109 
D. OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis is an attempt to determine (i) when it will be appropriate to regulate 
organised civil society and (ii) how that regulation might best be accomplished. The 
thesis is divided into three parts, entitled 'Understanding Civil Society', 'Towards a 
Theory of Civil Society Regulation' and 'Implementing Regulation'. 110 
Part One: Understanding Civil Society 
In order to develop an effective and targeted theory of regulation it is first necessary to 
understand our subject matter and, with this in mind, the first part of this thesis is a 
critical analysis of the constitution and functions of organised civil society. Chapter 
Two ('Constitution of Civil Society') considers the constitution of the sector. It 
introduces the concept of sector-based analyses of society and compares civil society 
with the other social, economic and political areas of society: namely, the private 
108 See www. law. w its. ac. za/salc/proj ects/proj ects. html, project 117. 
... However, of all the state-instigated consultations noted above, only the Scottish Charity 
Law Review Commission was clearly in a position to adopt such an approach: its remit being 
simply 'to review the law relating to charities ... and to make recommendations on any 
reforms considered necessary' (Campbell, N., Scottish Executive Consultation on the Report of 
the Scottish Charity Law Review Commission (www. scotiand. gov. uk/consultations/J*ustice/cllr- 
OO. asp, Scottish Executive, 2001). In Canada and New Zealand, the reform bodies' terms of 
reference explicitly limited their remit to the implementation of regulation (Voluntary Sector 
Initiative (Canada) Joint Regulatory Table, above n 87 at 2; Treasury Working Party, above n 
99, appendix 3). In England and Australia, there is no explicit limitation, but the reform 
bodies' terms of reference implicitly assume that regulation in some form is necessary (Prime 
Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 2, para 1.4; Charities Definition Inquiry, above n 77 at v- 
vi). In Ireland, no terms of reference are available for the Department of Community, Rural 
and Gaeltacht Affairs' consultation paper. However, the paper notes that its focus on the 
implementation of regulation reflects the government's commitment to 'introducing an 
integrated system of registration and regulation' (Department of Community, Rural and 
Gaeltacht Affairs, above n 91 at 6), and so it would seem likely that any consideration of 
whether a regulatory regime is, in fact, warranted would have fallen outside its scope. 
110 For a detailed discussion of the research methods involved, see below at 30 - 34. 
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sector, the public sector, the informal sector and the black market. It argues that it is 
inappropriate to focus on legal or financial definitions of civil society and instead 
advocates the use of Salamon and Anheier's definition by reference to the structural 
characteristics of (i) volunteerism, (ii) independence, (iii) organisation and (iv) non- 
profit distribution that are shared by civil society organisations. 
Having determined the nature of the organisations that make up organised civil society, 
Chapter Three ('Functions of Civil Society') proceeds to consider their social 
functions. It argues that whilst the sector has no single over-arching purpose, its 
functions fall broadly within eight overlapping categories. The first six of these are 
concerned with supplying an end product, and consist of (i) supporting the private 
market; (ii) the provision of public goods; (iii) the delivery of complex services; (iv) 
the redistribution of wealth; (v) the facilitation of political action and (vi) the provision 
of cultural services. The final two categories are concerned with the processes by 
which these end products are achieved and consist of (vii) the facilitation of self- 
determination and (viii) the facilitation of entrepreneurship. These eight purposes are 
critically evaluated with reference to existing theories of civil society. 
Part Two: Towards a Theory of Civil Society Regulation 
The second part of the thesis is concerned with establishing when regulation of 
organised civil society as a collective unit will be appropriate and how it might best be 
implemented. The first part of Chapter Four ffoundations of Civil Society 
Regulation') initiates this with an analysis of the traditional economic and social 
justifications for regulation, which are more usually advanced in the context of private 
sector regulation. It considers the relevance for the sector of issues such as the control 
of monopoly power, the control of externalities, information asymmetry and the 
redistribution of wealth. The second half of the chapter builds upon this and the model 
of organised civil society established in the earlier chapters to develop a rudimentary 
theory of civil society regulation. It suggests that there are six specific justifications 
for the regulation of the sector: (i) the prevention of anti-competitive practices; (ii) the 
control of campaigning; (iii) accountability and the prevention of maladministration; 
(iv) the co-ordination of the sector; (v) philanthropic failures; and (vi) the prevention 
of challenges to organisational quiddity. 
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A recurring theme in the second and third chapters is the nature of organised civil 
society's boundaries. Chapter Five ('Boundaries of Civil Society Regulation') returns 
to this and explores further the nature of the relationships between civil society and the 
other sectors and between civil society's constituent parts. The first half of the chapter 
considers how the characteristics of civil society organisations at the edge of the sector 
are affected by their interaction with the public and private spheres. It examines the 
sector's protean relationship with the state in the context of the provision of public 
goods, in particular the impact of contract culture, and the fluidity of the boundaries 
between civil society, the state and the private sector. The second half of the chapter 
examines the relationship between the charitable sector in England and Wales and 
wider organised civil society. It argues that in terms of organisational structure and 
function, no useful distinction can be drawn between the two. The oft-cited argument 
that regulation can be justified by reference to the tax relief granted to civil society 
organisations is also considered. 
Part Three: Implementing Regulation 
The final part of the thesis focuses on the implementation of civil society regulation. 
Chapter Six ('Models of Regulation') considers the models of regulatory institutions 
that might be employed by the state. It provides a comparative analysis of the different 
state institutions that might be charged with regulating the sector, and argues that, 
whilst the traditional 'executive agency' model has much to recommend it, there may 
be a secondary role for the courts and for some form of self-regulation. Chapter Seven 
('Regulation by the Executive') discusses the tools available to an executive agency - 
with particular focus upon command and control regulation, incentive-based regulation 
and disclosure regulation - and considers which of these are most suited to the pursuit 
of the various regulatory goals that emerge from the analysis in Chapter Four. Finally, 
Chapter Eight ('Regulation by the Courts') develops the idea of a secondary role for 
courts as regulators of maladministration, discussed in the previous two chapters, and 
considers the form that this might take in light of existing public and private law 
systems of maladministration regulation. 
By way of conclusion, Chapter Nine highlights the issues that emerge from the thesis. 
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E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The goals of the thesis are to examine possible justifications for regulating organised 
civil society, and to assess the relative merits of different regulatory approaches which 
might be taken towards the sector. Three broad questions are addressed: (i) whether 
the activities undertaken by civil society organisations are distinct from the activities 
undertaken by the state or the market, either because they are pursued in unique ways, 
or because they produce unique outcomes; (ii) if so, whether it is justifiable to regulate 
organised civil society activities in a sector-specific way; and (iii) if it is, whether the 
peculiar characteristics of these activities make one type of regulation more 
appropriate than another. 
(1) General Disciplinary and Methodological Approaches 
An interdisciplinary approach is adopted when answering these questions. The thesis 
draws upon two bodies of contemporary theoretical literature, respectively concerned 
with organised civil society and regulation. Theorists working in these fields have 
rather different goals. Broadly speaking, the aims of civil society theorists are to 
explain the existence of organised civil society and to distinguish its activities from 
those which are typically undertaken by the market and the state. The aims of 
regulation theorists are to explain when the regulation of an industry or social sphere, 
typically one falling within the private sector, can be justified, and to identify effective 
methods of achieving regulatory goals. Until now, there has been little, if any, 
interaction between researchers working in these two fields: convention has it that civil 
society theory is the domain of the social and political scientist, "' whilst regulation 
theory is the domain of the lawyer and economist. However, both bodies of writing 
offer valuable insights into the research questions identified above, and the thesis 
accordingly takes the form of an extended synthetic essay, using an inductive approach 
that builds upon critical analyses of both sets of theories in order to construct a theory 
of regulation which is specific to organised civil society. 




Although the discussion is essentially theoretical, it is not entirely abstract: where 
relevant, connections are made between theory and examples drawn from existing 
regulatory regimes and reform proposals, particularly in common law jurisdictions. 112 
A comprehensive analysis of the legal boundaries of the English charitable sector is 
also undertaken, in order to demonstrate that there are no theoretical grounds on which 
to differentiate between the sector and wider organised civil society for regulatory 
purposes. However, the general intention is not to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of current regulatory practice in any particular jurisdiction, and most references to 
practical examples are made solely in order to clarify theoretical points. 
The thesis takes an inherently constructivist approach to the law, in that it presupposes 
that social institutions are 'amenable to intentional creation, reform and intervention' 
by the state, " 3 and it is also normative, in that it is concerned with the development of 
principles de legeferenda and not principles de lege lata. 114 
(2) Specific Research Methods 
Part One takes as its main source material organised civil society theory, which seeks 
to explain the existence of civil society and the reasons for its presence or absence in 
particular social fields. A number of research methods are deployed. Generally, a 
unificatory approach is taken towards theories explaining civil society activity. Recent 
theories, such as those of Salamon 115 and Hansmann, ' 16 are interpreted as refining, 
rather than replacing, older theories, such as that of Weisbrod, ' 17 as the view is taken 
that no one theory is capable of rationalising the sector. A reductionist approach is 
employed to reveal possible causal links between the component characteristics of 
CSOs, as identified by Salamon and Anheier, 118 and their ability to perform certain 
social functions, although the thesis recognises that the organic nature of CSOs is such 
that specific causes and effects cannot always be identified and isolated. The focus of 
112 On which see below at 34. 
113 Hunt, A., 'The Problematisation of Law in Classical Social Theory' in Banakar, R., and 
Travers, M., An Introduction to Law and Social Theory (Oxford, Hart, 2002) at 17. 
114 I. e. 'what the law ought to be' as opposed to 'what the law is'. 
115 See below Ch 3 at 72 - 81. 116 See below Ch 3 at 65 - 70. 117 See below Ch 3 at 63 - 65. 118 See below Ch 2 at 48. 
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this part of the thesis is on secondary sources, but reference is also made to various 
primary sources in order to place particular ideas in a social, political and legal 
perspective. Specifically, reference is made to quantitative data in the public domain, 
primary and secondary legislation, guidelines issued by the English Charity 
Commission, caselaw, and statements of government policy. 
The first half of Part Two is a critical analysis of the public interest theories that have 
traditionally been advanced to justify the regulation of private sector activities. The 
source material consists of those secondary sources that provide public interest 
justifications for regulation, as opposed to those that seek to explain why regulation 
occurs in practice. Inductive logical reasoning is used to synthesise a set of 
justifications for regulating organised civil society from this material and material from 
the earlier chapters. The second half of Part Two then returns to the contextual 
approach of earlier chapters in order to discuss the delineation of regulatory 
boundaries. Most notably, the second half of Chapter Five uses caselaw, Charity 
Commission guidelines, and legislation, to identify the boundaries of a particular 
regulatory regime - the charitable sector in England and Wales - and to compare these 
with the boundaries of organised civil society which were identified in Part One. 
In Part Three a synthetic approach is used to apply accepted models and strategies of 
regulation, as identified in the regulation theory literature, to the theory of civil society 
regulation developed in the previous parts. In the first two chapters, secondary 
materials again form the main focus of the discussion, although some primary sources 
are also used to set the discussion in context. However, the final substantive chapter 
employs a very different method. It is concerned with regulation by the courts, a topic 
that is underplayed by the regulation literature. ' 19 Having argued earlier in the thesis 
that regulation by the courts may be an appropriate way of controlling 
maladministration in civil society organisations, it is necessary to look beyond the 
regulation theory that informs the preceding chapters in order to identify relevant 
issues. On the ground that the courts already have expertise controlling 
maladministration in other contexts, the chapter undertakes a doctrinal comparative 
analysis of the rules relating to maladministration in public law and analogous rules of 
119 See below Ch 6 at 210 - 211. 
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private trust law. Accordingly, the main source materials for this chapter are caselaw 
and academic case commentaries. 
(3) Limitations of the Thesis 
Although the thesis uses a variety of methodological approaches and sources across 
several disciplines, and is thereby better able to identify and engage with relevant 
issues than a traditional black-letter law discussion, the approach taken has certain 
limitations. 
First, the normative attitude taken towards regulation, and law generally, sidesteps the 
fact that neither hard nor soft legal rules are made in splendid isolation, with only the 
perceived public interest as motivation; law-makers at every level are influenced by 
external social, political, and economic forces. 120 This does not diminish the validity 
of our enterprise when we go out in pursuit of normative standards, but, even so, these 
issues should not be overlooked when the practical implementation of these normative 
standards comes to be considered. 
Secondly, the theory of civil society regulation proposed is untested and no empirical 
evidence, either qualitative or quantitative, was gathered in order to test its central 
propositions. Had it been decided at the outset to carry out empirical research and to 
extrapolate a theory from the resulting data, then the lack of literature on civil society 
regulation would have hindered the identification of relevant issues and the design of 
an appropriate empirical research project. Accordingly, it was felt more appropriate, 
given the wealth of diverse theoretical material considering civil society and regulation 
separately, to formulate a synthesised theory that could subsequently be tested. It is 
hoped that the thesis will inform, and be tested by, future empirical projects. 
Thirdly, many of the civil society theories and regulation theories relied upon are 
themselves untested. Although they are critically and contextually evaluated, so that 
they might reasonably be expected to be relatively robust, they are still, ultimately, 
informed suppositions. Hence it is likely that the theory of civil society regulation 
may need to be adapted in the future to take account of relevant empirical research. 
In this regard it should also be noted that the majority of theorists working in these 
"0 See e. g. below Ch 6 at nn 2-3 and associated text. 
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fields are currently Anglo-American, and it may be that reworking of the synthesised 
theory offered here will be required in order to give it a wider relevance. It should also 
be bome in mind that some of the theorists whose work informs this thesis take a 
positive approach to civil society, and seek to explain the phenomenon as it appears to 
be, but that others take a more ideological approach and are thus more concerned with 
establishing norms of civil society activity. For the purposes of identifying principles 
of sound regulation that are consistent with reality as well as internally coherent, the 
work of the former is most relevant. 
Finally, although the analytic topic of the thesis is organised civil society, the 
contextual analyses are focused upon the charitable sectors in common law, rather than 
civil law or mixed, jurisdictions. In order to achieve an appropriate depth of analysis, 
it was felt desirable to focus the discussion on a small number of countries. The 
choice of common law jurisdictions is influenced partly by the availability of 
resources, and partly by the fact that those jurisdictions currently engaged in high- 
profile programmes of regulatory reform are all common law jurisdictions, with the 
exception of Scotland. 121 
121 Whilst it is noted above at 26 that South Africa, a civil law country, has placed regulatory 
reform of civil society on the agenda of the Law Commission, it is not currently engaged in 
any active reforms. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Constitution of Civil Society 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before developing a theory of regulation it is necessary to acquaint ourselves with our 
subject matter. Thus, this chapter considers how organised civil society is constituted. 
It explains how civil society differs from other sectors and analyses the shared 
characteristics that connect an otherwise diverse collection of institutions. Coupled 
with the following chapter, which examines the functions of organised civil society, 
this will enable us to determine (i) the objectives we expect the sector to accomplish, 
(ii) the features of the sector and other factors that facilitate this and (iii) the features 
and other factors that hinder this. It will also reveal (iv) whether civil society activity 
produces externalities - that is, adverse effects on third parties. We can then begin to 
fashion a theory which balances the need to encourage (ii) against the need to 
minimise (iii) and (iv). 
At this point it is prudent to say a few words on terminology. Organised civil society 
is commonly referred to both in the literature and practice by a variety of names. 
These include the voluntary sector, ' the independent sector '2 the non-governmental 
3f (NGO) sector, the nonprofit (sometimes not-for-pro It)4 sector 5 and numerous 
1 See e. g. the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (www. ncvo-vol. org. uk); Davis 
Smith, J., Rochester, C., and Hedley, R., (eds. ), An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector 
(London and New York, Routledge, 1995); Dunn A. (ed. ), The Voluntary Sector, the State and 
the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2000); Kendall, J., and Knapp, M., The Voluntary Sector in the UK 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996); and many other works cited in the 
bibliography. 
2 See e. g. the Independent Sector Coalition (www. independentsector. org); Joseph, J., The 
Independent Sector and the African Renaissance: A Paradigm of Partnership and 
Participation (speech delivered I May 1998, Arlie House, Virginia, reprinted: 
usembassy. state. gov/ southafrica/wwwhjjl7. html). 
3 See e. g. Horton Smith, D., Seguin, M., and Collins, M., 'Dimensions and Categories of 
Voluntary Organizations / NGOs' (1973) 2 Journal of Voluntary Action Research 116; Hulme, 
D., and Edwards, M. (eds. ), NGOs, States and Donors Too Close for Comfort (Basingstoke 
and London, MacMillan, 1997). 
4 See e. g. International Journal ofNot-for-Profit Law (www. icnl. org, International Center for 
Not-for-Profit Law, 1998 onwards); International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Regulating 
Not-for-Profit Organizations (www. icnl. org, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 
1998); Irish, L., The Role and Purpose of the Not-for-Profit Sector (www. icnl. org, 
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 1995); Klingelhofer, S., and Kendall Frye, J., 
Global Perspectives on Not-for-Profit Law (www. icnl. org, International Center for Not-for- 
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variations on these. 6 Each of these labels focuses on one of the key characteristics of 
civil society at the expense of others. This is problematic, for, as discussed beloW, 7 
none of these characteristics alone are necessary for classification as part of organised 
civil society. Some commentators prefer the label 'third sector'. 8 This is 
unsatisfactory to the extent that it might lead people to assume, erroneously, that civil 
society is the third choice of provider of public goods, after the private and public 
sectors. 9 To avoid such problems, this thesis uses the neutral phrases 'organised civil 
society' and 'civil society organisation' (hereafter TSO') throughout. 10 
B. THE SECTOR MODEL OF SOCIETY 
Since the seventeenth century society has been split into different sections for analysis, 
Profit Law, 1997); Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of 
Charities and the Wider Not-For-Profit Sector (London, HMSO, 2002); Simon, K., Principles 
of Regulationfor the Not-for-Profit Sector (www. icnl. org, International Center for Not-for- 
Profit Law, 1998). 
' See e. g. Anheier, H., and Kendall, J. (eds. ), Third Sector Policy at the Crossroads An 
international nonprofit analysis (London and New York, Routledge, 2001); Gassler, R., The 
Economics ofNonprofit Enterprise: A Study in Applied Economic Theory (Lanham, Maryland, 
University Press of America, 1986); Powell, W. (ed. ), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research 
Handbook (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1987); Rose-Ackerman, S. (ed. ) 
The Economics ofNonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy (New York, OUP, 
1986); Salamon, L., and Anheier, H. (eds. ), Defining the Nonprofit Sector A Cross-National 
Analysis (Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1997); and many other 
works cited in the bibliography. 
' See e. g. Nonprofit and Voluntary, Sector Quarterly (Thousand Oaks and London, Sage, 1989 
onwards); Gassler, R., 'Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Economics: A Critical Survey' (1990) 
19 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 137; Home Office, Getting it Right Together: 
Compact on Relations between Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector in 
England (London, HMSO, Cm 4100,1998); Thayer Scott, J., 'Some Thoughts on Theory 
Development in the Voluntary and Nonprofit Sector' (1995) 24 Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly 3 1. 
'7 See below at 48 - 54. ' See e. g. Anheier and Kendall, above n 5; Anheier, H., and Seibel, W. (eds. ), The Third Sector 
Comparative Studies ofNonprofit Organisations (Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 
1990); Brock, K., Was Seattle Significant? The Emerging Interest in the Third Sector 
(www. cpsa-aesp. ca, Canadian Political Science Association, 2000); Douglas, J., ny Charity? 
The Casefor a Third Sector (Beverley Hills and London, Sage, 1983); Levitt, T., The Third 
Sector New Tacticsfor a Responsive Society (New York, AMACOM, 1973); Seibel, W., 
'Government / third-sector relationship in a comparative perspective: the cases of France and 
West Germany' (1990) 1 Voluntas 43, 
9 Those who use the term are generally clear that it makes no normative claim that third sector 
implies third choice. 
" Where the unqualified phrase 'civil society' is used (e. g. in 'civil society activity') this may 
be taken to be shorthand for 'organised civil society'. 
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an approach usually attributed to Hobbes, who described the constituent parts of 
society as being akin to the 'muscles of a body'. " Originally, two sectors were 
identified - the marketplace, also referred to as the private sector, and the state, also 
referred to as the public sector, 12 However, during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, a number of philosophers were attracted to the idea of a 'chain of social 
connexions' operating outside these sectors and distinct from the family unit, 13 and, in 
1975, the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 14 acknowledged 
officially the existence of a distinct sector that we now recognise as organised civil 
society. In addition, there are also now bodies of literature pertaining to the informal 
(or family) sector and the black market. These five sectors are each worthy of discrete 
analysis, as their institutions are, in theory, 'intrinsically different' in relation to 
'economic objectives, functions and behaviour'. 15 However, it is important to bear in 
mind that the distinctions between the sectors are not always clear-cut. Although at the 
heart of each sector is a core of paradigm institutions, at the edges the sectors overlap 
with one another. The result is that it is not always easy to say with any conviction 
into which sector, to the exclusion of all the others, an organisation falls. 16 Many 
CSOs, for example, contract with the state to carry out government functions, 17 or 
engage in trading activities non-nally associated with the private sector. The 
relationship between the three main sectors, and the blurring of the boundaries between 
them, are issues to which we shall return in Chapter Five. For the moment, it is useful 
to set out a brief overview of the five sectors. 
11 Hobbes, T., Leviathan: or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical 
and Civil (165 1; reprinted Cambridge, CUP, 199 1) at 155. 
12 Hobbes' original analysis refers to the state as the 'politicall' sector, above nII at 155. 
13 Hegel, G., The Philosophy of Right (182 1; translated Oxford, OUP, 1952), para 187 and 
generally Ch 3, part (ii); note that Hegel's definition of civil society includes not only charity 
(ibid, para 242), but also what we would today recognise as the private sector (ibid, paras 189 
- 208). See also e. g. Ferguson, A., An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767; reprinted 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1966), esp. at 51 - 57; Marx, K., Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right (1844; translated Cambridge, CUP, 1970); Toequeville, A., Democracy in 
America (1848; reprinted London, Fontana, 1994). 
14 Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Giving in America: Toward a 
Stronger Voluntary Sector: Report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public 
Needs (Washington, Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1975). 
15 United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, para 4.17. 
16 See Kendall, J., and Knapp, M., 'A loose and baggy monster: boundaries, definitions and 
typologies' in Davis Smith et al, above n 1. 
17 See below n 73 and associated text; also Ch 3 at 71 - 72. 
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(1) The Private Sector 
The private sector consists of organisations that exist to generate profits for 
distribution amongst their owners. Profit is generated by participation in the 
marketplace - i. e. by providing goods and services to consumers. According to 
classical micro-economic theory, each firm will seek to produce that quantity of their 
product at that price which will produce the maximum profit. The overriding aim of 
profit-maximisation enables microeconomic theory to predict how the private sector 
will behave in different situations. 
(2) The Public Sector 
At a crude level the public sector consists of central and local government, quangos, 
nationalised industries and other bodies that derive their powers from the state. Other 
18 
organisations may be classed as public if they exercise a 'public function'. 
According to public law, an organisation may be exercising a public function if it 
carries out an activity which would be undertaken by the state if the organisation was 
not already performing the task, 19 although this is not conclusive . 
20 An organisation 
may also be exercising a public function if it carries out an activity with the support of 
the state, 21 which must be something more than mere recognition in legislation. 22 
Finally, an organisation may be exercising a public function if it has a monopoly over 
18 Rv Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, exparteDatafinplc [1987] QB 815. 
19 See e. g. Rv Advertising Standards Authority, exparte Insurance Service plc(1989) 9 TrLR 
169 where it was held the state would regulate advertising standards in the absence of self- 
regulation by the advertising industry; Rv Football Association Ltd, ex parte Football League 
Ltd [ 1993 ]2 All ER 83 3 where it was held that the state would be unlikely to regulate football 
in the absence of the Football Association. It also seems that an organisation will be carrying 
out a public function if it takes over an activity previously undertake by the state: R (on the 
application of Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] 2 All ER 936; Hampshire CC 
v Beer [2003] NPC 93. 
20 See e. g. Rv Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [ 1993] 1 WLR 
909 where the Master of the Rolls (the rest of the Court of Appeal disagreeing on this point but 
reaching the same conclusion) held that even though the state would regulate horse racing in 
the absence of industry self-regulation, the existing governing body was not exercising a 
?, ublic function. 
See e. g. ex parte Aga Khan, above n 20, though cf Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with 
Billesley PCC v Wallbank [2003] 3 WLR 283 where it was held that a parish church council 
which formed part of the established Church of England, was not a public body for the purpose 
of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
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the regulation of some part of society, particularly if those being regulated have no 
choice in the matter if they wish to participate in the industry in question. 23 A 
similarly inclusive approach has been adopted by the European Union. In Foster v 
British Gas p1c, 24 the European Court of Justice held that, for the purpose of 
implementing EU directives, public bodies include (i) those organisations which the 
state has charged with carrying out its functions, (ii) those under state control and (iii) 
those which the state has granted powers beyond those exercisable by private bodies. 25 
(3) The Informal Sector 
The informal sector consists of family units. The family unit has two main functions. 
First, it acts as a support network for its members. Some commentators have 
suggested that civil society emerged as a natural extension of this network. 26 The 
family unit also plays the role of consumer in the private market, responding to the 
production of goods and services by purchasing those products which offer them the 
maximum utility at the lowest price. 
(4) The Black Market 
The black market consists of institutions which, like the private sector, operate to 
generate profits for their owners, but, unlike the private sector, operate outside the law. 
The sector includes organisations which engage in activities which by their nature are 
illegal such as mafia-type institutions, drug dealers and arms smugglers, and also those 
whose otherwise lawful activities are carried out in an illegal manner - for example 
practising a profession without a licence. 27 
22 See e. g. ex parte Football League Ltd, above n 19, where it was noted that the Football 
Association was acknowledged in the Football Spectators Act 1989. 
23 See e. g. ex parte Datafin, above n 20, where it was held that the Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers had such a monopoly. 24 [1990] 1 QB 405; applied by the House of Lords in [1991] 2 AC 306. 25 See further below Ch 5 at 163 - 167. 26 See e. g. Peachey, P., "'The Family": Obstacle or Embryo of Civil Society' in McLean, G., 
(ed. ), Civil Society and Social Reconstruction (Washington, Council for Research in Values 
and Philosophy, 1997). 
27 See generally Dallago, B., The Irregular Economy (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1990) especially 
Ch 1. 
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(5) Civil Society 
Organised civil society differs from other sectors in the fact that it has no substantive 
definition. Crudely speaking, the private sector is defined by the fact that its 
organisations are driven by the pursuit of profit, whilst the public sector is defined by 
the fact that its organisations are all either emanations of the state or engaged in public 
functions. As well as determining which of the two sectors an organisation falls into, 
these definitions also tell us something meaningful about the nature of the organisation 
in question. So, for example, we know that if x Ltd is a private sector organisation, 
then because it will be driven by profit-maximisation we can apply the microeconomic 
theory of the marketplace to predict how it will behave in certain situations. Similarly, 
if we know that the Department of y is a public body then we can apply the rules of 
public law to determine the limits of its legitimate actions. Conversely, the breadth of 
civil society organisations and their activities means that there is no paradigm CSO: 
there is no single purpose, form or mode of behaviour which captures the essence of 
the sector. It is therefore necessary to consider alternative means of understanding 
organised civil society and its operation. 
C. UNPACKING CIVIL SOCIETY 
(1) Legal Definition 
Charitable Sector in England and Wales 
One way of defining organised civil society is simply to focus on the legal definition 
of the sector in any given jurisdiction. This approach has the advantage of revealing a 
relatively 'certain and straightforward' area of society on which to focus our theory of 
regulation. 28 For this reason, the charitable sector in England is a 'tempting field' 
towards which we might direct our attention: 29 whereas civil society lacks a precise 
definition, the charitable sector is a clearly delineated section of society. Focusing 
attention upon it would therefore avoid evidential problems relating to whether a given 
" Salamon and Anheier, above n5 at 30. 
29 Osborne, S., and Hems, L., 'The Economic Structure of the Charitable Sector in the United 
Kingdom' (1995) 24(4) Nonprofit and Voluntaiýy Sector Quarterly 321 at 323. 
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organisation fell within the sector. 30 Furthermore, as charities have been described as 
the 'heart and SOUIO 1 and 'center of gravity' of civil society, 32 in common law 
jurisdictions at least, we might be forgiven for assuming that this approach would 
tackle the key issues of civil society regulation. Certainly this is the attitude taken by 
recent reform bodies in the UK and other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 33 
The charitable sector consists of those CSOs which (i) pursue, exclusively, legally 
charitable purposes and (ii) demonstrate that they provide a public benefit. At the time 
of writing, 34 charitable purposes are divided into four categories laid down by Lord 
Macnaghten in Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel: 35 the relief of 
poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of religion and other 
purposes beneficial to the community. 36 To be charitable, purposes must also fall 
within the 'spirit or intendment' of the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 
1601 '37 thus limiting the scope of the 
fourth, catch-all category so that not every 
purpose which benefits the community will be charitable. The list of charitable 
purposes contained in the Preamble is: 38 
The relief of aged, impotent, and poor people; the maintenance of sick and 
maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of leaming, free schools and scholars in 
universities; the repair of bridges, havens, causeways, churches, sea banks and 
highways; the education and preferment of orphans; the relief, stock or 
30 Registration with the Charity Commission is conclusive of charitable status: Charities Act 
1993, s 4(l). 
31 Greyham Dawes, R., Tolley's Charity Accountability and Compliance 1998 - 99 (Surrey, 
Tolley, 1998) at 1.2. 
32 Salamon and Anheier, above n5 at 16 (sic). 
33 See e. g. Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 4; Scottish Charity Law Review 
Commission, Charity Scotland The report of Scottish Charity Law Review Commission 
(www. charityreview. com, Scottish Charity Law Review Commission, 2001); Charities 
Definition Inquiry, Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related 
Organisations (www. cdi. gov. au, Charities Definition Inquiry, 2001); Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, Report on the Law of Charities (Toronto, Ontario Law Reform Commission, 
1996). Outside the Commonwealth, see Law Society of Ireland's Law Reform Committee, 
Charity Law. - The casefor reform (www. lawsociety. ie, Law Society of Ireland, 2002). 
3' For details of the proposed changes to this, see below Ch 5 at 182,193 - 194. 35 [1891] AC 531. 
36 Above n 35 at 583, derived from Sir Samuel Romilly's classification in Morice v Bishop of 
Durham (1805) 10 Ves 522 at 53 1. 
37 Williams' Trustees v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1947] AC 447 at 455 per Lord 
Simonds. 
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maintenance of houses of correction; marriages of poor maids; supportation, 
aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed; the 
relief or redemption of prisoners or captives and the aid or ease of any poor 
inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other 
taxes. 
To satisfy the requirement of public benefit, the purpose must confer a tangible benefit 
on the public of the sort capable of demonstration in a court of law, 39 and a sufficient 
cross-section of the public must be eligible to benefit. This varies across the four 
heads of charity. Charities which relieve poverty will automatically satisfy the second 
requirement unless limited to a class of named individuals. 40 Charities which advance 
education must not be limited to a class linked by 'personal nexus' such as the 
employees of a company 41 or the family of the founder. 42 Charities which advance 
religion may only be limited to a class of people if those people are in contact with the 
public at large. 43 Charities which pursue purposes under the fourth head must not be 
limited to a class linked by personal nexus 44 or to 'a class within a class', 45 for 
example the residents of town x who are also members of the religious group y. 
Additionally, in respect of charities that fall under the fourth head the burden of proof 
falls upon them to demonstrate public benefit; for purposes under the other three heads 
38 Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, Preamble, as translated into modern English in Picarda, H., 
The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (London, Butterworths, 1999,3rd ed. ) at 9. 
39 Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426. 
40 Dingle v Turner [1972] AC 601. 
41 Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co. Ltd [ 195 1] AC 297. 
42 Re Compton [1945] Ch 123. 
43 See Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426 where a gift to a cloistered order of nuns failed for lack 
of public benefit. Cf Neville Estates Ltd v Madden [19621 Ch 832 where a gift to a synagogue 
which was not open to the public was nevertheless valid because its members 'live in this 
world and mix with their fellow citizens' (at 853 per Cross J). 
44 Re Mead[ 1981 ]I WLR 1244. 
45 Baddeley v Inland Revenue Commissioners [19551 AC 572. CfRe Dunlop [1984] NI 408, 
which suggests that a charity may limit access if the limitation is reasonably related to its 
purpose. 
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public benefit is presumed unless proved otherwise. 46 Charities will also fail to 
demonstrate public benefit if they have a purpose that the courts deem political. 47 
The charitable sector is already subject to a system of regulation in the form of the 
Charity Commission, a non-ministerial government department with the general 
statutory functions of 'promoting effective use of charitable resources' and 
'investigating and checking abuses' . 
48 The Commission is responsible for registering 
as charities those CSOs which satisfy the legal definition and are not exempt from 
registration or classed as excepted charities by virtue of the Charities Act 1993.49 
Limitations of legal definitions 
It should be apparent that focusing on any legal definition is of limited use as a basis 
for our theory of regulation. First, taking the legal definition as a basis for analysis 
relies on the assumption that the existing legal definition is appropriate - this cannot be 
taken for granted, particularly as there are no existing theories of civil society 
regulation on which the laws could be based. English charity law, for example, is 
based on a statute which predates sector-based analyses of society altogether, 50 and its 
development has been influenced by factors which have attempted to undermine civil 
society. For example, the law of mortmain, which dates back to the Magna Carta in 
1215,51 prohibited certain testamentary gifts of land to charities, partly so as not to 
deprive the Crown of revenue and partly out of 'hatred ... and contempt' for charities 
and their benefactors. 52 Gifts which fell foul of this were declared void and would 
instead vest in the testator's heir or next-of-kin. The result of this was that the caselaw 
46 This presumption will be removed if the Charities Bill 2004 if enacted in its present form 
(under s 3(2)). Note also the Privy Council decision in Attorney General of Cayman Islands v 
Wahr-Hansen [2001] 1 AC 75,82 which suggests that, under the current law, if a purpose 
falling under the fourth head is apparently beneficial to community then it should be presumed 
charitable. 
4' Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406; National Anti- Vivisection Society v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31; McGovern v Attorney General [1982] Ch 321. See 
below Ch 5 at 196 - 200. 48 Charities Act 1993, s 1(3). 
49 Charities Act 1993, s 3(l). 
50 See above at 37 - 38. 51 The original law of mortmain restricted gifts to religious corporations; the Mortmain Act 
1736 placed similar restrictions on gifts to charitable causes. The law of mortmain was 
repealed by virtue of Charities Act 1960, s 38(l). 
52 Jones, G., History of the Law of Charity 1532 - 1827 (Cambridge, CUP, 1969) at 107. 
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developed a generous interpretation of what constituted a charitable purpose, not out of 
an enlightened understanding of civil society but in order to ensure that gifts to charity 
failed wherever possible. 53 In many cases, organisations strove to convince the courts 
that they were not charitable in order that they could receive the gift in question 54 _a 
stark contrast to the current position, where numerous fiscal and other benefits result 
from charitable status. 
Focusing on a legal definition would also risk our theory of regulation being limited in 
its applicability to those jurisdictions which shared the legal definition. Legal 
definitions differ considerably across state boundaries, 55 and even those common law 
countries which have a definition of charity law derived from the English model vary 
widely. In Australia, for example, it is not sufficient for a CSO to have exclusively 
charitable purposes - its current activities will also be taken into account. 
56 In Canada, 
the charitable sector is split into three sub-sectors consisting of charitable 
organisations, public foundations and private foundations, each with its own 
definition. 57 Once registered as one of these organisations, a CSO must satisfy a 
'disbursement quota', by spending at least 80% of its donations each year on charitable 
activities, 58 if it is to retain its charitable status. In the United States, charitable 
organisations under s 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code include those with 
purposes analogous to the four heads of charity in English law, but also include 
specific purposes such as: reducing the burdens of government; reducing 
discrimination; and promoting the community. 59 Whilst these are valid charitable 
purposes under the English law, they are not currently recognised as discrete purposes 
in this way, falling instead under the fourth catch-all head. 
53 See generally Jones, above n 52 at 107 - 108 and Ch 8. 54 See, for example, Macnaghten J's comments on the earlier case of Re Allsop (1884) 1 TLR 4 
in Royal Choral Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [194212 All ER 610 at 611, 
affirmed [ 194312 All ER 10 1. 
55 For thumbnail sketches of the differences, see P. 6 and A. Randon, Liberty, Charity and 
Politics: Non-Profit Law and Freedom of Speech (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995) Part 1. 
56 Australian Tax Office, Income Tax Guide for Non-profit Organisations (Canberra, 
Australian Tax Office, 2003) at 35. 
57 Income Tax Act (RSC 1985, cI (5th Supplement)), s 149.1 (1). 
58 In addition to this 80%, private foundations must spend 100% of the income they receive 
from other registered charities. 
'9 Internal Revenue Service, Tax-Exempt Statusfor Your Organisation (www. irs. gov, Inland 
Revenue Service, 2001) at 22. 
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Legal definitions, including the examples above, tend to focus on a specific section of 
civil society, thereby disregarding other CSOs with comparable organisational 
structures and characteristics, and which are engaged in comparable activities. 60 In 
addition to charities, the following organisations are considered by some to fall under 
the umbrella of civil society: political pressure groups, 61 mutuals, 62 religious 
institutions, 63 trade unions 64 and recreational societies. 65 They each display a number 
of the key civil society characteristics which we consider below. Focusing on the 
charitable sector could draw attention away from regulatory issues which might affect 
other CSOs but are of little concern to charities - this is particularly likely in respect of 
those organisations based on mutuality (such as mutuals and co-operatives) rather than 
philanthropy. 
Furthermore, as Douglas notes, many of the distinctions between charities and various 
other sections of organised civil society are 'somewhat artificial and arbitrary'. 66 For 
example, the political activities more traditionally associated with pressure groups are 
ca natural and almost inevitable extension' of certain charitable activities such as the 
60 For further discussion of the relationship between the charitable sector and civil society, see 
below Ch 5 at 177 - 205. 61 See United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, para 4.65; Douglas, J., 'Political 
Theories of Nonprofit Organizations' in Powell, above n5 at 52; also referred to as 
4community' organisations: Marshall, T., 'Can We Define the Voluntary Sector' in Billis, D., 
and Harris, M. (eds. ), Voluntary Agencies Challenges of Organisation and Management 
(Basingstoke and London, MacMillan, 1996) at 53. 
62 See United Nations System of National Accounts 1993 para 4.65; Douglas in Powell, above 
n5 at 51. 
63 Marshall, above n 61 at 53. Although many religious CSOs will satisfy the criteria for 
charitable status, some will fail to demonstrate an exclusively charitable purpose by falling 
outside the law's definition of a religion - namely, belief in a supreme being (R v Registrar 
General, ex parte Segerdal [ 1970] 2 QB 697) and reverence of that being (Re South Place 
Ethical Society [ 198011 WLR 1565). See e. g. Decisions of the Charity Commissioners, 17 
November 1999, where the Church of Scientology was refused charitable status partly because 
of the lack of 'reverence or veneration' of Scientology's supreme being (at 1; further see below 
Ch 5 at 195). A religious organisation may also fail to satisfy the public benefit test, for 
example if it can only point to spiritual, rather than tangible, public benefit (Gilmour v Coats 
[19491 AC 426); further see below Ch 3 at 83. 
64 United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, para 4.65. 
65 United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, para 4.65. Recreational CVOs will fall 
inside the charitable sector by virtue of the Recreational Charities Act 1958 if their activities 
are 'in the interests of social welfare' (s I (I)) and they satisfy a public benefit test which 
allows them to limit their beneficiaries to those disadvantaged by 'youth, age, infirmity or 
disablement, poverty or social and economic circumstances' but otherwise requires that the 
benefits to open to the general public as a whole (s 1(2)). 
66 Douglas, above n 61 at 5 1. 
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provision of public goods, 67 recognised by the Charity Commission's policy decision 
to allow charities to undertake a limited amount of political activity so long as it is 'in 
furtherance of, and ancillary to, the charity's stated objects'. 68 Most importantly, for 
every type of charitable activity undertaken and purpose pursued, it is a moment's 
work to think of a parallel from the wider, non-charitable civil society. 69 
More importantly for our purposes, legal definitions tend not to be particularly 
illuminating with regard to issues such as the nature and characteristics of CSOs. The 
legal definition of the charitable sector in England reveals the types of purposes which 
charities may pursue and also the fact that they must provide some benefit to a cross- 
section of the public, but significant regulatory questions are left unanswered. What 
organisational forms do CSOs take? 70 How are they governed? How do they behave? 
What conditions enable them to thrive? If these issues are to be determined it will be 
necessary to look at alternative methods of defining organised civil society. 
(2) Financial Definition 
The United Nations System of National Accounts defines organised civil society by 
reference to its source of income. It suggests that the sector consists of those 
organisations which are funded primarily by donations, explicitly excluding any 
organisations which operate within the private market. 71 The justification given for 
this is the idea that: 72 
the majority of NPIs [non-profit institutions] ... are 
likely to be non-market 
producers that provide goods or services to other institutional units either free 
or at prices or fees that are not economically significant. 
" Douglas, above n 61 at 5 1. For a discussion of public goods, see the next chapter. 
68 Charity Commission, CC9: Political Activities and Campaigning by Charities (London, 
Charity Commission, 1999), para 10. See also the 2004 version of the same document, para 23 
(activity must be 'incidental or ancillary to the charity's purposes'). 
69 This is a theme to which we shall return in Ch 5 at 169 - 180. 70 In contrast to the English definition, the Canadian definition of both public and private 
foundations does, in fact, prescribe organisational form (foundations must either be 
corporations or trusts). 
71 United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, para 4.161, noted by Salamon and 
Anheier, above nI at 3 1. 
72 United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, para 4.161. 
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Focusing on funding in this way highlights one of the key characteristics of organised 
civil society - its voluntary nature - yet as a definition it is limited in its application. 
The statement fails to reflect the fact that CSOs both collectively and individually 
receive funding from a variety of different sources, including investment income and 
participation in the private market, as well as private donations. In particular, it fails to 
take account of CSOs' increasing reliance on contracts for service provision, which are 
steadily replacing state grants, in order to secure funding. 73 It is also important to bear 
in mind that the way in which civil society is funded will change over time 74 _ for 
example, in the UK recent state initiatives such as Gift Aid and payroll giving have 
altered the landscape by increasing the levels of private donations. 75 The same is also 
true at an individual level -a CSO may be funded by a local authority service contract 
one year but be forced to rely on private donations the next. 
(3) Shared Characteristics of CSOs 
The inadequacies of the above attempts to define organised civil society have led a 
number of theorists to conclude that the most useful method of describing the sector is 
to focus on those shared characteristics exhibited by third sector organisations. This 
has been termed the 'structural / operational' definition. 76 It is useful for our purposes 
73 Often termed the 'contract culture'. See generally: 6, P., and Kendall, J. (eds. ), The Contract 
Culture in Public Services (Aldershot, Arena, 1997); Charity Commission, CC37: Charities 
and Contracts (www. charity-commission. gov. uk, Charity Commission, 2002); Deakin, N, 
'What does Contracting to do Users? ' in Billis and Harris, above n 61; Leat, D., 'Funding 
Matters' in Davis Smith et al, above n 1; Lewis, J., 'What Does Contracting Do To Voluntary 
Agencies? ' in Billis and Harris above n 61; Morris, D., Charities and the Contract Culture: 
Partners or Contractors? Law and Practice in Conflict (Liverpool, University of Liverpool 
Charity Law Unit, 1999); Morris, D., 'Charities in the contract culture: survival of the largest? ' 
(2000) 20(3) LS 409; Morris, D., 'Paying the Piper: The "Contract Culture" as Dependency for 
Charities in Dunn, A. (ed), The Voluntary Sector, the State and the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2000); 
O'Regan, K., and Oster, S., 'Nonprofit and For-Profit Partnerships: Rationale and Challenges 
of Cross-Sector Contracting' (2000) 29(l) (Supplement) Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 120; Robinson, M., 'Privatising the Voluntary Sector: NGOs as Public Service 
Contractors' in Hulme, D., and Edwards, M. (eds. ), NGOs, States and Donors Too Closefor 
Comfort (Basingstoke and London, MacMillan, 1997); Warburton, J. and Morris, D., 
'Charities and the Contract Culture' [19981 Conv 419. 
74 See generally Leat, above n 73. 
75 See generally Charities Aid Foundation, Dimensions 2001 Online (www. cafonline. org/ 
research/gift - aid. cfm, 
CAF, 2003 web version) under 'A Decade of Gift Aid 1990 - 2000'; 
Charities Aid Foundation, Payroll Giving 2001-02 Update (www. cafonline. org/research/ 
payroll_giving. cfm, CAF, 2003 web version). 
76 Salamon and Anheier, above n5 at 39 - 42. See also Kendall and Knapp, above n 16 at 18. 
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as these qualities reveal some of the factors which facilitate optimal levels of civil 
society activity. Salamon and Anheier highlight four characteristics which are not all 
displayed by every CSO but which are nevertheless prevalent in civil society. 77 These 
are: (i) volunteerism, (ii) independence, (iii) organisation and (iv) non-profit 
distribution. 
Volunteerism 
The general notion that CSOs should be voluntary is, of course, reflected in the fact 
that the 'voluntary sector' is a common synonym for organised civil society. 78 Kendall 
and Knapp suggest that volunteerism is the 'essential defining characteristic' of civil 
society, 79 whilst Levitt suggests it is the sector's 'central functioning tool'. 80 However, 
the requirement that an organisation be 'voluntary' is capable of a number of different 
interpretations. What is usually meant is either that (i) the organisation is funded by 
81 voluntary contributions as opposed to taxes or service purchase, (ii) it is reliant on 
volunteers rather than paid workers to carry out its activities or (iii) it is managed by 
volunteers. 82 In practice, the focus is often on the third interpretation. We have 
already noted that emphasis on voluntary contributions as a source of income is 
misleading, 83 due to the large number of CSOs engaged in service provision, a result of 
the fact that two of the key functions of civil society are the provision of public goods 
and the provision of intangible services. 84 Emphasis on volunteer workers is 
misleading because many CSOs operate in areas where it is essential to have a stable, 
85 employed workforce. 
77 Salamon and Anheier, above n5 at 33 - 34. 78 See above at 36. 
79 Kendall, J., and Knapp, M., 'The United Kingdom' in Salamon and Anheier, above n5 at 
272. 
80 Levitt, above n8 at 52. 
81 See above at 48. 
82 See Kendall and Knapp, above nI at 18; Kendall and Knapp, above n 16 at 88; Council of 
Better Business Bureau's Wise Giving Alliance, Standards in Philanthropy (www. give. org, 
Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance, 2002 web version) para Ia. Such donations or 
participation must, of course, be freely entered into as opposed to the result of coercion 
(Sheard, J., 'From lady bountiful to active citizen: volunteering and the voluntary sector' in 
Davis Smith et al, above nI at 115). 83 See above at 48. 
84 See below Ch 3 at 61 - 81 and 88 - 89 respectively. 15 Consider e. g. healthcare and education. 
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The minimum requirement in order to be viewed as legitimately 'voluntary' seems, in 
fact, merely to be that the organisation's board of directors must be unpaid. 86 In the 
US, this level of volunteerism is approved by the American Council for Voluntary 
International Action (InterAction), which states that directors must be 'serving without 
compensation', 87 and also the Council of Better Business Bureaus Wise Giving 
Alliance, 88 although the latter suggests that it might be acceptable for just one director 
to receive remuneration, 89 perhaps recognising the potential need for professional 
managers at the highest organisational level. 
However, even this small level of volunteerism may be dispensable. In England, the 
trustees of a charity may legitimately receive remuneration if the organisation's 
governing document so authorises 90 or if the Charity Commission deems it to be 
4clearly in the interests of the charity'. 91 Where a charity does remunerate its trustees 
there is no requirement that it must demonstrate some degree of volunteerism by 
another means. 92 
Independence 
It is widely accepted by theorists that in order to be seen as belonging to organised 
civil society an institution must be self-governing and independent from the interests 
of the state, the private market and the informal sector. 93 This is affirmed in the 
86 Except for out-of-pocket expenses. 
87 InterAction, PVO Standards (www. interaction. org, InterAction, 2002 web version) para 2.2. 
88 Council of Better Business Bureaus Wise Giving Alliance (sic), above n 82, para Ig. 
89 Council of Better Business Bureaus Wise Giving Alliance, above n 82, para Ig. 
90 Re Coxen [ 1948] 1 Ch 747. 
91 Charity Commission, CI P Payment of Trustees (London, Charity Commission, 2004), para 
9. The Charity Commission's current position appears to that even where expressly authorised 
in the trust instrument the trustees must demonstrate that their remuneration is in the interests 
of the charity (para 6). 
92 See below Ch 5 at 180 - 181. 93 Kendall and Knapp, above n 82 at 18; Kendall and Knapp in Davis Smith et al, above nI at 
86; Kendall and Knapp in Salamon and Anheier, above nI at 269 - 271; Salamon and 
Anheier, above nI at 33 - 34; Anheier, H., 'Foundations in Europe: a Comparative 
Perspective' in Schluter, A., Then, V., and Walkenhorst, P. (eds. ) Foundations in Europe 
Society Management and Law (London, Directory of Social Change, 200 1) at 4 1; Scottish 
Charity Law Review Commission, above n 33, recommendation 2. Note also Salamon, 
Sokolowski and List, whose revised structural-operational definition requires CSOs to be 
ý private' and 'self-governing' rather than 'independent' (Salamon, L., Sokolowski, S., and 
List, R., Global Civil Society An Overview (Baltimore, Centre for Civil Society Studies, Johns 
Hopkins University, 2003) at 8). Salamon et al use the word 'private' here in order to 
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standard- setting guidelines of numerous civil society umbrella bodies. 94 In practice 
this means that the directors of an organisation must be able to make independent 
decisions, and ideally an organisation will have in place some 'policy which prohibits 
direct and indirect conflicts of interest'. 95 
It has been stated that the 'independence ... of 
foundations has never been seriously 
challenged' in the United Kingdom. 96 Certainly in the context of charities there is the 
safeguard that trustees are under a fiduciary duty to act solely in the best interests of 
the charity at all times when acting in their official capacity, 97 which is reinforced by 
the Charity Commission in The Hallmarks of an Effective Charity. 98 However, the 
emergence of the contract culture between CSOs and government, and other examples 
of interaction between the sectors, may have ramifications for the independence of 
civil society. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 99 
Organisation 
It is generally accepted that the organisations which make up organised civil society 
should have a degree of formality. 100 This is acknowledged by the United Nations 
System of National Accounts, although this also recognises the fact that in some 
jurisdictions it may not be necessary for such organisations to have legal status so long 
as their 'existence is recognized by ... society'. 
10 1 The reason why we require 
formality is in part to distinguish the sector from activities carried out by the informal 
sector, which are often similar in character. 102 For example, members of a family unit 
distinguish civil society from the state (ibid); it is submitted that 'independent' is to be 
preferred in light of the fact that the sector is also distinguished from the private sector. 
94 See, for example: Council of Better Business Bureau's Wise Giving Alliance, above n 82, 
para I a; InterAction, PVO Standards (www. interaction. org, InterAction, 2002 web version), 
para 2.3. 
95 InterAction, PVO Standards (www. interaction. org, InterAction, 2002 web version), para 2.3. 
96 Anheier in Schluter et al, above n 93 at 36. 
9' Bray v Ford [ 1896] AC 44. 
98 Charity Commission, CC60: The Hallmarks o an Effective Charity (London, Charity 
Commission, 2004), para 3. 
99 See below Ch 5 at 169 - 171. 100 Kendall and Knapp, above nI at 18; Kendall and Knapp, above n 16 at 86; Kendall and 
Knapp, above n 79 at 268; Salamon and Anheier, above nI at 33. 
'0' United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, para 4.56(a). For example, in England 
an unincorporated association, which has no legal personality, may be registered as a charity. 
112 Sheard, above n 82 at 116. See above at 40. 
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will usually feel some moral compulsion to provide for other members of the unit who 
are poorer than themselves, and any activity undertaken in pursuit of this would 
normally fall under the umbrella of the informal sector. If, however, the same 
activities were carried out by some formal organisation, such as a charity, then this 
would fit more easily in civil society. Clearly there is potential for overlap here - for 
example, if the family unit established a 'poor relations' charitable trust to provide for 
solely for impoverished members of one particular family unit. 103 
It is of course desirable that CSOs are not merely organised, but organised according to 
principles of sound management. The Council of Better Business Bureaus 
recommends an 'adequate governing structure', 104 whilst InterAction talks of 
ýorganisational integrity'. 105 In the charity law context, the Charity Commission 
advocates that organisations be formally established with a coherent governing 
document, 106 display transparency' 07 and generally conduct themselves in a manner 
108 'consistent with high standards of management'. Below the level of trustees, the 
United Nations System of National Accounts suggests that members of institutions 
should have equal voting rights. 109 We will discuss the standards that we might expect 
of CSO managers in detail below. 110 
'0' Such a trust being the exception to the general rule in England and Wales that a charity 
must demonstrate that it benefits a cross-section of the public not linked by some personal 
nexus (Dingle v Turner [1972] AC 601). The orthodox position is that a poor relations trust 
will be charitable unless it is limited to specified persons, such as the settlor's next of kin (Re 
Scarisbrick [1951] Ch 622) or named individuals, in which case it will be a private trust. InRe 
Segelman [1996] Ch 171, Chadwick J upheld as charitable a trust under which named relations 
could benefit; however, it is unlikely that a similar outcome would be reached today by a 
higher court (see Luxton, P., The Law of Charities (Oxford, OUP, 2001) at 175). 
104 Council of Better Business Bureaus, Standardsfor Charitable Solicitations (www. give. org, 
Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance, 2002 web version), para El. 
105 InterAction, PVO Standards (www. interaction. org, InterAction, 2002 web version), para 3. 
106 Charity Commission, above n 98, para a. 107 
Ibid, para g. 
"' Ibid, para c. 
109 United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, para 4.56(b). 
110 See generally below Ch 8. 
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Non-profit distribution 
The final shared characteristic of CSOs is the fact that they do not distribute profits 
amongst their members. "' Some organisations will by their nature operate at a loss or 
simply hope to break even: one of the key functions of civil society that we shall 
examine in the next chapter is the provision of public goods, which are goods that the 
private market fails to supply for the very reason that doing so will not result in 
profit. 112 Some CSOs, conversely, do in fact make a profit, but what distinguishes 
them from the private sector is the idea that they should not distribute those profits to 
their members, 113 but instead plough them back into funding their activities. The 
characteristic of non- distribution of profit is a pre-requisite of the contract failure 
theory of civil society which we will consider in the following chapter. 114 
One issue of potential regulatory concern which arises from an organisation making a 
profit is the extent to which it should be allowed to accumulate reserves. CSOs which 
are heavily reliant on private donations may be tempted to do this as a means of 
securing their long-term future and mitigating the unpredictable nature of such 
funding. However, there has been a certain amount of media criticism of this approach 
in recent years, particularly in relation to relatively wealthy charities such as the Guide 
Dogs for the Blind Association and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution. 115 
If CSOs must not distribute profits then mutual societies and cooperatives must by 
their nature be excluded from our definition of civil society. However, this 'does not 
accord well with ... popular notions of the sector'. 
116 One of organised civil society's 
111 Salamon and Anheier, above nI at 33; United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, 
para 4.56(c); Kendall and Knapp, above nI at 18; Kendall and Knapp, above n 16 at 87; 
Kendall and Knapp, above n 79 at 27 1; Anheier, above n 93 at 4 1; Scottish Charity Law 
Review Commission, above n 93, recommendation 2. 
112 Of course, it is technically possible, although unlikely, that donations could exceed the cost 
of public goods provision. 
113 United Nations System of National Accounts 1993, para 4.56(d). 
114 See below Ch 3 at 65 - 70,88 - 90,92 - 93. 115 In 1994 the Guide Dogs for the Blind Association was reported as having between E120m 
and EI 60m in reserves (The Guardian, 17 October 1994), whilst in 2002 the RNLI had E200m 
'sitting comfortably at the bottom of its balance sheet' (The Guardian, 10 April 2002). See 
generally: Mitchell, C., 'Saving for a Rainy Day: Charity Reserves' (2002) 8 CL and PR 35; 
Charity Commission, RS3: Charity Reserves (www. charity-commission. gov. uk, Charity 
Commission, 2003). See below Ch 4 at 139 - 140. 116 Steingberg, R., 'Overall evaluations of economic theories' (1997) 8 Voluntas 179 at 181. 
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functions is the facilitation of public participation in democracy to counteract the 
'dirigisme of the state', 117 and cooperatives and mutuals can play an important role 
here. 118 Mutuals and cooperatives which display the other key characteristics of 
organisation, independence and volunteerism are, for this reason, included in our 
model of civil society. However, distinctions will be drawn where appropriate 
between these organisations and philanthropic CSOs. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to describe the constitution of organised civil society, by 
drawing comparisons with other sectors of society and highlighting the four key 
characteristics of volunteerism, independence, organisation and non-profit distribution 
which CSOs usually, though not always, exhibit. We have also introduced some of the 
reasons why it is not satisfactory to focus on the charitable sector when devising a 
regulation theory. We will return to these themes in Chapter Five, where we consider 
in greater detail the relationship between the three main sectors and also the 
relationship between the charitable sector in England and wider civil society. 
117 Knapp, M., Robertson, E., and Thomason, C., 'Public Money, Voluntary Action' in 
Anheier, H., and Seibel, W. (eds. ), The Third Sector Comparative Studies of Nonprofit 
Organisation (Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1990) at 209. 
118 See below Ch 3 at 101 - 104. 
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Functions of Civil Society 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter detailed the core characteristics shared by civil society 
organisations. This chapter follows on from this to consider the social functions that 
are performed by organised civil society. Understanding the functions of the sector is 
necessary in order that we can proceed (i) to develop an appropriate and effective 
theory of regulation targeted specifically at organised civil society, and (ii) to evaluate 
regulatory models and strategies with a view to putting this theory into practice. 
There is no single over-arching purpose of organised civil society - as Badelt has 
noted, it is 'too heterogeneous to be explained just by one specific theoretical 
approach'. ' Some commentators have suggested that its role is simply to accomplish 
those residual tasks which the state and the marketplace are unable to perform - 
Weisbrod, for example, suggests that society first looks to the public and private 
sectors and only when they fall short do we 'resort' to CSOs. 2 Others put forward 
vague and platitudinous purposes such as correcting 'the ills of society', 3 or 'stitching 
a torn social safety net', 4 which tell us very little about the activities that CSOs pursue 
on a routine basis. In fact, organised civil society goes much ftirther than the routine 
filling in of gaps. Its functions can be broadly categorised as follows: (i) market 
support; (ii) provision of public goods; (iii) delivery of complex services; (iv) 
redistribution of wealth; (v) facilitation of political action; (vi) provision of cultural 
services; (vii) facilitation of self-determination and finally (viii) facilitation of 
entrepreneurship. The first six of these are geared towards the production of end 
1 Badelt, C., 'Entrepreneurship theories of the non-profit sector' (1997) 8 Voluntas 162 at 169. 
2 Weisbrod, B., 'Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Sector in a Three-Sector Economy' in 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (ed. ), The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and 
Policy (New York, OUP, 1986) at 26. 
3 Douglas, J., W4V Charity? The Casefor a Third Sector (Beverly Hills and London, Sage, 
1983) at 14. 
4 Voluntary Sector Roundtable Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary 
Sector, Building on Strength: Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada's 
Voluntary Sector (www. vsr-trsb. net, Voluntary Sector Roundtable, 1999) at 13. 
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products, whereas the last two concern the processes by which these end products are 
achieved. 
It is important to note two things about these categories. First, they represent a 
distillation of the various economic and sociological arguments that seek to explain the 
presence of organised civil society. Although there are similarities between certain 
functions - in particular, several turn on the notion that CSOs are more trustworthy 
than private firms - each is, in certain key aspects, 
5 theoretically distinct, as we will 
attempt to demonstrate in the following discussion. However, the nature of organised 
civil society is such that there are no clear distinctions between these functions in 
practice. Much CSO activity will straddle two or more functions - for example, public 
goods may be provided by an entrepreneur through political action. 
B. MARKET SUPPORT 
A significant number of CSOs are engaged in activities that provide the private sector 
with the appropriate conditions and resources for it to operate effectively. Gassler 
refers to these as 'extra-market activities'. 6 However, this term is unsatisfactory as 
much of the rest of civil society activity also operates outside the market. What we are 
concerned with here are those activities that are concerned with enabling the market to 
operate effectively, as opposed to those activities which fulfil social functions that are 
not provided by the market, which we shall examine later in this chapter. These 
market support functions can be split into two categories - those that provide the 
conditions which are necessary for the market to operate ('systemic activities 9), 7 and 
those that operate to shape the environment in which the market functions 
('environmental activities 1). 8 
' However, there is some theoretical overlap: e. g. the advocacy of minority rights, which we 
discuss in the context of the facilitation of political action, may also be explained by reference 
to the public good function (see below at 92 - 93). 6 See generally Gassler, R., The Economics of Nonprofit Enterprise: A Study in Applied 
Economics (Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America, 1986); Gassler, R., 'Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Economics: A Critical Survey' (1990) 19 Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly 137. 
7 Gassler (1986), above n6 at 22; Gassler (1990), above n6 at 141. 
8 Gassler (1986), above n6 at 20; Gassler (1990), above n6 at 141. 
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(1) Systemic activities 
Redistribution of property rights 
The distribution of property rights is usually organised either by the market or the 
state. The market can achieve redistribution through individual bargaining - for 
example, by reaching an agreement as to whether x has the right to carry on an activity 
which interferes with y or whether y has the right to be free from interference by x's 
activity. The state can do this by passing laws which allocate rights - for example, by 
passing a law stating that y has the right to be free from interference and x must pay y 
compensation if he breaks this rule. 9 Alternatively, the market and the state can 
operate in tandem, with the state passing laws which facilitate bargaining between the 
parties by reducing the costs of that bargaininglo - for example, by developing a law of 
contract. Organised civil society can assist this process by informing state activity - as 
Gassler notes, the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
redistributed property rights by abolishing slavery, was, in part, a result of 
campaigning by CSOs which changed attitudes towards slavery in the US. I' This role 
is not merely historical; contemporary human rights organisations, such as Amnesty 
International and the American Anti-Slavery Group, are engaged in similar campaigns 
on a global level in the present day, whilst Anti-Slavery International was registered as 
a charity in England in 1995.12 
9 For examples of state allocation of property rights and the resolution of conflicting interests, 
see Miller v Jackson [ 1977] QB 966 and Kennaway v Thompson [ 198 1] QB 88 which arrive at 
differing allocations of rights in the context of tortious liability. Note also Dennis v Ministry 
of Defence [2003] EWHC 793, where, in the context of the right to privacy and a family life 
under Human Rights Act 1998, the public interest in the flying of military aircraft outweighed 
the private nuisance caused by the noise of the aircraft. 
10 Referred to as 'transaction costs'. According to the Coase Theorem, where transaction costs 
are zero, the market will be able to achieve an economically efficient distribution of property 
rights (see generally Coase, R., 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3J Law and Econ 1). On 
transaction costs in relation to the use of CSOs themselves, rather than private firms, see 
generally Krashinsky, M., 'Transaction Costs and a Theory of the Nonprofit Organization' in 
Rose-Ackerman, above n 2. 
11 Gassler (1986), above n6 at 22. 
12 Charity No. 1049160. However, Luxton suggests that charitable status was only granted 
because of the organisation's long tradition, having its origins in the Anti-Slavery Society 
founded in 1839 (Luxton, P., The Law of Charities (Oxford, OUP, 200 1) at 226); certainly it is 
difficult to see how the object of eliminating all forms of slavery and forced labour would 
sidestep the prohibition on political charitable purposes (see below Ch 5 at 196 - 200). 
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Reduction of transaction costs 
Markets are able to operate more efficiently when transactions costs are minimised. 13 
The introduction by the state of standard legal mechanisms such as the contract can go 
some way towards minimising these costs. For example, every time x and y decide to 
deal with each other, they do not have to start from first principles and draw up a new 
vehicle to carry out their endeavour. Instead, they follow the rules of contract law: 14 
one makes an invitation to treat to the other which, following bargaining, leads to an 
offer, which is either accepted, rejected or followed by a counter-offer and further 
bargaining until an agreement is reached. The parties do not have to invest resources 
in determining the consequences of their actions at each stage of this bargaining 
process, 15 as the law of contract has already determined this for them. Contract law 
can also determine the consequences if the agreement is carried out successfully, 
breached by one of the parties, or frustrated by actions outside either party's control. 
However, transaction costs are only kept at a minimum if the parties to a contract 'play 
the game' and adhere to the legal rules. The costs of individual transactions will rise if 
it is necessary to invoke the authority of the courts as a matter of course in order to 
resolve disputes. Gassler suggests that some CSOs can help to minimise this problem 
by encouraging members of society to follow the law, ' 6 by means of appropriate moral 
education or religious instruction. However, this role need not be limited to 
educational and religious institutions - any CSOs which participate in activities which 
engender respect towards others or encourage community spirit would seem likely to 
have a similar effect. 17 The somewhat nebulous nature of this function of organised 
civil society, along with the fact that it would be extremely difficult to measure the 
effects of moral education or religious instruction, mean that it is not easy to adduce 
evidence which either supports or refutes the idea that this function is carried out in 
" See above n 10. 
14 Cf Beale, H., and Dugdale, A., 'Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of 
Contractual Remedies' (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45 on the role of non- 
contractual business practices. 
15 Although they may decide to obtain legal advice. 
16 Gassler (1986), above n6 at 24 - 25. 17 On which see below at 102 - 103. 
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practice, though it seems plausible. However, this is unlikely to be the sole, or even 
main, purpose of any area of civil society activity. 18 
Market failure: resolution of information deficits 
We argue below that one of the most important functions carried out by organised civil 
society is the provision of goods and services which the market fails to provide. 19 one 
of the traditional reasons for market failure is that consumers are unable to make 
informed choices about competing products or suppliers because of a lack of available 
information on which to base their decision. 20 This typically occurs where the nature 
of a particular product means it cannot be adequately evaluated until it has been 
purchased. A box of breakfast cereal, for example, could be evaluated by comparing 
data that is freely available - such as its price, weight and the presence or absence of a 
free novelty toy - with that of competing brands. The state could increase the data 
available to consumers by regulating so that the disclosure of nutritional information is 
compulsory, 21 enabling a more informed choice. On the other hand, a product which is 
not so amenable to measurement in this fashion, such as a massage, cannot easily be 
assessed without actually trying both the product itself and a selection of the market 
rivals. 
Information deficits such as this can be resolved in numerous ways - in the case of the 
massage, state regulation could require all masseurs to reach a certain professional 
standard before they are allowed to practise. However, whilst this would ensure that 
all masseurs operated at an acceptable level of skill, it would still leave consumers 
unable to make a rational choice, as the abilities of each practitioner, and the services 
offered by them, could still vary widely. The market itself could correct some of the 
deficit by providing prospective consumers with an indication of the levels of 
18 Although note that under the Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(e) the advancement of citizenship or 
community advancement will become a charitable purpose in its own right. 
19 See below at 61 - 88. 20 See generally Ogus, A., Regulation: Legalform and economic theory (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1994) at 38 - 41; Breyer, S., 'Typical Justifications for Regulation' in Baldwin, R., 
Scott, C., and Hood, C. (eds. ), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford, OUP, 1998) at 72 - 74; 
Baldwin, R., and Cave, M., Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy and Practice (Oxford, 
OUP, 1999) at 12; Cooter, R., and Ulen, T., Law and Economics (Reading, Adison Wesley 
Longman, 2000,3rd ed. ) at 43. 
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satisfaction experienced by previous consumers. However, this is also unsatisfactory 
as there is strong incentive for service providers to give an inaccurate picture of 
customer satisfaction by directing prospective consumers only towards favourable 
reviews. In this situation, CSOs frequently adopt the role of 'consumer watchdog' 22 
and provide a vehicle for the dissemination of the product experiences of previous 
consumers to facilitate informed decision-making - the importance of this particular 
role of organised civil society is evidenced by the Charity Commission's recognition 
of the charitable status of the Consumers' Association as a research institution. 23 
Alternatively, CSOs can also operate to encourage firms to take it upon themselves to 
increase the quantity and quality of information available to consumers. 24 
(2) Environmental activities 
Provision of resources 
The most prevalent extra-market activity carried out by organised civil society is the 
provision of resources - raw materials which the market can utilise for its own ends. 
This activity is typically undertaken by educational CSOs. We can categorise 
provision according to the type of resources provided. First, CSOs provide 
technological resources, such as the 'basic research' which is undertaken by 
universities and which the market can develop and exploit. 25 Second, CSOs supply the 
human resources necessary for industries to operate, providing education and training 
which produces future workers. Often, the supply of technological and human 
resources will be among the main purposes of CSOs engaged in this kind of activity, 
21 See generally Baldwin and Cave, above n 20 at 49 - 50; Ogus, above n 20 at 121 - 149. 22 Gassler (1986), above n6 at 24; Gassler (1990) above n6 at 142. 
23 Charity Commission, Central Register of Charities, (www. charity-commission. gov. uk, 
Charity Commission, 2003 web version), Charity No. 296072. 
24 See e. g. the Institute of Business Ethics, Charity No. 1084014, which aims to help firms to 
'build relationships of trust with their customers ... through the exchange and discussion of 
experience on issues relating to the conduct of business' (Institute of Business Ethics, IBE 
Homepage (www. ibe. org. uk, IBE, 2003 web version) under 'Welcome'). 
25 Gassler (1986), above n6 at 20. 
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and these will typically be organisations such as schools and universities. However, 
education and training need not be limited to traditional schooling. 26 
Shaping of consumer preferences 
The moulding of consumer preferences and attitudes towards product utility may result 
from the instruction provided by educational and religious institutions. 27 As with the 
role of CSOs in relation to the reduction of transaction costs discussed above, it is 
unlikely that this is anything more than an incidental result of other civil society 
activities. 
C. PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 
The bulk of civil society theory to date focuses on the role of CSOs as providers of 
'public goods'. Empirical work conducted by James and Rose-Ackerman in the 1980s 
confirmed that the bulk of civil society presence is 'generally consistent with theories 
that stress ... public goods' provision, 
28 and this presence is acknowledged in a 
number of official papers. 29 Four theories have been used to explain this - Weisbrod's 
theory of market failure, 30 Hansmann's theory of contract failure 31 Levitt's theory of 
government failure, 32 and, more recently, Salanion's theory of voluntary failure. 33 
26 This is recognised by the current definition of education under the second head of charity - 
see, for example: Townley v Bedwell (1801) 6 Ves 194 (botanical garden held to be charitable); 
Re Lopes [1931] 2 Ch 130 (Zoological Society held to be charitable); Re Dupree's Deed Trusts 
[19451 Ch 16 (trust for the promotion of chess upheld as charitable). 
27 Gassler (1986), above n6 at 20. 
28 James, E. and Rose-Ackerman, S., The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economies (Chur, 
Switzerland and New York, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1986) at 60. 
29 See further: Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law of Charities (Toronto, 
Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1996) chapter nine at 10 - 11; Prime Minister's Strategy 
Unit, above n 161 para 3.1. 
30 Weisbrod, above n 2. 
31 Hausmann, H., 'Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization' in Powell, W. (ed. ), The 
Nonprofit Sector A Research Handbook (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 
1987); Hansmann, H., 'The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise' in Rose-Ackerman (1986) above n 
2. 
32 Levitt, T., The Third Sector: New Tacticsfor a Responsive Society (New York, AMACOM, 
1973). 
33 Salamon, L., 'Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: Towards 
a Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State' in Ostrander, S. 
and Langton, S. (eds. ), Shifting the Debate: public1private sector relations in the modern 
welfare state (New Brunswick, Transaction, 1987) (hereafter Salamon (1987a)); Salamon, L., 
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Each of these answers the question of why CSOs are able to provide public goods from 
a different angle, and only together do they provide a complete picture. They all 
essentially suggest two things: first, that in certain circumstances CSOs will be the 
only appropriate vehicles for the supply of certain products; second, that in certain 
other circumstances CSOs, whilst not the only option, will be the most appropriate 
vehicles for the supply of certain products. The theories are useful from a regulatory 
perspective as they highlight (i) the characteristics that make CSOs successful public 
goods providers and (ii) the reasons why the public and private sectors are less 
successful. This enables us to shape a regulatory strategy that (i) encourages these 
characteristics and (ii) prevents the problems which affect the public and private 
sectors from infecting organised civil society. 
(1) Concept ofpublic goods 
Public goods (sometimes referred to as 'collective goods' )34 are all those goods and 
services which are nonrivalous and nonexcludable. By nonrivalous, we mean two 
things: first, no matter how many consumers use the product, it remains available to 
others, 35 and second, it costs the producer the same amount to provide the product for 
many consumers as it does to provide it for a few. 36 The 'oft-cited' archetypal 
nonrivalous product is national security. 37 If a state defends its territory by erecting a 
fortified wall around its border then the benefits are available to anyone who chooses 
to set foot inside, regardless of how many other citizens also gain the benefit. 
Similarly, the cost of providing the wall will not increase if more people take the 
benefit, nor will it decrease if fewer people take the benefit. By nonexcludable, we 
mean that whilst the product is being provided it is impossible, or at least so 
impractical as to make it effectively impossible in practice, 38 to prevent people from 
'Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations' in 
Powell, above n 31 (hereafter Salamon (1987b)). 
34 Olson, M., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, Harvard University Press, 1971) at 14 - 16. 35 Cooter and Ulen, above n 20 at 42; Olson, above n 34 at 15. 
36 Hanmann (1987), above n 31 at 29. 
37 Ogus, above n 20 at 33. 
38 Goods which are nonexcludable in this sense are sometimes referred to as 'impure' public 
goods. 
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taking the benefit even if they do not pay. 39 The archetypal nonexcludable product is 
clean air - if the effects of pollution were to be reversed in a particular locality, it 
would not be possible to prevent residents who refused to contribute to the cost from 
breathing in the clean air. 
(2) Weisbrod's theory of marketfailure 40 
According to Olson, private organisations will not normally choose to provide public 
goods on any significant scale. 41 This is because there is a strong temptation for the 
rational consumer, driven by the desire to maximise his utility, to 'free-ride' 42 _ that is, 
to take the benefit but leave others to bear the cost. This is possible because (i) so long 
as at least one other consumer is paying for the provision of the public good then the 
benefit will be prima facie available to all consumers, because consumption is 
nonrivalous; and (ii) access to the good cannot be limited depending upon whether or 
not a consumer makes a financial contribution, because consumption is nonexcludable. 
This is particularly a problem where the number of consumers is large - which will 
typically be the case: archetypal public goods are national security and the 
environment - as the consumer will be able to ease his conscience with the thought 
that his individual contribution would be relatively insignificant. 
A number of possible scenarios result from this. First, if we assume that all consumers 
are economically rational, everyone will choose to free-ride in relation to a given 
public good. This means that no private organisation will supply the good, as it will 
not be able to recoup its costs, let alone make a profit. On the other hand, we can 
recognise that not all consumers are motivated solely by economic factors, and that 
there will be a number of good souls who are willing to pay for the good. There are 
still problems, however. Many of those who willing to pay are likely to be 
discouraged by the fear that they will be in the minority and will have to bear the 
39 Cooter and Ulen, above n 34 at 42; Olson, above n 34 at 14; Hansmann (1987), above n 31 
at 29. 
40 See generally Weisbrod, above n 2; also Salamon (1987b), above n 33 at 109; Levitt above n 
32 at 49. 
41 Olson, above n 34. 
42 Olson, above n 34 at 10. 
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burden of all those who choose to free-ride . 
43 Hence, they ultimately choose to free- 
ride as well. This is compounded by the fact that for each consumer who chooses not 
to contribute, the cost to the remaining consumers will increase. Thus the greater the 
number who choose to free-ride, the greater the incentive will be to follow suit. The 
few who defiantly remain willing to pay are likely to be faced with a prohibitively high 
price in order to compensate for the rest. The end result is that consumers are either 
unwilling to pay or willing to pay but unable to do so. Consequently, there is no 
reason for a private organisation to offer to produce any public goods, as their 
production is unlikely to yield any profit. Those firms which do decide to take the risk 
and provide public goods are likely to be insignificant. 
The result of this is that public goods provision will instead be provided by the state, 
which is able to avoid the problem of free-riding by coercing citizens into contributing 
towards The cost - typically through taxation. However, in a democracy, majority 
government will be unable to provide public goods which satisfy the preferences of 
minority groups. Weisbrod's theory suggests that the only practical option for these 
groups, short of migrating to another state whose public goods provision suits them, 44 
is to turn to organised civil society. 45 Because CSOs are not constrained by the need to 
46 maximise profit for their owners, as they are typically non-profit distributing, they 
are able to pursue an activity for its own sake. This means they can safely commit 
themselves to the production of a public good, as they are sheltered from the profit- 
related difficulties which result from nonrivalous consumption and nonexcludability. 
Furthermore, Olson argues that free-riding is less likely to occur when we are 
concerned with a relatively small group of people, because individual contributions 
will now be proportionately larger so that it does matter if one member of the group 
chooses not to contribute. 47 The consequence of all this is that small groups of 
consumers who desire a particular public good will in theory join together and form a 
CSO in order that they might have a vehicle through which they can pursue this. 
43 Douglas, J., 'Political Theories of Nonprofit Organisations' in Powell, above n 31 at 45. 
" Weisbrod, above n2 at 26 - 27. 15 Weisbrod, above n2 at 27. 
46 Non-profit distribution is one of the key characteristics of organised civil society discussed 
above in Ch 2 at 47 - 48. 47 Olson, above n 41, ch 2. 
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Alternatively, they may associate themselves with an existing CSO which shares their 
desire. 
Weisbrod's theory is an important step in understanding organised civil society 
presence. However, it does not actually focus on civil society; rather, it is primarily 
concerned with the market's inability to produce any public goods, and with the state's 
inability to produce levels of public goods which satisfy all consumers. As a 
consequence of this, whilst Weisbrod's theory explains why the private and public 
sectors cannot provide satisfactory levels of public goods, it does not consider in any 
detail why CSOs are a viable choice as providers of public goods. 
The second limitation of the theory of market failure is that it fails to address fully why 
the market does not provide a significant level of public goods . 
18 The free-riding 
problem, upon which the theory hinges, implies that the market will not be able to 
provide public goods on a large scale. However, the theory concludes with the idea 
that consumers will band together in small groups with others who share the same 
preferences. Weisbrod does not explain why at this low level consumers cannot turn to 
(or establish their own) private enterprises instead of CSOs to provide public goods. 49 
(3) Hansmann's theory of contractfailure 50 
Hansmann's theory of contract failure answers this question and explains why CSOs, 
rather than the market, dominate small-scale public goods provision. The basic 
premise is that when consumers group together and fund public goods, they will be 
'incapable of accurately evaluating' those goods, 51 because of a lack of product 
information. When faced with a choice of potential service providers, consumers are 
therefore inclined to select the organisation which they consider most trustworthy, in 
48 Noted by Badelt, C., 'Institutional Choice and the Nonprofit Sector' in Anheier and Seibel, 
above n 34 at 56. 
" On which, see below at 75. 
50 Also referred to as 'trust theory'. See generally Hansmarm (1986), above n31; Hausmann 
(1987), above n31. See also: Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law of 
Charities (Toronto, Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1996) chapter 9 at 12; Rose-Ackerman, 
S., 'Altruism, ideological entrepreneurs and the non-profit firm' (1997) 8 Voluntas 120 at 124; 
Salamon (I 987b) above n 33 at 109; Easley, D. and O'Hara, M., 'Optimal Nonprofit Firms' in 
Rose-Ackerman, above n2 at 88. 
51 Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 6 1. 
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order to minimise the risk that their public goods will be compromised in some way. 
Because CSOs are not susceptible to the perceived corrupting influence of profit, they 
are generally seen as more reliable and responsible than their private sector 
counterparts. 52 
The situations in which information asymmetry between producer and consumer is 
problematic are those in which it is either impossible or highly impractical for the 
consumer to evaluate the quality of the goods in question. In the private goods 
context, the issue will usually be whether evaluation is possible before purchase; post- 
purchase, most information deficits will be resolved, as the consumer will now have 
product experience. 53 In the public goods context, however, the problem is much 
bigger: as well as the difficulty of pre-purchase evaluation, there is also the fact that 
consumers will typically not be able to judge the quality of the goods even after they 
have been supplied. There are two main reasons for this. First, because the 
beneficiaries extend far beyond those who are financing the good, it will be very 
54 difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the quality of the good overall . This 
is 
compounded by the fact that the beneficiaries will not all have the same public goods 
preferences, so that even if it were possible for a representative sample to provide 
feedback it would be hard to eliminate the resulting bias. Second, the nature of many 
public goods means that some or all of their benefits will be either (i) incompatible 
with evaluation, because we lack the appropriate technology and tools of assessment, 
or (ii) not apparent until some point in the future - for example, this will be the case 
with many environmental public goods such as pollution control. 
The result of this information asymmetry is that consumers believe that private 
enterprises cannot be trusted not to 'raise prices and cut quality', 55 or even to 'renege 
on promised service' altogether, 56 in order to maximise their profits. When 
52 Hansmann (1987), above n 31 at 29. 
53 Of course, this will not always be the case: some product qualities - for example, durability 
- must be assessed over a prolonged period of time. For further on information deficits in the 
context of private goods, see above at 52 - 54 and below at 88 - 89. 54 It may be technically possible for all the beneficiaries to come together and evaluate the 
good, but the cost of doing so renders this impractical (Krashinsky, above n 10 at 117). 
55 Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 62. 
56 Young, D., 'Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations: Theoretical and 
International Perspectives' (2000) 29(l) Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 149 at 154. 
66 
3: FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
information asymmetries arise in the context of private goods provision, there are 
several regulatory strategies which can be employed to resolve them and re-engender 
trust in the market. Contract failure theory assumes the first choice will be for the 
market to resolve the deficit by itself, with consumers agreeing parameters of quality 
when contracting with the service provider, and then seeking damages if this 
agreement is breached. Alternatively, consumers could insure against the service 
providers' failure to maintain adequate standards. 57 Another option would be state 
intervention - government could restrict production to qualified or licensed service 
providers, 58 or require mandatory disclosure of information about the goods. 59 We 
have also noted earlier the role which CSOs can play in distributing product 
information to consumers. 60 With the possible exception of licensing, 61 the 
effectiveness of all these methods of remedying information asymmetry relies at least 
in part on post-purchase monitoring: without this, it would be difficult (i) to determine 
whether there has been a breach of contract, (ii) to ensure the accuracy of disclosed 
information or (iii) to provide proof of failure to meet standards to an insurer. Because 
the nature of public goods limits post-purchase evaluation, these safeguards are 
unlikely to be an effective solution to the problem of lack of trust in this context. The 
best option for consumers is to employ organisations which are not affected by the 
temptation to maximise profit. Consumers will therefore be attracted to CSOs because 
although they are capable of lowering production standards in the manner described 
above, their non-profit character means that in theory they have no incentive to do so. 62 
The alternative would be to contract with the owners of a private enterprise not to 
distribute more than a certain amount of profit. This would essentially mean 
converting the enterprise into a nonprofit organisation, 63 and as this would increase 
" See Krashinsky, above n 10 at 117. 
58 See Krashinsky, above n 10 at H 7. 
59 See generally Baldwin and Cave, above n 20 at 49 - 50; Ogus, above n 20 at 121 - 149. 60 See above at 52 - 54. 61 Licensing works instead by ensuring that only trustworthy enterprises are permitted to 
produce goods in the first place. 
62 Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 62. 
63 Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 67. 
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transaction costs, it will be in the interests of consumers to turn to civil society 
instead. 64 
As with market failure theory, Hansmann's thesis assumes that organised civil society 
is 'second best' to the market, 65 and consequently fails to consider in any detail how 
suitable CSOs are to public goods provision beyond their non-profit distribution. The 
significance of the theory has also been challenged recently by Ortmann and 
Schlesinger, 66 who highlight three phenomena which could negate any advantage 
organised civil society holds over the market in terms of trust: reputational ubiquity, 
incentive compatibility and sector adulteration. 
Challenges to contract failure theory 
Reputational ubiquity 
Ortmarm and Schlesinger have argued that by virtue of 'repeat encounters and 
reasonable information flows', 67 the market will be able foster consumer trust over a 
period of time and thus remove the need to utilise CSOs. Certainly, it is easy to 
imagine three situations in particular when this may be true. First, a private enterprise 
may be trusted where the members of the group financing the public good are able to 
evaluate the end product themselves, because the benefits are readily apparent - for 
example, the construction of a flood barrier. Where this is not the case, private 
enterprise may still be trusted to provide public goods if it has already established a 
reputation as a trustworthy provider of private goods, especially if there is a natural 
connection between the public and private goods. Alternatively, a firm may publicly 
demonstrate a 'social conscience' to show it is not motivated wholly by profit, for 
example by contributing financially or otherwise to a CSO or local community project. 
64 Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 68. This is an example of the clear overlap between the 
different functions of organised civil society: its role as a tool to reduce transaction costs is 
noted above at 51 - 52. 65 Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 62. 
66 Ortmann, A. and Schlesinger, M., 'Trust, repute and the role of non-prof it enterprise' (1997) 
8 Voluntas 97. 
67 Ibid at 10 1 
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Despite these examples, it is unlikely that the reputational ubiquity argument is a 
serious threat to Hansmann's theory. As we have already noted, most public goods 
will not be capable of meaningful evaluation by those who fund them, regardless of the 
number of repeat encounters; Ortmann and Schlesinger recognise that in this situation 
the market is not the most appropriate vehicle. 68 It is also unclear how far consumers 
will be willing to trust private enterprise to provide goods in an unsupervised fashion 
solely on the basis of its trustworthiness in a supervised environment. Furthermore, 
reputations are built over a sustained period of time, suggesting that CSOs should 
retain their edge with respect to novel public goods. 69 
Incentive compatibility 
Ortmann and Schlesinger's second challenge centres on the idea that profit- 
maximisation is not the sole threat to quality of service, 70 and that there are several 
other temptations which may be just as distracting to CSOs as the market. Resources 
may be diverted from service provision by inflating administration costs unnecessarily 
in order to increase salaries 71 or to provide staff with other benefits such as company 
cars or extravagant office facilities. This is likely to be less of a problem in those areas 
of organised civil society which are viewed as prestigious - e. g. universities and 
research institutes - as prestige itself may operate as 'compensation' for forgoing 
pecuniary benefits. 72 
It is also not clear that CSOs will in fact always be immune from profit-maximisation. 
As James notes, a CSO with a portfolio of different activities may focus on those 
which yield a profit in order to subsidise those which operate at a loss, 73 thereby 
introducing profit-maximisation as an operational consideration. 
" Ibid at 102. 
'9 Ibid at 104. 
'0 Ibid at 102. 
71 We have already noted that, despite the supposed voluntary nature of organised civil society, 
it is commonplace for CSOs to employ staff and remunerate trustees (see above Ch 2 at 49 - 
50). 
72 Ortmann and Schlesinger, above n 66 at 105. See also DiMaggio, P., 'Nonprofit 
Organizations in the Production and Distribution of Culture' in Powell, above n 31 at 204. 
73 James, E., 'How Nonprofits Grow: A Model' in Rose-Ackerman, above n2 at 185 - 195. 
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Adulteration 
The third challenge to contract failure theory stems from the fact that the more 
trustworthy organised civil society is perceived to be, the more resources it will attract, 
thereby increasing the incentive for abuse. At least in theory, the paradox then occurs 
that those CSOs that are most trusted initially are most likely to have this 'eroded by 
subsequent violations'. 74 
(4) Levitt's theory ofgovernment failure 75 
Levitt's theory of government failure develops the second strand of market failure 
theory and explains why the state will not always be an appropriate public goods 
provider. Traditional microeconomic theory suggests that, in light of the market's 
inability to provide public goods, 76 it is the role of the state to supply them. The state 
is readily able to overcome the free-riding problem as it has the power to coerce 
consumers into contributing - typically, through taxation. There is certainly clear 
evidence that this is happens in practice - national security, for example, will almost 
invariably be co-ordinated by the state even if individual defence roles are contracted- 
out. In a democracy, however, the state will not be able to provide public goods at a 
level which satisfies the utility of all its citizens. This is an inevitable consequence of 
the fact that the government is controlled by the majority and therefore only those 
goods approved by the majority will be provided. In any heterogeneous society, there 
will be innumerable minority groups who desire both (i) public goods which are not 
supplied by the government and (ii) different levels of those public goods which are 
being provided at present. 77 Additionally, public goods provision may be targeted at 
resolving a problem which is actually caused by government activities. 78 
" Ortmann and Schlesinger, above n 66 at 103. 
75 Levitt, above n 32 at 49. 
76 See above at 63 - 64. 77 Those public goods which are only considered desirable by a minority of citizens are 
deemed 'merit' goods by Gassler, whilst if a minority desire a lower level of a public good 
than the state is supplying, their attempts to counter this are 'demerit' goods (Gassler (1986), 
above n6 at 29; Gassler (1990), above n6 at 142). 
78 Levitt, above n 32 at 52. 
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As with Weisbrod's market failure theory, 
79 the first limitation of Levitt's theory is 
that it fails to explain why CSOs, rather than the market, provide the public goods 
80 
which the state does not. More significantly, the proposition that the government's 
failure to provide appropriate levels of public goods is due to the fact that it will 
provide only those goods requested by the majority is overly simplistic. In reality, the 
problem is more complex. At a domestic level, governments are most likely to be 
influenced by those interest groups with the loudest voice, 81 typically those groups 
with the greatest resources to devote to political lobbying and party contributions, as 
opposed to the electorate. Also, governments are likely to be influenced by 
international peer pressure and concern for their standing on the world stage. This is 
evidenced by the fact that much of the public goods provision in the context of 
pollution reduction has been agreed at a global level. 82 Of course, no government will 
be wholly blind to the desires of the electorate; otherwise it would risk being replaced 
at the next election. However, the significance of this may be somewhat limited by the 
phenomenon of voter apathy, whereby the 'majority' which votes a particular 
government into office is not necessarily the majority of the electorate. 83 Also, there is 
a strong temptation for the party in power to focus on the wants of floating voters, 
undermining its representative role further still. The cumulative effect of these 
considerations is likely to be a state unable to provide all the public goods requested by 
the majority, let alone minority groups. 
Government failure theory is also misleading in that it does not take into account the 
emergence of a considerable 'contract culture', 84 whereby the governinent engages 
CSOs to carry out, amongst other activities, public goods to which it is committed. 
Goveniment failure theory states that the role of organised civil society is to provide 
79 See above at 63 - 65, 80 Hansmann (1987), above n 31 at 29. 
81 See further Craig, P., Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United 
States ofAmerica (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990). 
82 See e. g. Third Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 1997 (the 'Kyoto Summit'). 
83 E. g. turnout at the 2001 general election was 59.4%, a significant drop from 71.4% in 1997 
and 77.7% in 1992 (Electoral Commission, General Election 2001: The Official Results 
(London, Politico's Publishing, 2001) at 70. Local election turnout is significantly lower: 
32.8% in 2002 (Electoral Commission statistics, www. electoralcommission. org. uk/ 
elections/publicparticipation. cfm). 
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public goods for minority groups, not to provide maj ority- approved goods on behalf of 
the government. Thus, if the theory explained everything, whenever CSOs contract 
with the government they would 'violate their theoretical raison dWre'. " It is 
interesting to note at this point that, until recently, the Charity Commission appeared to 
reject the theory of government failure, 86 at least in the context of charities, as its 
position was that it was not acceptable, for those charities which contract with local 
government to carry out services which fall under authorities' statutory duties, to use 
charity resources to supplement the level of service provision except in the short- 
term; 87 rather, they should use legitimate political activity to lobby the government to 
provide more. 88 However, in 2004, when considering the charitable status of two 
trusts which carried out such serviceS, 89 the Commission conceded that charities may 
subsidise services in this way under the current law, so long as it is 'in the charity's 
best interests' to do so and the trustees do not step outside the terms of their 
authority. 90 
(5) Salamon's theory of voluntaryfailure 91 
Salamon's theory of voluntary failure suggests that organised civil society is 
fundamentally better suited to public goods provision than the state. Rather than 
simply turning to CSOs when citizens are not satisfied with the state's performance, 
they should be the preferred response to market failure to provide optimal levels of 
public goods. 92 There is some anthropological support for this: in early civilisations, 
84 See above Ch 2, n 73 and associated text. 
85 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 35. 
86 Charity Commission, CC37: Charities and Contracts (www. charity-commission. gov. uk, 
Charity Commission, 2003) paras 30 - 32. 87 Charity Commission, above n 86 para 32. On the level of service provision when the state 
contracts with a charity generally, see Morris, D., 'Paying the Piper: The "Contract Culture" as 
Dependency Culture for Charities' in Dunn, A. (ed. ), The Voluntary Sector, the State and the 
Law (Oxford, Hart, 2000) at 136 - 138. 88 Charity Commission, above n 86, para 3 1. On the political role of organised civil society, 
see below at 91 - 96. 89 Decisions of the Charity Commissioners, 21 April 2004, para 6.2.5. 
90 Ibid, para 6.1.9. The Commission has since issued fresh policy guidance reflecting this 
change of position: see Charity Commission, Policy Statement on Charities and Public Service 
Delivery (www. charity-commission. gov. uk, Charity Commission, 2005). 
91 See generally: Salamon (I 987a), above n 33; Salamon (I 987b), above n 33 at 111 - 113. 92 Salamon in (1987a), above n 33 at 39. 
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public goods are produced at a tribal or familial level, 93 and several commentators 
view organised civil society as having developed from the family unit. 94 If we 
acknowledge that organised civil society is 'more than simply residual or derivative' 
but at the 'core of the political economy', 95 it becomes necessary to explain (i) why 
CSOs are more suited to public goods provision than the state and (ii) when CSO 
provision will be sub-optimal and thus necessitate state intervention (either in the form 
of regulation or the provision of more public goods). In answer to the first question, 
we can note that CSOs are more institutionally efficient, 96 more expert 97 and less 
affected by political distractions than government. In answer to the second, Salamon 
identifies four possible causes of organised civil society's failure to produce optimal 
amounts of public goods: philanthropic insufficiency, philanthropic particularism, 
philanthropic paternalism and philanthropic amateurism. 98 
Advantages of civil society over government 
Efficiency 
The first advantage that CSOs have over government is their institutional efficiency, 99 
which results largely from their size. CSOs are typically much smaller than 
government institutions, which means that their transaction costs are lower. Salamon 
notes that in order for government to start supplying a public good: 100 
'substantial segments of the public must be aroused, public officials must be 
informed, laws must be written, majorities must be assembled, and programs 
must be, put into operation'. 
This is exacerbated by the phenomenon of 'institutional stickiness', whereby large 
bureaucracies are unwilling to abandon established policies and activities, tending 
93 Krashinsky, above n 10 at 114. 
9' See above Ch 2 at 40. 
95 van Till, J., 'The Three Sectors: Voluntarism in a Changing Political Economy' in S. 
Ostrander and S. Langton, n 33 at 53. 
96 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 39. 
97 Ibid at 44. 
98 Ibid at 39 -41. 99 Salamon (I 987a), above n33 at 39; Morris, S., 'Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Some 
Lessons from History' (2000) 11 (1) Voluntas 25 at 27. 
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naturally towards inertia rather than change. 101 By comparison, CSOs can commence 
provision simply with 'a handful of individuals acting on their own' and will thus be 
more cost-effective. 102 There is support for this in microeconomic theory, which 
suggests it will be less costly for smaller organisations to undertake new activities than 
for large organisations. 103 The small scale of CSOs enables them to 'form and 
disband' with ease, 104 minimising the response time to the 'unpredictable and often 
changing' public goods requirements of society. 105 
The problem with this argument is that it is dependent on CSOs being small 
organisations. In reality, the idea that CSOs are 'small' and government agencies 
'large' is overly simplistic. Many successful CSOs are large organisations, whilst 
many govermnent agencies are comparatively small: for example, the National Trust 
(the second largest fundraising charity in the UK terms of income, 106 and arguably the 
largest provider of public goods through its conservation activities) employs in the 
region of 4,000 full-time staff, 4,000 part-time staff and has over 34,000 volunteers, 107 
whereas the Charity Commission is staffed by just 600.108 Therefore it will not always 
be true to say that trustees will not be distanced from the grassroots by organisational 
100 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 39. 
101 See generally Genschel, P., 'The Dynamics of Inertia: Institutional Persistence and Change 
in Telecommunications and Health Care' (1997) 10 Governance 43. 
102 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 39. See also Douglas, above n 43 at 49 - 50; James, E., 
'Economic Theories of the Nonprofit Sector: A Comparative Perspective' in Anheier and 
Seibel, above n 33 at 24; Simon, J., 'Modern Welfare State Policy Toward the Nonprofit 
Sector: Some Efficiency - Equity Dilemmas' in Anheier and Seibel, above n 33 at 32; Knapp, 
M., Robertson, E. and Thomason, C., 'Public Money, Voluntary Action: Whose Welfare? ' in 
Anheier and Seibel, above n 33 at 204 - 205. 103 Olson, above n 41 at 5- 55. See also Coase, R., The Firm, The Market and The Law 
(Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1988) at 42 - 47; noted in Young, above n 
56 at 153; Anheier, H., 'Foundations in Europe: a Comparative Perspective' in SchRiter, A., 
Then, V. and Walkenhorst, P. (eds. ) Foundations in Europe: Society Management and Law 
(London, Directory of Social Change, 2001) at 69. 
104 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 44. Also noted by: Home Office, Charities. - A Framework 
for the Future (London, HMSO, Cmnd 694,1989) para 1.4; Knapp et al, above n 102 at 205 - 
206. 
105 Morris, above n 87 at 128. 
106 Charities Aid Foundation, Dimensions 2002 Update of CAF's Top 500 Fundraising 
Charities (West Malling, Kent, Charities Aid Foundation, 2002) at 14. 
107 National Trust, Annual Report and Accounts 200212003 (http: //www. nationaltrust. org. uk/ 
main/nati on altrust/agm/2003 /report - accounts. 
htmi, National Trust, 2003) at 12. 
"' Charity Commission, Charity Commission Corporate Plan 2003 - 2006 (London, Charity 
Commission, 2002) at 15. 
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structure, 109 or that it will be comparatively easy for a CSO to commence production of 
a novel public good. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that, in practice, a small 
organisation will always be more efficient than a large organisation. Empirical 
research by Kendall in the context of the provision of residential care, for example, 
suggests that CSOs have an edge over their private sector counterparts partly because 
they are 'relatively large' by comparison, 110 and accordingly are able to take advantage 
of 'technical economies of scale and scope, cross-subsidy from other current 
activities... and historically accumulated reserves'. "' Even in a sphere where CSOs 
are typically small, it does not follow that their efficiency turns on size alone - other 
factors, such as the ability to utilize volunteer labour, 112 or raise finances, 113 will also 
play a part. 
One particular situation where a CSO might be deemed more efficient than either the 
state or the market is in relation to so-called 'relational goods'. These are goods which 
depend on interpersonal relationships for their utility and which 'can be enjoyed only 
by participating in a social process'. 114 Ben-Ner and Gui argue that these relationships 
will be more 'satisfactory' when consumers are able to participate as stakeholders in 
the organisation, 115 as they will have a greater opportunity to 'express their intentions, 
opinions and desires' than if they engaged with a private firm or the state. 116 It seems 
likely that this will also, in part, turn on the size of any given CSO, as the greater the 
number of members or stakeholders, the quieter their individual voices will be. 117 
109 See Bennett, J. and DiLorenzo, T., Unfair Competition: The Profits ofNonprofits (Lanham, 
Maryland, Hamilton Press, 1989) at 48 - 49. 110 Kendall, J., The Voluntary Sector (London, Routledge, 2003) at 169. 
... Ibid. 
112 See Kendall, ibid, in the context of day care provision. 
113 See Kendall, ibid at 192, in the context of environmental organisations and the 
dissemination of information. 
114 Ben-Ner, A., and Gui, B., 'The Theory of Nonprofit Organisations Revisited' in Anheier, 
H., and Ben-Ner, A. (eds. ), The Study of the Nonprofit Enterprise: Theories and Approaches 
(New York, Kluwer / Plenum, 2003) at 14. See also Gui, B., 'Interpersonal Relations: a 
Disregarded Theme in the Debate on Ethics and Economics' in Lewis, A, and Warneryd, K. 
(eds. ), Ethics and Economic Affairs (London, Routledge, 1994). 
... On the stakeholder theory of CSOs generally, see Ben-Ner, A., and Van Hoomissen, T., 
'Nonprofit Organisations in the Mixed Economy: A Demand and Supply Analysis' (1991) 62 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 519. 
116 Ben-Ner and Gui, ibid at 16. 
... This suggests that it may, in fact, be inappropriate to classify relational goods as public 
goods, as some commentators do (see Ben-Ner and Gui, ibid at 14). If a network's 
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Expertise 
Salamon suggests that the small size of CSOs should also encourage expertise. 
" 8 
Much has been written on the nature of expertise, and a detailed exposition is outside 
the scope of this thesis. '' 9 For present purposes we can note that the label is generally 
taken to mean more than merely some acquired skill or specialist knowledge; in 
addition, it connotes the ability to utilise that skill or knowledge when faced with novel 
problems. 120 
We have already noted that the state is unlikely to be able to provide public goods 
which suit the different preferences of different groups of citizens. This is exacerbated 
by the fact that even if the state were minded to look beyond the majority of the 
electorate or the most powerful interest groups, it would be difficult for its agencies to 
target public goods provision so as to reflect minority preferences, as they will tend to 
lack knowledge of the various preferences held by each minority group. Organised 
civil society, on the other hand, will in theory enable more targeted provision. We have 
already noted that a minority preference group can either (i) create a new CSO to 
supply the desired public goods or (ii) utilise an existing CSO with similar, if not 
identical, preferences. 12 1 The former strategy will obviously reflect their preferences, 
as the group will be able to set the CSO's service parameters. In the latter scenario, 
whilst the group's preferences might not exactly match those of an existing CSO, there 
is a greater likelihood, compared with government provision, that the group's 
particular preferences will be taken into account, as the relatively small size of the 
CSO means that their individual contributions (or potential contributions) will be 
proportionately more important and there is therefore an incentive for CSOs to 'tailor 
services to client needs'. 122 Moreover, there is a greater chance that these preferences 
effectiveness depends upon its small size, then, beyond a certain point, the greater the number 
of members, the less utility each will have. Therefore, it cannot be said that the goods are 
nonrivalous. (Neither are they nonexcludable in any meaningful sense, as it will always be a 
simple matter to restrict membership. ) 
118 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 44; Morris, above n 99 at 27. 
'19 For an overview of the various theories of expertise, see Gaines, B., 'The Collective Stance 
in Modelling Expertise in Individuals and Organizations' (1994) 7 International Journal of 
Expert Systems 21 (extended version available online at ksi. cpsc. ucalgary. ca/articles/ 
Collective/). 
120 See generally Schon, D., The Reflexive Practitioner (New York, Basic Books, 1983). 
121 See above at 58. 
122 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 44. See also Home Office, above n 104, para 1.4. 
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will be accurately represented to high level decision-makers within a CSO, as a smaller 
organisational structure means fewer opportunities for information to become distorted 
as it filters up through the various stages of administration from the coalface to the 
trustees. 123 In addition to minority groups, the government may wish to utilise the 
expertise of CSOs for the same reasons. Public goods provision on a small scale also 
encourages diversity, providing greater 'consumer choice' of goods provision. ' 24 
Again, Salamon's thesis is limited in that it is dependent on CSOs being small 
organisations: in the case of large CSOs, trustees are likely to be distanced from the 
grassroots by organisational structure. 125 However, we can note that, as with 
efficiency, there are factors other than organisational size which contribute to the 
expertise of CSOs. In particular, we can note that both (i) the facilitation of 
entrepreneurship and (ii) the civil society 'ethos' will tend towards expertise. First, 
those CSOs that provide the appropriate conditions for entrepreneurial activity, 
discussed in detail below, 126 will, by definition, be able to apply their skills or 
knowledge bases to novel situations. Second, according to the exchange theory of 
expertise, 'the more valuable to a person is the result of his action, the more likely he is 
to perform the action'. 127 Accordingly, if some philanthropic or charitable satisfaction 
is derived by actors from their successful pursuit of civil society activity, this utility 
will encourage them to repeat the activity and thus, over time, develop specialised 
skills or knowledge. 
Salamon suggests that CSOs have the 'capacity to avoid fragmented approaches and to 
concentrate on the full range' of public goods needs. 128 Although in theory the sector 
123 Referred to as the sector's 'modelling function' (Langton, S., 'The New Volunteerism' 
(198 1) 10 Journal of Voluntary Action Research 7 at 11). See also Salamon (I 987a), above n 
33 at 44; Young, above n 56 at 154; Clark, J., 'The State, Popular Participation and the 
Voluntary Sector' in Hulme, D. and Edwards, M. (eds. ), NGOs, States and Donors. - Too Close 
for Comfort (Basingstoke and London, MacMillan, 1997) at 46. 
124 Knapp et al, above n 102 at 202. See also: Salamon (I 987a), above n33 at 44; Rose- 
Ackerman, S., 'Altruism, ideological entrepreneurs and the non-profit firm' (1997) 8(2) 
Voluntas 120 at 124; Voluntary Sector Roundtable Panel on Accountability and Governance in 
the Voluntary Sector, above n4 at 12; Douglas, above n 43 at 46 - 48. 125 See Bennett, J. and DiLorenzo, T., Unfair Competition: The Profits offonprofits (Lanham, 
Maryland, Hamilton Press, 1989) at 48 - 49. 126 See below at 105 - 111. 12' Gaines, above n 119 at 3.3. 
128 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 44. 
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should be able to provide a broader range of services than the government for the 
reasons considered above, it is not clear that organised civil society provision as a 
whole will be any less fragmented than state provision. If anything, it would seem that 
the opposite is likely, as without some form of regulation to provide direction, whether 
from an external body or self-regulation, it is hard to see how a disparate collection of 
hundreds of thousands of organisations varying in size, structure and purpose will be 
able to co-ordinate their activities on any meaningful level. 129 That said, some degree 
of co-operation is clearly possible: empirical research undertaken by the Charity 
Commission notes that 22% of registered charities currently participate in 
collaborative working of varying levels of formality. 130 
Insulationftom politics 
The third advantage of organised civil society is its relative insulation from political 
considerations. 13 1 Because CSOs do not have to worry about being removed at the 
next election, unlike the government, they are less affected by the consideration of 
time, 132 which enables them to adopt a long-term strategy for their public goods 
provision; for the same reason, they are also freer to pursue innovative methods of 
production. 133 The use of CSOs draws attention away from the government when the 
goods in question are 'culturally sensitive'. 134 On the other side of the coin, there may 
be a 'social stigma' attached to government intervention in a particular situation which 
organised civil society may also be able to avoid. 135 CSOs are also useful in garnering 
resources without alienating the electorate by increasing taxation. 
However, this also paints a somewhat simplistic picture. It is naYve to suggest that 
CSOs are unaffected by political considerations - just as governments must appease 
129 See below Ch 4 at 138 - 140. 130 Charity Commission, RS4: Collaborative Working and Mergers (London, Charity 
Commission, 2003) under 'Extent of collaborative working'. 
131 See Saidel, J., 'Dimensions of Interdependence: The State and Voluntary-Sector 
Relationship' (1989) 18(4) Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 335 at 343; also 
Douglas, above n 43 at 50. 
132 Gassler (1990), above n6 at 143; Anheier, above n 104 at 69. 
133 For further on organised civil society as innovator, see at 97 - 99. 134 Boris, E., 'Nonprofit Organisations in a Democracy: Varied Roles and Responsibilities' in 
Boris, E. and Steuerle, E. (eds. ), Nonprofits and Government Collaboration and Conflict 
(Washington, DC, Urban Institute Press, 1999) at 21. 
"' Douglas, above n 43 at 50. 
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voters and interest groups, so too must CSOs appease their own 'multiple constituents' 
and engage in micro level politics. 136 As well as taking into account the preferences of 
their existing members and donation base, CSOs will need to consider their own image 
in order to increase levels of public support. In addition, CSOs which enter into 
funding arrangements with government bodies will also have to take their interests into 
account, as the terms of an individual contract (or grant) 137 will inevitably reflect the 
political concerns of the funding body. Furthermore, those CSOs which rely on 
government funding have an incentive to ensure they remain politically fashionable in 
order to secure future income. CSOs are also not immune from the macro level 
politics more normally associated with government - those which engage in the 
campaigning and lobbying of government, or, more formally, in consultation 
processes, necessarily occupy a space in the political arena, 138 and may need to 
consider whether shifting the focus of their activities to new public goods will see 
them cast as fickle service providers by the media. 
Philanthropic failures 
Having argued that CSOs are superior public goods providers in comparison to 
government, Salamon identifies four simple problems that may prevent organised civil 
society from producing optimal amounts of public goods, thereby justifying 
government action. 
Philanthropic insufficiency 
The first problem that may arise is if organised civil society as a whole is unable to 
136 O'Regan, K. and Oster, S., 'Nonprofit and For-Profit Partnerships: Rationale and 
Challenges of Cross-Sector Contracting' (2000) 29(l) (Supplement) Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly 120 at 123. Consider e. g. the recent disputes between the National Trust and 
the Devon and Somerset Staghounds and Quantock Staghounds in relation to the use of land 
owned by the Trust (R v National Trustfor Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty, ex 
parte Scott [ 199811 WLR 226 and Scott v National Trust [1998] 2 All ER 705; see also below 
Ch 7 at n 96 and associated text) and between the RSPCA and various pro-hunting lobby 
groups in relation to excluding pro-hunting activists from its membership (Royal Societyfor 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Attorney General [2002] 1 WLR 448). 
137 Government grants will frequently be as prescriptive as contracts: see further Garton, J., 
'Charities and the State' (2000) 14 TLI 93 at 95 - 96. 138 See below at 91 - 96. See e. g. the social housing sector and, to a lesser extent, the provision 
of care for the elderly (see Kendall, above n 110 at 144 - 145,176 - 178). 
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generate sufficient, stable resources to satisfy demands for public goods. Although we 
have already noted how CSOs can be used to circumvent free-riding, the phenomenon 
affects organised civil society as well as the market as there will always be consumers 
who consider it an effective means of maximising their own utility. 139 Even where 
organised civil society as a whole is well resourced, there may be localised problems, 
such as difficulty in attracting funding for particular goods or a lack of CSO presence 
in a particular geographic area. 140 
Philanthropic particularism 
Lack of available funding for particular goods can in turn lead to particularism, 
whereby CSOs are naturally drawn to providing those public goods that attract the 
most resources. 14 1 This will mean that less lucrative goods will be neglected, and low 
CSO activity may, in turn, mean that those who are willing to fund the goods have no 
vehicle to supply them. Conversely, high CSO activity in relation to more popular 
goods may result in 'wasteful duplication of services'. 142 
Philanthropic paternalism 
Salamon suggests that, whilst in theory organised civil society should operate in such a 
way that small groups of citizens are able to fund their own public goods preferences, 
in practice the sector's goods provision as a whole will represent the preferences 'not 
of the community but of its wealthy members'. 143 This may result in 'a debilitating 
sense of dependency' on the part of those who benefit from CSO activity. ' 44 
139 Salarnon (I 987a), above n33 at 39. On the issue of securing stable resources generally, see 
Mitchell, C., 'Saving for a Rainy Day: Charity Reserves' (2002) 8 CL & PR 35; Morris 
(2000), above n 84; Morris, above n 87. 
140 Salarrion (1987a), above n 33 at 40; Salamon (1987b), above n 33 at I 11. See also Kendall, 
above in 110at 118- 119. 
141 Salarnon (1987a), above n 33 at4l; Salamon (1987b), above n 33 at III - 112. Seealso 
Kendall, above n 140 at 119 - 120; Kuti, E., 'The possible role of the non-profit sector in 
Hungary' (1990) 1 (1) Voluntas 26 at 27. For empirical data confirming philanthropic 
particularism, see L. Salamon, 'Nonprofits: the Results are Coming' (1984) 25 (4) Foundation 
News 16. 
142 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 41. 
143 Salamon (1987a), above n 33 at 41; Salamon (1987b), above n 33 at 112; Kendall, above n 
110 at 120 - 121. 144 Salarnon (1987b), above n 33 at 112. 
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Philanthropic amateurism 
We have already noted that the paradigm CSO is either managed by volunteers or 
reliant upon a volunteer workforce. 145 Whilst this is seen by many as a strength for 
several reasons, e. g. because it encourages entrepreneurship and civic participation, 146 
it may also be a weakness if it results in goods of poor quality. 147 This will be a risk 
where a CSO is unable to attract a highly qualified and experienced workforce or 
management team because it cannot afford to remunerate them for their services. 
(6) Public goods and the public benefit test 
It is worth noting at this stage the relationship between the concept of public goods and 
the current regulatory requirement in England, whereby CSOs who wish to obtain 
charitable status must be able to show that their purposes enure to the public benefit. 148 
Despite their similar labels, public benefit is not synonymous with the concept of 
public goods. 149 Charities do not need to provide products that are either nonrivalous 
or nonexcludable (although, of course, they may do). In order to satisfy the public 
benefit test, organisations must simply show (i) that their purposes benefit a cross- 
section of the general public and (ii) that a sufficient number of people are entitled to 
benefit so as to constitute a cross-section of society. 150 It is not surprising that there is 
not an exact correlation between public benefit and public goods, as the foundations of 
145 See above Ch 2 at 49 - 50. 146 See below at 95 - 96,111. 147 Salamon (I 987a), above n 33 at 41; Salamon (1987b), above n 33 at 112 - 113; Kendall, 
above nI 10 at 12 1. See also Smith, S., and Lipsky, M., Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare 
State in the Age of Contracting (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1993) on the 
ý uneven and unpredictable' (at 113) nature of civil society activity in the context of the service 
contracts between CSOs and government. 
148 Jones v Williams (1767) Amb 65 1. 
149 In Australia, which shares the English definition of public benefit, the abandoned Charities 
Bill 2003 proposed that public benefit be defined as being that which is 'aimed at achieving a 
universal or common good' (s 7(l)(a)). This appears to have been in response to the 
submissions made by a number of charities to the Charities Definition Inquiry, which 
suggested that public benefit is synonymous with the provision of public goods or 'near' 
public goods. The Inquiry states that this restatement of public benefit reflects the current 
legal position; however, the submissions concerning public goods were acknowledged without 
comment in its final report (Charities Definition Inquiry, Report of the Inquiry into the 
Definition of Charities and Related Organisations (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 
2001) at 118 - 119). "' Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co [ 195 1] AC 297 at 3 06 per Lord Simonds. 
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charity law predate explicit academic identification and discussion of public goods by 
over three centuries. Yet despite this, the concepts enjoy several shared characteristics 
on different several levels. 
Public goods and indirect public bencrit 
At one level, it can be argued that despite the disparity between the concept of public 
goods and the test of public benefit, all charitable purposes result in the creation of 
public goods. This is because one of the rationales for conferring the advantages of 
charitable status on CSOs is the idea that the public as a whole takes an indirect benefit 
from each isolated act of philanthropy carried out by charitable bodies. In other words, 
every time poverty is relieved, for example, society as a whole is somehow elevated. 
This indirect benefit is clearly both nonrivalous and nonexcludable, for it is not 
diminished if more people enjoy the benefit, nor is it possible to exclude anyone from 
enjoying this benefit; therefore, it is a paradigm public good. 
There is some support for this argument in the caselaw. Organisations which promote 
animal welfare have been upheld as charitable, not because of the direct benefit to the 
animals in question, 15 1 but because they indirectly 'promote public morality by 
checking the innate tendency to cruelty'. 152 As Chitty J stated in the leading case of Re 
Wedgwood: 153 
A gift for the benefit and protection of animals tends to promote and 
encourage kindness towards them, to discourage cruelty, and to ameliorate the 
condition of the brute creation, and thus to stimulate humane and generous 
sentiments in man towards the lower animals, and by these means promote 
feelings of humanity and morality generally, repress brutality, and thus elevate 
the human race. 
Similarly, in Neville Estates v Madden, 154 Cross J held that an unincorporated 
association which ran a private synagogue for the sole use of members satisfied the 
15 1 This satisfies the public benefit test in Ireland: see Armstrong v Reeves (1890) 25 LR Ir 
325. 
152 Re Green's WT [1985] 3 All ER 455 at 457 per Nourse J. 
153 [191511 Ch 113 at 122. 
154 [19621 Ch 832. 
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public benefit test indirectly as 'benefit accrues to the public from the attendance at 
places of worship of persons who live in this world and mix with their fellow 
citizens'. 155 
There are however a number of limitations with this approach to public benefit. First, 
whilst those purposes which satisfy the public test also result in indirect benefit to the 
whole of society, indirect public benefit alone will not always satisfy the test. In 
Gilmour v Coats, 156 which concerned an enclosed order of Carmelite nuns which was 
unable to demonstrate public benefit in its activities of the kind in Neville Estates v 
Madden as there was no mixing with fellow citizens, the House of Lords rejected the 
idea that the public benefit test could be satisfied by reference to the indirect public 
benefit of 'the edification of a wider public by the example of lives devoted to 
prayer', 157 as this was too 'vague and intangible' to be justiciable. 158 Furthermore, 
when considering the extent of public benefit under the fourth head of charity in 
BaddeleY v Inland Revenue Commissioners, 159 Viscount Simonds, whilst recognising 
an indirect benefit to wider society from all charitable pursuits, expressed doubt as to 
whether this was an appropriate way of accounting for a body of caselaw which owes 
more to incremental development by way of drawing analogies with purposes listed in 
the preamble to the Statute of Uses 1601 than any overarching principle. 160 
Second, it is possible to find indirect public benefit of this type, which technically 
corresponds with the concept of public goods, in the activities not just of wider civil 
society but also of both the private and public sectors. For example, the operation of 
any private enterprise may have indirect public benefits such as the creation of jobs 161 
and contribution towards the economy, which elevate society. Similarly, state 
functions such as the provision of a judicial system and a national health service have 
an equivalent indirect benefit extending beyond those individuals who avail 
themselves of these services. One could argue that to define either charities or wider 
155 Above n 154 at 853. 156 [ 1949] AC 426. 
157 Above n 15 6 at 442 per Lord Simonds. 
158 Above n 15 6 at 446 per Lord Simonds. 
159 [19551 AC 572. 
160 Above n 159 at 590. 
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civil society in terms of the provision of this kind of public good is therefore 
meaningless, as every organisation across every sector, with the exception of those 
which seek to subvert society, will indirectly produce some kind of public good. 
Whilst there is some strength in this argument, we should note that a distinction can be 
drawn between charitable CSOs (and also public bodies) and private organisations. 
Whilst the activities of a private enterprise may result in the creation of public goods at 
this intangible level, this is not its purpose; that is profit-maximisation. Conversely, it 
is the purpose of a charity, at least theoretically, to provide public goods. Accordingly, 
it is the purposes of a charity rather than its activities to which the public benefit test 
relates. The Charity Commission has made numerous attempts in recent years to turn 
the focus of charitable status towards an organisation's activities as well as its purpose. 
In 1996 the Commission proposed unsuccessfully that only organisations which could 
demonstrate how their activities would accomplish their charitable purpose should be 
admitted onto the register of charities. 162 In 1999, when the Commission recognised 
for the first time the promotion of urban and rural regeneration as a distinct charitable 
purpose, 163 it stated that a successful registration would have to demonstrate that the 
charity would undertake 'at least three or four' activities covering a 'broad spectrum of 
regeneration work'. 164 This attitude is explained by the fact that the Commission has 
both gate-keeping and regulatory functions, being responsible not just for registering 
charities but also overseeing their conduct afterwards; it is clearly administratively 
efficient to iron out as many potential problems with an organisation's existing or 
proposed activities (e. g. if they fall outside the scope of its stated purpose) at the time 
of registration. 165 
161 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and 
the Wider Not-For-Profit Sector (London, HMSO, 2002), para 4.5. 
162 Charity Commission, Draft Frameworkfor the Review of the Register of Charities 
(London, HMSO, 1996). In response to negative feedback (e. g. NCVO, Charity Commission 
Review of the Register: NCVO's Response to the Draft Frameworkfor the Review (London, 
NCVO, 1998), para 3.2), this proposal was dropped in the final review: Charity Commission, 
RRI: The Review of the Register of Charities (London, HMSO, 2001). 
163 Charity Commission, RR2: Promotion of Urban and Rural Regeneration (London, HMSO, 
1999), para 6. 
... Charity Commission, above n 163, para 8. 
165 See Mitchell, C., 'Reviewing the Register' in Mitchell, C. and Moody, S. (eds. ), 
Foundations of Charity (Oxford, Hart, 2000) at 185. 
84 
3: FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
There are also several examples in the caselaw where activities have been taken into 
account when determining charitable status, most recently in Southwood v Attorney- 
General, 166 where the Court of Appeal relied on evidence of an organisation's past 
activities to deny charitable status despite it having purposes which were 'redolent 
with the flavour of charity'. 167 Nevertheless, it is not clear that consideration of an 
organisation's activities is officially part of the public benefit test, and in 2002 the 
consultation paper released by the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit recommended that 
activities should not be a defining factor. The paper considered that basing charitable 
status on activities rather than purposes would risk the 'stifling of initiative and 
innovation'. 168 There is also a perceived danger that an activities-based test would 
have ramifications for the independence of the sector. 169 Under the current law, 
although it is the state (through the law courts and the Charity Commission) that 
decides from time to time which purposes are to be considered charitable, charities are 
free to engage in any activities that are legitimately directed towards the 
accomplishment of these purposes. 170 An activities-based test would effectively mean 
that charities would not be free to choose how to work towards a particular charitable 
purpose, for each activity undertaken would need the approval of the court or the 
Commission. 
Public goods and direct public benerit 
We can say two things about the relationship between direct public benefit and public 
goods. First, the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses and the subsequent 
caselaw can both be viewed as implicitly acknowledging the importance of public 
goods at a practical level. Second, public benefit under the fourth head of charity - 
166 The Times, July 18,2000 
167 CA transcript, para 4 per Chadwick LJ. Another recent example is IRC v Oldham Training 
and Enterprise Council [ 1996] STC 1218. 
168 Above n 161 para 4.11. For discussion of the significance of initiative and innovation in 
organised civil society generally, see below at 106 - 108. 169 Also noted in the Strategy Unit report, above n 161, para 4.11. 
170 With the exception of political activities, which must not be the main activity of a charity 
(Charity Commission, CC9: Political Activities and Campaigning by Charities (London, 
HMSO, 2004), para 23). 
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cother purposes beneficial to the community' 171 _ replicates one of the characteristics 
of public goods, as the test laid down in Baddeley v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
operates to ensure that charities under this head only provide goods and services in a 
nonexcludable fashion. 172 
English charity law can be viewed as utilitarian in nature. The list of purposes in the 
173 
Preamble, which demonstrates 'the kind of charity the State wished to encourage' , 
reflects legal charity's origin in the activities of the Protestant Church of England, 
which played a 'fundamental' role in maintaining the structure and social fabric of 
British society in the seventeenth century. 174 Furthermore, the proliferation of charity 
law cases in the nineteenth century that expanded upon these original purposes has 
been attributed to the Victorian social conscience. 175 What is significant for our 
purposes is that many early charitable purposes are of a kind which we would now 
recognise as public goods: for example, the Preamble includes purposes which cover 
environmental concerns ('the repair of ... sea-banks'), 
176 law and order ('the 
maintenance of houses of correction' ), 177 and national security ('the aid or ease of any 
poor inhabitants concerning the payment of fifteens [and] setting out of soldiers'), 178 
all of which are nonexcludable and nonrivalous. Francis Moore, writing at the time the 
Statute of Charitable Uses was enacted, was of the view that its aim was to encourage 
activities which benefited the whole of society. 179 
This concern with improving the general quality of life across society is further 
illustrated by the fact that it will not suffice for an organisation which advances 
religion to rely on spiritual benefits to satisfy the public benefit test. In Gilmour v 
171 Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 at 583 per Lord 
Macnaghten. See also Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 9 Ves 399 at 531 per Sir Samuel 
Romilly (arguing as counsel): 'the advancements of objects of general utility'. 
172 [1953] Ch 504. 
173 Jones, G., History of the Law of Charity 1532 - 1827 (Cambridge, CUP, 1969) at 27. 174 Woodfield, 'Doing God's Work: Is Religion Always Charitable? ' (1996) 8 Auckland Law 
Review 25 at 27. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Preamble, Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 as translated into modern English in Picarda, H., 
The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (London, Butterworths, 1999,3rd ed. ) at 9. 
177 Preamble, Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, above n 176. 
178 Preamble, Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, above n 176. 
179 Francis Moore, Reading on the 1601 Statute (1607), quoted in Jones, above n 173 at 27. 
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Coats, 180 in addition to the edification argument discussed above, 181 the House of 
Lords refused to recognise public benefit in the activities of a closed order of nuns who 
had no contact with the outside world but merely indulged in 'sequestered piety'. 182 
The argument that there was a spiritual benefit from the nuns' acts of prayer was 
rejected, as 'good works demanded participation in mundane affairs, not withdrawal 
from them through flight to monastery'. 183 This was affirmed in Re Warre's Will 
Trusts, 184 where it was held that that spiritual activities are 'no doubt good for the soul 
and may be of benefit by some intercessory process of which the law takes no notice 
but they are not (legally speaking) charitable activities'. 185 
Implicit recognition of the importance of the provision of public goods can also be 
found with regard to the public benefit test under the fourth head of charity. In 
Baddeley v Inland Revenue Commissioners, Lord Simonds stated that an organisation 
will not be granted charitable status if its direct beneficiaries are limited to a 'class 
within a class'. 186 In other words, no individual or group of people may be declared 
ineligible to take advantage of a charity's services except insofar as the inherent nature 
of the service limits beneficiaries: for example, a organisation with the purpose of 
treating the sick could legitimately turn away the healthy, but could not limit itself to 
treating only the sick members of a specific group of people. In laying down this test, 
His Lordship effectively ensured that all charities which fall under the fourth head 
perform their services as though they were nonexcludable. 
180 Above n 156. 
"' See above, text relating to nn 157 and 158. 
182 Blakeney, M., 'Sequestered Piety and Charity' (1981) 2 JnI Leg Hist 207. 
183 Merton, R., Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England (New York, 
Howard Fertig, 1970) at 62, quoted in Blakeney above n 182 at 214. 
184 [19531 1 WLR725. 
185 Above n 184 at 729 per Harman J. It should be noted, however, that there are ways of 
explaining the law's attitude to spirituality without implicit reference to public goods. In 
Gilmour v Coats itself the House of Lords regarded their conclusion as the inevitable 
consequence of a court system only equipped to deal with evidence that is capable of proof - at 
446 per Lord Simonds; at 453 per Lord du Parcq. Others have suggested, less convincingly, 
that it is the manifestation of bias against the Roman Catholic church, which places more 
emphasis on spirituality than the established church - for example, Blakeney, above n 182. 
For a summary of evidence to the contrary, see Rickett, C., 'An Anti-Roman Catholic Bias in 
the Law of Charity? ' [ 1990] Conv 34. 
186 Above n 159 at 591. The only exceptions to this seem to be if the organisation limits its 
work to a particular geographic area (Lord Simonds, above n 159 at 591); or if the limitation is 
reasonably related to its charitable purpose (Re Dunlop [ 1984] NI 408). 
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D. PROVISION OF PRIVATE GOODS: 
INTANGIBLE SERVICES AND RE-DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 
Hansmann's theory of contract failure and the lack of trust towards the market are not 
limited in their applicability to the provision of public goods. There is a need for 
trustworthy organisations to provide certain types of private goods or services which 
are afflicted by information asymmetry, and which do not lend themselves easily to 
evaluation. For the same reasons as noted in our discussion of public goods, "' CSOs 
therefore provide an attractive alternative to the market where this is the case. The two 
types of good where information asymmetry results in a strong CSO presence as 
service provider are (i) those where the service provided is intangible in nature and (ii) 
those where the purchaser is not the consumer or beneficiary and the result is 
essentially a redistribution of wealth. 
(1) Intangible services 
The first type of private goods commonly provided by organised civil society consists 
of services which, by their intangible nature, are too 'complex and difficult' to 
evaluate, 1 88 even when the purchaser and consumer are same or are able to 
communicate with ease. 189 Organised civil society's role here is evidenced by 
prominent charitable activity under the second and fourth heads of charity (the 
advancement of education and the provision of social welfare as a purpose beneficial 
to the community), 190 and CSOs engaged in this function are strongly represented in 
the twenty most successful fundraising charities in 1999/2000.191 Commonplace 
187 See above at 65 - 68. 188 Hansmann (1987), above n 31 at 70 - 71. 189 Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 30; Hansmann (1987), above n 31 at 70 - 71. 190 Aspects of social welfare provision are sometimes classified under an extended first head of 
charity covering the 'relief of poverty, the impotent and the aged' (e. g. Warburton, J., Tudor 
on Charities (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1995) at 20); however, there is no logical reason 
for this grouping and the most recent leading text places the provision of social welfare which 
is unrelated to poverty under the fourth (Picarda, above n 176 at 13). 
191 These are (followed by ranking) NSPCC (9), MacMillan Cancer Relief (10), Barnardo's 
(11), British Red Cross Society (13), Save the Children Fund (14), Marie Curie Cancer Care 
(15), Help the Aged (16), SCOPE (18) and Christian Aid (19) (Charities Aid Foundation, 
above n 106 at 14). 
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intangible services include academic and physical education, the provision of care 
homes and mental health care, and social housing. 192 
(2) Redistribution of wealth 
A significant amount of organised civil society is dedicated to facilitating the transfer 
of resources from donors, who purchase goods and service, to beneficiaries, who 
consume them. 193 This is reflected in the fact that two of the four heads of charity 
focus upon redistribution of wealth: the relief of poverty and, to a lesser extent, 194 the 
advancement of education; it is also significant that twelve of the top twenty 
fandraising charities are wholly or partly concerned with wealth redistribution in some 
form. 195 We should also note at this juncture the social housing sector, which 
facilitates the redistribution of wealth by providing accommodation, through various 
means, 196 to those whose 'personal financial constraints and social vulnerabilities' 
prevent them from renting or purchasing property in the private sector. 197 
The reason for such a strong CSO presence in this arena is due to the information 
asymmetry which arises from the fact that the donor is not the beneficiary. Whilst it 
192 Where a CSO operates simply to provide accommodation and nothing more, no intangible 
services will necessarily be involved; accordingly social housing is better dealt with under the 
discussion of the distribution of wealth (see below at 89 - 90). However, it merits inclusion 
here as a number of housing associations undertake social care, which will involve intangible 
service provision (see Kendall, above nI 10 at 140). 
193 See generally Possett, J. and Sandler, T., 'Transfers, Transaction Costs and Charitable 
Intermediaries' (1988) 8 International Review of Law and Economics 145. 
194 Under the current law, fee-paying schools are eligible for charitable status, yet there is no 
redistribution of wealth inherent in their activities - they might more naturally be classed as 
providers of complex personal services (see previous paragraph). Proposals for reform have 
suggested that fee-paying schools wishing to obtain charitable status should be required to 
offer scholarships or make their facilities available to neighbouring non-fee-paying schools 
(NCVO Charity Law Reform Advisory Group, For the public benefit? (London, NCVO, 
200 1), para 4.3.8; Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 16 1, para 4.26), implicitly 
recognising the significance of wealth redistribution in civil society activity. 
195 These are (followed by ranking): Oxfam (4), British Heart Foundation (5), Salvation Army 
(8), NSPCC (9), MacMillan Cancer Relief (10), Barnardo's (11), British Red Cross Society 
(13), Save the Children Fund (14), Marie Curie Cancer Care (15), Help the Aged (16), SCOPE 
(18) and Christian Aid (19) (Charities Aid Foundation, above n 106 at 14). All of these 
charities are concerned, to a greater or lesser extent, with applying donations for the benefit of 
others. 
196 On these, see the Housing Act 1996, ss 2(2), 2(4). 
197 Kendall, above nI 10 at 140. 
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may be possible for the beneficiary to evaluate the quality of the service he receives, 
although this will not be the case if the service provided is intangible, 198 it will usually 
be difficult for this information to be communicated to the donor. As with public 
goods, regulation of the market to resolve the deficit would be stymied by lack of post- 
delivery monitoring, and so again donors turn to organised civil society as the most 
trustworthy option. 
An alternative analysis, suggested by Hansmann, 199 is that there is an implicit loan 
arrangement between CSOs and beneficiaries, whereby goods and services are 
provided in expectation of 'voluntary payback' at a point in the future when the 
beneficiaries are themselves in a position to make donations. 200 Payback could be 
coerced through a combination of moral instruction during the actual service provision 
followed by pressure from beneficiary-targeted fundraising campaigns. There is no 
available empirical research showing the proportion of CSO income which consists of 
ex-beneficiary donations (it may be difficult to obtain accurate statistics relating to the 
origins of donations, given that many gifts to CSOs are anonymous), but some 
informal support for this theory may be found in the education context with the 
prevalence of alumni associations designed to encourage ex-beneficiaries to donate to 
the institutions which schooled them. 
It is interesting to note from a regulatory point of view that the redistribution of wealth 
can be an end in its own right and also the means by which another civil society 
function is achieved. For example, all the charities listed above as examples of 
providers of intangible services rely on donations from non-beneficiaries and thus their 
activities contribute to wealth redistribution, 201 even though this may not be their 
primary purpose. We should note, however, that not every CSO that relies on 
donations will redistribute wealth in any meaningful sense - it may be that an 
organisation's donors are also its users, as is typically the case with CSOs that promote 
high art. 202 
'98 On which, see above at 88 - 89. 199 Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 70. 
200 Hansmann (1987), above n 31 at 30; Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 70. 
20 1 Above n 191. 
202 See further below at 97. 
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E. FACILITATION OF POLITICAL ACTION 
The political function of organised civil society is, somewhat ironically, a politically 
controversial one. The value of CSOs' generally engaging in political action is 
explicitly recognised in several policy statements of the post-1997 Labour 
governments, 203 but there is a marked contrast in the state's attitude towards charities. 
Under existing law, charities may not have a political purpose, 204 even if it otherwise 
falls under one of the four heads of charity. 205 Charity Commission guidelines permit 
charities to carry out political activity in furtherance of their non-political charitable 
objects, but only insofar as this is 'ancillary' to the rest of their customary activities. 206 
Despite the disparity between CSO government policy and charity law, both the Prime 
Minister's Strategy Unit report 207 and the government's response 208 recommend that 
these restrictions remain in place. 209 It would be inappropriate at this juncture to 
consider the many abstract arguments for and against freedom of political speech and 
association generally; 210 rather, we shall consider the specific roles played by 
organised civil society in this arena. CSO political activity can be split broadly into 
overlapping functions: (i) the advocacy of minority ideas, (ii) the accountability of the 
state and (iii) the facilitation of pluralism. 
203 See in particular: Home Office, Getting it Right Together: Compact on Relations between 
Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector in England (London, HMSO, Cm 4100, 
1998), para 8.6; Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 161, para 4.52 
204 De Themmines v De Bonneval (1828) 5 Russ 288; Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] 
AC 406; National Anti- Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 3 1; 
McGovern vAttorney-General [1982] Ch 321. Apolitical purpose is defined by Slade J in 
McGovern as being one which aims to secure a change in the law, or reversal of government 
policy, of any country, or which promotes a particular political party (at 340). 
205 McGovern, above n 204 at 340 per Slade J. 
206 Charity Commission, above n 170, para 23. 
207 Above n 161 under the recommendation following para 4.56. 
208 Home Office, Charities and Not-for-Profits: A Modern Legal Framework (London, Home 
Office, 2003), para 3.37. 
2'9 The only concessions to increasing political action are recommendations (i) that the 
Commission guidelines state clearly the type of activities which charities may engage in, as 
opposed to merely emphasising those which are prohibited and (ii) that the guidelines should 
also differentiate between the type of activities which are prohibited by law and those which 
are discouraged by the Commission but have no adverse regulatory consequences, for 
example, the potential loss of charitable status (Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 161 
under the recommendation following para 4.56; approved by Home Office, above n 208, para 
3.37). 
"0 For a detailed analysis see Barendt, E., Freedom of Speech (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1987), especially chs I (on free speech generally), 5 (on political speech) and 10 (on freedom 
of association). 
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(1) Advocacy of minority interests 
One of the key functions of organised civil society is the so-called 'pressure group 
function', 211 whereby CSOs act as platforms for the advocacy of minority groups' 
interests. These minority groups will typically represent the socially disadvantaged - 
for example, disabled rights groups such as the British Council of Disabled People, or 
human rights groups such as Amnesty International. However, CSOs also enable other 
minority interests to be voiced - for example, think tanks allow political 
ideologies 
212 
other than those of the current government to be advanced . 
The dissemination of 
minority viewpoints is not only of benefit to members of the minority in question, but 
also to the wider public. First, it encourages the tolerance of minority ideas by the 
majority. 213 Second, it facilitates specialist involvement in 'problem identification and 
agenda- setting', 214 creating what 6 and Randon refer to as a 'market place of ideas' to 
assist policymakers. 215 These ideas should also be all the more robust by virtue of the 
fact that the proliferation of conflicting ideas ensures that citizens are routinely 
'challenged and forced to defend their views'. 216 
Market failure 
The reasons why minority groups look to organised civil society, and not the private or 
public sectors, is because minority interest advocacy is analogous to public goods in 
that the benefits are nonrivalous and nonexcludable. 217 Unlike public goods, however, 
the benefits are only nonrivalous and nonexcludable within the boundaries of the 
minority group in question, rather than the public at large. Because of these qualities, 
minority interest advocacy will typically be unable to yield a profit, for, as with public 
21 1 Kendall, J. and Knapp, M., 'A loose and baggy monster: boundaries, definitions and 
typologies' in Davis Smith, J., Rochester, C. and Hedley, R. (eds. ), An Introduction to the 
Voluntary Sector (London & New York, Routledge, 1995) at 67. 
212 Think tanks are particularly noteworthy, as political bias has not prevented a number from 
registering as educational charities - for example, Demos (Registered Charity No. 1042046). 213 6, P. and Randon, A., Liberty, Charity and Politics: Non-Profit Law and Freedom of 
Speech (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995) at 132 - 133. 214 Saidel, above n 131 at 342. 
215 6 and Randon, above n 213 at 135. 
216 Barendt, above n2 10 at 9. 
217 See above at 62 - 63. 
92 
3: FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
goods provision, there will always be a strong incentive for members of the minority 
group to free ride. 218 
Furthermore, as with many public goods and intangible private services, the complex 
nature of the service being provided means it will often be difficult to evaluate the 
success of any given campaign. For example, let us imagine that campaign group a 
wants the govermnent to implement policy b. If group a lobbies the government but 
the government implements policy c instead, this will not necessarily be a reflection of 
the quality of group a's campaign (although it might be), as behind every policy 
decision lies any number of factors which need to be taken into account when arriving 
at a decision. On the other side of the coin, if the government does implement policy 
b, it does not necessarily follow that group a's campaign was a contributory factor 
(although it may have been). Difficulties of evaluation will also arise where a 
campaign is less targeted than the above example - for example, if its purpose is to 
'raise public awareness' rather than effect a specific policy change. The consequence 
of these difficulties in evaluating the quality of advocacy is that minority groups will 
be drawn towards the most trustworthy service provider, which we have already noted 
is organised civil society. 219 
It is interesting to note that the lack of information regarding the success of a campaign 
may be ameliorated in practice by the threat of judicial review. Although there is no 
220 
general rule that the reasons for a public body's decision must always be given , 
lack 
of reasons may leave a decision open to a challenge of irrationality if the 'known facts 
and circumstances appear to point overwhelmingly in favour of a different decision'. 221 
Also, the context in which a decision is made may be such that fairness requires 
reasons to be given - for example, where an existing policy is supplanted by another 
222 
or where the decision determines an individual's 'civil rights and obligations'. 223 
Furthermore, even in those situations where reasons are not required per se, reasons 
218 See above at 63. 219 See above at 65 - 68. 220 Rv Home Secretary, exparte Doody [1994] 1 AC 53 1; Rv Minister ofDefence, exparte 
Murray [1998] COS 134. 
22 1Rv Secretary ofStatefor Trade andIndustry, exparte Lonrho [1989] 1 WLR 525 at 540 
per Lord Keith. See below Ch 8 at 260 - 262. 222 Rv Home Secretary, ex parte Urmaza [ 1996] COD 479. See H. Wade and C. Forsyth, 
Administrative Law (Oxford, OUP, 2000) at 517 - 518. 
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must be given to the court if leave to apply for judicial review is granted. 224 The result 
of this is likely to be that in practice, decision-makers will give reasons as a matter of 
course. However, it has been suggested that over time decision-makers learn to 'play 
the game' and as a matter of course declare that certain factors were taken into account 
when reaching a particular decision, regardless of whether this is an accurate reflection 
of the decision-making process. 225 Problems may also arise if a campaign is targeted 
at the private sector rather than government - unless a private organisation is carrying 
out a public function 226 these rules will not apply. 
Role of civil society 
We have noted that a democratic government is unable to cater effectively for the 
public goods demands of minority groups because this would conflict with its 
underlying theoretical basis to give effect to the wishes of the majority. 227 Conversely, 
there is no inherent problem with a democracy providing some state mechanism to 
facilitate the advocacy of minority interests and enable attention to be drawn to them in 
policy formulation and other decision-making processes. Nevertheless there are a 
number of reasons to suggest that it may be more appropriate to utilise CSOs - 
namely, the fact that they are, in theory, easy to form, efficient and expert. We have 
already considered these features of organised civil society in detail elsewhere. 228 
(2) Accountability of government 
One of the important effects of organised civil society's pressure group function is that 
it contributes towards the accountability of government. 229 Because CSOs have the 
potential to develop expertise in their chosen field '230 they are well-positioned to 
223 Human Rights Act 1998, ss 3&6; ECHR, art 6(l). 
224 Rv Lancashire County Council, exparte Huddleston [1986] 2 All ER 941. 
225 Of course, this can work both ways -a decision maker may state that he has taken x, y and z 
into account when in fact his mandate was to take into account only x and y. 
226 On which, see above Ch 2 at 39 - 40 and below Ch 5 at 163 - 164. 22' Although we have already considered the limitations of this in practice (see above at 71). 
228 See above at 73 - 78. 229 See Saidel, above n 131 at 342; Young, above n 56 at 155 - 156. 230 See above at 76 - 78. 
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evaluate government policies and act as 4watchdog', 231 providing a 'valuable check 
and balance' on the actions of the state. 232 This can take effect in two ways. First, 
CSO feedback may be requested and recognised by the state, e. g. through formal 
mechanisms such as consultation processes. 233 Second, CSOs are able to disseminate 
their feedback to the general public and thereby publicly 'prod' the goverment into 
rethinking or justifying a particular policy decision. 234 The result is, as Blair notes : 
235 
a constant flow of citizen inputs to the state, which, being continually 
reminded of what its citizens want, finds it difficult to wander too far from 
those wishes. ... 
[and] discovers itself having to accommodate conflicting 
voices in such ways that it cannot surrender to any one voice or small coterie 
of voices. 
This is particularly important when we consider the tendency of democratic 
governments to pursue the interests of those groups with the loudest voices rather than 
those of the majority. 236 It is important to bear in mind, however, that, despite their 
expertise and supposedly 'independent voice', 237 there may be temptation for 
individual CSOs to misrepresent or distort the implications of policy decisions in order 
to further their objectives. This is an issue to which we shall return later. 238 
(3) Pluralism and civic involvement 
Organised civil society's participation in the political arena facilitates pluralism and 
citizen involvement in society. 239 This function has been recognised officially, 240 and 
23 1 Lloyd, P., 'The Relationship Between Voluntary Associations and State Agencies in the 
Provision of Social Services at the Local Level' in Anheier and Seibel, above n 34 at 244. 
232 NCVO Charity Law Reform Advisory Group, above n 194, para 2.2.5. 
233 See Saidel, above n 131 at 342. 
234 Young, above n 56 at 15 1. See also Jenkins, J., 'Nonprofit Organizations and Policy 
Advocacy' in Powell, above n 31 at 307. 
235 Blair, H., 'Donors, Democratisation and Civil Society: Relating Theory to Practice' in 
Hulme and Edwards, above n 123 at 29. 
236 See above n 81 and associated text. The loudest voices will typically be those of private 
industries or individual private business with sufficient capital to devote considerable sums of 
money to lobbying the government. 
237 Saidel, above n 13 1 at 343; see also above Ch 2 at 50 -51. 
238 See below Ch 4 at 129 - 13 1. 239 See Anheier, above n 103 at 69; Blair, above n 235 at 28; Dunn, A., 'Shoots among the 
Grassroots: Political Activity and the Independence of the Voluntary Sector' in Dunn, above n 
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has been described as the 'most attractive' justification for freedom of political 
expression generally. 24 1 By providing minority groups with the opportunity to 
represent their interests, organised civil society enables 'previously marginalised' 
groups to mobilise and play an active part in civic affairs. 242 This in turn encourages 
self-fulfilment through autonomy and self-determination, which we consider in detail 
below. 243 Furthermore, it has been suggested that, by facilitating the creation of many 
assorted interest groups with diverse but overlapping interests, organised civil society 
encourages citizens to affiliate themselves with many different groups 
simultaneously. 244 This may discourage the polarization of interest groups with 
accentuated ideological differences, which itself may jeopardise citizen co-operation 
and the tolerance of the ideas of others. 
F. PROVISION OF CULTURAL SERVICES 
The inability to generate a profit is not the exclusive domain of the public good. In the 
realm of private goods, those activities which fall under the banner of 'high culture' 
also suffer from this problem, 245 and as a consequence they are frequently provided by 
organised civil society rather than the market. There have been a number of attempts 
to explain civil society activity in this arena. On one level it could be argued that there 
is an intrinsic indirect public benefit to society as a whole (of a nonexcludable and 
nonrivalous kind) in the provision of cultural services, 246 and that civil society 
presence in this arena can consequently be explained purely by reference to public 
goods. However, we have already noted that this approach towards civil society 
activity and the provision of public goods is unsatisfactory as it fails to differentiate 
CSO activity from that undertaken by the public and private sectors. 247 Alternatively, 
87 at 144; Klingelhofer, S., and Kendall Frye, J., Global Perspectives on Not-for-Profit Law 
(www. icnl. org, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 1997) at 1. 
240 United Nations System of National Accounts, para 4.55. 
24 1 Barendt, above n 210 at 20. 
242 Blair, above n 235 at 28. 
243 See below at 98 - 105. 244 Blair, above n 235 at 28. 
245 DiMaggio, above n 72 at 195. 
246 Such as the generation of prestige for a geographic area, or the enhancement of the 'cultural 
experience' of those who do not benefit directly through 'processes of cultural stimulus and 
transmission' (Hansmann, H., 'Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing Arts' (1981) 12 Bell 
Journal q Economics 341 at 342). !f 
247 See above at 83 - 84. 
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although many cultural CSOs charge their users for their services, we might expect 
that as many are also funded in part by donations, 248 they are concerned with 
249 facilitating the redistribution of wealth. However, this explanation is also 
problematic in that in practice it tends not to be the economically disadvantaged who 
make use of cultural services; rather it is the 'well-heeled'; 250 also, donors tend to be 
the ones who purchase the services. 251 
The better analysis is that of Hansmarm, who suggests that in order to provide certain 
cultural services it is necessary to engage in 'voluntary price discrimination' 252 with 
ýsome consumers agree[ing] to pay more than others for the same service'. 253 The 
reason for this is to do with the relationship between the fixed costs and incremental 
costs of service production. Individual ticket prices for a cultural event must reflect 
the fact that once the event is held, the cost of allowing one more consumer to attend 
(i. e. the 'incremental' cost) is virtually nonexistent. 254 However, in order to hold the 
event there will be a large number of unavoidable production costs which will be 
unaffected by the number of consumers who purchase a ticket (i. e. they are 'fixed') - 
for example, the cost of hiring actors or commissioning paintings remains constant 
regardless of whether the event will ultimately attract one patron or a thousand. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that demand is such that cultural events are generally unable to 
attract enough consumers to cover the total costs of production. 255 Consequently, if a 
cultural organisation was dependent on ticket sales alone, it would be unlikely to be 
able to mount many, if any, productions. 
The solution to this problem is simple: some consumers voluntarily pay more for their 
tickets than others, despite the fact that they receive the same utility as those 
consumers who do not, for they are aware that if they do not future productions would 
not be possible. 256 This is achieved by making a donation to the organisation in 
248 Hansmann, above n 246 at 341 - 342. 249 See above at 89 - 90. 2" Hansmann, above n 246 at 342. 
25 , Hansmann, above n 246 at 342. 
252 Hansmann, above n 246 at 343; Hansmann (1986), above n 31 at 69. 
253 DiMaggio, above n 72 at 202. 
254 Hausmann notes that this is only true up until the point when the venue of a particular 
cultural event reaches capacity (above n 246 at 343). 
25 ' Hansmann, above n 246 at 343. 
256 Hansmann, above n 246 at 344. 
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addition to purchasing a ticket. The reason why CSOs dominate the provision of 
cultural services is therefore that they are once more the most trustworthy option when 
faced with the information asymmetry which will inevitably result. 257 Of course, 
where consumers are aware that others are willing to pay more for their tickets, there 
will always be some who are tempted to free-ride, which would necessitate those few 
good souls donating even more money in order to secure future productions. 
G. FACILITATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
Organised civil society can play a significant role in the facilitation of the 'self- 
determination' of its participants, by which we mean the development of an 
independent and self-directed personality. The nurturing of such a personality is a 
central theme in much philosophical writing and is necessary to satisfy the human 
desire for 'power, emotional associations, autonomy and ... mutual support'. 
258 It also 
plays a part in counteracting the 'dirigisme of the state'. 259 There are three ways in 
which organised civil society is able to contribute to self-determination: (i) by 
providing an outlet for the expression of altruism, (ii) by providing a vehicle for 
mutual support and (iii) by providing an outlet for ideological expression. 
(1) Altruistic expression 
The idea that organised civil society is an important vehicle for altruistic expression is 
260 261 
well-documented in the literature and affirmed in empirical research . 
Charity and philanthropy 
Although the virtues of charity and philanthropy are sometimes treated as 
interchangeable, 262 they are in fact quite distinct: charity is benevolence towards those 
257 See above at 65 - 68. 25' Anderson, J. and Moore, L., 'The Motivation to Volunteer' (1978) 7 Journal of Voluntary 
Action Research 120 at 120 
259 Knapp et al, above n 102 at 209. 
260 See e. g. Anderson and Moore, above n 258 at 120; Anheier, above n 103 at 68; Clohesy, 
W., 'Altruism and the Endurance of the Good' (2000) 11(3) Voluntas 237; Gassler (1990), 
above n6 at 143; Home Office, above n 104, para 1.4; Rose-Ackerman, above n 50 at 121; 
United Nations System of National Accounts, para 4.55. 
261 James and Rose-Ackerman, above n 28 at 60. 
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in need; philanthropy is benevolence towards mankind more generally. 
263 The 
tendency to treat the two as one and the same is perhaps the result of the current 
definition of legal charity, which encompasses both virtues. For example, a charity 
which relieves poverty by running a soup kitchen must by definition limit its class of 
264 beneficiaries to those who are in need , and thus 
facilitates the charitable intentions 
of its trustees, volunteers and donors. A charity which advances education by running 
an art gallery open to the general public, on the other hand, will not necessarily benefit 
the needy, but is able to facilitate philanthropic intention by providing a benefit to all 
the members of the wider community who choose to avail themselves of its 
facilities. 265 
Interestingly, if legal charity were concerned solely with facilitating charitable and 
philanthropic intentions, then the weak test of public benefit which applies to those 
charities which relieve poverty could be justified on the ground that this head of 
charity is the only one which is necessarily concerned, in terms of direct benefit, with 
charitable, rather than philanthropic, intention, and so it should not be necessary to 
ensure a cross-section of society was able to benefit. In Australia, the Charities 
Definition Inquiry recommended that altruism be a requirement of all legal charity and 
be factored into the public benefit te St'266 although this suggestion was not adopted by 
the now defunct government reform package. 267 We should also note that under 
English law the motives of a donor are wholly irrelevant when deciding whether a gift 
is charitable - it is sufficient that the gift is for a valid charitable purpose and satisfies 
262 See Chesterman, M., Charities, Trusts and Social Welfare (London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1979) at 2; Gardner, J., 'The Virtue of Charity and its Foils' in Mitchell and Moody, 
above n 165 at 17. 
263 See generally Gardner, above n 262. 
264 Although this has been held to include those who 'have to "go short"' (Re Coulthurst 
[ 195 1] Ch 661 at 666 per Lord Evershed MR). 
265 Of course, at an abstract level, all purposes and activities which fall within the framework 
of legal charity can be said to facilitate philanthropic intention by virtue of the notion that all 
charitable pursuits result in an indirect benefit to society at large. See above at 82 - 83. 266 Charities Definition Inquiry, above n 149 Chapter 13, recommendation 7. However, the 
reference to altruism seems largely to have been for appearance's sake, as the Inquiry 
considered that 'while the concept of altruism needs to be emphasised, it is not necessary to 
define the term any more precisely for the purposes of clarifying public benefit ... [as] the 
concept of altruism is sufficiently understood within the community' (at 125). 
26' The Charities Bill 2003, abandoned in May 2004, contained no mention of altruism. 
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the public benefit requirement 268 _ although they may be relevant when deciding 
whether a failed gift is applied to another charitable object under the doctrine of cy 
prL. 269 
Private altruism and public altruism 
In addition to the distinction between charity and philanthropy, it is also useful to 
distinguish between benevolence (whether directed towards the needy or wider 
society) for its own sake (which we might term 'private altruism') and benevolence 
which is motivated by the 'spirit of ostentation' 270 and 'lure of honour 271 (which we 
might term 'public altruism'). By private altruism we do not mean that the charitable 
or philanthropic intent must necessarily be 'pure' in the sense that the donor or 
volunteer receives no utility whatsoever from his participation in organised civil 
society; 272 rather, we mean that his reason for participation is not dependent on 
external factors. Instead, the motivation is introverted in nature - either a feeling of 
personal elevation or satisfaction, like that of a 'good cup of coffee', 273 or a 'relief of 
guilt', 274 that results from the benevolence. Schervish has also noted that there may be 
more pragmatic reasons for favouring private altruism, such as the desire to avoid 
stigmatising beneficiaries or to deflect claims of attention seeking. 275 Public altruism, 
by contrast, is dependent on external factors for its utility to the participant. This is 
268 Hoare v Osborne (1886) LR I Eq 585; Re King [1923] 1 Ch 243; Davies v Hardwick 
[1999] CLY 9454. 
269 Where a gift fails ab initio, rather than after it has already be dedicated to charitable 
purposes, there must be a general or paramount charitable intention on the part of the donor, 
rather than a specific intention to benefit the recipient charity (Re Lysaght [ 1966] Ch 191 at 
202 per Buckley J). Where there is no such intention, cyprýs will not apply and the gift will 
go back to the donor on resulting trust. 
270 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis (translated by Miller, W., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Press, 1913) Book 1.14, para 44. 
271 Cicero, De Officiis Book 1.14, para 44, alternative translation in Hands, A., Charities and 
Social Aid in Greece and Rome (London, Thames and Hudson, 1968) at 49; noted in Smith, J. 
and Borgmann, K., 'Foundations in Europe: the Historical Context', in Schl0ter et al, above n 
103 at 4. 
272 Indeed, many commentators doubt whether 'pure' altruism in this sense can ever actually 
exist - see e. g. Anderson & Moore, above n 260. 273 Brown, E., 'Altruism Towards Groups: The Charitable Provision of Private Goods (1997) 
26 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 175 at 175. 
274 Kingma, B., 'Public good theories of the non-profit sector: Weisbrod revisited' (1997) 8 
Voluntas 135 at 138. 
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interesting from a regulatory perspective, as it means that, unlike private altruism, 
regulation may be able to influence the external factors in order encourage increased 
altruism and generate further resources for the sector. 
It is perhaps worth noting that the public attitude to private and public altruism seems 
to favour the former, with examples of the latter frequently being greeted with a degree 
of cynicism; indeed, Cicero described this form of benevolence 'akin to hypocrisy'. 276 
This is of interest for regulation purposes for two reasons: (i) because it is dependent 
on external factors, we could style regulation to reduce, rather than encourage, 
benevolence of this kind, and (ii) it raises the issue of the extent to which the legal 
framework of organised civil society should reflect public opinion. It is also important 
to note, however, that whilst public altruism may be greeted with cynicism, there may 
be equally unattractive reasons for remaining anonymous, such as the desire to avoid 
being overwhelmed by further requests for money or simply to 'deflect the 
embarrassment of being a philanthropist'. 277 
(2) Mutual support 
The second way in which organised civil society facilitates self-determination is by 
enabling the provision of mutual support. 278 Mutual support lies uneasily, at least in 
theory, with charity and philanthropy, for although both result in the elevation of 
others, the first two are motivated by benevolence, whereas mutual support stems from 
the desire to help one's self and is thus the 'very opposite of altruism'. 279 In practice, 
CSO activity exhibits differing degrees of mutuality and on occasion may sit happily 
alongside charitable and philanthropic activities. The inclusion of CSOs based on 
mutuality in organised civil society is also controversial as they lack the characteristic 
of non-profit distribution, 280 which many focus upon when defining the sector. 281 In 
fact, they have grown in prominence over the past forty years and some argue they are 
275 See generally Schervish, P., 'The sound of one hand clapping: the case for and against 
anonymous giving' (1994) 5(l) Voluntas 1, particularly at 8 and 10 - 11. 27' Above n 27 1, para 44. 
277 Schervish, above n 275 at 5-6. 
278 See Anderson and Moore, n 260; Kendall & Knapp, above n 211 at 67; United Nations 
System of National Accounts, para 4.55. 279 Luxton, above n 12 at 191. 280 See above Ch 2 at 53 - 54. 
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now the dominant force in organised civil society. 282 Furthermore, the non-profit 
distribution requirement itself betrays the Anglo-American focus of much civil society 
theory: there is a strong tradition of mutuality in Europe, where CSOs based on 
'various forms of solidarity' constitute a distinct sub-sector operating alongside 
nonprofits. 283 Like other elements of organised civil society, the mutual sector is 
diverse, consisting of organisations ranging from support networks pursuing social 
aims to building societies and other financial institutions. 
Support groups 
An important element of mutuality within civil society is the self-help support 
284 
network . By creating 'networks and relationships that connect people to each 
other', 285 CSOs enable socially-disadvantaged citizens to associate with each other for 
the benefit of all concemed. The advantage of these associations is that they have the 
281 See above Ch 2, nn 4&5 and associated text. 
282 See e. g. Deakin, N., 'Putting narrow-mindedness out of countenance - the UK voluntary 
sector in the new millennium' in Anheier, H. and Kendall, J. (eds. ), Third Sector Policy at the 
Crossroads An international nonprofit analysis (London & New York, Routledge, 2001) at 37; 
also Kendall, J., Knapp, M., Paton., R., and Thomas, A., 'The "Social Economy" in the UK' in 
Defourny, J., and Monzon Campos, L. (eds. ), Economie Sociale - The Third Sector. - 
Cooperative, Mutual and Nonprofit Organizations (Brussels, de Boeck, 1992); Kendall, J., 
Knapp, M., Paton., R., and Thomas, A., 'The Social Economy of the United Kingdom' (1993) 
46 Revue des Etudes Cooperatives, Mutualistes et Associatives 5 1. On recent efforts to 
quantify these organisations and their place within organised civil society, see Kendall, above 
n 110, Ch 2. 
283 Evers, A., and Laville, J., 'Defining the Third Sector in Europe' in Evers, A., and Laville, J. 
(eds. ), The Third Sector in Europe (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2004) at 3 6. This is referred to 
in the literature as the 'social economy': on which see generally Evers and Laville, ibid; 
International Centre of Research and Information on the Public and Cooperative Economy 
(CIRIEC), The Enterprises and Organzations of the Third System. - A Strategic Challenge for 
Employment (Liege, CIRIEC, 2000). On specific jurisdictions see: Pestoff, V., 'The 
Development and Future of the Social Economy in Sweden' in Evers and Laville, ibid; Ibsen, 
B., 'Changes in Local Voluntary Associations in Denmark' (1996) 7 Voluntas 160; Klausen, 
K., and Selle, P., 'The Third Sector in Scandinavia' (1996) 7 Voluntas 99; Chanial, P., and 
Laville, J., 'French Civil Society Experiences: Attempts to Bridge the Gap Between Political 
and Economic Dimensions' in Evers and Laville, ibid; Archambault, E., 'Defining the 
Nonprofit Sector: France' (www. jhu. edu/-ccss/pubs/pdf/france. pdf, Johns Hopkins 
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, 1993); Laville, J., and Nyssens, M., 'Solidarity-Based 
Third Sector Organizations in the "Proximity Services" Field: A European Francophone 
Perspective' (2000) 11 Voluntas 67; Thomas, A., 'The Rise of Social Solidarity Cooperatives 
in Italy' (2004) 15 Voluntas 243; also note Kendall et al, above n 282 in the UK context. 
284 On which see generally Borkman, T., Understanding Seýf-Help /Mutual Aid: Experiential 
Learning in the Commons (Piscataway, Rutgers University Press, 1999). 
285 Boris, above n 134 at 18. 
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potential to avoid the negative aspects of assistance based on the altruism of others, 
which can be seen as stigmatising 286 and demoralising by virtue of the fact that the 
benefit is dependent on the benevolence of those who are not similarly disadvantaged. 
Self-help also gives citizens the opportunity to take control of their situation and thus 
provide psychological elevation as well as material support. The most obvious 
example of such a support network is Alcoholics Anonymous. 287 
Support groups and charitable status 
Where the 'support' in question is financial, for the most part, the existing law 
conforms to the idea that self-help is anathema to altruism, and a CSO that provides 
financial assistance to its members in return for subscriptions will normally be 
ineligible for charitable status. Certainly it is likely that self-help for its own sake 
cannot be charitable in English law, as it does not fall under any of the four heads of 
charity, 288 although it is now a recognised charitable purpose in Australia by virtue of s 
4 of the Extension of Charitable Purposes Act 2004. There is also a problem when a 
CSO uses self-help as the means to pursue an exclusively charitable purpose, because 
by forming a network with each other its participants necessarily create a nexus 
between themselves, and the organisation will thus fail to satisfy the public benefit test 
under the second, third and fourth heads of charity. 289 However, the 'weak' public 
benefit test under the first head of charity means that those self-help groups that 
operate for the relief of poverty will be legally charitable. 290 
However, if the self-help element of a CSO's activity is of a non-pecuniary nature it 
will not in itself be a bar to charitable status, despite the supposed ideological conflict 
286 See e. g. Schervish, above n 27 5 at 10 -11. 287 Alcoholics Anonymous is a particularly interesting CSO, as it lacks one of the key 
characteristics of a CSO identified earlier (see above Ch 2 at 51 - 52) by virtue of the fact that 
it is informal, having 'no governing officers, no rules or regulations' (Alcoholics Anonymous, 
Structure ofA. A. General Services in US/ Canada (www. alcoholics-anonymous. org. uk/ 
em24doc5. html, Alcoholics Anonymous, 2003 web version), para 1). 
288 See Luxton, above n 12 at 191. 
289 See e. g. Re Hobourn's Aero Components Ltd's Air Raid Distress Fund [1946] 1 Ch 194, 
where a trust to relieve those who were suffering 'damage and distress' from air raids ('in 
itself a good charitable object' (at 202 per Lord Greene MR)) was held not to be charitable as 
only those who had made contributions to the fund were eligible to benefit. 
290 Spiller v Maude (Note) (1886) 32 Chl) 158. See above Ch 2 at 43. 
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between mutuality and altruism. It is possible to satisfactorily combine the two in 
practice, and so long as an organisation is 'substantially altruistic', 291 if its purposes 
are exclusively charitable and public benefit is satisfied, it will be charitable. 292 The 
simplest way in which such a combination can take effect is where an organisation 
relies on donations and a volunteer workforce for administration purposes but utilises a 
support network as a practical means of pursuing its charitable purpose - for example, 
Gingerbread (An Association for One Parent Families) Ltd. 293 Of course, where the 
beneficiaries of a charity are also engaged in its administration at trustee level, care 
must be taken to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure that decisions are taken solely in 
the interests of the organisation. 294 
Mutuality and economic benefits 
At this juncture it is prudent to discuss those mutual organisations which operate to 
provide economic or commercial benefits for their members. Where this is the sole 
purpose of an organisation, then it is likely that we would consider the organisation to 
fall outside the scope of organised civil society. The exclusive pursuit of economic or 
commercial benefits would suggest the organisation falls squarely within our definition 
of the private sector. 295 However, where an organisation pursues these activities (i) as 
a means to carrying out a wider social objective (for example, trade unions) or (ii) in 
conjunction with carrying out a wider social objective (for example, social enterprises) 
then there is an argument that we should include them in our map of organised civil 
society. We shall return to consider this issue in detail in Chapter Five. 296 
291 National Deposit Friendly Society Trustees vSkegness UDC [1959] AC 293 at 315 per 
Lord MacDermott. 
292 At the time of writing, there are 158 registered charities whose names or stated objects 
include the words 'self-help' (Central Register of Charities, www. charity-commission. gov. uk). 
293 Registered Charity No. 282512. 
294 See generally Charity Commission, CC24: Users on Board: Beneficiaries who become 
trustees (London, Charity Commission, 2000). 
295 See above Ch 2 at 39. 
296 See below Ch 5 at 203 - 204. 
104 
3: FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
(3) Ideological expression 
The final way in which organised civil society can facilitate self-determination is by 
providing platforms for ideological expression. 297 We have already noted the 
significance of political action and the role CSOs can play in enabling this. However, 
there are innumerable belief systems outside the political arena and it is equally 
important for the autonomy of the individual that citizens are free to express these as 
well. As religious beliefs are the most common form of ideology, we can include 
those CSOs which advance religion under this heading. 298 
H. FACILITATION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The final function of organised civil society is illustrated by the 'energetic dedication 
of its numerous participants', 299 and explains further why it is that the sector is able to 
attract the actors needed to take control of the provision of public goods, complex 
private services and cultural services. The various theories detailed above explain why 
there is a demand for certain goods and services that is not satisfied by the public and 
private sectors, 300 and they also explain why organised civil society is the appropriate 
vehicle, but they fail to consider in any detail why potential suppliers are drawn to 
these particular products. 301 Several commentators have suggested that the reason why 
a career within civil society is attractive is because it provides an envirom-nent which is 
amenable to entrepreneurship. 302 There are three reasons for this: the freedom to 
innovate, the ability to retain control of a project and the intangible notion of civil 
society 'ethos'. We shall examine each in turn. 
297 See James and Rose-Ackerman, above n 28 at 60; Rose Ackerman, above n 50 at 126. 
298 See Boris, above n 134 at 20. 
299 Levitt, above n 32 at 57. 
300 See above at 63 - 65,70 - 72. 30 1 Legorreta, J. and Young, D., 'Why Organizations Turn Nonprofit: Lessons from Case 
Studies' in Rose-Ackerman, above n2 at 196. 
302 See particularly Young, D., 'Entrepreneurship and the Behaviour of Nonprofit 
Organizations: Elements of a Theory' in Rose-Ackerman, above n 2. 
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(1) Innovation 
The desire to innovate - that is, break new ground in a chosen industry - is at the heart 
of entrepreneurship. Schumpeter identifies five actions an entrepreneur can take in 
order to be innovative: 303 
(1) The introduction of a new good - that is one with which consumers are not 
yet familiar - or a new quality of a good. (2) The introduction of a new 
method of production, that is one not yet tested by experience in the branch of 
manufacture concerned, which need by no means be founded upon a discovery 
scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling a commodity 
commercially. (3) The opening of a new market, that is a market into which 
the particular branch of manufacture of the country in question has not 
previously entered, whether or not this market has existed before. (4) The 
conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured 
goods, again irrespective of whether this source already exists or whether it 
has first to be created. (5) The carrying out of the new organisation of any 
industry. 
The functions we have examined throughout this chapter suggest that in practice all 
five of these are characteristic of much civil society activity. We shall examine each 
in turn. 
Introduction of a new good, method of production or supply 
It is convenient to consider the first, second and fourth actions of Schumpeter's 
taxonomy together, as all three are concerned with supply. We have already noted that 
many CSOs which operate to provide market support, such as research institutions and 
consumer organisations, are regularly involved in the development of new goods, new 
methods of production and the discovery of raw materials. 304 However, probably the 
most significant contributions of organised civil society relate to the provision of 
public goods and complex private goods. In the public goods context, organised civil 
303 Schumpeter, J., The Theory of Economic Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1936) at 66. See also Badelt, C., 'Entrepreneurship theories of the non-profit 
sector' (1997) 8 Voluntas 162 at 164. 
'0' See above at 60 - 61. 
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society was the first sector to provide prisons 
305 and develop a transport 
infrastructure, 306 whilst in the context of complex private goods and the redistribution 
of wealth CSOs pioneered educational establishments (such as universities 
307 and 
public libraries 308 ) and hospitals. 309 
Opening of a new market 
With regard to creating new markets, CSOs are regularly engaged in identifying social 
needs that have hitherto not formerly been recognised. At a less abstract level, 
organised civil society also gives entrepreneurs the opportunity to create new market 
opportunities. For example, Gassler suggests that in a small-sized state it might be 
possible for CSOs to deal with 'unemployment and inflation' and thereby establish the 
conditions necessary for new markets to operate. 310 
New organisation of an industry 
Organised civil society has a strong history of reforming pre-existing industries. 
Having established the education sector in the United Kingdom, in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries private philanthropy was responsible for a 'revolution' within 
305 E. g. in Pennsylvania, United States, the Quaker movement was responsible for securing the 
introduction of incarceration as the standard response to a criminal conviction in 1682; 
previously the standard response had been corporal punishment (see further, United States 
Bureau of Prisons, Handbook of Correctional Institution Design and Construction 
(Washington DC, United States Bureau of Prisons, 1949; relevant text also online at 
www. notfrisco. com/prisonhistory/) under 'Pennsylvania Quakers Establish the Modern Prison 
System'. 
306 See Douglas, above n3 at 13; Chesterman, above n 262 at 17. The importance of these 
examples of innovation is evidenced by their inclusion in the Preamble to the Statute of 
Charitable Uses 1601 (see above Ch 2 at 42 - 43). 307 Although there is no agreement as to precise dates, the first two universities were founded 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries at Oxford (between 1096 and 1167 (University of 
Oxford, A BriefHistory of the Oxford University (www. ox. ac. uk, University of Oxford, 2003 
web version), para 1)) and Cambridge (between 1209 and 1226 (University of Cambridge, A 
BriefHistory (www. cam. ac. uk, University of Cambridge, 2003 web version) under 'Early 
Records')). 
308 Lawson, J. and Silver, H., A ýocial History of Education in England (London, Methuen, 
1973) at 105. 
309 See Douglas, above n3 at 13; Chesterman, above n 262 at 17. These examples are also 
notable by their inclusion in the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 (see above, 
Ch 2 at 42 - 43). 3 1() Gassler (1990), above n6 at 143. See also discussion above at 57 - 60. 
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the sector, 31 1 by switching the focus away from universities to schools with the 
foundation of petty schools and grammar schools. 312 The redistribution of property 
rights undertaken by some CSOs, for example in relation to the abolition of slavery, 313 
could also be viewed as falling under this head. However, reorganisation need not be 
limited to those industries which already have a strong civil society presence. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, a number of CSOs trade in the private market and engage 
in competition with private enterprises. 314 This may simply be in order to raise funds 
for their (unconnected) charitable purposes, as will often be the case with CSOs which 
run shops selling donated used goods. However, some enter the private market in 
order to effect a reorganisation of the industry in question - for example, organised 
civil society has begun to infiltrate the financial sector with organisations such as The 
Charity Bank Ltd which offers banking services on beneficial terms to both charities 
and individuals as 'social investment', 315 and the Ethical Investment Association, the 
purposes of which are to promote and set standards for ethical investment in the 
sector. 316 
(2) Retention of Control 
The second reason why entrepreneurs are attracted to organised civil society is said to 
be from the desire to retain control of organisations after their creation. 317 This desire 
for control has been cited as one of the reasons for organised civil society prevalence 
in the realm of cultural services in the United States, 318 which was the result of the 
newly emergent urban upper class's desire to 'define and legitimate a body of art that 
they could call their own'. 319 
311 Chesterman, above n 262 at 17. 
312 See Lawson and Silver, above n 308 at 103 - 107, especially at 104. 313 See above at 5 1. 
314 See below Ch 5 at 168,203 - 204. 3" Decisions of the Charity Commissioners, I November 2002 at 2. 316 For the constitution of the Ethical Investment Association see 
www. ethicalinvestment. org. uk under 'Constitution and Code of Conduct'. 317 See Ben-Ner, A., 'Nonprofit Organisations: Why Do They Exist in Market Economies? ' in 
Rose-Ackerman, above n2 at 95; Hansmann (1987), above n 31 at 33; Legorreta and Young, 
above n3 01 at 20 1. See also the discussion of relational goods above at 75. 311 See above at 96 - 98. 3 '9 DiMaggio, above n 72 at 204. 
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Retention of control becomes an issue when an organisation wishes to raise capital. In 
order for a private sector venture to do this, there are generally two options - (i) borrow 
money from a financial institution or (ii) incorporate and sell shares in the undertaking. 
There are a number of problems inherent in borrowing from a financial institution. 
First, most will typically require some security or personal guarantee before they will 
agree to loan money. Not only will many entrepreneurs consider this an unacceptable 
personal risk, many will simply be unable to provide adequate security or guarantees. 
Second, there will typically be conditions attached to the loan restricting the disposal 
of the capital - for example, requiring it to be used for a specific purpose only 
320 
_ 
which may limit the proprietors' managerial discretion. The alternative is to raise 
capital by incorporating the organisation and issuing shares. Although this sidesteps 
the problem of lack of security or guarantees, the payoff is that control of the 
organisation, at least in theory, 321 will vest in those who have purchased the shares. 322 
By comparison, reconstituting the organisation as a CSO will enable capital to be 
raised by way of donation. 323 As these are gratuitous, donors do not receive any 
interest in the organisation in return and hence control does not shift to them. By 
320 See Barclay's Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments [1970] AC 567; Twinsectrav Yardley 
[2002] 2 AC 164. 
321 The issues of how much managerial autonomy the directors of a company should have, and 
to whom they should be answerable, are matters of some debate. The traditional view is that, 
because they are the owners, a company should be run in the interests of its shareholders: see 
Berle Jnr, A., and Means, G., The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York, 
Macmillan, 1932); also Friedman, M., 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its 
Profits' The New York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970. However, numerous other 
theories abound: see e. g. Dodd Jnr, E., 'For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees' (1932) 
45 Harv L Rev 1145 at 1154; Nader, R., Green, M., and Seligman, J., Taming the Giant 
Corporation (New York, Norton, 1976) (on the company as good citizen); O'Neill, T., 'Gender 
and Corporate Personhood: A Feminist Response to David Millon' (2001) StanfordAgora 77 
(on feminist theories of corporate governance). For a general discussion of the debates see 
Dine, J., The Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge, CUP, 2000), Ch 1; Millon, D., 
'The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood' (2001) 2 StanfordAgora 39. The 
current Labour reforms in this area acknowledge the relevance of stakeholders other than 
shareholders: if the reform proposals are implemented in their current form, the basic position 
re shareholders will be maintained (see below n 322), but directors will also have to take wider 
interests into account where appropriate (Draft Companies Bill, s 17 and Sched 2, para 2). 322 Under s 309 of the Companies Act 1985, the board of directors is required to take the 
interests of shareholders and employees into account in determining what is in the interests of 
the company, where the company is solvent. Further, the general powers of management in 
public and private companies that are normally vested in the board of directors, are subject to 
directions by special resolution from the shareholders in general meeting: see e. g. the 
Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 (SI 1985/805), Table A, Reg 70. 
109 
3: FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
establishing themselves as trustees, the original proprietors can continue to run the 
organisation in the manner they deem appropriate. 
It is certainly true to say that CSOs are generally able to attract donations in a manner 
which private enterprises cannot - we have already noted the reasons for this above. 
324 
However, it is overly simplistic to say that, by relying on donations, the trustees of a 
CSO will always retain managerial control. First, there is an increasing trend for local 
authority and central government grants to CSOs to be highly prescriptive - for 
example, the Select Committee for Public Accounts recommends that CSOs in receipt 
of National Lottery grants should be closely monitored 'to address the risks to value 
for money ... such as changes to the project or 
improper uses of the award . 
325 
Second, where a CSO is reliant on regular, large donations from a small number of 
benefactors, there may be strong temptation to make only those managerial decisions 
which are likely to be approved by the funders, so as not to jeopardise future income. 
Third, if a donation is advanced for a specific purpose, it may be held by the CSO (or 
its trustees if it has no legal personality) on trust for that purpose rather than as a gift to 
the CSO to be treated as an accretion to its general funds, 326 and a failure to adhere to 
this could result in an action for breach of trust. Finally, where a CSO raises funds 
through member subscriptions, its members will typically have voting rights and, 
accordingly, may be able to direct the trustees with regard to policy decisions - for 
example, the reason why the trustees of the RSPCA wished to exclude members in the 
dispute which culminated in the case of RSPCA v Attorney General was that the 
members in question were attempting to alter the organisation's policy in relation to 
323 Legorreta and Young, above n 301 at 201. 
324 See above at 89 - 90. 325 Select Committee for Public Accounts, The Distribution of Lottery Funds by the English 
Sports Council (London, HNISO, 1997-8), para 4(xi). See also Garton, above n 137 at 95 - 96. 326 There are two situations when this might occur: (i) if the donor specifically states that 
donation is to be held on trust for exclusively charitable purposes which satisfy the public 
benefit test; (ii) if the donor is silent on the matter but the recipient CSO is a charitable 
unincorporated association (Re Vernon's Will Trusts [1972] Ch 300n; Re Roberts [1963] 1 
WLR 406; Re Finger's Will Trusts [1972] Ch 286). One might try to argue that the courts 
should draw an analogy with specific-purpose loans and hold that donations for specific 
purposes (charitable or otherwise) should be held on Quistclose-style trusts until they are 
applied for the purposes for which they have been given (see above, n 320). However, it 
seems unlikely that this would happen, as the rationale behind Quistclose trusts is to protect 
creditors against organisations failing to pay back loans; donors, on the other hand, do not 
expect their money to be returned. 
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hunting. 327 Indeed, we have already noted that Ben-Ner and others have argued that in 
relation to those CSOs which provide relational goods, it is the right to participate in 
an organisation's affairs which specifically attracts consumers. 328 
(3) Civil Society Ethos 
The final reason why entrepreneurs are attracted to civil society activity is best 
described as the characteristic spirit or 'ethos' of the sector. 329 Because non-profit 
distribution is one of the key characteristics of CSOs, 330 its participants must look for 
their utility elsewhere; typically this takes the form of prestige and the fulfilment of 
altruistic impulses, which we have already considered above in detail. 331 
1. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to highlight and explain the different theories which seek to 
explain the existence of organised civil society, and distil them into eight distinct 
social functions, It is clear that, although we identified a number of overlapping areas 
both in theory and in practice, each of the eight functions identified has its own distinct 
features and, accordingly, they cannot satisfactorily be further reduced without losing 
part of the picture. The first function identified, the provision of market support, is 
distinct from the other seven in that it is concerned with explaining how organised civil 
society can assist the operation of the private sector as opposed to providing 
consumers with an alternative to it. The second function, the provision of public 
goods, is explained partly by reference to the theory of contract failure, and 
accordingly has much in common with several other functions - we noted that this 
theory has also been used to explain the provision of certain private services, namely 
complex, intangible goods and those goods where the consumer is separated in some 
327 See above n 136, 328 See above at 75. 
329 See NCVO Charity Law Reform Advisory Group, above n 194, para 2.2.8; Badelt, above n 
I at 171; DiMaggio, above n 72 at 204. 330 See above Ch 2 at 53 - 54. 331 See above at 98 - 10 1. Some argue that a similar ethic exists within the public sector, on 
which see Plant, R. (Lord Plant of Highfield), 'A Public Service Ethic and Political 
Accountability' (2003) Parliamentary Affairs 560. 
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way from the person who pays for their provision. However, it is important that these 
remain distinct categories. This is partly because the shared theoretical rationale has 
led numerous commentators to categorise private goods of this nature, such as the 
provision of healthcare or the provision of education, as public goods, which we have 
shown is not the case as they are not inherently nonrivalous or nonexcludable. Also, 
there are other theoretical explanations for the sector's public goods provision which 
are inapplicable to private goods - such as the free rider issue. The provision of 
cultural services is also based on trust theory, but is distinct from the provision of other 
private goods as it does not necessarily involve either a service which cannot be 
adequately evaluated even after purchase, or the redistribution of wealth - where this is 
the case, CSO activity is better explained by consumers' voluntary price 
discrimination. Likewise, the sector's facilitation of political action is based partly on 
trust theory, but the unique nature of the advocacy role and the sector's ability to 
facilitate government accountability warrant detailed exposition. Lastly, the remaining 
two categories afford us an insight into the processes involved in the sector. Again, 
there is a degree of overlap between these categories, but it is useful to keep them 
distinct: the facilitation of self-determination is primarily concerned with explaining 
how the sector provides a vehicle for self-expression and the roles played by altruism 
and mutuality, whereas the facilitation of entrepreneurship is concerned with 
explaining why certain actors are prepared to go beyond merely passive engagement 
with the sector - for example, making donations - and move to active participation at a 
managerial level. 
Taken together, these functions, along with the previous chapter, explain why and how 
CSOs operate in certain social spheres. They also hint at a number of potential 
weaknesses that may prevent the sector from achieving its full potential. In the next 
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CHAPTER 4 
Foundations of Civil Society Regulation 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters on the constitution and social functions of organised civil 
society revealed (i) what we might reasonably expect the sector to achieve and (ii) 
various factors that might prevent the sector from achieving its potential. This chapter 
builds upon this analysis and considers when, and for what reasons, it may be 
appropriate to regulate the sector in order to minimise the effects of (ii). The first part 
of the chapter introduces traditional theories of regulation based on the private sector 
and considers their application to organised civil society. It argues that, although these 
theories are instructive, the structural and functional differences between CSOs and 
private sector firms mean that that it is inappropriate to apply them indiscriminately to 
the sector: certain justifications for regulation, such as the need to control monopolies, 
are of limited relevance whereas others, such as the resolution of information deficits, 
have a particular pertinence. The second part of the chapter considers whether there 
are other sector-specific justifications for regulating organised civil society, and argues 
that regulation can also be justified by reference to (i) the philanthropic failures 
identified in Chapter Three and (ii) the organisational characteristics identified in 
Chapter Two. Finally, the chapter considers the limitations of regulation with specific 
regard to the issues of juridification and the tension between the different justifications 
of regulation. 
Before we begin it is important to make two sets of distinctions. The first is between 
those theories which seek to justify regulation and those which seek to explain it. I 
Much regulation literature is devoted to explaining the emergence of regulatory rules 
in a particular sphere. 2 It is not the aim of this thesis to consider why, at a pragmatic 
1 See Blankart, C., 'Strategies of Regulatory Reform: An Economic Analysis with Some 
Remarks on Germany' in Majone, G. (ed. ), Deregulation or Re-Regulation? Regulatory 
Reform in Europe and the United, ýtates (London, Pinter, 1990) at 212. 
2 E. g. public interest theory, which argues that regulation is carried out in the interests of 
society in general and 'is likely to involve reference to' the justifications we shall consider 
below: see Baldwin, R., and Cave, M., Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy, and 
Practice (Oxford, OUP, 1999) at 19); see also e. g. private interest theories (for a brief summary 
see Baldwin and Cave, ibid at 21 - 25); new institutionalism (on which see Hall, P., and 
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level, civil society regulation has taken certain forms in certain jurisdictions; rather, we 
are concerned with establishing a generic framework against which such regulation can 
be evaluated. 3 The second distinction we need to make is between justifications for 
different types of regulation. First, we can distinguish between regulation that is 
designed to prevent or rectify specific problems that may occur in the course of the 
sector's operation and regulation that is designed to encourage an already successful 
sector to flourish further. 4 For present purposes, we are concerned primarily with the 
former; the scope of the latter means that detailed analysis is outside the scope of this 
thesis, although we shall return to this issue briefly below. 5 Further, with regard to 
regulation to prevent or rectify specific problems, it is useful to delineate between 
three different types of problems: (i) those which apply specifically to CSOs by virtue 
of their structural characteristics or social functions; (ii) those which apply specifically 
to certain CSOs by virtue of the activities in which they are engaged; and (iii) those 
which apply to certain CSOs, but also to organisations in other sectors, by virtue of the 
activities in which they are engaged. Where a problem falls into the first category, 
there will be a prima facie argument for sector-based regulation, since the problem is 
one intrinsic to organised civil society. Where a problem falls into the third category, 
and the problem is not civil society-specific, activity-based regulation would seem 
more appropriate. Where a problem falls into the second category, and so is both 
sector-based and activity-based, then either regulatory approach would seem 
acceptable. The following analysis will seek to identify all three categories of 
problem. However, as this thesis is essentially concerned with the question of when it 
may be appropriate to regulate organised civil society as a whole, our primary concern 
is with the first category. 
Taylor, R., 'Political Science and the Three New Institutional isms' (1996) 44 Political Studies 
936); network theory (on which see Bbrzel, T., 'Organizing Babylon - On the Different 
Conceptions of Policy Networks' (1998) 76 Public Administration 253); economic theories of 
regulation (on which see Peltzman, S., 'The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of 
Deregulation' in Baldwin, R., Scott, C., and Hood, C. (eds. ), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford, 
OUP, 1998)). 
3 See Breyer, S., Regulation and its Reform (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University 
Press, 1982) at 15: 'the details of any program often reflect political force, not reasoned 
argument. Yet thoughtful justification is still needed when programs are evaluated'. 
4 Some commentators suggest that regulation is by definition concerned with the former, being 
'that designed to protect ... 
[a sector] against threats to its survival' (Prosser, T., Law and the 
Regulators (Oxford, Clarendon, 1997) at 19). 
115 
4: FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY REGULATION 
B. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF REGULATION 
Before we begin to formulate a rudimentary theory of civil society regulation it is 
prudent first to consider existing theories of regulation. Almost all of the existing 
regulation literature concerns the regulation of private markets and, to a lesser extent, 
the regulation of the public sector. In light of the analysis in the first Part of this thesis, 
it would be surprising if any of these theories could be mapped directly onto organised 
civil society with any degree of precision. In particular, much private sector regulation 
theory hangs on profit-maximisation, which we might expect to be incompatible with 
the characteristic of non profit distribution. However, in the following chapter we 
suggest that CSOs and private sector organisations sometimes operate in the same 
social sphere, and also that CSOs may absorb some of the characteristics of their 
private sector counterparts. 6 It would therefore be improvident to dismiss private 
sector theories of regulation out of hand entirely. Accordingly, the following analysis 
considers the relevance of these theories for organised civil society, focusing in 
particular on the traditional economic justifications for regulation and broader social 
justifications such as the redistribution of wealth. 
(1) Microeconomic theories of regulation 
In order to understand the traditional economic justifications for regulation, which are 
based on theories of market failure, it is necessary at this juncture to consider briefly 
the fundamentals of microeconomic theory, which explains how a paradigm market 
operates. A private market consists of two categories of players: firms and consumers. 
Firms exist primarily in order to make a profit for their owners and investors, and a 
rational firm will attempt to maximise its profits 'subject to the constraints ... imposed 
... by consumer demand and the technology of production'. 
7 This is achieved by 
reaching the stage where goods or services are being produced at a level such that (i) 
producing one more unit of the good or service would cost the firm more than the 
profit its sale will generate and (ii) the saving that would be made by producing one 
fewer unit of the good is outweighed by the reduction in the amount of profit that 
5 See below at 148 - 149. 6 See below Ch 5 at 171. 
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would accrue. Consumers exist, in the eyes of micro economists at least, primarily to 
purchase those goods and services that are of the greatest benefit to themselves, subject 
to the depth of their pockets. The consumer attempts rationally to evaluate all those 
goods and services that have the potential to be of utility to her and then purchases that 
combination of goods whereby (i) the benefits of purchasing goods more suited to her 
- e. g. those of a higher quality, or the same goods in a higher quantity - will be 
outweighed by the extra cost involved and (ii) the benefit of saving money by 
purchasing fewer goods or goods of a lower quality will be outweighed by the lower 
amount of utility that follows. 
In a perfectly competitive market, 8 firms and consumers are able to maximise their 
respective profit and utility. In other words, the quality and quantity of goods that 
firms will produce in order to maximise their profits will be the same as the quality and 
quantity of goods that consumers will purchase to maximise their utility. This is 
because of the theory of supply and demand: if the firms operating in a particular 
market produce more of a particular product than consumers desire, then the market 
price will drop and firms will produce less of the product. As the price drops, more 
consumers will decide that the benefit of purchasing the product outweighs the cost 
and so demand will increase. The reverse is also true - if consumers desire more of a 
particular product than firms provide, the market price will increase and firms will 
respond by producing more of the product. As the price increases, fewer consumers 
will be prepared to bear the extra cost and so demand will tail off. After some initial 
fluctuation, the market will eventually level off and the levels of supply and demand 
will be the same. 9 This is possible because in a perfectly competitive market, the 
number of firms and consumers is such that no individual actor can influence the 
market price. This state of affairs is desirable in that it is said to be 'productively' 
efficient, in that it is not possible for firms either to increase output but maintain costs 
or maintain output but reduce costs. 10 It is also 'allocatively' efficient, in that every 
7 Cooter, R., and Ulen, T., Law and Economics (Reading, Adison Wesley Longman, 2000) at 
26. 
8 See Cooter and Ulen, above n7 at 29 - 30; Gellhorn, E., and Pierce, R., Regulated Industries 
(St Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing, 1987) at 28 - 33; Ogus, A., Regulation: Legalform and 
economic theory (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) at 22 - 23. 9 Referred to as 'market equilibrium': see Cooter and Ulen, above n7 at 29. 
10 Cooter and Ulen, above n7 at 12. 
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party is better off as a result of the transactions that take place within the market, 
because the firms all value their revenue more than their products whilst consumers 
value the products more than the money spent on them'' (were it otherwise, firms 
would choose to keep their products and consumers would choose to keep their wallets 
closed). 
(2) Traditional 'market'failurejustificationsfor regulation 
The traditional economic justifications for regulation arise when the circumstances are 
such that a particular market is not perfectly competitive and so does not tend towards 
market equilibrium. These circumstances are (i) where one firm has a monopoly (or 
where a small number of firms operate a price-fixing cartel to the same effect); (ii) 
where excessively competitive practices - for example, temporarily selling products at 
low prices in order to drive rival firms out of business - threaten to undermine the 
market; (iii) where the product in question is a public good; (iv) where externalities 
result from the production of a particular good or service; (v) where information 
deficits prevent consumers from making rational choices; and (vi) where the nature of 
the market is such that production is naturally irregular, either temporally or 
geographically. 
Monopoly power and anti-competitive behaviour 
Market equilibrium will only occur where there is a sufficiently large number of firms 
and consumers to prevent any one player in the market from influencing the market 
price of a product. If there is a monopoly - i. e. only one firm operates in a particular 
market - then lack of competition means that market equilibrium is unlikely to be 
achieved naturally. When a monopoly arises, the one firm in the market, in order to 
maximise profit, will 
curtail ... production in order to raise prices (from fewer sales) by gaining 
revenue through increased price on the units that are still sold. 12 C, 
11 Ibid. 
12 Breyer, above n3 at 15 - 16. See also Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 10, 
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In addition to the likelihood of increased prices, there is a risk that a monopolistic firm 
will be 'lazy' with regard to the costs of production, 13 as the lack of competition 
removes the incentive to keep such costs to a minimum. Further, a firm may fail to 
meet what society deems to be an appropriate level of customer service - if consumers 
are treated shabbily by company x in a monopoly market, there is 'no ready recourse' 
to an alternative service provider. 14 There may also be a non-economic element to the 
regulation of monopolies, in that society tends to harbour a 'distrust of the social and 
political ... power of an unregulated monopolist' irrespective of any market failure. 
15 
A monopoly will typically arise if three conditions occur: 16 (i) where the market is 
constituted by a single firm; 17 (ii) where the good or service supplied is unique; 18 and 
(iii) where 'substantial barriers' prevent potential rival firms from entering the 
market. 19 Similar problems will also arise in those markets where, although more than 
one firm is present, there is 'collusion' between firms who form cartels and engage in 
anti-competitive activities such as price-fixing. 20 Because the market is unable to 
correct these problems naturally, the existence or threat of a monopoly is viewed 
traditionally as justifying some form of state intervention. 2' Typically, this will take 
the form of competition law. 22 
13 Breyer, above n3 at 16. The problem of organisational slack has also been noted in the civil 
society context: see Ortmann, A., 'Modem Economic Theory and the Study of Nonprofit 
Organizations: Why the Twain Shall Meet' (1996) 25 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 470 at 472. This may be particular problem for CSOs: Rose-Ackerman notes that 
the lack of 'market discipline' (not specific to monopoly power but inherent in non profit 
distribution) may mean that an organisation continues to operate long after it has served its 
purpose or ceased to be effectual (Rose-Ackerman, S., 'Altruism, ideological entrepreneurs 
and the non-profit firm' (1997) 8 Voluntas 120 at 125). 
14 Breyer, above n3 at 20. 
15 Breyer, S., 'Regulation and Deregulation in the United States' in Majone, above nI at 10. 
16 Gellhorn and Pierce identify a fourth condition, that of information asymmetry (above n8 at 
33). This is unsatisfactory, for although information asymmetry may tend towards market 
failure, and as such mayjustify regulation, it will not result in a monopoly market unless one 
firm is somehow immune to information deficits affecting its market rivals such that they are 
driven out of business; it is not at all clear whether such a state of affairs could arise. 
Accordingly, information asymmetry is treated as a distinct category of market failure (see 
below at 132 - 137). 17 See Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 10; Gellhorn and Pierce, above n8 at 33. 18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See Cooter and Ulen, above n7 at 40; Ogus, above n8 at 30. 
21 See generally Breyer, above n 15 at 10; Cooter and Ulen, above n7 at 40; Gellhorn and 
Pierce, above n8 at 33 - 35,44 - 49; Ogus, above n8 at 30; Kay, J., and Vickers, J., 
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The nature of certain industries is that they will naturally tend towards monopoly 
rather than perfect competition. 23 This is likely to be the case where, no matter how 
many units of a particular good are produced, the firm never reaches the stage 
described above where producing one more unit of the good or service would cost the 
firm more than the profit its sale will generate. 24 In other words, it will never be in the 
interests of profit-maximisation for the firm to stop producing more units. Moreover, 
as the overall production cost of each unit drops as more units are produced, the price 
will lower accordingly. Where this is the case, it is in the interests of both consumers 
and the firm itself to have a monopoly rather than a competitive market. The paradigm 
example of a natural monopoly is the supply of electricity 25 _ the initial outlay is high, 
in that generators and supply networks must be established before even one unit can be 
supplied. However, once the generators and networks are in place and that first unit 
has been supplied, it will always be more cost-effective to produce more units. 26 
However, whilst a natural monopoly will in theory result in both lower production 
costs and lower prices, in practice the lack of rival firms is likely to mean that the 
monopoly firm will succumb to the same temptations that afflict firms in other 
monopolies - namely, the temptation to (i) increase prices, (ii) neglect ways of 
reducing production costs and (iii) neglect customer service. Consequently, state 
intervention is also desirable in the case of natural monopolies. However, competition 
laws will clearly be inappropriate here, as competition will be more costly than the 
'Regulatory Reform: An Appraisal' in Majone, above n 15 at 227 - 228; Sunstein, C., After the 
Rights Revolution: Reconstituting the Regulatory State (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1990) at 48 - 49. 22 Also referred to as antitrust law: e. g. Cooter and Ulen, above n7 at 40; Ogus, above n8 at 
30. Ogus implies that where competition law is the state response to monopoly or collusion 
between firms, this should not be viewed as regulation because such law 'serves to reinforce 
rather than overreach the market system' (Ogus, above n8 at 30) whether one subscribes to 
this approach depends on whether we take a narrow or broad view of what we mean by 
regulation (see above Ch I at 17). 
23 Referred to in the literature as 'natural' monopolies: see e. g. Cooter and Ulen, above n7 at 
40; Kay and Vickers, above n 21 at 227; Ogus, above n8 at 30. 
24 See above at 116 - 117. 25 See Ogus, above n8 at 3 1. 
26 It should be noted that a natural monopoly may occur only at one particular stage in the 
production process - Ogus notes that in the case of electricity supply, whilst it is clearly cost- 
effective to have a single network for transmission, it may be appropriate for more than one 
firm to generate the electricity (above n8 at 3 1; see also Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 10 - 
11). 
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monopoly. Instead, regulating the monopoly firm with regard to its 'prices, quality 
and output' is the traditional response. 27 
Criticisms of monopolypower as a regulatoryjustification 
Sunstein suggests that regulation as a response to monopoly markets is the 'least 
controversial' form of regulation. 28 However, Breyer notes a number of factors that 
4seriously temper the enthusiasm' for reacting to monopolies with state intervention. 29 
First, although monopoly markets lead to higher prices, if there were the same level of 
monopoly across the economy it would mean that the relative prices of goods would 
remain the same as if the whole economy was perfectly competitive and so consumers 
would still be able to make rational choices. 30 However, it will be difficult to measure 
degrees of monopoly and so whilst this may be true, it will be difficult to know when 
this is the case. Second, a monopoly firm can maximise its profit without reducing its 
output if it can engage in 'price discrimination' between consumers, and charge certain 
customers more than others for the same product. 31 However, this is often 
administratively unworkable and in many cases would be futile, as consumers who 
purchase goods at lower prices can simply resell to consumers who would otherwise 
be forced to pay higher prices. 32 Third, the fact that most monopolies do not operate in 
perfect isolation may mean that firms resist the temptation to raise prices and lower 
output. For example, where there are rival products in another market, the threat of 
alienating consumers may keep a monopoly firmly in check. 33 Thus, if there was a 
monopoly on air travel, the fact that consumers could turn to rail, road or sea if they 
were dissatisfied with the firm's product might well reduce the problems detailed 
above. Also, where the entry barriers to the market are not prohibitively high, the 
threat that other firms may enter the market in the future may have a similar effect. 34 
27 Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 10. Where the natural monopoly only affects the 
transmission stage of production, then it may also be necessary to regulate access to the means 
of transmission (Baldwin and Cave, ibid). 
28 Sunstein, above n 21 at 48. 
29 Breyer, above n3 at 16. 30 Ibid at 16 - 17. 31 Ibid at 17 - 18. 32 Ibid at 17. 33 Ibid at 18. 34 Ib id at 18. 
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We should also note that regulation is not the only state response to market failure in 
this situation - it may be more appropriate to nationalise the industry in question. 
35 
Relevance to civil society 
There are several things that we can say about treating the regulation of organised civil 
society as a response to monopoly. First, it is clear that there are two specific areas of 
activity in which CSOs regularly operate on a monopolistic basis. First, a number of 
organisations that regulate entry into particular professions are constituted in such a 
way that they might properly be classed as falling within the sector. 36 For example, in 
England, the General Medical Council and the General Council of the Bar both have 
the shared characteristics of CSOs identified in Chapter Two, and pursue an 
appropriate social function (the provision of market support). 37 Both exercise a 
gatekeeping function such that anyone wishing to practise as a doctor or barrister must 
meet the training requirements and standards of conduct demanded of the respective 
professional body - accordingly, they have a monopoly on entry to their professions. 
Similarly, trade unions that operate on a 'closed shop' basis effectively have a 
monopoly on entry into a particular trade. Second, some ideological organisations 
may operate on a monopoly basis if there are no other organisations with comparable 
belief systems - in other words, if the services provided are unique. For example, if a 
member of church x is told that if he breaches the church rules he will be 
excommunicated, then it will be of little consolation to him that he would be 
welcomed into churches y and z if those churches are not compatible with his religious 
38 beliefs. However, aside from professional and ideological organisations, it is not 
clear that there are any other areas of civil society activity that are particularly likely to 
35 Ibid at 18 - 19. Of course, this brings with it its own problems, such as 'risk of undue 
political interference' (at 19). 
36 See below Ch 5 at 184. 
31 Indeed the GMC was awarded charitable status in April 2001: see below Ch 5 at n 70; note 
also the Nursing and Midwifery Council, which was awarded charitable status on 27 March 
2002. 
31 Of course, whereas the aspirant doctor prevented from practicing by the GMC is forced to 
give up his chosen profession, here the member of church x could in theory band with others to 
establish a rival organisation upon excommunication - we have already noted that one of the 
advantages of CSOs is the relative ease with which they can be formed (see above Ch 3 at 73 - 
75). However, in reality this is unlikely to satisfy the member as we may assume that he 
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tend towards monopoly. Not only is there multiple CSO presence in the areas of 
activity discussed in the previous chapter, but, as we consider in detail in the following 
chapter, 39 the fact that no social function is the exclusive province of civil society 
means that there will typically be a public or private sector presence as well. It is, of 
course, perfectly possible that within a specific field a CSO may develop a unique 
product, which may warrant a specific regulatory response. 40 However, it would 
clearly be inappropriate to justify any broader, sector-based regulation by reference to 
the control of monopoly. 
More generally, however, we might note that we have already considered the fact that 
CSOs are regularly engaged in creating new markets: identifying and responding to 
areas of social need which have yet to be formally acknowledged. 41 Where this is the 
case, there may be so-called 'first-mover' advantages for the organisation which 
responds the fastest - namely, the potential to capitalise on the period during which it 
is the only service provider in order to establish a dominant position in the market. 42 
The first-mover advantage may be increased where a CSO is already a dominant player 
in another market, as it will be able to 'impose high barriers against new entrants ... 
[by taking] advantage of economies of scale, access to a large contributor base, and 
43 relatively ready access to distribution channels' . 
Where this is the case, regulation 
may again be justified, although as the first-mover phenomenon is not specific to 
wishes to be afollower rather than a leader; further, his belief system may itself stipulate 
membership of church x. 
39 See below Ch 5 at 158. 
40 It should be noted that the fact that CSOs typically operate on a nonprofit basis may I imit 
some of the problems usually associated with monopolies: where an organisation does not 
operate so as to maximise profit it does not follow that in monopoly conditions it will reduce 
output and raise prices in the manner described above. However, other problems - particularly 
the issue of excessive social and political power, or the risk of organisational slack (on which, 
see generally Steinberg, R., 'Nonprofit Organizations and the Market' in Powell, W. (ed. ), The 
Nonprofit Sector A Research Handbook (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 
1987), esp at 127 - 130) -may still justify some form of regulation. 41 See above Ch 3 at 106 - 107. 42 See e. g. Conrad, C., 'The Advantage of Being First and Competition Between Firms' (1983) 
International Journal ofIndustrial Organization 353; Mueller, D., 'First-Mover Advantages 
and Path Dependence' (1997) 15 International Journal ofIndustrial Organization 827. 
43 Tuckman, H., 'Competition, Commercialization, and the Evolution of Nonprofit 
Organizational Structures' in Weisbrod, B. (ed. ), To Profit or Not to Profit: the Commercial 
Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector (Cambridge, CUP, 1998) at 3 1. 
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CSOs, this is something which, again, is perhaps better tackled by activity specific, 
rather than sector specific, regulation. 
Whilst it is unlikely that sector-based regulation can be justified by reference to 
monopoly control, regulation may be appropriate if CSOs engage in anti-competitive 
practices. Although some argue that competition is anathema to the concept of civil 
society, 44 and, in theory, all the players in the sector have 'the same ultimate goal' and 
so should not need to compete with each other, 45 the fact that there is only a 'finite pot 
of donations' 46 from which civil society activity is resourced means that not every 
CSO will be able to carry out all its existing and proposed future activities to 
completion. 47 Consequently, it is inevitable that some CSOs will find themselves 
competing with others for funding. 48 This is likely to be exacerbated (i) by the 
contract culture, 49 where organisations are forced to tender for government funding 
and demonstrate that they provide the most attractive package for service provision, 
44 E. g. Gardner argues that the moral virtue of charity is incompatible with competition: if x 
and y are both in need then z, being someone motivated by charity alone, will simply give 
money to whoever approaches her first without making any judgment as to the relative worth 
ofxandy. If z were to make such a judgment, and then give to whomever was more 
deserving, she would be motivated by justice. See Gardner, J., 'The Virtue of Charity and its 
Foils' in Mitchell, C., and Moody, S., (eds. ), Foundations of Charity (Oxford, Hart, 2000). Of 
course, neither the charitable sector or wider organised civil society are synonymous with 
moral charity - see above Ch 3 at 98 - 100. 45 Greybam Dawes, R., Tolley's Charity Accountability and Compliance 1998 - 99 (Surrey, 
Tolley, 1998) at 1.3. 
46 Morris, D., 'The Media and the Message: An Evaluation of Advertising by Charities and an 
Examination of the Regulatory Frameworks (1995 / 96) 3 CLPR 15 7 at 158. 
47 Although there is no empirical research relating to the difference between the income 
received by the sector and the income needed to maximise its activity, the fact that those CSOs 
devoted to relieving specific social needs - e. g. homelessness, poverty - are still in business 
suggests that some shortfall exists. 
48 It would seem likely that only those CSOs with a stable source of sufficient income from an 
endowment fund will ever be wholly exempt from such competition. Again, there is no 
empirical research relating to the extent of competition in organised civil society (indeed, this 
is probably not quantifiable). However, an opinion poll carried out by the Charity 
Commission in 1999 suggested that public opinion was that there are 'too many charities 
competing for too few funds' (Charity Commission, RS4. - Collaborative Working and Mergers 
(London, Charity Commission, 2003) at nI and associated text; note also Halfpenny, P., and 
Lowe, P., Individual Giving and Volunteering in Britain: Who Gives what - and Why? 
(Tonbridge, Charities Aid Foundation, 1994), para 5.4. Although public opinion is clearly not 
an accurate measure of competition, this may be a self-fulfilling prophesy in that if potential 
donors believe that CSOs are competing for their patronage, they are likely to make donations 
as though this were the case - i. e. by making a rational choice between CSOs -thus forcing 
CSOs into competition. 
49 See above Ch 2 at n 73. 
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and (ii) where CSOs operate in the same sphere as private sector firms. 50 Those CSOs 
feeling the pressure of competition have an incentive to engage in anti-competitive 
practices such as forming cartels with funding bodies in order to divert resources away 
from rival organisations. 51 
Excessive competition 
At this juncture it is appropriate to briefly mention the issue of excessive competition, 
in which CSOs may be tempted to engage so as to maximise their own funding 
opportunities. 52 In the context of the private market, excessive competition refers to 
the situation where an organisation competes with rivals so aggressively as to 'force' 
them out of business. 53 By temporarily setting prices so low that other firms are 
unable to attract consumers to their products, it can obtain greater market 'domination' 
and thus the ability to set prices at a higher level than would otherwise have been 
viable. 54 From the point of view of organised civil society, this kind of predatory 
pricing could in theory be practised by those CSOs that provide a service in return for 
a fee - for example, educational establishments. However, we have noted that one of 
the key rationales for selecting CSOs over the private market is their perceived greater 
degree of trustworthiness in delivering services where it is either impossible or 
impractical to assess quality, even after delivery. 55 Hence, it may be that if a CSO 
lowered prices significantly below those of its rivals, clients would suspect that this 
was at the expense of service quality, If this were indeed the case, then clients would 
respond by gravitating towards the rival organisations, and the CSO's incentive to 
lower prices would diminish. Accordingly, the sector would remedy the problem itself 
and regulation would not be required. Excessive competition may also be practised by 
CSOs that do not engage in service provision - e. g. through aggressive fundraising 
50 See below Ch 5 at 168. 
51 See Downer, S., 'Third sector 'cartel' blasted for controlling NDC funds', New Start, 10 
December 2003, who reports that a leaked draft paper by Northumbria University's 
Sustainable Cities Research Institute discloses evidence of an attempt by three CSOs in 
Sunderland to 'control developments in the area in order to ensure that they dominate 
delivery'. At the time of writing, this paper is yet to be published. 
52 On CSO competition generally, see Tuckman, above n 43 at 25 - 37. 53 Breyer, above n3 at 29. See also Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 13; Breyer, above n 15 at 
11; Gellhorn and Pierce, above n8 at 49 - 50; Kay and Vickers, above n 21 at 227 - 228. 54 Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 13. 
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campaigns. 56 In any case, Breyer argues that excessive competition will never be 
likely to justify regulation of the private market, because organisations would not only 
have to outlast their rivals but also somehow prevent them from re-entering the 
market. 57 There is no reason to think that the same would not also be true in the 
context of organised civil society - indeed, the comparative ease with which CSOs can 
disband and reform should make this even less of a problem. 58 
Public goods 
We have already noted that the market is unable to provide a significant level of public 
goods by virtue of the free rider problem and the perceived lack of trustworthiness of 
for-profit firms. 59 In addition to proving the impetus for civil society activity in this 
area, 60 this is also one of the traditional economic justifications for regulating the 
private market. 61 Ogus notes that the market is able to operate as service provider so 
long as there is state intervention in relation to two key functions: (i) raising monies to 
'secure the supply' and (ii) determining the 'quality and quantity' of the goods in 
question. 62 The fact that civil society presence in this sphere is itself, at least according 
to Weisbrod, 63 a response to market failure suggests prima facie that it would be inapt 
to justify regulation of organised civil society by reference to the need to provide 
public goods. Certainly we have already considered the fact that CSOs are, in theory, 
in a better position than the state to determine the quality and quantity of public goods 
provision. 64 However, it will be apparent from the discussion of competition within 
the sector above that problems may arise in relation to the ability to raise sufficient 
funds. 65 This is discussed in detail be IOW. 66 
55 See above Ch 3 at 65 - 67,88 - 89. 56 We shall discuss the control of campaigning as ajustification for regulation below (at 129 - 
131). 
5' Breyer, above n3 at 32. Unless it is clear that an organisation can achieve this, it would be 
'irrational' to attempt this action (Breyer, ibid). 58 
See above at 112. 59 
See above Ch 3 at 65 - 66. 60 See above Ch 3 at 66 - 67. 61 See generally Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 13 - 14; Breyer, above n3 at 22; Gellhorn 
and Pierce, above n8 at 55 - 58; Ogus, above n8 at 33; Sunstein, above n 21 at 49 - 52. 62 Ogus, above n8 at 33. 63 
See above Ch 3 at 63 - 65. 64 
See above Ch 3 at 76 - 78. 65 
See above at 124 - 125. 
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Externalities 
The fourth traditional economic justification for regulation is as a response to 
externalities, or 'spillovers' 67 - the 'social costs' of a product that are not taken into 
account in pricing by firms or consumers. 68 For example, let us imagine that the 
manufacture of product x results in pollution affecting all the inhabitants of town y. If 
all of the inhabitants are able to co-ordinate themselves and bring an action in private 
law (for example, in the torts of negligence or nuisance) then the cost of the pollution 
will be borne by the producer; this will then be reflected in the price of product x. 
However, if the inhabitants are large in number, then concerted action by the affected 
individuals may well be hard to co-ordinate and may be affected by the free rider 
phenomenon. Further, the nature of the pollution may be such that detrimental effects 
are not manifested until many years later, or such that the manufacture of product x is 
only one of several contributory factors. In these situations it becomes unlikely that 
the producer will bear the cost - either because no action is brought (because the 
inhabitants do not co-ordinate their efforts or are unaware of the pollution) or because 
it is impossible to accurately assess the proportion of damage attributable to the 
production of x. 
As far as CSOs are concerned, there is nothing inherent in (i) the provision of market 
support; (ii) the provision of public goods; (iii) the delivery of complex services; (iv) 
the redistribution of wealth; (v) the provision of cultural services; or (vi) the 
facilitation of entrepreneurship - that would suggest externalities are likely to result 
from civil society activity in these areas. Of course, individual activities carried out in 
pursuit of these functions may result in externalities: for example, a university's 
chemistry department may, in the pursuit of research, carry on experiments that 
contribute towards pollution in one of the ways described above. Where such 
externalities occur it may be that activity-based regulation is desirable. However, it 
would be inappropriate to justify sector-wider regulation on this basis. Further, 
activity-based regulation would tend towards a coherent approach to the externality - 
66 See below at 138 - 140. 6' Breyer, above n3 at 23; Breyer, above n 15 at 10. 
68 Ogus, above n8 at 35. See generally Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 11 - 12; Gellhorn and 
Pierce, above n8 at 55 - 58; Kay and Vickers, above n 21 at 226 - 227; Sunstein, above n 21 
at 36,54 - 55. 
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in the example above, organisations outside civil society may pollute the environment 
as well, so we would not wish to restrict appropriate regulatory provisions to CSOs- 
It should perhaps be noted at this juncture that the fact that much civil society activity 
is carried out by volunteers, as opposed to employees, will not, in itself, increase the 
likelihood of a CSO producing externalities. One might assume that the lack of formal 
nexus between volunteer and organisation may make it difficult to fix a CSO with 
vicarious liability for the actions of its volunteers. If this were the case, then a CSO 
would not be held to account for any tortious or criminal act carried out by a volunteer 
in the course of acting for the CSO, thereby rendering the effects of the act 
externalities. However, it is clear that volunteers may be viewed as agents and CSOs 
their principals. In the words of the leading text on agency: 69 
There is no general requirement in the law of agency that an agent has a 
contract with his principal, and the external position between principal and 
third party can certainly be changed by a gratuitous agent. 
Accordingly, CSOs can be liable for the actions of their volunteers just as private firms 
can be liable for the actions of employees carried out in the course of their 
employment. 70 
Protection of vulnerable parties 
It is convenient at this point to briefly mention the fact that certain civil society 
activities have the potential to cause harm to individuals who interact with the sector's 
69 Reynolds, F., Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 200 1) at 
162. See also Moody, S., 'Policing the Voluntary Sector: Legal Issues and Volunteer Vetting' 
in Dunn, A., (ed. ), The Voluntary Sector, the State and the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2000) at 53 - 
54, who notes an earlier edition of Bowstead ((London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1995) at 2) on the 
same point); also Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd [1969] 1 AC 552. 
70 Indeed, the modern rationale for imposing vicarious liability in tort relates simply to the 
issue of whether there is 'a significant connection between the creation or enhancement of a 
risk and the ensuing wrong' (Wingfield, D., 'The Short Life and Long After Life of Charitable 
Immunity in the Common Law' (2003) Can Bar Rev 315 at 343; see also Bazley v Curry 
(1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45; Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215). If an organisation carries 
out activities and, in the course of doing so, enhances the risk that third parties will be harmed 
by volunteers working under the organisation's control, then that organisation may well be 
made vicariously liable for their actions in just the same way as a private sector organisation 
may be made liable for the actions of its employees. (See also the Promotion of Volunteering 
Bill 2004, which proposes the use of 'Statements of Inherent Risk' that will spell out the risks 
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participants. In particular, a number of CSOs are routinely engaged with individuals 
who have an inherent level of vulnerability above that of the average citizen, 71 such 
that there may be said to be a relationship of trust and confidence between CSO 
workers and those who benefit from their services. Where CSO worker x has such a 
relationship with vulnerable beneficiary y, there is clear potential for x, as the dominant 
actor, to cause harm to y, whether intentionally or otherwise. Such harm can be 
classed as an externality if the CSO is not held responsible - for example, if a class of 
schoolchildren are routinely abused by their teacher, this may go unchecked if the 
pupils feel too afraid to complain or are too young to realise that they are being 
abused; even in adulthood, pupils may never come forward for fear of stigmatisation. 
Accordingly, it may be appropriate to regulate certain activities for the reasons given 
in the previous paragraph. However, it may also be appropriate to regulate even where 
the harm is not technically an externality: a society may view certain forms of harm as 
being so abhorrent that it will never be enough to ensure simply that their social cost is 
borne by the relevant CSO. 72 Rather, it is preferable to ensure they never occur in the 
first place. The inherent vulnerability of the groups listed above may mean that harm 
caused to their members is viewed in this way and, if so, regulation to prevent the 
harm from occurring may be justified. However, the fact that the need to protect 
vulnerable parties is activity-specific, rather than sector-specific, means that, as with 
pure externalities, activity-based regulation is probably more appropriate than sector- 
wider regulation. Again, this would also have the advantage of ensuring a coherent 
approach to the harm in question. 
Control of campaigning 
If a CSO undertakes campaigning this may lead to the production of externalities. 
Campaigning of a political nature is particularly likely to be carried out by those CSOs 
which have (1) the facilitation of political action and (ii) the facilitation of self- 
involved in CSO activities and will be taken into account in any subsequent actions for 
negligence or breach of duty (s 2). ) 
" E. g. children, the physically or mental ill, the poor, minority groups and the otherwise 
disadvantaged. The CSOs that are particularly likely to deal with these groups are those 
engaged in certain forms of wealth redistribution (particularly the advancement of education, 
the advancement of health and the relief of poverty) and the facilitation of political action. 
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determination as their primary purpose. 73 However, organisations operating across all 
the social functions discussed in the previous chapter may also engage in campaigning 
- for example, in order to effect a change in the law or government policy relating to 
their sphere of activity or simply to raise funds or public awareness. 74 Campaigning 
may result in externalities in that excessive lobbying can be a 'divisive and 
fragmenting influence' 75 which may overload any given decision making process and 
lead to 'political paralysis'. 76 Accordingly, Barendt notes that in respect of freedom of 
expression in general: 77 
some regulation ... must surely be conceded, if any expression is to be 
communicated effectively. 
Even if campaigning is undertaken on a more general basis, as opposed to being 
specifically targeted at official decision-makers, there is a risk that inaccurate or 
polemical campaigns will manipulate public opinion without due cause. 78 This 
72 It may also be appropriate to make use of criminal sanctions as a deterrent against these 
types of harm. 
73 Indeed, single issue campaigning is singled out for criticism by the Deakin Commission as a 
'disruptive element' within the sector (Dunn, A., 'Shoots among the Grassroots: Political 
Activity and the Independence of the Voluntary Sector' in Dunn, above n 69 at 156). Knapp, 
M., Robertson, E., and Thomason, C., 'Public Money, Voluntary Action: Whose Welfare? ' in 
Anheier, H., and Seibel, W. (eds. ), The Third Sector: Comparative Studies ofNonprofit 
Organisations (Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1990) note the potential for 
ýsectarianism' in the sector (at 214); see also Blair, H., 'Donors, Democratisation and Civil 
Society: Relating Theory to Practice' in Hulme, D., and Edwards, M., NG0s, States and 
Donors. - Too Closefor Comfort (Basingstoke and London, MacMillan, 1997) on the potential 
for 'destructive ethnic conflict' at 40. 
74 A campaign designed purely to raise funds from the public can, of course, easily cross the 
line and become political even if it is not specifically designed to change the law (see Morris, 
above n 46 at 174). 
75 Boris, E., 'Nonprofit Organisations in a Democracy: Varied Roles and Responsibilities' in 
Boris, E., and Steuerle, E. (eds. ), Nonprofits and Government Collaboration and Conflict 
(Washington, DC, Urban Institute Press, 1999) at 23. See also James, E., 'Economic Theories 
of the Nonprofit Sector: A Comparative Perspective' in Anheier and Seibel, above n 73 at 24. 76 Jenkins, J., 'Nonprofit Organizations and Policy Advocacy' in Powell, above n 40 at 296. 
See also 6, P., and Randon, A., Liberty, Charity and Politics. - Non-Profit Law and Freedom of 
Speech (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995) at 139; Blair, above n 73 at 30; 
77 Barendt, E., Freedom ofSpeech (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985) at 13. 
78 Boris, above n 75 at 23. Morris notes that this may be a particular problem in respect of 
those CSOs with charitable status, as their perceived elevated status may enhance their 
standing in the eyes of the public (Morris, above n 46 at 172). InterAction guidelines stress the 
importance of ensuring that campaigns draw a balance 'neither minimise nor overstate the 
human and material needs of those whom it assists' (InterAction American Council for 
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problem may be exacerbated by the fact that, whereas campaigning by the state is 
called to account by opposition parties and CSOs, and private sector campaigning is 
called to account by rival firms, civil society campaigning has no natural control, 79 
except insofar as rival CSOs may be competing for the same funding and thus have an 
incentive to disprove each other's inaccurate campaigning. 80 
In addition to producing externalities, some regulation of campaigning may also be 
justified on the ground that participation in the political arena risks compromising the 
independence of the sector, in that individual CSOs may be tempted to form 
allegiances with political parties or officials in an attempt to secure the passing of a 
particular law or the implementation of a particular policy. Such arrangements may 
encourage those CSOs to take the interests of their political allies into account when 
making decisions and lose their 'non-partisan' reputation. 81 Loss of the structural 
characteristic of independence would be a significant one: it would undermine the 
ability of the sector to contribute towards the accountability of political players, 82 
especially were an individual CSO to be called upon to pass comment on the actions of 
its ally; it may result in the application of a CSO's resources to activities approved by 
its ally rather than its members or benefactors; 83 and, on a more general level, it may 
reduce trust and confidence in the sector which is likely, in turn, to exacerbate 
concerns relating to information deficits. 84 Further, we have already noted that one of 
the reasons why organised civil society is an appropriate provider of public goods is 
85 the fact that the sector is relatively insulated from 'populist pressures'. Political 
campaigning is likely to raise the profile of a CSO and remove a layer of political 
insulation. 
Voluntary International Action, PVO Standards (www. interaction. org, InterAction, 2002 web 
version), para 5.3). 
79 See Bennett, J., and DiLorenzo, T., Unhealthy Charities Hazardous to your Health and 
Wealth (New York, BasicBooks, 1994) at 3 1. 
80 See above at 124 - 125. 81 InterAction, above n 78, para 8.3. 
82 See above Ch 3 at 94 - 95. 83 See generally Meier, R., 'The Darker Side of Nonprofits: When Charities and Social 
Welfare Groups Become Political Slush Funds' (1999) 147 University ofPennsylvania Law 
Review 971. 
84 On which see below at 132 - 137. 8' Blair, above n 73 at 40. See above Ch 3 at 79 - 79. 
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Information deficits and accountability 
Regulation is also traditionally justified where a particular market does not tend 
towards the free flow of information that consumers need in order to make rational 
purchasing decisions. 86 We have already noted that where it is impossible or highly 
impractical to evaluate a particular good or service prior to its purchase, and 
sometimes even after its purchase, consumers will be ill-equipped to decide which 
products or combination of products will be of the greatest utility. 87 In this situation, 
although a producer could rectify matters by making relevant information about its 
products freely available, there will be a temptation to mislead consumers into 
selecting its products over those of its rivals by supplying 'false information or by 
88 omitting key facts'. Accordingly, state intervention may be justified to compel firms 
to provide sufficient (and accurate) information so as to ensure that consumers are able 
to make rational choices. 
Relevance to civil society 
It may seem, prima facie, that regulating organised civil society on the ground of 
information asymmetry would be somewhat misguided. We have already noted that 
the theory of contract failure uses the information deficits inherent in (i) public 
goods, 89 (ii) complex private services 90 and (iii) the redistribution of wealth, 91 to 
explain civil society's presence in these areas - the idea being that, because they 
generally do not operate on a for-profit basis, CSOs lack the fiscal temptation to 
deceive consumers in the way that a private firm might choose to do. If organised civil 
86 See generally Breyer, above n3 at 26 - 28; Kay and Vickers, above n 21 at 228 - 230; Ogus, 
above n above n8 at 38 - 41; Sunstein, above n 21 at 52 - 53. 87 On information asymmetry, see above Ch 3 at 65 - 66. 88 Breyer, above n3 at 27. It should be noted that the problem of lack of information not one 
that only blights consumers - firms may also suffer at the hands of information asymmetry. 
Kay and Vickers note that in the insurance industry it is the consumers who hold the upper 
hand and have an incentive to conceal personal information that would otherwise cause their 
premiums to increase (above n 21 at 230). 
'9 See above Ch 3 at 65 - 68. 90 See above Ch 3 at 88 - 89. 91 See above Ch 3 at 89 - 90. 
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society is itself a response to information asymmetry, 92 one might assume that there 
would be no need to regulate CSOs for this reason. However, there are several reasons 
why the sector might suffer from problems relating to information deficits. 
First, organised civil society will only be a viable alternative to the market where 
consumers are confident that CSOs do, in fact, operate on a nonprofit basis. Without 
some form of regulation, organisations may decide to operate on a for-profit basis, in 
order to make money for the benefit of private concerns, but conceal this from donors 
and other stakeholders. Although one would hope that the civil society 'ethos' 
discussed earlier would counter the incentive to operate a CSO for private benefit, 93 we 
have already noted that the sector's reputation of trustworthiness may attract dishonest 
persons keen to exploit its resources. 94 Accordingly, regulation to ensure the 
accountability of CSO directors and trustees has been described as the 'charm ... 
expected to both prevent and cure the evils of sleaze and corruption'. 95 
92 Albeit a very different one to regulation. The latter is an attempt to artificially shape the 
operation of the market whereas the former is an organic attempt to provide an alternative to 
the market. 
93 See above Ch 3 at I 11. 
94 See above Ch 3 at 69 - 70; also Kendall, J., and Knapp, M., The Voluntary Sector in the UK 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996) at 257 - 258; Ortmann, A., and Schlesinger, 
M., 'Trust, repute and the role of non-profit enterprise' (1997) 8 Voluntas 97 at 103; Young, 
D., 'Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations: Theoretical and 
International Perspectives' (2000) 29 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 149 at 156. 
95 Belcher, A., 'Board Responsibilities in the Voluntary Sector: The Case of Housing' in Dunn, 
above n 69 at 62. Just as Breyer notes that there can be 'little quarrel' with regulation that 
remedies information deficits in the private sector context (above n3 at 28), there is general 
agreement among both civil society theorists and official publications that regulation of the 
sector is justifiable on these grounds: see e. g. Home Office, Home Office Annual Report 1998 
- 99 (London, HMSO, 1998), para 24.1; InterAction, above n 78, para 5 generally (esp. 5.1); 
Leat, D., 'Are Voluntary Organisations Accountable? ' in Billis, D, and Harris, M. (eds. ), 
Voluntary Agencies Challenges of Organisation and Management (Basingstoke and London, 
MacMillan, 1996) at 66 Parliamentary Select Committee on Public Accounts, Charity 
Commission: Regulation and Support of Charities (HC 408,1998), para 6; Rochester, C., 
'Voluntary agencies and accountability' in Davis Smith, J., Rochester, C., and Hedley, R. 
(eds. ), An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector (London and New York, Routledge, 1995) at 
193; Salamon, L., 'Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: 
Toward a Theory of Government-N on profit Relations in the Modem Welfare State' in 
Ostrander, S., and Langton, S., Shifting the Debate: publiclprivate sector relations in the 
modern welfare state (New Brunswick, Transaction, 1987) at 45; Simon, K., Principles of 
Regulationfor the Not-for-Profit Sector (www. icni. org, International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law, 1998) at 1; Scottish Charity Law Review Commission, Charity Scotland The report of 
Scottish Charity Law Review Commission (www. scotland. gov. uk/justice/charitylaw/ 
csmr/csmr-OO. htm, Scottish Charity Law Review Commission, 2001), recommendation 39, - 
Voluntary Sector Roundtable Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary 
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It is also clear that certain CSOs operate legitimately on a for-profit basis. Hybrid 
organisations such as social enterprises, for example, distribute a limited amount of 
profit amongst investors. 96 Non profit distributing CSOs may, where appropriate, 97 
decide to carry on profit-making activities that are 'ancillary' to their main 
endeavours, 98 in order to replace or supplement income from donations or state 
grants 99 and thus fund other, loss-making activities. 100 Without some form of control, 
these legitimate profit-making CSOs may succumb to the same problems as their 
illegitimate cousins. Furthermore, Weisbrod notes that the pursuit of profit through 
ancillary activities may compromise a CSO's main objectives by 'distract[ing] 
management' or, more seriously, causing 'mission displacement' in order to satisfy 
potential customers. 101 
Sector, Building on Strength: Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada's 
Voluntary Sector (www. vsr-trsb. net, Voluntary Sector Roundtable, 1999) at 14. 
96 See below Ch 5 nn 226 - 228 and associated text. 97 Tuckman suggests that appropriateness turns on four factors: (i) whether a CSO has a need 
for additional resources; (ii) whether it has a potentially sellable product which (iii) doesn't 
'substantially interfere' with the organisation's primary activities; and (iv) whether it will be 
able to locate 'willing' consumers (Tuckman, above n 43 at 36). 
98 On trading generally see below Ch 5 at 168. Note the distinction drawn by Weisbrod 
between 'ancillary' trading, which is only undertaken in order to increase revenue for other 
activities, and trading which is 'mission-related' (Weisbrod, B., 'The Nonprofit Mission and 
its Financing: Growing Links Between Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy' in Weisbrod, 
above n 43 at 18). We are concerned here with the pursuit of profit as an influence on an 
organisation's behaviour; however, Weisbrod acknowledges the fact that not every CSO 
commercial activity will be motivated by the pursuit of profit - e. g. trading may reflect 'social- 
service missions to reach particular target populations' or 'distributional mission[s]' 
(Weisbrod, ibid at 11; see also Weisbrod, B., 'Modeling the Nonprofit Organization as a 
Multiproduct Firm: A Framework for Choice' in Weisbrod, above n 43 at 52 - 55,61; and 
generally Steinberg, R., and Weisbrod, B., 'Pricing and Rationing by Nonprofit Organizations 
with Distributional Objectives' in Weisbrod, above n 43). 
99 On the relationship between commercial income and other revenue streams, see Weisbrod, 
ibid at 56 -61; James, E., 'Commercialism among Nonprofits: Objectives, Opportunities, and 
Constraints' in Weisbrod, above n 43 at 272; also generally Segal, L., and Weisbrod, B., 
, Interdependence of Commercial and Donative Revenues' in Weisbrod, above n 43. 
100 See above Ch 3 at 69; also James, E., 'How Nonprofits Grow: A Model' in Rose- 
Ackerman, S. (ed. ), The Economics ofNonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy 
(New York, OUP, 1986) at 185 - 195. Indeed, many of the reports of Charity Commission 
inquiries into the administration of charities made under s8 of the Charities Act 1993, 
published on the Commission's website highlight these issues - see e. g. the inquiries into: the 
Bournemouth Aviation Charitable Foundation (I I January 2005); Frankgiving Ltd (I I January 
2005); the Clownes Foundation (2 September 2003); and many others (see generally 
www. charitycommission. gov. uk/investigations/ inquiryreports/inqreps. asp). 
... Weisbrod, above n 43 at 54. 
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Further, we have noted that the pursuit of profit is not the only corrupting influence on 
organisations - without some form of control, organisations may be tempted to inflate 
administration costs unnecessarily in order to line the pockets of trustees 102 or 
employees, for example by paying higher than average wages, remunerating needless 
expenses or providing overly extravagant facilities; ' 03 in fact, through: 104 
everything from power, prestige, and other perks, to cross-subsidisation, 
influence costs, advocacy expenditures, and organisational slack. 
Trustees may also use their position to engage in political campaigning to secure their 
own interests rather than those of their members. 105 King notes that even the actions of 
those trustees whose 'motives are pure' may warrant regulation, 106 if, for example, in 
the case of charitable CSOs, they fail to understand the limits of the expenses for 
which they can legitimately be reimbursed. 107 By ensuring certain financial 
information is made available, regulation will also have the additional benefit of 
revealing to donors, who usually have 'no meaningful opportunity to learn about fund- 
raising costs', 108 that some administration costs are both legitimate and necessary. 
The threats to the quality and quantity of a CSO's activities that stem from information 
deficits are exacerbated by three factors. First, whenever a CSO is funded by 
donations, its beneficiaries or consumers will typically be separated from its patrons, 
which will further hinder the latter's ability to evaluate the quality and quantity of the 
10' On the issue of trustee remuneration, see above Ch 2 at 49 - 50 and below Ch 5 at 180 - 
181. 
103 See above Ch 3 at 69; also Ortmarm and Schlesinger, above n 94 at 102 - 105; also Bennett 
and DiLorenzo, above n 79 at 46 - 47; Bennett and DiLorenzo, above n 79 generally; 
Hansmarm, H., 'The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise' in Rose-Ackerman, above n 99 at 77. 
104 Ortmann, above n 13 at 472. 
'0' Blair, above n 73 at 30. 
106 King, M., 'Trustee Benefit' (2000) 6 CUR 185 at 187. 
107 King, above n 106 at 186 - 187. See In re Barber [1887] LR 34 Ch D 77 at 81 per Chitty J: 
'he is allowed, of course, his costs out of pocket, that is to say, the expenditure, but not 
anything for his time or trouble. That principle is based upon this consideration, that the Court 
of Equity will not allow a man to place himself in a position in which his interest and duty are 
in conflict. If it were not the rule, a trust ... might be heavily burdened by reason of business being done by a trustee ... employing himself. 108 Espinoza, L., 'Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed 
Charitable Giving' (1991) 64 Southern California Law Review 605 at 605. 
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goods or services they have financed. 109 Second, there is a long tradition of 
testamentary gifts to CSOs. 110 Unlike inter vivos gifts, evaluation by a testator is, of 
course, not merely impractical but impossible. Similarly, those who set up CSOs 
rather than merely donate to them, whether inter vivos or by will, may be discouraged 
from their endeavours if they believe that, after their death, the organisation's aims 
may be corrupted. ' 11 This is particularly significant in the context of charitable CSOs 
as, by virtue of s 13(l) of the Charities Act 1993 and the doctrine of cy prL, a 
charity's funds may be applied to a new purpose, if it is no longer appropriate for its 
purpose to be carried out. 112 In theory, this purpose must be one that is 'as near as 
possible' to the original, ' 13 but it is clear from the caselaw that this is not always the 
109 See generally Krashinsky, M., 'Transaction Costs and a Theory of the Nonprofit 
Organization' in Rose-Ackerman, above n 99; Possett, J., and Sandler, T., 'Transfers, 
Transaction Costs and Charitable Intermediaries' (1988) 8 International Review ofLaw and 
Economics 145; also Bennett and DiLorenzo, above n 79 at 47 and 50; Steinberg, R., 
'Competition in contracted markets' in 6, P., and Kendall, J., (eds. ), The Contract Culture in 
Public Services (Aldershot, Arena, 1997) at 166. We should note that separation of purchaser 
and consumer occurs in the private sector as well (consider the insurance industry) and may 
lead to the problem of 'moral hazard' where the market is skewed because the consumer 'feels 
no pocketbook restraint' (Breyer, S., 'Typical Justifications for Regulation' in Baldwin et al, 
above n2 at 79). 
110 See above Ch I im 28 - 29 and associated text. III The European Foundation Centre notes the 'the importance of operating in accordance with 
the wishes of founders who provide initial capital' (European Foundation Centre, Principles of 
Good Practice (www. efc. be, European Foundation Centre, 2002 web version), Preamble), 
whilst the Ontario Law Reform Commission emphasises the need for 'loyalty to purpose' 
(Report on the Law of Charities (Toronto, Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1996) at 9). See 
also Tasman Asia Pacific, Analysis ofMarket Circumstances where Industry Self-Regulation is 
Likely to be Most and Least Effective (www. selfregulation. gov. au, TaskForce on Industry Self- 
Regulation, 2000) at 27. However, whilst the need to protect the interests of founders may 
primaJacie strengthen the argument for regulation, it is important that the 'dead hand' of the 
settlor does not needlessly hinder the operation of a CSO in later years (Simon, J., 'Modern 
Welfare State Policy Toward the Nonprofit Sector: Some Efficiency - Equity Dilemmas' in Anheier and Seibel, above n 73 at 41), particularly where the settlor's concerns do not relate to 
mismanagement or abuse but simply a change in direction or organisational ethos. 112 The circumstances in which it will no longer be appropriate are: (i) where the original 
purpose has been fulfilled or can no longer be carried out 'in the spirit of the gift' (s 13(l)(a)); 
(ii) where the original purpose is such that only part of the gift is utilized (s 13(l)(b)); (iii) 
where the gift can be used 'more effectively' if combined with other resources (s 13(l)(c)); 
(iv) where the area of class of beneficiaries no longer exists (s 13(l)(d)); (v) where the original 
purpose is being fulfilled by other means (s 13(1)(e)(i)); (vi) where the original purpose is no 
longer a legally charitable one (s 13(1)(e)(ii)); and (vii) where the original purpose is no longer 
a 'suitable or effective' means of pursuing out the objective of the gift (s 13(l)(e)(iii)). 113 See e. g. Cook v Duckenfield (1743) 2 Atk 562; Re Avenon's Charity [1913] 2 Ch 261. 
136 
4: FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY REGULATION 
case. 114 Third, the structure of a CSO will often exacerbate accountability issues. 
Although the directors of those CSOs constituted as companies limited by guarantee 
must, in theory, account to their members, 115 whilst staff of CSOs must account to 
their trustees, Rochester notes that the effectiveness of these mechanisms may be 
limited, for example: (i) where a board of lay trustees is intimidated by the expertise of 
employed staff, 1 16 (ii) where a CSO is based around a small group of entrepreneurs 
who act both as trustees and as workers; 117 or (iii) in the case of CSOs based on 
mutuality, where 'regular and close contact between the staff and members' may lead 
to problems of capture. ' 18 
Finally we should note that regulation to ensure the availability of operational 
information will also be of use from an evaluative perspective - detailed information 
about the sector may provide a basis for determining whether a given regulatory 
regime is effective, although we must of course be wary of regulating purely for 
statistical or mapping purposes. '19 Such information may also prove illuminating for 
the sector itself. 120 
Accountability or control? 
We should also note briefly that, in certain circumstances, regulating to resolve 
information deficits might not in itself ensure the trustworthiness of the sector - 
particularly where donors do not have the time or resources to evaluate the information 
which is made available to them before making a donation. Where this is the case, it 
might also be appropriate to regulate so as to require organisations to meet certain 
standards in the course of their activities. This is a topic which we shall consider in 
more detail later. 121 
114 See e. g. Attorney General v Ironmongers' Company (1834) 2 My &K 576, where funds 
originally devoted to the redemption of slaves was applied cypris to educational 
establishments (noted in Luxton, P., The Law of Charities (Oxford, OUP, 2001) at 55 1). 
115 In a similar fashion to the way in which the directors of private firms are kept in check by 
shareholders (at least in theory: see above Ch 3n 321). 
116 Above n 95 at 196. 
117 Above n 95 at 194 - 195. 1" Above n 95 at 194. 
119 Voluntary Sector Roundtable, above n 95 at 12. 
120 Ontario Law Reform Commission, above nI 11, Ch I at 9. 
121 See below Ch 6 at 222 - 226, Ch 7 at 234 - 238, also Ch 8 generally. 
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Co-ordination and irregularity of production 
The final traditional justification for regulation is as a means of ensuring that the 
market is not disrupted by irregularity of production. Irregularity may be 
geographical, in that firms may be discouraged from supplying goods in remote areas 
if the supply costs are higher than in non-remote regions -a practice known as 'cream- 
skimming' 122 - or it may be temporal, in that there may be a scarcity of resources from 
time or time 123 or demand may be 'cyclical'. 124 Certain consumers may find that they 
are unable to purchase goods by virtue of their location or the timing of their need and, 
as a consequence, regulation to co-ordinate production may be necessary in order to 
ensure an appropriate level of availability. Further, where demand is cyclical, firms 
may find that they have to periodically close down and re-open according to whether 
demand is in a trough or at a peak, which will 'engender waste' from increased 
administrative costs. 125 Regulation may prevent this as well. 
Irregularity of production is particularly significant in the context of organised civil 
society. According to Salamon's theory of voluntary failure, 126 CSOs will be limited 
in their ability to provide public goods where there is 'philanthropic insufficiency' and 
'philanthropic particularism'. ' 27 The former will arise where the sector is unable to 
attract sufficient resources, either in general or in relation to specific activities, as a 
result of the free-riding phenomenon. Philanthropic insufficiency may, in turn, lead to 
philanthropic particularism, whereby activists sidestep activity x, which is unable to 
attract sufficient resources, and move towards activity y, which is. This is problematic 
for two reasons: first, it will mean that the donors who are willing to fund activity x 
may have no-one to deliver it; second, it risks the supersaturation of the provision of 
activity y. 128 These two forms of voluntary failure could be seen as justification for the 
1 22 Ogus, above n8 at 32. 
123 See Breyer, above n 15 at 11; Gellhorn and Pierce, above n8 at 51 - 52; Ogus, above n8 at 
42; Sunstein, above n 21 at 45. 
24 Ogus, above n8 at 43. 
25 Ogus, above n8 at 43. 
126 See above Ch 3 at 72 - 81. 127 See above Ch 3 at 79 - 80; Salamon, above n 95 at 44; Salamon, L., 'Partners in Public 
Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations' in Powell, above n 40 at 
111-112. 
128 See above Ch 3 at 80; also Clark, J., 'The State, Popular Participation and the Voluntary 
Sector' in Hulme and Edwards, above n 73 at 5 1; Government of Canada Privy Council Office 
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state provision of public goods. However, it is submitted that regulation of organised 
civil society to control these problems is prima facie preferable, in light of the 
advantages that CSOs have over the state in terms of service provision - namely, 
efficiency, expertise and political insulation. 129 
Accumulation of reserves 
At this point, we can briefly mention the issue of those CSOs that attempt to counter 
the unpredictability of raising funds through donations (or service provision) by 
accumulating reserve funds. We have already noted that this has been the subject of 
some media criticism, particularly in the context of charities; 130 indeed, Bennett and 
DiLorenzo suggest that such accumulation displays: 131 
a mind-set which is incompatible with the ultimate goal ... to conquer [a social 
problem] and go out of business as rapidly as possible. 
Accordingly, some regulatory regimes place limits on the proportion of a CSO's 
income that may be withheld from being applied to its social functions in a given 
period. 132 However, although the accumulation of reserves may be incompatible with 
certain civil society activities - such as emergency appeals intended simply to tackle 
one-off problems on a short-term basis - as a general rule it is surely desirable that 
Voluntary Sector Task Force, Partneringfor the Benefit of Canadians: Government of Canada 
- Voluntary Sector Initiative (www. pco-bcp. gc. ca, Government of Canada Privy Council 
Off ice, 2000) at 5; Knapp et al, above n 73 at 213 - 214; Taylor, M., 'What are the Key 
Influences on the Work of Voluntary AgenciesT in Billis and Harris, above n 95 at 23. 
129 See above Ch 3 at 73 - 79. 130 See above Ch 2n 115. 
13 1 Bennett and DiLorenzo, above n 79 at 82. 
132 See e. g. the Canadian Income Tax Act (RSC 1985, cI (5th Supplement)), s 149.1 (1), which 
requires that charities, private foundations and public foundations satisfy a 'disbursement 
quota' requiring that they spend at least 80% of their donations each year on charitable 
activities, lest they lose charitable status (see above Ch 2 nn 57 - 58 and associated text). In 
the context of self-regulation (on which see below Ch 6 at 227 - 233), in the United States, 
where there is no such statutory requirement, the Council of Better Business Bureaus 
recommends that disbursement quotas are adhered to as a matter of good administration 
(Council of Better Business Bureaus , 
Standardsfor Charitable Solicitations (www. give. org, 
Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance, 2002 web version), para 131; Better Business 
Bureaus Wise Giving Alliance, Standardsfor Charity Accountability (www. give. org, Better 
Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance, 2003 web version), para 8). On a related point, the 
English Law Commission recommends that the trustees of charitable trusts should only be able 
to accumulate income for a maximum of 21 years (Law Commission, The Rules against 
Perpetuities and Excessive Accumulations (1998, Law Com No 25 1), para 10.2 1. 
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CSOs engage in long-term financial planning; indeed, many CSOs pursue functions 
that do not call for the 'conquering' of a social ill, but rather call for sustained activity 
- for example, educational organisations, healthcare providers and religious bodies. 
133 
Further, Ogus argues that, in the private market context, maintaining a reserve fund 
may obviate the need for state regulation on the basis of temporal irregularity of 
demand in that: 134 
if such markets ... anticipat[e] ... recoveries in demand and the profits thereby 
engendered, they will furnish sufficient funds during the trough to maintain the 
firm's capacity. 
Accordingly, regulatory provisions that limit the capacity of CSOs to build up reserves 
may prevent the sector from effectively resolving these problems without the need for 
state intervention. 135 It is perhaps worth noting that if regulation is in place to ensure 
the accountability of CSOs and the provision of operational information, 136 this may be 
a sufficient response to any concern regarding reserves, as it will enable those donors 
who disapprove of reserve funds to avoid those organisations that accumulate and 
patronise those that do not. ' 37 
133 In common law countries, the exemption of charitable trusts from the rule against perpetual 
duration (inalienability) suggests the implicit state recognition of the need to ensure the 
longevity of CSOs. On the exemption from the rule, see e. g. Income Tax Special Purposes 
Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 at 580 - 581 per Lord Macnaghten. Note also the cy 
prýs doctrine, which operates to prevent funds from leaving the charitable sector (see above n 
112 and associated text). 134 Ogus, above n8 at 43. 
135 It is important to note that we have already considered one of the advantages of CSOs is 
their ability to 'form and disband' with ease (Salamon, above n 95 at 44; see above Ch 3 at 73 
- 75). This should mean that in some situations the problems of shutting down and restarting 
operations will be less pronounced than with the private sector; however, much will, of course, 
turn on the nature of the individual CSO - factors such as organisational size and the nature of 
its activities will obvious impact upon this. 136 See above at 132 - 137. 137 Indeed, this characterises the approach of the Charity Commission in England, which takes 
a neutral approach to the issue of reserves (Charity Commission, CC19. - Charities Reserves 
(London, Charity Commission, 2002), para 3) but suggests that those charities that do 
accumulate funds should justify and explain their decision to do so (ibid). 
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(3) Traditional socialjustifications for regulation 
Windfalls 
Regulation is sometimes a response to windfall profits or economic rents - profits that 
accrue by virtue of some 'accident' 138 rather than the 'talents or skill' of the 
organisation in question. 139 An organisation might receive a windfall profit because a 
particular asset has suddenly appreciated in value 140 (for example, the discovery by an 
art dealer that a painting in her collection, previously thought to be of little value, is in 
fact a Rembrandt) or because it has happened upon an abundant source of a raw 
material required in the manufacture of its product 141 (for example, the discovery by a 
drinks manufacturer of a natural spring on its land). The justification for regulation in 
these types of situation is that, because the profit is simply the result of the 
organisation catching a lucky break, it is somehow 'undeserved'. 142 Accordingly, 
regulation may be used to redistribute the windfall so that others may benefit. 143 
It is apparent from the examples given above that CSOs, as well as private sector 
organisations, may receive windfall profits - for example, the undiscovered Rembrandt 
could be in the hands of a public art gallery rather than a private dealer, whilst the 
natural spring could be on land owned by a disaster charity that sends water supplies to 
areas of drought. However, the nature of CSO activity is such that regulation may not 
necessarily be an appropriate response to windfall profits: 144 unlike their private sector 
counterparts, windfall profits that occur within organised civil society - as with all 
other profits - will normally be applied to some social function as opposed to merely 
138 Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 11. 
139 Breyer, above n3 at 2 1. See also Breyer, above n 15 at 10; Gellhorn and Pierce, above n8 
at 52 - 54. 14' Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 11. 
14 1 Baldwin and Cave, above n2 at 11. 
142 Breyer, above n3 at 22. 
143 For example, the high-profile one-off windfall tax levied by the Labour government in the 
UK in July 1997, which targeted privatised utility companies in an attempt to 'claw back' 
windfall profits that these companies were able to make by virtue of (i) the initial underpricing 
of their shares when privatisation occurred, followed by (ii) perceived lax regulation 
(Cbennels, L., 'The Windfall Tax' (1997) 18 Fiscal Studies 279 at 280). The tax was then 
used to fund the 'welfare to work' initiative. 
144 Indeed, Baldwin and Cave note that it may not always be an appropriate response to 
windfall profits in the private sector, as it may remove 'incentives to search for new 
efficiencies, products, or areas of demand' (above n2 at 11). 
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being distributed among investors. 145 It could be argued that a social function is, by 
definition, inherently deserving of any extra resources that it is able to attract; 
accordingly, regulation to prevent 'undeserved' profit is inappropriate. Furthermore, a 
windfall in the private sector will typically mean nothing more than a difference in 
profit margin, 146 but in civil society, it will have a direct impact on the scale and nature 
of activities a CSO can carry out in pursuit of its social function. However, regulation 
to redistribute windfall profits may be justified by reference to philanthropic 
insufficiency or particularism, 147 if the organisation in receipt of the windfall is 
operating in an area where resources are comparatively plentiful. 
Other social goals 
Redistribution of wealth 
Regulation is sometimes justified on the ground of the redistribution of wealth .1 
48 
Such regulation does not relate to any flaw in a particular industry or the market 
mechanism but is instead intended to override the natural distribution of wealth in 
order to achieve a more "'fair" or "just" distribution of resources'. 149 It would be 
inappropriate to discuss this justification for regulation in any detail, as the notion of 
what constitutes a just distribution of resources is dependent upon one's political 
standpoint. However, the fact that organised civil society is itself concerned with the 
redistribution of wealth, either as a direct social function or indirectly through reliance 
on donations, 150 may mean it is harder to justify state intervention than with the private 
market. We have already noted that there are reasons to believe that organised civil 
society is better able to judge certain social needs than the state. 151 
145 One notable exception is of course the social enterprise, the organisational form of which 
permits limited profit distribution, on which see below Ch 5 at 187 - 188. Mutual 
organisations that fall within organised civil society may distribute profits but will do so in 
pursuit of a social function: see generally above Ch 3 at 101 - 104. 146 Of course, this will not necessarily be the case: a windfall in the private sector may enable a 
struggling company to turn itself around and avoid insolvency. 147 See above at 138 - 139. 148 See e. g. Ogus, above n8 at 46 -51. 149 Ogus, above n8 at 46. 
150 See above Ch 3 at 89 - 90. "' See above Ch 3 at 76 - 78. 
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Paternalism 
Regulation is also sometimes justified on the ground that, in certain circumstances, 
individuals are not capable of making the rational choices with regard to utility 
maximisation that are necessary for markets to operate. Where this is the case, the 
paternalist response is for the state to make the decision for individuals instead so that 
their 'choices are overridden'. 152 There is nothing inherent in civil society activity that 
suggests this would be an appropriate justification for regulation of the sector; further, 
as with the redistribution of wealth, the appropriateness of paternalism depends on 
one's political standpoint. 153 
C. FURTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
(1) Other philanthropic failures 
We noted earlier that two of the four philanthropic failures noted by Salamon may 
warrant state intervention. 154 It is therefore appropriate to consider the remaining two 
- namely, philanthropic paternalism and philanthropic amateurism - at this juncture. 
Philanthropic paternalism 
Salanion suggests that problems may arise if civil society activity in a particular sphere 
is driven by social need as perceived by wealthy benefactors rather than social need as 
perceived by those who benefit from the activity. 155 Where this happens, CSOs may 
cause beneficiaries to feel stigmatised or debilitated by the feeling that they are reliant 
upon the benevolence of others. It is fair to assume that this phenomenon is, by its 
nature, one that this specific to those CSOs which operate on an altruistic basis rather 
than on the basis of mutual support. 156 It is unclear whether regulation will be an 
appropriate response to this philanthropic failure. There would appear to be three 
ways of alleviating the problem: (i) by changing public attitudes towards altruism so as 
52 Ogus, above n8 at 5 1. 
" For a summary of the arguments for and against paternalism, see Ogus, above n8 at 51- 53. 
154 See above at 138 - 139. 155 See above Ch 3 at 80; also Salamon, above n 95 at 4 1; Salamon, above n 76 at 112. 
156 We have already noted that support groups may be funded by donations (see above Ch 3 at 
103 - 104); where a CSO is organised partly on mutuality and partly on altruism, we may 
assume that a weakened version of the same stigmatisation may be manifested. 
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to minimise the negative connotations of reliance on the benevolence of others, (ii) by 
ensuring that the activities in question are funded by means other than the munificence 
of rich citizens, and (iii) by empowering those who are dependent on altruism, in order 
that they do not feel that they are in a position of comparative 'weakness'. The first, 
although something the state may attempt, cannot be considered 'regulation' in any 
meaningful sense, even on our broad definition of the term. 157 The second could be 
achieved in a number of ways - for example: (i) by decreeing that certain activities 
cannot be funded on a donative basis; 158 (ii) by encouraging relevant CSOs to look 
elsewhere for funding; 159 or (iii) by encouraging donors to give money to other 
causes. 160 Of course, the problem with each of these regulatory responses is that they 
presume the ready availability of alternative resources to fund the activities in 
question, which will not always be the case. Accordingly, it is difficult to separate 
philanthropic paternalism from the issues of philanthropic insufficiency and 
particularism discussed above. 16 1 The third method could be achieved simply by 
giving beneficiaries or users increased rights in relation to the CSOs with which they 
interact - for example, the right to a fair hearing before any benefits are withdrawn, or 
the right to be given the reasons for any decision by which they are affected. We shall 
consider this and other issues relating to the due administration of CSOs in detail in 
Chapter Eight. 
Philanthropic amateurism 
Salamon's final example of philanthropic failure is that of amateurism. 162 This may 
take two forms. First, certain civil society activities cannot be undertaken 
satisfactorily by volunteer efforts alone, but instead require the skills of qualified or 
experienced paid workers that a CSO may not be able to afford - consider schools and 
universities or healthcare providers. Second, civil society activities in general may 
"' See above Ch I at 17. 
... In other words, prohibit private donations to certain activities and insist instead that their 
funding must come either from government, service provision, corporate philanthropy or 
trading. 
"' E. g. by making it easier for organisations to engage in trading activities. 
60 E. g. by making certain activities tax-deductible but not others. 
61 See above at 138 - 139. 162 See above Ch 3 at 8 1; also Salamon, above n 95 at 4 1; Salamon, above n 76 at 112 - 113. 
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suffer from an 'uneven or unpredictable' quality, 163 either as a result of the sector's 
emphasis upon volunteerism or because of the lack of profit maximisation driving 
organisational efficiency. The first form of amateurism may be treated as a form of 
philanthropic insufficiency and, as such, has already been dealt with above. 164 The 
second form of amateurism could be minimised with appropriate regulation - for 
example, by providing for minimum standards of professional behaviour to which 
trustees or CSO workers must adhere. 165 However, any regulation designed to 
'professionalize' the sector would be at the risk of one of the four structural 
characteristics identified as defining the sector in Chapter Two - namely, 
volunteerism. 166 Accordingly, regulation may change the nature of regulated 
organisations in such a way that we may no longer consider them to fall within our 
definition of organised civil society; further, erosion of this characteristic may impact 
negatively on sector performance. 167 
(2) Challenges to quiddity 
In the second chapter we considered the four shared structural characteristics identified 
by Salamon and Anheier that, whilst not all exhibited by every organisation, we would 
generally expect CSOs to demonstrate - namely, independence, organisation, 
volunteerism and non profit distribution. 168 In addition to assisting our map of 
organised civil society, these characteristics go some way towards explaining civil 
society presence in relation to the eight social functions discussed in the previous 
chapter. Accordingly, erosion of these key characteristics may have a negative impact 
on the sector's activities. It may therefore be appropriate for the state to regulate so as 
to prevent any serious challenges to organisational quiddity. We have already 
considered when it may be appropriate to regulate in order to ensure non profit 
163 Smith, S., and Lipsky, M., Nonprofitsfor Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1993) at 113. 
164 See above at 138. 
165 On which, see below Ch 6 at 222 - 226, Ch 7 at 234 - 238, also Ch 8 generally. 166 See above Ch 2 at 49 - 50. 167 See further below at 147 - 148. 168 See above Ch 2 at 49; also Salamon, L., and Anheier, H., Salarnon, L., and Anheier, H. 
(eds. ), Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-National Analysis (Manchester and New York, 
Manchester University Press, 1997) at 33 - 34. 
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distribution; it is therefore prudent to consider the remaining characteristics at this 
juncture. 
Independence 
Loss of independence may have a number of ramifications for the effectiveness of a 
CSO. We have already noted that one of the three significant advantages that the 
sector has over the state in relation to the provision of public goods is its relative 
political insulation, 169 which in turn results from the sector's perceived independence 
from the state; further, political independence is a pre-requisite of effective CSO 
advocacy. ' 70 Independence from external influences other than political ones is also 
necessary if the sector is to remain trustworthy in the eyes of donors. 17 1 Accordingly, 
two of our previous justifications for regulation - the need to (i) control political 
campaigning 172 and (ii) remedy information deficits 173 _ may be justified by reference 
to this structural characteristic. 
Organisation 
The idea that CSOs must be organised is largely a definitional requirement, intended to 
distinguish the activities of the sector from those of the family sector. However, there 
are a number of organisational issues that may impact upon the sector's operation. 
First, we have already noticed that although CSOs tend to be relatively small 
organisations when compared with state institutions, this is not always the case, and 
certain CSOs operating in well-resourced fields may have more in common, 
structurally speaking, with large corporations or govermnent departments than with 
their smaller civil society brethren. 174 Salamon suggests that one of the three key 
advantages that the sector has over the state in relation to public goods is its 
comparative organisational efficiency, which stems from the typically small size of 
CSOS. 175 
169 See above Ch 3 at 78 - 79. 170 See above Ch 3 at 95. 
"I See above Ch 3 at 67,69. 172 See above at 129 - 13 1. 173 See above at 131 - 137. 174 See above Ch 3 at 74 - 75. 175 Salamon, above n 95 at 39. 
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There may therefore be a prima facie case for regulating the sector so as to limit the 
size of its constituent organisations. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are advantages 
in permitting CSOs of all sizes - for example, larger organisations are likely to have 
greater political influence than smaller organisations, and economies of scale may 
mean that a single larger organisation may in fact be more efficient than two smaller, 
distinct organisations. 176 Hence, it is not clear that regulation will necessarily be 
appropriate in this regard. However, organisational size may reinforce the need for 
regulation in relation to other justifications - for example, a large CSO may be better 
able to use excessive competition to force rivals out of business, whilst the larger the 
organisation, the more likely it will be that 'policy-making and implementation' are 
separated, which may exacerbate issues of accountability. 177 
Volunteerism 
The final structural characteristic we considered in Chapter Two is volunteerism. It 
seems likely that this plays at least some part in creating the 'civil society ethos' that 
we have already noted attracts entrepreneurs to the sector. 178 Accordingly, if it were 
shown that a lack of volunteerism impacted detrimentally upon this, then regulation 
might be justified. 179 However, empirical research carried out as part of the Johns 
Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project suggests that the extent to which 
volunteering is significant to the sector varies across both industries and 
jurisdictions. 180 It appears that volunteerism in the UK is particularly important in 
"' Consider, for example, the merger between the Imperial Cancer Research Fund and the 
Cancer Research Campaign in February 2002, which was intended to increase the 
organisations' collective funding budget by reducing administrative costs (see Torkar, M., 
'Charity merger streamlines UK cancer research' (2002) ELSO Gazette 1). On charity mergers 
generally, see Morris, D., Legal Issues in Charity Mergers (Liverpool, Charity Law Unit, 
University of Liverpool, 200 1); Warburton, J., Mergers: A Legal Good Practice Guide 
(Liverpool, Charity Law Unit, University of Liverpool, 2001). 177 
Leat, above n 95 at 64. 178 See above Ch 3 at I 11. 
179 Kendall and Knapp note the need for regulation to encourage volunteerism: above n 94 at 
254-257. 
180 See Salamon, L., Sokolowski, S., and List, R., Global Civil Society An Overview 
(Baltimore, Centre for Civil Society Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2003) at 15 -21; 23 - 
26. This research suggests that in developed nations volunteers are particularly significant in 
relation to the provision of cultural services and the facilitation of political action, as well as 
certain public goods (environmental protection) and intangible private goods (recreational 
services), particularly as opposed to service provision, where paid staff dominate (ibid at 23 - 
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relation to certain public goods (specifically, envirom-nental protection and community 
development), certain complex private goods (specifically, healthcare), the facilitation 
of political action, and the facilitation of self-determination (specifically, religious 
activities). 181 However, we have already noted that, even in those spheres where 
volunteerism plays a significant role, there may be sound reasons why an organisation 
might wish to rely on paid workers rather than volunteers - for example, where an 
activity requires a stable workforce or particular expertise, or where it is possible for a 
CSO's beneficiaries to pay for services themselves rather than rely on the donations of 
others. Hansmarm also notes that volunteerism must be balanced against the need to 
ensure some level of organisational efficiency. 182 
(3) Fostering the sector 
Regulation is sometimes justified, by both commentators and official publications, by 
reference to a perceived general need to foster organised civil society and provide a 
'hospitable environment that encourages a high level of ... sector activity'. 
' 83 Indeed, 
the Charities Act 1993, s 1(3) charges the Charity Commission with: 184 
the general function of promoting the effective use of charitable resources by 
encouraging the development of better methods of administration, by giving 
charity trustees information or advice on any matter affecting the charity ... 
whilst s 1(4) provides that: 
It shall be the general object of the Commissioners so to act in the case of any 
charity ... as best to promote and make effective ... 
[its] work ... 
24). In developing and transitional nations, volunteers play a more significant role in service 
provision than in their developed counterparts (ibid at 25). See also generally Salamon, L., 
Anheier, H., List, R., Toepler, S., Sokolowski, S., and Associates, Global Civil Society: 
Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society 
Studies, 1999). 
... Kendall, J., and Almond, S., 'United Kingdom' in Salamon et al, ibid, at 183 - 184. 
182 Hansmann, above n 103 at 81. 
183 Simon, above nIII at 34. See also e. g. Home Office, Home Office Annual Report 1998 - 
99 (London, HMSO, 1998) at 24.1 and 24.13; 
184 We have already noted that the Charities Bill 2004 will replace this broad legislative 
mandate with a detailed provisions with regard to its regulatory and advisory functions (see 
above Ch I nn 67 - 74 and associated text). 
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It is inappropriate to consider this rather vague justification in any detail. Regulation 
that is not designed to remedy a specific, identifiable problem cannot be justified by 
reference to any objective criterion. Rather, its validity depends on the extent to which 
one believes it acceptable for the state to interfere in a functioning social sphere. We 
can, however, briefly note that regulation not aimed at a specific ill may be more 
difficult to defend against charges of juridification when compared with the 
justifications detailed above. 185 A good example of this is the suggestion, posited in a 
number of reform proposals, that regulation can be justified by reference to the need to 
ensure the 'modernisation' of the sector, in order to ensure its ability to 'keep pace 
with social developments'. 186 We have noted elsewhere that CSOs have a strong 
tradition of innovation 187 and so, in the absence of any specific problems affecting the 
sector in this regard, regulation to 'modemise' organised civil society may serve little 
purpose beyond replacing the organic structures which naturally govern the sector's 
operation with a formalistic legal equivalent. 188 
D. LIMITATIONS OF REGULATION 
Having considered the economic and social justifications for regulating organised civil 
society, it is prudent at this point to say a few words on the limitations of regulation as 
a response to problems in the operation of the sector. As with any sector or industry, it 
may be inappropriate for the state to respond to a monopoly at all if the regulatory 
strategy is poorly designed or badly implemented as this may cause more problems 
than it solves. 189 However, where regulation is experimental - for example, if there is 
185 See below at 150. 
"' National Council of Voluntary Organisations Charity Law Reform Advisory Group, For the 
public benefit? (London, NCVO, 2001), para 2.5. See also Charity Commission, RRP The 
Review of the Register of Charities (London, Charity Commission, 200 1), para 2. 187 See above Ch 3 at 106 - 108. 188 Of course, it may be that problems in this area may arise by virtue of a flawed pre-existing 
regulatory regime that operates to hold the sector back. In this context, justifying a new 
regulatory regime on the ground of modernisation may be acceptable (consider e. g. the Charity 
Commission's stated purpose of its Review of the Register: 'to develop further the boundaries 
of charitable status' (above n 186, para 2)). However, this is, of course, not ajustification for 
regulation per se, merely ajustification for preferring one system of regulation over another. 
1'9 See Ogus, above n8 at 30. Regulation may operate to damage the regulated organisations 
or may be inherently flawed (e. g. through regulatory capture (see e. g. Makkai, T., and 
Braithwaite, J., 'In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture' in 
Baldwin et al, above n 2) or lack of accountability (see e. g. Graham, C., 'Is there a crisis in 
regulatory accountability' in Baldwin et al, above n 2)). We shall consider the potential 
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a lack of empirical evidence to confirm or deny the theories upon which it is based - 
then it may not be possible to adduce its 'quality' in this respect prior to 
implementation. 190 
(1) Juridification 
At a basic level, juridification refers simply to the over-proliferation of legal rules in a 
given area. 191 It is clearly in the interests of proportionality and targeting that a 
particular regulatory goal is achieved through rules that are no more complex, or 
greater in number, than necessary. In this sense, juridification is an issue of general 
regulatory concern and not specific to the regulation of civil society. Hence, it is not 
appropriate to discuss this in any detail here. However, juridification is also used to 
refer to the situation whereby a regulatory strategy recognises the informal structural 
characteristics that govern the operation of a particular social sphere and attempts to 
replicate these with a set of rules which it then imposes on the sphere in question. As 
noted above, this phenomenon is likely to be associated with regulation that attempts 
to 'improve' the sector's performance generally rather than that which responds to 
specific areas of concern. Leaving aside the issue of whether we believe this to be an 
appropriate justification for regulation, there is a risk that any legal rule designed to 
replicate and supplant a natural rule will be, at best, a crude approximation of its 
counterpart: it is unlikely that any legal rule, however well-drafted, will be able to 
reflect fully the infinite subtleties of a naturally occurring phenomenon. 192 
problems with different regulatory strategies in the context of organised civil society in Chs 5 
-7 below. "0 In which case, it may be necessary to design regulation solely on the basis of informed 
theory and then simply 'try it and see' with the expectation that modifications will be 
necessary once its impact has been measured. 
191 See generally Teubner, G., 'Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions' in 
Baldwin et al, above n 2; Teubner, G. (ed. ), Juridiflication of Social Spheres (Berlin, Walter de 
Gruyter, 1987); also below Ch 5 at 156, Ch 6 at 216 - 220, Ch 8 at 236 - 238. 192 We might note that the potential juridification of organised civil society has received 
attention in the context of the European Union, following the European Commission's 
European Governance. - A White Paper COM (2001) 428, which proposes a code of conduct 
for the sector to 'identify responsibilities and improve accountability of all partners .... [and] 
enhance dialogue, and contribute to the openness of organized civil society' (at 33). 
Armstrong notes that the effect of this may be that 'the voices of national civil society actors 
may be lost or excluded as civil society becomes Europeanised and autonomised' (Armstrong, 
K., 'Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the White Paper on Governance' 
(2002) 8 European Law Journal 102 at 115; see also Armstrong, K., 'Civil Society and the 
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(2) Contradicting regulatory goals 
Finally, we should note briefly that the justifications for regulation detailed above will 
not always be happy bedfellows, and so an effective regulatory strategy may be 
required to effect a compromise between competing goals. For example, regulation to 
ensure the accountability of CSOs, in order to minimise information asymmetry, may 
have implications for the sector's volunteerism, 193 independence, 194 and role as 
innovator, 195 whilst regulation to ensure the independence of the sector may have 
implications with regard to co-ordination of resources. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to argue that some form of state regulation of organised civil 
society as a collective unit can prima facie be justified by reference to six overlapping 
grounds: (i) preventing anti-competitive practices, (ii) controlling campaigning, (iii) 
ensuring accountability, (iv) co-ordinating the sector; (v) rectifying philanthropic 
failures and (vi) preventing challenges to organisational quiddity. In the following 
chapter we will consider some of the problems with treating organised civil society as 
such a collective unit for the purpose of regulation in light of the lack of a discretely 
defined boundary around the sector. 
White Paper - Bridging or Jumping the GapsT in Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? A 
Critical Appraisal of'the Commission White Paper on Governance, Jean Mormet Working 
Paper No 6/01 (wwwjeanmonnetprogram. org, Jean Mormet Program, 200 1) at 5). 
193 Voluntary Sector Roundtable, above n 95 at 12. 
194 Simon, above n 95 at 3. 




Boundaries of Civil Society Regulation 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From a regulatory perspective, there are a number of limitations inherent in our 
preceding analysis; these must be dealt with at this juncture. Any sector-based 
analysis of society depends upon the premise that it is possible to distinguish CSOs 
from private sector organisations and emanations of the state. This is certainly true in 
respect of those organisations which operate at the core of each sector - for example, if 
we consider a government department, a bookshop and a reading group, there is prima 
facie nothing objectionable in holding that the first falls within the public sector, the 
second within the private sector and the third within organised civil society. However, 
towards the outer edges of each sector, categorisation becomes harder as organisations 
fail to adhere to the 
artificial and academic distinctions imposed on what is ... the seamless web or 
the institutional fabric of society. ' 
Accordingly, the first part of this chapter is an attempt to refine our analysis of 
organised civil society by examining in detail the relationship between it and the 
public and private sectors. In particular, the chapter examines the issues of (i) the 
blurred nature of the sector boundaries, (ii) functional overlap and (iii) cross-sector 
interaction. 
The second half of the chapter examines a rather different, but equally significant 
boundary dispute: the relationship between the charitable sector and wider organised 
civil society. It explains further why our theory of regulation takes a broad, functional 
definition of the sector as its basis, 2 rather than focusing simply on the charitable 
sector as many jurisdictions have chosen to do in practice. Specifically, it argues that 
regulation of the charitable sector in isolation is untenable because (i) no meaningful 
distinction between this and wider organised civil society can be drawn on the basis of 
1 Douglas, J., 'Political Theories of Nonprofit Organizations' in Powell, W. (ed. ), The 
Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 
1987) at 53. 
2 See also above Ch 2 at 44 - 47. 
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either organisational structure or social function and (ii) the reasons traditionally given 
by successive governments for treating charities as a special case are inadequate. This 
is particularly significant in light of the fact that the jurisdictions identified in Chapter 
One as being currently in the process of introducing new, or reforming existing, 
systems of regulation continue to focus on the charitable sector. 
3 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY, THE MARKET AND THE STATE 
(1) Blurred nature of sector boundaries 
It will be apparent from Chapters Two and Three that it is not possible to draw a clear 
line marking where organised civil society ends and the other sectors begin. First, 
there is no consensus as to where such a line should lie. Fee-paying public schools, for 
example, could be seen as either CSOs or private organisations - in England, these 
have charitable status under the second head of Pemsel, 
4 but as organisations 'engaged 
in the market production of goods and non-financial services' they are classed as 
private sector organisations under the UN System of National Accounts. 
5 Likewise, in 
the previous chapter we saw that religious groups can be regarded as part of organised 
civil societY6 - in England, many will obviously fall under the third head of charity 
7_ 
but where a church is established, some may prefer to class it as a public body; some 
theorists even exclude religious organisations per se from their map of the sector. 
8 
Housing associations, meanwhile, carry out an appropriate social function - we have 
already noted the fact that the provision of social housing facilitates wealth 
redistribution; 9 many also facilitate entrepreneurship and political action 
10 
- yet we 
might question the extent of the sector's independence from the state, in light of the 
3 Namely Canada, England, New Zealand and Scotland. See above Ch I at 19 - 26. 
4 Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 53 1. 
5 UN System of National Account 1993, para 4.7 (more specifically, they are classed as being 
part of the 'non-financial corporations sector'). 
6 See above Ch 3 at 105. 
7 Although those CSOs which are registered under the Places of Worship Act 1855 are not 
required to register as charities by virtue of the Charities Act 1993, s 3(5). 
8 E. g. Kendall, J., and Knapp, M., 'A loose and baggy monster: boundaries, definitions and 
typologies' in Davis Smith, J., Rochester, C., and Hedley, R. (eds. ), An Introduction to the 
Voluntary Sector (London and New York, Routledge, 1995) at 19. 
9 See above Ch 3 at 89. 
10 See Kendall, J., The Voluntary Sector (London, Routledge, 2003) at 144 - 148. 
153 
5: BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY REGULATION 
extensive public funding of registered social landlords through the Housing 
Corporation. ' 1A further problem is the fact that even if it were possible to draw a line, 
however blurred, between the sectors, it is unlikely to remain static over any length of 
time. As the National Council for Voluntary Organisations has observed, 'the 
12 boundary between the sectors has never been watertight" and an industry that begins 
life as the preserve of one sector may become subsumed by another over time. Four 
industries that we noted in Chapter Three as examples of organised civil society's 
entrepreneurialism - the prison service, transport infrastructure, public libraries and 
healthcare - are illustrative of this point, each beginning life as part of organised civil 
society before subsequently being adopted by the state. All but one of these 
industries, public libraries, also now have a significant private sector presence: at the 
time of writing there are nine private sector prisons; 13 the railway system was 
privatised in 1995, whilst in March 2003 the Labour government agreed a 30 year plan 
with three private sector consortiums for the funding and maintenance of the London 
underground under the 'Transport for London' initiative; and in 1999, the last year for 
which official figures are available, there were 294 private hospitals offering acute 
medical treatment. 14 
11 Indeed, the Committee on Standards in Public Life classes registered social landlords as 
'local public spending bodies' in light of this (Committee on Standards in Public Life, Second 
Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life: Local Public Spending Bodies (Cm 327- 
1,1996), Ch 5; noted by Wigglesworth, R., and Kendall, J., The Impact of the Third Sector in 
the UK: the Case of Social Housing (Civil Society Working Paper No. 9) (www. Ise. ac. uk/ 
collections/CCS/pdf/eswp9. pdf, Centre for Civil Society, 2000) at 16). In the US context, 
housing associations have been cast as 'textbook examples of public-private partnerships' 
(Anheier, H., Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2005) at 103). However, we have already considered that, under the definition of a CSO we 
have adopted, an organisation might not exhibit all the shared structural characteristics 
identified in Ch 2 (see above at 49); accordingly we do not exclude housing associations from 
the scope of this thesis. 
12 National Council of Voluntary Organisations Charity Law Reform Advisory Group, For the 
public benefit? (London, NCVO, 200 1), para 2.2.10. 
13 The first of these, HM Prison Altcourse, opened on I December 1997. 
14 Parliamentary Select Committee on Health, The Regulation of Private and Other 
Independent Healthcare (HC Paper No. 281-1,1999), para 12. See generally below at 158 - 
162. 
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Impact on regulation 
The blurred nature of the boundaries between organised civil society and the other 
sectors poses something of a problem when it comes to defining the scope of sector- 
based regulation. It has been said that good regulation should be 'no heavier, nor cut 
more deeply, than is necessary'. 15 In other words, regulation should be proportionate, 
striking an appropriate balance between precision and flexibility. Although the status 
of proportionality within the framework of administrative law in general is somewhat 
uncertain, 16 its importance in the context of regulation appears to be settled. 17 
Proportionality is relevant on three levels of regulatory design, relating to: (i) the 
jurisdictional span of any given regulatory strategy; (ii) the nature of the individual 
rules within that strategy; 18 and (iii) the co-ordination of those individual rules. 19 We 
shall deal with the second and third levels of regulatory design at a later stage, when 
we consider the implementation of our regulation theory. 20 For current purposes, we 
are interested in how we might go about determining the operating boundary of our 
regulatory strategy, given the lack of any clearly defined perimeter around organised 
civil society. 
15 Simon, K., Principles of Regulationfor the Not-for-Profit Sector (www. icnl. org, 
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 1998) at 246. 
16 Although in Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [ 1991 ]I AC 
696 the House of Lords explicitly rejected this as a general ground ofjudicial review in 
relation to domestic law, the idea that public bodies must act in a proportionate fashion is 
fundamental to both EU law (see e. g. Rv Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International 
Trader's Ferry Ltd [ 1999] 1 All ER 129) and also the Human Rights Act 1998. Furthermore, 
Craig identifies a number of domestic cases outside the context of human rights where, despite 
Brind, decisions have explicitly or implicitly turned on the issue of proportionality (Craig, P., 
Administrative Law (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2003) at 619 - 620. 17 Proportionality has been officially 'recognised' as one of five essential features of good 
regulation (Cabinet Office Better Regulation Task Force, Principles of Good Regulation 
(London, Better Regulation Task Force, 2003) at 2 and 4). See also Baldwin, R., Rules and 
Government (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) who notes that targeted regulation is essential in 
securing compliance at 15 7; Irish, L., The Role of a Good Legal Framework - Capacity 
Building and Sustainability (www. icnl. org, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 1999) 
at 2. 
18 See generally Diver, C., 'The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules' (1983) 93 Yale U 
65. 
19 E. g. the graded accounting and reporting requirements for charities: see generally, Charity 
Commission, CC61. - Charity Accounts. - The Framework (London, Charity Commission, 2002). 
20 See below Ch 6 at 216 - 220. 
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Regulation ideally should be (i) sufficiently tight that it does not affect x, an 
organisation which falls outside organised civil society, but also (ii) sufficiently 
flexible that y, an organisation which falls inside organised civil society but is in some 
way novel, and whose presence has not specifically been accounted for, can be 
included without too much difficulty. Ideally this balance should be struck in such a 
way that z, any given organisation, knows whether it falls within the regulated sector, 
and can order its affairs accordingly. The previous chapter argued that several of the 
justifications for regulating organised civil society apply to the whole of the sector. 21 
If we therefore wish to include all CSOs within our regulatory strategy, 22 then we are 
faced with a problem. Because the theories of organised civil society reveal no natural 
boundary, it will be difficult to cast the net of regulation so as to achieve this balance 
by reference to a tight definition that does not create grey areas - in other words, the 
sort that would allow us to draw up a complete list of regulated organisations if we so 
wished. 
By way of comparison, let us imagine that we have decided that the only CSOs that 
warrant regulation are those that work with children, because we think that children are 
inherently vulnerable and in need of protection. 23 Because the relevant CSOs 
constitute a relatively discrete group - either the staff or volunteers of organisation x 
work with children or they do not - it would seem tolerable to use a definition with 
minimal or no flexibility. Accordingly, a hypothetical piece of regulation might be 
targeted at 'organisations that have workers who deal, in the course of their work, with 
those under the age of eighteen'. We might then wish to tweak this slightly - for 
example, define what we mean by 'work' and define workers to include volunteers - 
but the benefits of this tight regulation are obvious: the mischief would be targeted 
without affecting those organisations that are not engaged in relevant activities. The 
loose nature of organised civil society as a whole, however, is such that a black and 
white test of this kind would inevitably be either over- or under-inclusive. This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the edges of the sector, such as they are, 
fluctuate over time. Hence, even if we were to compromise and settle upon a tight 
definition in the interests of certainty, this is unlikely to remain effective over time. 
21 See above Ch 4 generally. 
22 See above Ch 4 at 115. 
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This problem has been recognised by both the courts and Parliament in their 
development of modem charity law. The definition of legal charity is not a model of 
precision but rather, in the words of Luxton, 'a work of art'. 24 From its inception- 25 
the Statute of Elizabeth ... made it clear that at least the purposes enumerated 
in the preamble were charitable, but ... it appears to have been assumed that 
the enumeration was not exhaustive and that those purposes also were 
charitable which could be fairly regarded as within its spirit and intendment. 
This view enabled the court to extend its protection to a vast number of objects 
which appeared both to the charitable donor and to it to be for the benefit of 
the community. 
The development of charity law by the courts has been effected on this basis ever 
since: consider the flexibility of the four heads of charity as they currently stand. 26 
Reform proposals have also tended to favour a loose definition of charity - either 
maintaining the current approach or an approximation of the same, 27 or one looser than 
the current position, such as a definition based solely on public beneflt. 28 The 
Charities Bill maintains this approach, supplementing its eleven purposes with a catch- 
all category of 'any purposes that may reasonably be regarded as analogous' either to 
those statutory purposes or to purposes which are themselves analogous to the 
statutory purposes. 29 However, despite the flexibility inherent in both the existing and 
23 On the protection of vulnerable parties, see above Ch 4 at 128 - 129. 24 Luxton, P., The Law of Charities (Oxford, OUP, 2001) at I 11. 
25 National Anti- Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [19481 AC 31 at 64per 
Lord Simonds. 
26 On the breadth of charitable purposes, see below at 182 - 183. 27 E. g. Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts (Nathan Committee), 
Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts (Cmnd 8710, 
1952); Goodman Committee, Report of the Goodman Committee: Charity Law and Voluntary 
Organisations (London, Bedford Square Press, 1976); Home Office, Charities: A Framework 
for the Future (London, HMSO, Cmnd 694,1989). 
28 E. g. Deakin Commission, Meeting the Challenge of Change: Voluntary Action into the 21" 
Century (London, National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 1996), para 3.2.6; Scottish 
Charity Law Review Commission, Charity Scotland The report of Scottish Charity Law 
Review Commission (www. scotiand. gov. uk/justice/charitylaw/csmr/csmr-OO. htm, Scottish 
Charity Law Review Commission, 2001), recommendation 2; also House of Commons 
Expenditure Committee, Charity Commissioners and their Accountability (HC 495-1,1975), 
noted in Luxton, above n 24 at 25. 
29 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(4). Furthermore, this flexibility is regularly tested by virtue of the 
fact that charitable trusts do not need to demonstrate conceptual certainty in relation to their 
objects, unlike their private counterparts (see e. g. Inland Revenue Commissioners v Broadway 
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proposed definitions of charity, it is clear that a significant proportion of organised 
civil society - particularly political CSOs, mutuals and social enterprises - falls 
outside the charitable sector. We shall return to this issue below when we consider the 
relationship between organised civil society and the charitable sector. 30 
(2) Functional overlap 
The boundary between organised civil society, the market and the state becomes even 
fuzzier when we take account of the fact that there are a number of areas of activity in 
which more than one sector is present 31 - for example, all three sectors have a 
presence in the fields of education, 32 healthcare 33 and even financial services. 34 In fact, 
this is one of the reasons why we found it necessary also to define CSOs by reference 
to their structural characteristics, as we did in Chapter Two. 35 As no social function is 
the exclusive preserve of civil society, 36 we require more information than simply the 
nature of the activities in which it is engaged in order to classify an organisation as 
belonging to the sector. This may have implications for any regulatory strategy. First, 
where more than one sector is present in a particular social sphere, sector-based 
regulation may result in organisations engaged in identical activities being subjected to 
Cottages Trust [ 195 5] Ch 20; McPhail v Doulton [ 19711 AC 424): were this not the case, 
settlors would be encouraged to draft more precise objects, which would in turn result in fewer 
cases before the courts pushing at the boundaries of charity law. 
30 See below at 177 - 205. 31 See generally Weisbrod, B. (ed. ), To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial 
Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector (Cambridge, CUP, 1998), especially: Weisbrod, B., 
'The Nonprofit Mission and its Financing: Growing Links Between Nonprofits and the Rest of 
the Economy' (ibid); also Tuckman, H., 'Competition, Commercialization, and the Evolution 
of Nonprofit Organizational Structures' (ibid) at 37. 
32 Consider state-run comprehensive schools, charitable public schools and private tuition. See 
also below nn 90,91 and associated text; also Cain, L., and Meritt Jnr, D., 'Zoos and 
Aquariums' in We isbrod, above n31; Anheier, H., and Toepler, S., 'Commerce and the Muse: 
Are Art Museums Becoming Commercial? ' in Weisbrod, ibid. 
33 Consider the National Health Service, BUPA and charitable hospitals. In the United States 
context, see generally Sloan, F., 'Commercialism in Nonprofit Hospitals' in Weisbrod, above n 
3 1; also Young, D., 'Commercialism in Nonprofit Social Service Associations: its Character, 
Significance, and Rationale' in Weisbrod, ibid. 
34 Although more typically the preserve of the private sector, consider the Bank of England and 
financial mutuals. There is now also charitable sector presence: see Decisions of the Charity 
Commissioners, I November 2002 (where the Commission held that the Charity Bank Ltd is a 
charitable company; its purpose is to provide loans and guarantees to charities, and for 
charitable purposes, at favourable rates (at 1)). 
35 See above Ch 2 at 48 - 54. 
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different constraints and rewarded with different incentives. This would violate the 
idea that regulation should be 'even-handed' and treat like cases in a consistent 
manner, 37 which has been identified by Baldwin and Cave as one of the key tests of 
'good' regulation'. 38 This is why our theory of regulation posited in Chapter Four 
focuses upon issues that are of sector-based, rather than activity-based, concern. 39 
Second, because the sectors do not operate in isolation, changes which are brought 
about in one may have an impact upon the others: thus policy x, targeted at organised 
civil society, may have unforeseen consequences for the state and the market. It may 
therefore sometimes be appropriate to regulate solely based on social function, rather 
than social sector. 40 
A third problem is that organisations that operate in the sector with the heaviest 
regulation may decide to reconstitute themselves to enable them to join the sector with 
the weakest regulation. 41 Alternatively, organisations that operate in the sector with 
the least state support may decide to reconstitute themselves so they can join the sector 
with the most. This is not as fanciful as it might first sound: Anheier notes that in 
Greece, there is a trend for private foundations to reconstitute themselves as public 
foundations where lack of resources threatens their future; 42 in Italy, the opposite trend 
is evident in relation to CSOs engaged in the provision of cultural services. 43 In the 
English context, this sector shift could, in many cases, be done with relative ease. The 
change from private sector firm to CSO could be effected simply by making the 
36 On those social functions which the sector shares with the market, see below at 167 - 168. 37 Simon, above n 15 at 246. 
38 Baldwin, R., and Cave, M., Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy, and Practice 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999) at 76 and 79. Of course, even if organisations across the sectors are 
functionally the same, they may have different structural characteristics that could justify 
separate treatment. 
39 See above Ch 4 at 115. 
40 We shall consider in the third part of the thesis the issue of whether there should be an 
integrated regulatory policy effective across all sectors - see below Ch 6 at 215,226. 41 See Goddeeris, J., and Weisbrod, B., 'Conversion from Nonprofit to For-Profit Legal Status: 
Why Does it Happen and Should Anyone CareT in Weisbrod, above n 31 at 135 - 136. An 
organisation may also take advantage of differences in regulatory regimes by forming a 
relationship with an organisation in the rival sector, rather than joining the rival sector outright: 
see Weisbrod, ibid at 18 (on collaborations across sector boundaries, see Tuckman, above n 31 
at 40 - 42). 42 Anheier, H., 'Foundations in Europe: a Comparative Perspective' in Schlilter, A., Then, V., 
and Walkenhorst, P. (eds. ), Foundations in Europe Society Management and Law (London, 
Directory of Social Change, 2001) at 44. 
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change from operating on a for-profit basis to a non-profit basis (although making the 
change from private firm to charity is, of course, rather more complicated). 44 This 
may require creating another legal vehicle and transferring the assets of the original 
organisation across to it. Although a public company may re-register as a company 
limited by guarantee (the typical corporate form for a CSO)'45 a private company 
limited by shares (a typical vehicle for private enterprise) may not. 46 However, this 
restriction can be circumvented, as a private company limited by shares can re-register 
as a public company and then use the statutory provisions to convert to a company 
limited by guarantee. 47 There has also been at least one instance of a private company 
limited by shares turning itself into a charity without any re-registration. In The 
Abbey, Malvern Wells Ltd v Ministry of Local Government and Planning, 48 the three 
shareholders of a school for girls constituted as a company limited by shares 
transferred their holdings to a board of trustees to be held for the benefit of the school. 
Danckwerts J held that the trust deed prevented the company from being operated for 
private gain, 49 as any profits were required to be fed back into the school, and 
accordingly found the company to be charitable. 50 Luxton advises against this 
approach on the ground that it requires the corporate veil to be pierced, which the 
Charity Commission may not be prepared to do; 51 in any case, though, it would be a 
simple matter to set up a new guarantee company and transfer the assets across if the 
owners so wished. 
The change from CSO to private sector organisation is more complicated, particularly 
when the CSO in question has charitable status. A company limited by guarantee 
43 Anheier, above n 42 at 44. 
44 As this would require an organisation to: (i) ensure that it operates for exclusively charitable 
purposes, which may require a change to its stated objects; (ii) ensure that it satisfies the public 
benefit test; and (iii) go through the Charity Commission's registration process. 
45 Companies Act 1985, s 53(3). 
46 By virtue of the statutory provisions for other types of re-registration, it is generally accepted 
that this would require express statutory provision; the Companies Act 1985 contains no such 
provision. See Mayson, S., French, D., and Ryan, C., Mayson, French and Ryan on Company 
Law (London, Blackstone Press, 2002) at 60. 
47 Companies Act 1985, ss 43(l), 53(3). 
48 [1951] Ch 728. 
49 Above n 48 at 735. 
50 Above n 48 at 740. 
51 Luxton, above n 24 at 277. 
160 
5: BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY REGULATION 
cannot be converted into company limited by shares under any circumstances. 52 It can 
re-register as an unlimited company, 53 but the unlimited liability of members is 
unlikely to make this an attractive proposition. 54 More significant is the fact that, 
although a new for-profit organisation could be created, any assets owned by the CSO 
would only be free for the new organisation to utilise if the CSO does not have 
charitable status: once monies have been committed to charity, the law does not permit 
them to be applied to non-charitable purposes. 55 Where the CSO is a charity, this 
could happen in one of four ways. First, if the CSO is based upon a charitable trust 
(either alone or as part of an unincorporated association) and funds are transferred 
across, the new organisation will simply hold the funds on the same charitable trust as 
the previous trustees, 56 who will be liable for breach of trust if they have applied the 
trust's assets for a non-charitable purpose (videlicet, to resource their new for-profit 
organisation). 57 Second, if the CSO is a charitable company, although there would be 
no initial charitable trust, a constructive trust in favour of the charitable purpose would 
presumably be imposed on the assets and thus restrict the new organisation in much 
the same fashion; certainly this is the case where a charitable company alters its 
objects so that they are no longer exclusively charitable, 58 and there can be no 
52 For the same reasons given above n 46. 
53 Companies Act 1985, s 49(l). 
54 Although an unlimited company may normally re-register as a company limited by shares 
(Companies Act 1985, ss 51 - 52); this would not avail a CSO in the process of transition, as 
re-registration is not permitted where the unlimited company was previously a private limited 
company (ss 51(2), 49(l)). 
55 Except insofar as every charity may be engaged in limited non-charitable purposes and use 
their resources accordingly. 
56 It is hard to conceive of a situation whereby the new organisation would be a bonafide 
purchaser of the assets without notice, and hence take free of the trust: aside from the fact that 
it will most likely be a volunteer; its managers / owners would clearly have notice of the trust, 
having been the trustees / members of the charity. 
57 This principle is not exclusive to charities. If a private trust is settled for the benefit of the 
members of a particular CSO, then applying the trust property for the purposes of a new 
organisation would be in breach of trust unless all the beneficiaries of the trust consented (see 
Smith v Hugh Watt Society Inc [20041 NZLR 537, especially para 62). 
58 See Luxton, above n 24 at 294. Although companies may normally alter their objects by 
special resolution (Companies Act 1985, s 4(l)), charitable companies also require the written 
permission of the Charity Commission (Charities Act 1993, s 64(2)). Luxton suggests that 
consent will routinely be given so long as the Commission is satisfied that the existing funds 
will still be applied for their original purpose (at 294). Recent Charity Commission 
operational guidance appears primafacie to contradict this, stating that the Commission will 
refuse consent where the change to the objects is 'so radical that it would not reasonably have 
been contemplated by those who have supported the company' (Charity Commission, 
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justification for treating a transfer to new organisation any differently. Third, if the 
CSO was a charitable guarantee company and decided to re-register as an unlimited 
private company, this would require the permission of the Charity Commission, who 
would again ensure that this did not prejudice existing charitable funds. 59 Finally, we 
can note than any attempt to evade these restrictions by dissolving the original charity 
is doomed: charitable trusts cannot be dissolved as such, and will continue for as long 
as there is trust property; the dissolution of a charitable company would simply result 
in the assets being applied either (i) to those charitable purposes specified in the 
memorandum, if any, 60 or (ii) to similar charitable purposes cy prýs by way of a 
scheme. 
It would also be easy for an organisation to leave the public sector to join organised 
civil society, as this would simply require severing any links with the state - indeed, a 
number of independent charities have been set up by public bodies in order to carry out 
their statutory duties. 61 The hardest change to effect would, of course, be entry into the 
public sector, as, unlike the other moves, this would require a willing public body to 
establish a nexus with the organisation in question. It could not be effected by those 
with the power to amend the organisation's constitution alone. 
Overlap between civil society and the public sector 
It is apparent that many of the social functions described in the previous chapter are 
carried out not just by organised civil society but also by the state - in particular, the 
Alterations to Governing Documents: Charitable Companies: The Legal Background (OG47 
Al, available at www. charity-commission. gov. uk, 2003), para 5). However, the operational 
guidance seems to be designed to ensure the change does not 'prejudice the original object 
beneficiary class' (Charity Commission, Alterations to Governing Documents: Charitable 
Companies: When is our Consent Required (OG47 132, available at www. charity- 
commission. gov. uk, 2003), para 2.2); the guidance therefore may only to relate to changes 
which would result in existing funds being devoted to the new objects. 
59 Companies Act 1985, s 49(5) requires that as part of the re-registration process, the company 
memorandum and articles have 'requisite' amendments; this would require the permission of 
the Commission under Charities Act 1993, s 64(2). 
60 See Luxton, above n 24 at 297,846. 
61 See Charity Commission, RR7. - The Independence of Charitiesfrom the State (London, 
Charity Commission, 2001), paras 3-4; on which see Garton, J., 'Charities and the State' 
(2000) 14 TLI 93 at 98. 
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state is regularly engaged in market support, 62 the provision of public goodS, 63 the 
redistribution of wealth 64 and the facilitation of political action. 65 
Civil society and the scope ofpublic law 
As a result of the functional overlap between organised civil society and the state, a 
CSO may be engaged in the provision of what public law deems to be a 'public 
function'. It is trite to say that there is no single definition or rule for determining 
whether a particular function is public; rather there are a number of overlapping factors 
that are to be taken into account, although none is decisive. As the law stands, 66 it 
would seem that a CSO may be deemed to be exercising a public function if it is 
carrying out an activity (i) which, were it not doing so, the state would carry out 
f. 67 ; 68 itsel . (ii) which 
had previously been carried out by the state (iii) with some kind 
of backing or approval of the state; 69 or (iv) which is concerned with the monopolistic 
62 E. g. the state reduces transaction costs by providing legal mechanisms such as the contract 
and the company. See above Ch 3 at 58 - 59. 6' E. g. the provision of national security. See above Ch 3 at 62. 
64 E. g. the provision of social welfare such as the National Heath Service, Jobseekers' 
Allowance etc. 
65 Although at one level everything that relates to the state is inherently political, a more 
sophisticated analysis might distinguish between that which is directly political - e. g. policy- 
making and legislative action - and that which is only indirectly political - e. g. the 
employment relationship between the state and its public servants. We are concerned here 
with the former. A similar distinction is regularly made between the public and private actions 
of the state - the employment relationship noted above e. g. would be considered a private 
matter: see Rv British Broadcasting Corporation, exparte Lavelle [1983] 1 WLR 23, where 
an ex-employee of the BBC failed to secure judicial review of the decision to dismiss her as 
there was no public element to her relationship with her employer. 
66 The following categorisation of the law can be found in Woolf (Lord), Jowell, J., and Le 
Seur, A., de Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Principles ofJudicial Review (London, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1999) at 68 - 70. 67 See e. g. Rv Advertising Standards Authority, ex parte Insurance Service plc (1989) 9 Tr LR 
169 and Rv Football Association Ltd, exparte Football League [1993] 2 All ER 833. In the 
former, it was relevant that if the ASA did not regulate advertising standards the government 
would; in the latter, it was relevant that if the Football Association did not regulate the football 
industry the government would not take over - rather, the market would step into the breach. 68 See e. g. Poplar Housing v Donoghue [2002] QB 48; R (Beer) v Hampshire Farmers' 
Market [2004] 1 WLR 233 (in the context of the Human Rights Act 1998). 
69 See e. g. Rv Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [199311 WLR 
909; Scott v National Trust [1998] 2 All ER 705 (on which see below Ch 8n 8); Rv Servite 
Houses (2001) 33 HLR 3 5; Poplar Housing v Donoghue, above n 68; Rv Leonard Cheshire 
Foundation [2002] HRLR 30. Note also that for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights recommends that a contractual nexus between state and 
a CSO as service provider should be enough to class the service provider as 'public' (House of 
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regulation of an industry. 70 Although it would seem from the caselaw to date that, 
even if a CSO displayed one or more of these factors, the courts would be reluctant to 
find the requisite public function to enable an action for judicial review to lie, 71 it is 
nevertheless clear that, given the right circumstances, it is possible for a charity to be 
deemed to be exercising a public function. 72 There are several implications in casting 
certain civil society activity as public in this way. First, there are obvious practical 
ramifications, in that CSOs may find themselves subject to judicial review, 73 although 
in the case of charities the impact of this would be minimal in light of s 33 of the 
Charities Act 1993, which allows for proceedings to be brought in relation to a 
charity's administration in a similar fashion to judicial review. 74 They may also be 
75 treated as public bodies for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Second, there may be theoretical implications in extending the scope of judicial review 
to CSOs, particularly in relation to the provision of public goods, depending on the 
sociological theories of civil society to which we subscribe. It seems likely, on the 
basis of judicial review as it stands, that the provision of public goods could be classed 
as a public function. There are no published cases on this point, but one leading 
Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act: Seventh Report of Session 2003 - 04 (14L Paper 39, HC 
382, London, HMSO, 2004), Ch 3. 
70 This was considered a relevant, though again not determinative factor in Rv Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 815; see too Rv Football Association 
Ltd, ex parte Football League [1993] 2 All ER 833; Rv Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey 
Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909. In General Nursing Councilfor England and 
Wales v St Marylebone BC [1959] AC 540, the House of Lords confirmed that an organisation 
which exists primarily to regulate an industry cannot be charitable (cf Royal College of 
Nursing v St Marylebone BC [195911 WLR 1077, where the Royal College of Nursing was 
deemed charitable because its purpose was not the regulation of its members: the RCN's 
purpose is 'to promote the science and art of nursing and the better education training of nurses 
and their efficiency in the profession of nursing' (Registered Charity No. 276435)). However, 
the Charity Commission concluded in 2002 that the General Medical Council, the main 
function of which is the registration of medical practitioners (Decisions of the Charity 
Commissioners, 2 April 2001, para 8.3.2), was charitable by virtue of the fact that the overall 
purpose was 'to promote, protect and maintain the health and safety of the community by 
ensuring proper standards in the practice of medicine' (ibid, para 8.4.3). 
71 See Poplar Housing v Donoghue, above n 68; Rv Leonard Cheshire Foundation, above n 
69. 
72 See Poplar Housing v Donoghue, above n 68. 
73 See generally Lyon, A., 'Judicial Review of Voluntary Bodies' in Dunn, A. (ed. ), The 
Voluntary Sector, the State and the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2000). 
74 For a comparative analysis of the two mechanisms see below Ch 8 generally. 
" See Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley PCC v Wallbank [2003] 3 WLR 283. 
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administrative law text states unequivocally, although without authority, that 'a body is 
performing a public function when it provides "public goods"'. 76 Certainly if we 
consider paradigm public goods such as national security or public amenities such as 
street lighting 77 or the transport infrastructure, 78 it is easy to conceive that civil society 
activity in these areas would be replaced by the state if CSOs were to withdraw their 
presence. In fact, this has already occurred in some cases, for example in relation to 
charities concerned with the maintenance of bridges: Picarda notes that today the 
income received by these charities 'in most cases' is simply given straight to the 
relevant local authority for that purpose. 79 In relation to environmental public goods, 
the National Trust operates within a statutory framework and thus could be said to 
80 enjoy the support of the state. Civil society activities in relation to other social 
functions may be equally susceptible to classification as public functions for judicial 
review purposes. In relation to market support, it is likely that the activities of 
professional organisations such as the General Medical Council would be undertaken 
by the state if circumstances were different. 81 In relation to the redistribution of 
wealth, the same is true of certain activities directed towards the relief of poverty or 
the provision of education. 82 
76 Woolf et al, above n 66 at 65. 
77 Attorney General v Brown (1818) 1 Swan 265. 
78 Attorney General v Shrewsbury Corporation (1843) 6 Beav 220. 
79 Picarda, H., The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (London, Butterworths, 1999) at 
140. The reason for the continued existence of such charities appears to be because of a 
reluctance on the part of the trustees to apply for a scheme so that the money can be utilised 
elsewhere (ibid at 141). Without such a scheme, exemption from the rule against perpetuity 
means that a charity with endowment funds can trundle along ad infinitum. 
80 National Trust Act 197 1, Part 11. On the law regarding the position of the National Trust 
with regard to judicial review, see below Ch 8n8. 
81 See above n 70. 
82 E. g. in the absence of CSO hospitals, hospices et al, the state would doubtless wish to 
expand NHS provision accordingly (on functional overlap in relation to healthcare, see 
Rothermich, P., 'Defining "Charitable" in the Context of State Property Tax Exemption for 
Nonprofit Nursing Homes' (1999) 34 Saint Louis University Law Journal 1109 at 1113). 
Similarly, in the absence of public schools, the state would wish to accommodate these 
students with the state education system. Of course, in situations such as this, whether the 
state would, in reality, step in were civil society provision to drop off, would be dependent on 
resource implications, and also on whether people would be willing to pay for the goods in 
private sector instead. 
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Weibrod's theory of market failure 83 and Levitt's theory of government failure 84 lend 
weight to the idea that activities of this sort may be classified as public functions. 
These theories suggest that the state is the appropriate provider of collective goods and 
that civil society organisations step in only when the government fails (inevitably) to 
provide collective goods at a level that satisfies the utility of all its citizens. Thus, the 
judicial review of CSOs which engage in the provision of collective goods would, 
under this analysis, seem uncontroversial: if the state is our first-choice as provider, it 
would seem reasonable to class the provision of collective goods as a public function. 
However, theoretical difficulties arise if we consider Salamon's theory of voluntary 
failure, 85 which regards organised civil society as the preferred provider of public 
goods, with the state stepping in only in those situations when organised civil society 
fails to carry this out satisfactorily. If we prefer this interpretation of civil society 
86 activity (and we have already noted limitations in the others), then it cannot be 
appropriate to label the provision of collective goods as inherently 'public' in nature: 
in the absence of voluntary failure, the state would not be concerned with their 
provision at all. Considering judicial review in the light of the theory of voluntary 
failure throws up a number of interesting public law questions - such as the 
appropriateness of the existing criteria for determining public functions, the inherent 
limitations of the bipartite classification of society adopted by the courts in judicial 
review actions, 87 whether amenability to judicial review should be based solely on 
function or take organisational structure into account as wel, 88 - but an attempt to 
answer these would fall outside the scope of this thesis. From a regulatory perspective, 
it is sufficient that we are aware of the possibility that CSOs may, in the future, 
become routinely reviewed in this way. Should this happen, then an integrated 
83 See above Ch 3 at 63 - 65. 84 See above Ch 3 at 70 - 72. 85 See above Ch 3 at 72 - 81. 86 See above Ch 3 at 65,71 - 72. 87 On which see generally Freedland, M., 'Charity Law and the Public/Private Distinction' in 
Mitchell, C., and Moody, S., (eds. ), Foundations of Charity (Oxford, Hart, 2000). 
88 See e. g. Oliver, D., Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (London, Butterworths, 
1999); Oliver, D., 'The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities and Public Functions under 
the Human Rights Act' [20001 PL 476; Oliver, D., 'Functions of a Public Nature under the 
Human Rights Act' [20041 PL 329. 
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regulatory policy must take this into account in order to minimise any duplication of 
control. 89 
Overlap between civil society and the private sector 
The functional overlap between organised civil society and the private sector can be 
divided in two types: (i) that which occurs when both sectors operate in the same 
social sphere and (ii) that which occurs when CSOs engage in trading in order to 
finance their social function. In relation to the first type, the market has at least some 
presence in most social spheres. In particular, we should note that private firms are 
regularly engaged in the provision of education: consider those professional colleges 
run on a for-profit basis, 90 the public / private partnerships (PPPs) between the state 
and private investors which are used to attract resources to ailing state schools, 91 and 
the research and development which is carried out in-house by private firms. 92 We 
have also already noted the functional overlap between organised civil society and the 
state in relation to the provision of healthcare: the private sector also has a significant 
presence in this sector. 93 Finally, it is important to note, particularly following the 
recent recognition of the charitable status of amateur sports clubs, 94 the private sector 
activities relating to sport and recreation. 95 Functional overlap of this kind is 
significant from a regulatory perspective for the reason noted above: 96 namely, the 
need for some consistency within a particular sphere of industry. 
89 For a discussion of the likely impact of this on the basis of the current law, see below Ch 8 
generally. 
90 E. g. BPP Professional Education Ltd, which has been listed on the Stock Exchange since 
1988. 
91 As at 24 February 2004, there were 40 PPPs in operation (including 14 at further education 
level and 12 at higher education level (see www. dfes. gov. uk/ ppppfi/projects/proj2. shtml and 
www. dfes. gov. uk/ppppfi/projects/proj3. shtml)) with another 26 signed agreements at the 
planning stage and a further 36 agreement at procurement stage: see Department for Education 
and Skills, Public Private Partnership (PPP) Projects in Schools Project List (DFES, London, 
2004). The first of these ventures, the Sir John Colfox School, Dorset, opened in September 
1999, 
92 This overlaps with similar research and development undertaken in CSOs such as 
universities (see above Ch 3 at 60 - 61). 93 See above n 14 and associated text; Rothermich, above n 82 at 1113. 
94 See below at 194. 
9' Consider e. g. health clubs and corporate gyms. 
96 See above at 146. 
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In relation to trading activities by CSOs, the main regulatory concern is whether any 
regulation aimed at fostering civil society activity might have the effect of giving 
CSOs an unfair advantage over private sector firms operating in the same market. It is 
for this reason that the Labour government has refused to implement the Strategy Unit 
recommendation that charities be permitted to carry on all their trading activities 
themselves. 97 Under the current law, it has been held that: 98 
... merely to set out to raise money, to run a 
business or to buy and sell 
property, for example, stocks and shares, in order to make money, albeit with 
the motive of paying that money over so that it will be used for charitable 
purposes, is not ... charitable ... 
It is ... a purpose or purposes of which the 
motive is to make the outcome of the activities available to those who will 
apply that outcome for charitable purposes. It is a separate and earlier step 
leading to an increase in the assets of those who carry out the charitable 
purposes. 
Accordingly, if a charity wishes to engage in trading other than that which is (i) an 
inherent part of its charitable purpose, 99 or (ii) ancillary to and in furtherance of its 
charitable purpose, 100 it must do so through a subsidiary for-profit organisation. which 
transfers any surplus back to the parent charity. 
Overlap between civil society and the informal sector 
There is a degree of functional overlap between CSOs and the informal sector: 
redistribution of wealth and the provision of mutual support are commonly carried out 
within the family unit or tribe. This is unsurprising, as we have already noted that 
organised civil society may have developed out of extended familial support 
networks. 101 From a regulatory perspective, this is significant because insufficiently 
97 See below n 279. 
98 Aldous v Southwark Corp [1968] 1 WLR 1671 at 1682 per Winn LJ; this case was doubted 
by the majority of the House of Lords in Oxfam v Birmingham City District Council [19761 
AC 126, but not on this general point. 
99 Charity Commission, CC35: Charities and Trading (London, Charity Commission, 2001) 
para 6. 
100 Charity Commission, above n 99 paras 13 - 14. On the kinds of trading likely to fall into 
this category, see Luxton, above n 24 at 730. 
"' See above Ch 2 at 40. 
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tight regulation' 02 risks the juridification' of the informal sector, by which we mean 
replacing the organic, informal structures which naturally govern the sector's operation 
with a formalistic legal equivalent, 103 which, at an extreme level, may have the effect 
that 
human conflicts are torn ... out of their living context and distorted by being 
subject to the legal process. "' 
As we have already noted, M this is a problem to which organised civil society itself is 
also susceptible: the nature of 'resources such as personal effort, commitment and 
flexibility of interaction' which characterise the sector 106 being such that they 'cannot 
... be centrally monitored for errors'. 
107 
(3) Micro level interaction between sectors 
Consider the government department, the bookshop and the reading group that we held 
up as sector paradigms at the beginning of this chapter. Would we still be confident in 
classifying them as falling, respectively, in the public sector, private sector and 
organised civil society if, for example, we learned that the bookshop, although 
operating in the same market as other bookshops, was in fact owned by the reading 
group and run solely to fund its activities? '08 How would we deal with another reading 
group which operated on exactly the same basis but was established under the aegis of 
the government department, say as part of a national literacy campaign? 109 There is no 
easy solution to situations such as these. If the bookshop was operated on a for-profit 
basis then there is a case for treating it as belonging in the private sector. However, if 
all profits go to the reading group, as the owner, and the bookshop exists solely to 
102 See above at 15 5- 15 8. 
103 Teubner, G., 'Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions' in Baldwin, R., Scott, C., 
and Hood, C. (eds. ), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford, OUP, 1998). 
104 Teubner, above n 103 at 393. 
'0' See above Ch 4 at 150. 106 See above Ch 3 at 105 - 111. 10' Zacher, H., 'Juridification in the Field of Social Law' in Teubner, G. (ed. ), Juridification of 
the Social Spheres (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1987) at 389. 
"' On links between CSOs and the private sector, see generally Abzug, R., and Webb, N., 
'Relationships Between Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizations: A Stakeholder Perspective' 
(1999) 28 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 416. 
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resource a parent organisation which satisfies our structural and functional definition 
of a CSO, then there is clearly a case for saying the bookshop more properly belongs 
in organised civil society. Likewise, as the second reading group is owned and 
operated by a government department there is case for saying it too falls in the public 
sector. However, it would seem to satisfy the functional definition of organised civil 
society - its function being the facilitation of self-determination through ideological 
expression - and if it exhibits the shared characteristics (other than independence) we 
identified in Chapter Two then there is a case for saying it should stand alongside the 
other reading group in organised civil society. ' 10 
Implications for regulation 
As well as having implications for the scope of regulation, III these kinds of cross- 
sector interactions may result in the structural differences between organised civil 
society and the other sectors breaking down over time, by way of what Langton terms 
trait absorption. 112 Problems of this nature may also arise where organisations interact 
with existing organisations (as opposed to creating their own subsidiary as in the 
examples above) across the sector boundaries, even if those organisations are, when 
examined in isolation, paradigms of their respective sectors. An obvious example of 
this kind of interaction between the sector and the state is the contract culture, 113 which 
we will discuss in detail later; 114 there are also instances where CSOs actually engage 
'09 On the charity law implications of a move such as this, see Garton, above n 61 at 97; also 
generally Charity Commission, above n 61. 
11() On hybridisation generally, see Langton, S., 'Envoi: Developing Nonprofit Theory' in 
Ostrander, S., and Langton, S., Shifting the Debate: Public / Private Sector Relations in the 
Modern Welfare State (New Brunswick, Transaction, 1987) at 143 - 144. 111 See above at 15 5- 15 8. 
112 Langton, above n 110 at 144. 
113 The contract culture emerged during the 1980 and 90s (see Kendall, J. and Knapp, M., The 
Voluntary Sector in the UK (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996) at 228) but, on 
an individual level, there is a long tradition of conditional funding by the state - in his history 
of English philanthropy, Owen mentions such a grant received by the Foundling Hospital in 
1756, which Morris notes as an early example of contracting (Owen, D., English Philanthropy 
1660 - 1960 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1965) at 52 - 57; Morris, 
D., 'Paying the Piper: The "Contract Culture" as Dependency Culture for Charities' in Dunn, 
above n 73 at 125). 
114 See below Ch 6 at 240 - 243. 
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the state as service provider, particularly in relation to public amenities. 115 So far as 
the relationship between organised civil society and the market is concerned, O'Regan 
and Oster suggest a number of reasons why CSOs may wish to subcontract certain 
activities to private firms: (i) to raise capital, (ii) motivate staff, and (iii) for 'ease of 
action', avoiding the 'checks and balances' of any applicable CSO regulatory 
regime. 116 Particularly important is the contracting out of fundraising to the private 
sector, 117 which has been the subject of specific government scrutiny. 118 Firms, 
meanwhile, engage CSOs in activities which tend towards the welfare of their own 
staff, such as child care. ' 19 Over time, such interaction can tend towards organisations 
from one sector adopting characteristics of another - evidenced by the trend towards 
professionalization across organised civil society. ' 20 At an extreme level, this can lead 
to the creation of hybrid organisations, such as the social enterprise in the UK, which 
operate half way between organised civil society and the private sector. 12 1 This is 
particularly significant from a regulatory perspective, as we must be careful to ensure 
that the transfer of traits from other sectors to organised civil society does not (i) alter 
the quiddity of the sector such that CSOs lose the characteristics which make them 
suited to their particular social functions, or (ii) bring with it other weaknesses that 
may encumber the operation of the sector. 
115 See Young, D., 'Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations: 
Theoretical and International Perspectives' (2000) 29 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 149, who cites the example of United States CSOs paying for the government to 
erect public monuments (at 155); also above n 79 and associated text. 
116 O'Regan, K., and Oster, S., 'Nonprofit and For-Profit Partnerships: Rationale and 
Challenges of Cross-Sector Contracting' (2000) 29 (Supplement) Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly 120 at 123. 
117 Morris, D., 'The Media and the Message: An Evaluation of Advertising by Charities and an 
Examination of the Regulatory Frameworks (1995 / 96) 3 CLPR 157 at 15 8. 
118 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Private Action, Public Benefit. - A Review of Charities and 
the Wider Not-For-Profit Sector (London, HMSO, 2002), para 6.33. 
119 Boris, E., 'Nonprofit Organisations in a Democracy: Varied Roles and Responsibilities' in 
Boris, E. and Steuerle, E. (eds. ), Nonprofits and Government Collaboration and Conflict 
(Washington, DC, Urban Institute Press, 1999) at 21. 
120 Langton, above nI 10 at 144. Although this characteristic is commonly associated with the 
private sector, it is also encouraged by increased links with the public sector who are used to 
contracting out to the private sector and encourage CSOs to act in a similarly professional 
fashion. See Garton, above n 61 at 96 - 97. 121 See below at 187 - 189. 
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(4) Macro level interaction between sectors 
Finally, any regulatory strategy must also be aware of the way in which the sectors as a 
whole affect each other, as trends in one may have an unanticipated impact on the 
others. 122 Young suggests that the relationship between organised civil society and the 
state can be characterised as being 'supplementary', 'complementary' or 'adversarial' 
(or a combination of all three). 123 The predominant type of relationship in any given 
social sphere will be determined partly by the nature of the social function pursued and 
partly by the way in which CSOs conceptualise their own role in society. 
Supplementary relationship 
Young notes that, in the context of public goods provision, CSOs may consider that 
their function is to augment the services provided by the state - to step in when state 
output drops below what it considers to be the optimum level. 124 Much CSO provision 
of public goods is either explicitly or implicitly consistent with this relationship. For 
example, in the context of national security, the purpose of the Nuffield Trust for the 
Forces of the Crown is: 125 
promoting the welfare and efficiency of the forces of the crown either by the 
provision of facilities for recreation or by any other means 
but it is the trustees' explicit policy only to provide those facilities 'which are not 
126 
provided by public funds'. The same is also true of many organisations that 
facilitate the redistribution of wealth. For example, many charities that relieve 
poverty, such as Oxfam and Shelter, 127 are in the business of helping those to whom 
the resources of the state do not extend. So far as implicit consistency goes, we can 
consider the significant number of environmental organisations that undertake 
122 See Langton nI 10 at 144; also generally Saidel, J., 'Dimensions of Interdependence: The 
State and Voluntary -Sector Relationship' (1989) 18(4) Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 335 especially at 337. 
1 23 See generally Young, above n 115. 
124 Young, above n 115; see also Langton, S., 'The New Volunteerism' (1981) 10 Journal of 
Voluntary Action Research 7 at 10. 
1 25 Registered Charity 210829. 
126 See the trust's website (www. nuffieldtrust. org). 
127 Charity Numbers 202918 and 263710 respectively. 
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conservation activity, as opposed to environmental research - for example, projects 
undertaken by Friends of the Earth Trust Ltd in pursuit of its second stated purpose: 
'the conservation, protection and restoration for the public benefit of the 
natural resources, natural beauty and animal and plant life of the world' 128 
can be viewed as a response to the fact that the state has insufficient available 
resources to tackle every environmental problem. 129 A supplementary relationship 
between the sector and the state is consistent with the theory of market failure'30 and 
with the theory of government failure. 13 1 However, it is clearly inconsistent with the 
theory of voluntary failure, as this understands state provision to be supplementary to 
civil society activity, not the reverse. 132 
Complementary relationship 
Alternatively, Young suggests CSOs may consider that their role is to complement the 
services already provided by the state 133 - in other words, to act primarily as 
alternative service providers to give consumers greater choice. 134 This would appear 
to be evidenced in relation to those CSOs which enter into service contracts with the 
state. 1 35 In contrast to the supplementary relationship described above, this 
relationship is consistent with the theory of voluntary failure, 136 but inconsistent with 
the theory of government failure. 137 
128 Charity Number 281681 
129 On these organisations generally, see Charity Commission, RR9: Preservation and 
Conservation (London, Charity Commission, 2001). 
130 Young, above n 115 at 15 1; see above Ch 3 at 63 - 65. 131 See above Ch 3 at 70 - 72. 132 See above Ch 3 at 72 - 79. 133 Young, above n 115 at 153 - 155. 134 Noted by Home Office, Getting it Right Together: Compact on Relations between 
Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector in England (London, HMSO, Cm 4100, 
1998), para 8.2; see also, Douglas, J., Why Charity? The Casefor a Third Sector (Beverley 
Hills and London, Sage, 1983) at 13; James, above n 138 at 22. 
135 Salamon and Anheier suggest that when this relationship is in place, if the state increases 
spending then state funding will constitute a greater proportion of CSO income than otherwise 
(Salamon, L. and Anheier, H., 'Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit 
Sector Cross-Nationally' (1998) 9 Voluntas 213 at 226). 
136 Young, above n 115 at 153. The 'contract culture' can be viewed as the government 
responding to voluntary failure on the grounds of insufficiency of resources (see above Ch 3 at 
79-80). 
137 See above Ch 3n 85 and associated text. 
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Adversarial relationship 
A third type of relationship may arise in relation to the facilitation of political action: 
where this function is concerned, the relationship between organised civil society and 
the state will frequently be adversarial in nature. 13 8 Typically, this will happen when 
(i) a CSO campaigns in order to effect a change in government policy so as to persuade 
the administration to fund a particular social cause in a manner which suits its 
members or (ii) a CSO uses its expertise to highlight the defects in a particular 
government initiative. 139 When this occurs, there will be a natural temptation for the 
state to try either to prevent CSOs from campaigning altogether, or to minimise the 
effectiveness of their campaigns, and this may impact upon any regulatory strategy. In 
its Compact with the sector, the Labour government made a commitment to respect the 
political role of CSOs even when they are critical of government. ' 40 However, we 
have already noted 141 that so far as the charitable sector is concerned, significant 
restrictions are placed on campaigning by both rules of charity law 142 and Charity 
Commission guidelines. 143 Current reform proposals do not recommend any 
substantive changes in this area. 144 
138 Young, above n 115 at 15 1. Note that there may be elements of an adversarial relationship 
between organised civil society and the state outside the area of political action: James notes 
that where CSOs operate as alternative service providers they may find themselves competing 
with the government for service users (James, E., 'Economic Theories of the Nonprofit Sector: 
A Comparative Perspective' in Anheier, H. and Seibel, W. (eds. ), The Third Sector: 
Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organisations (Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 
1990) at 22). Note also that political action by organised civil society will not necessarily be 
adversarial -a CSO may campaign in order to alert the government and the public to a 
particular social problem in relation to which there is no established government policy, or 
may use its expertise to comment favourably on a particular government initiative. 
1'9 Although in the short-term the administration may look upon this unfavourably as 
generating negative publicity, one would hope that where criticism is justified and constructive 
this would lead to improved performance in the long-term (see Clark, J., 'The State, Popular 
Participation and the Voluntary Sector' in Hulme, D., and Edwards, M. (eds. ), NGOs, States 
and Donors: Too Close for Comfort (Basingstoke and London, MacMillan, 1997) at 5 5). 
140 Home Office, above n 134, para 9.1. 
M See above Ch 2 at 44; also below at 196 - 200. 142 See e. g. National Anti- Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1848] AC 31 
at 61 per Lord Simonds; at 77 per Lord Normand; noted in McGovern v Attorney General 
[19821 Ch 321 at 341 per Slade J. 
143 Charity Commission, CC9: Political Activities and Campaigning by Charities (London, 
Charity Commission, 2004) especially paras 23 - 24. 144 See below n 23 1. 
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Protean nature of boundary 
Where both sectors have a presence in a particular sphere, it would seem likely that the 
operation of one may have some impact on the actions of the other. Young suggests 
that the topography of organised civil society will be determined in part by the way in 
which its participants conceptualise their relationship with the state. 145 The same is 
also likely to be true in relation to the way that the relevant state organs conceptualise 
the relationship. If the collective attitude of CSOs in a particular sphere is that they are 
supplementary to the state then, in theory, if the state were to decrease its activities, 
civil society presence would grow. Similarly, if the state were to increase its activities, 
civil society activity would decrease proportionately - the sector will either shrink in 
size 146 or devote fewer resources to the relevant activities. 147 Conversely, if CSOs 
view their role as complementary to the state, we would expect the opposite reaction to 
shifting levels of state activity: 148 CSO activity should increase when state activity 
increases and vice versa. 149 
Social origins theory of civil society / state relations 
The extent to which these ideas are bome out in reality is unclear. Young suggests it is 
possible to map a history of organised civil society from the eighteenth century to the 
twentieth century which shows how shifting attitudes towards the role of the sector 
have shaped its activity, 150 but empirical research conducted in the 1990s by the Johns 
Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project to test whether the size of organised 
civil society shifts according to government spending suggests other social factors are 
at play, as 151 
the nonprofit sector [is] not an isolated phenomenon floating freely in social 
space but ... an 
integral part of a social system whose role and scale are a by 
product of a complex set of historical forces. 
145 See generally Young, above n 115. 
146 Salamon and Anheier, above n 13 5 at 22 1. 
147 Young, above n 115 at 150. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid; also Salamon and Anheier, above n 135 at 225. 
150 Young, above n 115 at 159. 
151 See generally Salamon and Anheier, above n 135. 
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Salamon and Anheier argue that the relationship between organised civil society and 
the state is better explained by the relationship between the different classes of citizens 
in a given jurisdiction. Specifically, on the basis of the Johns Hopkins project, it 
seems that, at least in the context of social welfare provision, the following is likely: 
(i) a dominant middle class encourages minimal state activity and extensive civil 
society activity, with the latter being largely reliant on private donations rather than 
state service contracts; (ii) a dominant working class encourages extensive state 
activity and minimal civil society activity, with the latter again being dependent 
largely on private donations; (iii) a strong landed class encourages both extensive state 
and civil society activity, with the latter largely reliant on state funding; and finally (iv) 
where the state 'exercises power on its own behalf, or on behalf of business', both state 
and civil society activity will be minimal, the latter now being funded primarily by 
service charges. 152 
Impact on regulation 
These theories may have an impact on the success of any given regulatory strategy. If 
regulation designed to encourage sector growth 153 ran alongside increased state 
provision in a sphere where the prevailing attitude is that organised civil society 
provision is supplementary to state provision, then the sector would be pulled in 
opposite directions. The same would be true if a similar regulatory strategy were 
pursued in order to compensate for reduced state presence in a sphere where the 
prevailing attitude is that organised civil society provision is complementary to state 
provision. Similarly, in relation to social origins theory, regulation designed to nurture 
CSOs may struggle to overcome social forces in societies with a dominant working 
class or an autonomous state. 154 However, it is likely that in practice the sector's 
heterogeneity will mean that no one theory will enable us to predict accurately how the 
relationship between the state and organised civil society will affect the operation of 
the latter. Certainly, Young suggests that supplementary and complementary 
152 Salamon and Anheier, above n 13 5 at 23 0- 23 1. 
153 See above Ch 4 at 148 - 149. 154 See the previous paragraph. 
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relationships are often 'manifested simultaneously', 155 even in relation to a particular 
social sphere. It is also likely that the sector will be affected by the size and shape of 
the private sector - where the private sector is seen to be trustworthy, there may be less 
call for CSO activity in spheres where their presence is predicated on their 
trustworthiness. 
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE CHARITABLE SECTOR 
Having considered the nature of the relationship between organised civil society and 
the public and private sectors, it is prudent at this point to consider in detail the 
relationship between the charitable sector and wider organised civil society. 
156 When 
considering how best to define organised civil society, we chose to leave the legal 
definition of charity to one side on the ground that, as it predates the sociological 
theories of civil society which formed the basis of our definition, it may prove an 
inappropriate basis for regulation. We are now in a position to consider whether this is 
in fact the case. Accordingly, the following analysis examines the topography of the 
charitable sector, as currently defined in England, in relation to wider organised civil 
society in order to determine (i) the extent to which the sector is congruent with 
organised civil society as a whole and (ii) whether the reasons for any incongruity are 
sufficient to justify focusing regulation on charities. This is an important task: the 
current system of regulation in England takes the charitable sector as its focus, and the 
current reforms in Canada, England, New Zealand and Scotland continue to focus 
regulatory attention on the charitable sector, albeit in some cases an enlarged one. ' 57 it 
is argued that there are no functional distinctions between the charitable sector and the 
rest of organised civil society, but that the range of purposes traditionally considered 
charitable fails to reflect this. The Charity Commission's review of the register and 
155 Young, D., 'Complementary, Supplementary, or Adversarial? A Theoretical Examination 
of Nonprofit-Government Relations in the United States' in Boris and Steuerle, above n 119 at 
32. 
156 It is important to note that, wbilst the following discussion takes the charitable sector in 
England and Wales as its focus, the concept of charity, and organised civil society more 
generally, also have relevance in (i) other common law jurisdictions and (ii) civil law and 
mixed law systems (for an overview of this see, see generally 6, P., and Randon, A., Liberty, 
Charity and Politics: Non-Profit Law and Freedom ofSpeech (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995), 
Chs 2- 3). On the decision to focus generally on common law jurisdictions and, more 
specifically, on the English law, see the research methodology, above Ch I at 31,34. 
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the draft Charities Bill go some way towards rectifying this disparity - in particular by 
explicitly recognising the charitable status of the promotion of human rights and 
amateur sports clubs - but two key features continue to separate charities from the 
wider sector: the rule against political purposes and the public benefit requirement. 
The second of these is related to the one structural distinction separating charities and 
some (but not all) non-charitable CSOs - non profit distribution. It is argued that 
whilst it may be proper that the presence or absence of profit or non-fiscal private 
benefit should influence regulatory strategy, it is inappropriate to define the limits of 
regulation on this basis. 
(1) Structural comparison 
We concluded in Chapter Two that there are four characteristics which structurally 
define CSOs: (i) independence, (ii) organisation, (iii) non profit distribution and (iv) 
volunteerism. All charities are required by law to exhibit the first three characteristics. 
Technically, not every charity has to operate on a voluntary basis, although it is 
probable that in practice most will be able to demonstrate a 'reasonable showing' of 
this fourth characteristic. 158 
Independence 
Organisations which fall inside organised civil society should in theory be independent 
from control by other sectors. In relation to charities, this is provided for by the 
fiduciary nature of charitable trusteeship and directorship, which demands that all 
decisions taken at trustee level are made solely in the interests of the charity itself. 159 
In this respect, charity law goes beyond the requirements of civil society theory, as 
every charity is independent not only from public sector organisations, private sector 
firms and the private interests of the trustees, but also from other CSOs and charities. 
Despite this theoretical requirement, those charities that interact with organisations 
157 See above Ch I at 19 - 26. 158 Salamon, L. and Anheier, H. (eds), Defining the nonprofit sector: A cross-national analysis 
(Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1997) at 34. 
159 Bray v Ford [ 1896] AC 44. 
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from other sectors are, in practice, inevitably susceptible to challenges to their 
independence along the lines discussed above. 160 
Organisation 
Charity law also obliges us to use a formal legal structure when establishing a charity. 
Thus charities satisfy the requirement that CSOs be organised (and thus distinct from 
the informal sector). This is well illustrated by the case of Down v Worrall, 161 which 
concerned a bequest to trustees to apply the testator's residuary estate: 162 
either to or for charitable or pious purposes, at their discretion, or otherwise for 
the separate benefit of my sister ... and all or any of her children. 
When the sole surviving trustee died, f 500 of the residuary estate remained. The High 
Court held that the bequest did not invoke the jurisdiction of charity law, which would 
have allowed the court to carry out the bequest on the ground that a charitable trust 
will not fail for want of a trustee, 163 because 'here no disposition is made in favour of 
charity'; 164 rather, the trustees merely 'had a personal discretion as to the application of 
the fund'. 165 In order to make such a disposition, it is necessary to separate the fund 
from the assets of both the founder and the trustees, which necessitates the use of one 
of three basic legal structures: ' 66 (i) the trust; (ii) the unincorporated association; and 
(iii) the company. 167 It is clear that each of these structures is appropriately 
160 On which, see generally: Charity Commission, CC29: Charities and Local Authorities 
(London, Charity Commission, 2001); Charity Commission, CC35: Charities and Trading 
(London, Charity Commission, 200 1); Charity Commission, CC3 7: Charities and Contracts 
(London, Charity Commission, 2003). See also above at 169 - 17 1. 161 (1833) 1 My &K 561 
162 Above n 161 at 561. 
163 See e. g. Moggridge v Thackwell (1803) 7 Ves 36. The exception to this is where the trust is 
predicated on a specific person taking up trusteeship: Re Lysaght [ 1966] Ch 191 at 204 - 205 
per Buckley J. For this, the settlor must clearly do more than merely identify his trustees. 
164 Above n 161 at 563 per Sir John Leach MR. 
165 Above n 161 at 5 63 - 564 per Sir John Leach MR. 166 Attempts to use other legal structures, such as the contract or the covenant, will fail (unless 
used in conjunction with one of the three structures: see Liverpool City Council v Attorney 
General The Times I May 1992 (on the contract) and Attorney General v Barratt Manchester 
Ltd The Times II July 1991 (on the covenant). See generally, Luxton, above n 24 at 253 - 
254. 
"' Although there are other legal structures available to charities, namely the friendly society 
and the industrial and provident society, these are simply variant forms of either the 
unincorporated association or the company: friendly societies may take either form (Friendly 
179 
5: BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY REGULATION 
'organised': the company has its own legal personality independent from its members, 
and, whilst this privilege is not accorded either to the trust or to the unincorporated 
association, the assets of both are treated as segregated from those of the trustees and 
members. 
Non profit distribution 
Charities are required to operate on a non profit distributing basis. 168 They are not 
required to operate at a loss, 169 but any profit made must be used for exclusively 
charitable purposes as opposed to distributed amongst the organisation's members. 170 
However, although charities demonstrate this structural characteristic, a number of 
CSOs - such as certain mutuals and social enterprises - do not. We shall return to this 
issue below. 171 
Volunteerism 
The only structural characteristic which is not demanded of charities by law is 
volunteerism, which we defined in Chapter Two as meaning that a CSO is (i) either 
managed by volunteers, (ii) staffed by volunteers or (iii) funded by voluntary 
contributions. 172 Although it has been said that 'the essence of charitable service in the 
capacity of a trustee is to act without gratuity', 173 it is clear from the caselaw that it is 
perfectly acceptable for the trustees of a charity to be remunerated for their work 
where the charity's governing document expressly authorises this. 174 It is also clear 
Societies Act 1992, ss 5& 6); industrial and provident societies take the form of the latter 
(Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965, s 3). The Charities Bill 2004 provides for a new 
organisation, the Charitable Incorporated Organisation (see s 32 and Sched. 6); again, as its 
name suggests, this will simply be another variation on the company. 
168 Re Smith's Will Trusts [ 1962] 1 WLR 763. 
169 Re Resch's Will Trusts [ 1969] 1 AC 514. 
170 Incorporated Council of Law Reportingfor England and Wales v Attorney General [1971] 
Ch 626. 
171 See below at 202 - 204. 172 See above Ch 2 at 49 - 50. 173 Lord Phi I ips of Sudbury, Hansard Lords Debates, 14 April 2000, column 3 87. This 
comment was made during the second reading of the Trustee Act 2000, which empowers the 
Secretary of State to provide for the remuneration of professional charity trustees (s 30(l)). 
174 See e. g. Willis v Kibble (1839) 1 Beav 559. 
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that it is acceptable for a charity to employ workers; 
175 indeed, this will often be 
necessary where particular skills are required. 176 Finally, it is clear that charities may 
rely on resources other than donations - for example, by carrying on a trade 
177 or 
entering into a contract for service provision. 178 
Prima facie, it may seem that this is the point where structural differences between 
charities and wider organised civil society appear. However, there are two important 
things we must note, First, the need to employ professional managers and workers in 
certain circumstances - in order to secure particular skills or attract participants of an 
appropriate calibre - is not exclusive to charities but can affect organisations across the 
whole of organised civil society, and the same is true of the need to look beyond 
donations for funding. Second, although the law does not demand that trustees are 
unpaid in all circumstances, this is discouraged. Where a charity's governing 
document does not expressly permit the remuneration of its trustees, remuneration can 
only take place with the approval of the Charity Commission or the court. 
179 The 
Commission's stance is that the 'concept of unpaid trusteeship has been one of the 
defining characteristics of the charitable sector' '180 and, for that reason, 
it will only 
approve a scheme to amend the governing document if the trustees demonstrate that 
they are unable to find appropriately qualified volunteers to carry out the task for 
which remuneration is requested. 181 It also seems that even where the Commission is 
prepared to take action, it will not do so if this would mean that all the trustees of the 
charity in question would be remunerated. This effectively means that the only 
charities that might find themselves unable to demonstrate at least some level of 
volunteerism are those whose founders had the prescience to expressly permit the 
remuneration of all their trustees. 
175 See generally Burrows, E., Employment Lawfor Charities. - A Practical Guide (London, 
Jordans, 2003). Note that it may be necessary to amend a charity's governing document in 
order that the trustees have the power to do this. 
176 Warburton, J. and Morris, D., 'Charities and the Contract Culture' [1998] Conv 419 at 426. 
177 See above at 168. 
171 See above Ch 2n 73 and associated text. 
179 By way of a scheme: see Charities Act 1993, ss 16 and 17. 
180 Charity Commission, above n 180, para 6. 
181 Charity Commission, CC] I. - Payment of Charity Trustees (London, Charity Commission, 
2004), Annex, under 'Additional factors to consider when paying a trustee for being a trustee'. 
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(2) Functional comparison 
Pre-reform position 182 
Before the current reforms, there were three discrete charitable purposes that emerged 
from the caselaw: (i) the relief of poverty, (ii) the advancement of education and (iii) 
the advancement of religion. 183 To these we can add those other purposes which are 
beneficial to the community and are analogous to the purposes listed in the Preamble 
to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, which hence fall into the fourth head of charity. 
Although there are no formal subcategories of the purposes which the courts have 
upheld as charitable under this head, it is useful to adopt the following groupings, 
some of which are used by the Charities Bill 2004 (all but two of the new heads of 
charity proposed under the Bill are already charitable under the current law) and the 
rest of which can be found in the three leading monographs: 184 (iv) the advancement of 
health or the saving of lives; 185 (v) the advancement of citizenship or community 
development; 186 (vi) the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science; 187 (Vii) 
the advancement of environmental protection or improvement; 188 (viii) the relief of 
those in need, by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or other 
disadvantage; ' 89 (ix) the advancement of animal welfare; 190 (x) the promotion of public 
works and amenities; 191 (xi) the relief of rates and taxes; 192 (xii) the protection of 
human life and property; 193 (xiii) national security and the preservation of public 
order; 194 (xiv) the promotion of agriculture, industry and commerce; 195 (xv) the benefit 
182 For the purposes of the following analysis, the pre-reform position refers to the law as it 
stood before the start of the Charity Commission's review of the register in 1998. 
183 Pemsel, above n4 at 583 per Lord Macnaghten. 
184 These being Luxton, above n 24; Warburton, J., Tudor on Charities (London, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1995); Picarda, H., The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (London, 
Butterworths, 1999). 
185 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(d). 
186 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(e). 
'8' Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(f). 
188 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(i). 
189 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)0). 
190 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(k). 
19, Luxton, above n 24 at 144; Picarda, above n 184 at 140,142; Warburton, above n 184 at 91. 
192 Luxton, above n 24 at 145; Picarda, above n 184 at 144; Warburton, above n 184 at 103. 
193 Luxton, above n 24 at 146; Picarda, above n 184 at 152; Warburton, above n 184 at 93. 
194 Luxton, above n 24 at 147; Picarda, above n 184 at 147; Warburton, above n 184 at 96. 
195 Luxton, above n 24 at 150; Picarda, above n 184 at 161; Warburton, above n 184 at 103. 
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of a locality; ' 96 (xvi) the advancement of moral or spiritual welfare; '9' (xvii) 
resettlement and rehabilitation; 198 (xxviii) the welfare of children; 199 and (xix) the 
relief of prisoners. 200 Finally, we can add the statutory purpose made charitable by 
virtue of the Recreational Charities Act 1958: (xx) the provision of recreational 
facilities in the interests of social welfare. 201 
Although these twenty purposes have in common the fact that they have each been 
deemed worthy of charitable status by either parliament, the courts or the Charity 
Commission, they do not constitute a cohesive subset of organised civil society. If we 
consider each purpose in the context of our functional map of the sector, we can see 
that they are distributed broadly across all eight social functions. 
Market support 
Four charitable purposes are concerned in whole or in part with supporting the private 
market: (i) the advancement of education; (ii) the advancement of citizenship or 
community development; (iii) the advancement of science; and (iv) the promotion of 
agriculture, industry and commerce. We have already noted the ways in which the 
first three purposes achieve this. First, charities which advance education, citizenship 
or community development can assist in the reduction of transaction costs by 
encouraging citizens to adhere to the legal rules which govern commercial 
transactions, such as the law of contract; 202 they may also affect the market by the 
shaping of consumer preferences. 203 Second, certain charities which advance 
education are concerned with resolving the information asymmetry which can result in 
market failure, by disseminating information about private sector products and services 
in order that consumers can make more rational choices. 204 Finally, those charities 
196 Luxton, above n 24 at 155; Picarda, above n 184 at 145; Warburton, above n 184 at 105. 
'9' Luxton, above n 24 at 159; Picarda, above n 184 at 163; Warburton, above n 184 at 115 
198 Picarda, above n 184 at 154; Warburton, above n 184 at 97. 
199 Luxton, above n 24 at 140; Warburton, above n 184 at 98. 
200 Luxton, above n 24 at 141; Warburton, above n 184 at 109. 
20 1 Recreational Charities Act 195 8, s1 (1). Note that whilst recreational and sporting facilities 
are not charitable per se they may also be charitable if they are the means of promoting a valid 
charitable purpose - for example, education (see Inland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen 
[1981] AC 1). 
202 See above Ch 3 at 58 - 59. 203 See above Ch 3 at 61. 
204 See above Ch 3 at 59 - 60. 
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which advance education and science supply the private sector with technological and 
human resources. 205 
The most significant purpose, however, is the promotion of agriculture, industry and 
commerce, as it would seem that this is synonymous with the provision of market 
support. All of the systemic and environmental activities functions we considered in 
Chapter Three, namely the redistribution of property rights, the reduction of 
transaction costs, the resolution of information deficits, the provision of resources and 
the shaping of consumer preferences, would therefore appear to fall within the scope of 
this purpose so long as they are carried out so as to benefit the public and the intention 
is not 'the furtherance of the interests of individuals engaging in trade or industry or 
commerce'. 206 However, the provision of support networks for those who participate 
in the market - for example, trade unions and some professional bodies 
207 
_ are 
considered to fall foul of this rule, which prevents synonymity between the charitable 
sector and organised civil society in relation to this first social function. 
Provision ofpublic goods 
Six charitable purposes may be regarded as promoting the provision of public 
goods. 208 We considered earlier that two paradigm public goods are national security 
and environmental protection. Therefore (i) the advancement of environmental 
protection or improvement and (ii) national security and the preservation of public 
order must fall into this category. No other charitable purposes necessarily result in 
the provision of public goods, but four have the potential to do this depending upon the 
205 See above Ch 3 at 60 - 61. 206 In Re Town and Country Planning Act 194 7 [195 1] Ch 13 2 at 141 per Danckwerts J. This 
public benefit requirement is not required in relation to the promotion of agriculture, which is 
deemed to satisfy public benefit per se: Commissioners ofInland Revenue v Yorkshire 
Agricultural Society [ 1928] 1 KB 611. See Luxton, above n 24 at 150. 
207 Some professional bodies may be eligible for charitable status if they can demonstrate 
sufficient pub] ic interest in their activities: e. g. the General Medical Council (Decisions of the 
Charity Commissioners, 2 April 2001, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
General Medical Council v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1928] All ER 252 (which was 
affirmed by the House of Lords in General Nursing Council v St Marylebone Borough Council 
[1959] AC 540). 
208 The following analysis includes only those charitable purposes whose purpose is to provide 
a direct public good. It excludes those purposes which have been held to provide an indirect 
public benefit to society as a whole, such as the advancement of animal welfare, for the 
reasons discussed above in Ch 3 at 82 - 85. 
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activities which are carried out pursuant to them. Thus, (iii) the protection of human 
life and property may be a public good when it operates a nonrivalous and 
nonexcludable way. For example, the repair of sea walls, listed as charitable in the 
Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, appears to be the basis of this 
charitable purpose : 209 the cost of repairing such a wall remains constant regardless of 
the number of people who benefit, whilst the benefit of flood prevention cannot be 
excluded from those who choose not to contribute. 2 10 Likewise, (iv) the fact that the 
provision of policemen and a courthouse have been held to be charitable means that 
the promotion of public works and amenities may be carried out by the provision of 
public goods. 21 1 Also, (v) the relief of rates may be a public good where this is not 
limited to a particular class of beneficiary, such as a gift to the coffers of the state in 
order that less revenue need be generated by taxation. Finally, (vi) purposes which 
benefit a locality may be conveniently dealt with here. Although these are not 
inherently nonrivalous, they are, for all practical purposes, 212 nonexcludable. 
However, it may be those local purposes which are also nonrivalous would be better 
classified elsewhere: for example, under the promotion of public works or relief of 
rate S. 213 
It might be thought that, because no-one can be excluded from the benefit of public 
goods, all public goods will provide a sufficient public benefit to be charitable. 
However, certain public goods probably fall outside the scope of charity. For example, 
a firework display, which is a pure public good, would appear not to be charitable per 
se. 214 A less frivolous example of a non-charitable public good is the promotion of 
fundamental human rights. The recognition of the existence of human rights by a 
209 Luxton, above n 24 at 146. 
2 10 However, not all forms of such protection could be classed as public goods provision. 
Luxton notes the activities of Disaster Action, a charity concerned with both the prevention of 
disasters and the relief of those who suffer as a result of them (above n 24 at 146): the former 
purpose may be a public good but the latter is unlikely to be either nonrivalous or 
nonexcludable. Instead, this should more appropriately be seen as wealth redistribution (on 
which, see below at 187- 188). 
211 Attorney General v Heelis (1824) 2 Sim & St 67. 
212 Technically it may be possible to exclude beneficiaries by restricting access to the locality 
in question. 
213 See Luxton, above n 24 at 156 (specifically n 343); also below at 187. 
214 Although it is easy to envisage circumstances in which it might become charitable - e. g. as 
part of a religious festival, such as Diwah. 
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society is nonrivalous, as bestowing such a right on x does not take the same right 
away from y, 215 and also, by definition, nonexcludable, as denying such a right to 
certain citizens would render it no longer a fundamental human right. Under the pre- 
reform law, it was clear following McGovern v Attorney General that the promotion of 
human rights was inherently political, 216 although Picarda notes persuasive Australian 
authority for the proposition that the promotion of human rights may be charitable in 
jurisdictions where this is 'consistent with the way the law is tending'. 217 
Delivery of intangible services 
Although every charitable purpose may potentially involve the delivery of some 
intangible service, four in particular can be justified by reference to this social 
function: (i) the relief of poverty, (ii) the advancement of education, (iii) the 
advancement of health and (iv) the relief of those in need. These have already been 
discussed in detail above. 218 Outside the charitable sector, wider organised civil 
society is engaged in similar activities - indeed, Kendall estimates that around three- 
quarters of the 'broad nonprofit sector' consists of CSOs that are concerned with the 
delivery of intangible activities (videlicet, those organisations concerned with 
education and research, culture and recreation, and social care) .2 
19 A large number of 
215 Although it is of course possible that, taken in isolation, specific human rights may impinge 
upon each other - x's right to freedom of speech, for example, may impinge upon y's right to 
privacy: see e. g. Douglas v Hello Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 289; AvB (A Company) [2002] 2 All 
ER 545; Theakston v MGNLtd [2002] EWHC 137; Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2003] 2 
All ER 318; Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] 2 WLR 1232. 
216 [1982] Ch 321. 
217 Public Trustee v Attorney Generalfor New South Wales (1997) 42 NSWLR 600, noted by 
Picarda, above n 184 at 179. See also Moffat, G., 'Charity, Politics, and the Human Rights 
Act 1998: Much Ado About Nothing? ' (2002) 13 KCLJ 1. 
218 See above Ch 3 at 88 - 89. 
219 Kendall, above n 10 at 22. The 'broad nonprofit sector' is defined as including 'all entities 
which are formal organizations having an institutionalised character; constitutionally 
independent of the state and self-governing; nonprofit-distributing; and involve some degree of 
voluntarism' (ibid at 21; cf the structural / operational definition in Ch 2 above at 48 - 54). See 
also the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations, which estimates that 46% of the 
sector's activities are concerned with 'social care and development' (Scottish Council for 
Voluntary Organisations, A Guide to the Voluntary Sector in Scotland 1998 
(www. scvo. org. uk/research/reports, SCVO, 1998) at 4). 
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these CSOs are amateur sports clubs, 220 whose activities also tend towards the 
advancement of health . 
22 1 The advancement of sport is not considered a charitable 
purpose per se under the old law, although, depending upon its objects, a sports club 
may be able to argue that it advances education 222 or it may fall under the Recreational 
Charities Act 1958.223 
Redistribution of wealth 
Every charity which is funded, either wholly or in part, by donations, is, of course, 
engaged in the redistribution of wealth, with the exception of those cultural CSOs 
whose donors are also users. 224 More specifically, this function is at the heart of (i) the 
relief of poverty, (ii) the relief of those in need, (iii) the relief of rates, (iv) resettlement 
and rehabilitation, (v) the welfare of children and (vi) the relief of prisoners, as each of 
these purposes necessarily involves the transfer of resources from donors to 
beneficiaries. We have also already noted that a number of charities for the 
advancement of education, notably fee-paying public schools, are concerned with the 
same. 225 
Outside the charitable sector, the provision of social enterprise, being the conduct 
of. 
226 
business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally 
reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, 
may also be concerned with the redistribution of wealth - either by reinvesting 
surpluses in an appropriate community project, such as the relief of poverty, or by 
engaging in business practices such as voluntary price discrimination in order to 
220 Kendall and Knapp estimate that there are around 150,000 such organisations (above n 113 
at 113); see also Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations, SCVO Annual Forum Briefing 
(www. scvo. org. uk/research/reports, SCVO, 2002) at 5 and 10. 
221 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 118, para 4.35. 
222 See below at 189. 
223 See above n 201. 224 See above Ch 3 at 96 - 98. 225 See above Ch 3 at 89. 
226 Department for Trade and Industry, Social Enterprise: A Strategyfor Success (London, 
DTI, 2002) at 7. 
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provide services to those who could not otherwise afford to purchase them. 227 The 
provision of social enterprise is not prima facie charitable, as there is room for 
significant private benefit by virtue of the fact that it is acceptable for a limited amount 
of surplus to be distributed between members. 228 Further, we have already considered 
the role of housing associations in redistributing wealth; 229 whilst many associations 
fall within the charitable sector, those without exclusively charitable purposes, or 
which fail satisfy the public benefit requirement, fall outside. 230 
Facilitation ofpolitical action 
A necessary consequence of the fact that political purposes cannot be charitable 231 is 
that no particular charitable purposes can be identified as being likely to promote this 
social function. However, any charity may be involved in political action if this is 'in 
furtherance of, and ancillary to' its charitable objects. 232 The result of these 
restrictions is that the promotion of political action for its own sake, rather than in 
pursuit of other social goals, 233 is carried out exclusively outside the charitable sector. 
The same is true of all political action undertaken in pursuit of social functions which 
cannot be achieved except by political means. The paradigm vehicles for these kinds 
of political action are, of course, the political party and the lobby group; however, 
other CSOs, such as housing associations, are frequently engaged in mission-related 
advocacy. 234 
227 See Steinberg, R., and Weisbrod, B., 'Pricing and Rationing by Nonprofit Organizations 
with Distributional Objectives' in Weisbrod, above n 31 at 70. 
228 However, it is entirely acceptable that a social enterprise whose governing document 
precludes any distribution of profit can be charitable. 
229 See above Ch 3 at 89. 
230 On the range of social housing-related objects and activities currently considered charitable 
by the Charity Commission, see generally Housing Corporation and Charity Commission, 
Guidance for Charitable Registered Social Landlords (www. charity-commission. gov. uk/ 
suppo rtin gc harities/hcgui de. asp, Charity Commission, 2004). 
231 See Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [ 1917] AC 406; National Anti- Vivisection Society v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners [1848] AC 3 1; McGovern v Attorney General [1982] Ch 321. 
These cases will remain good law after the Charities Bill 2004 is enacted: see ss 2(l)(b) and 
3(3). 
232 Charity Commission, above n 143, para 10. 
233 See above Ch 3 at 56. 
234 See Kendall, above n 10 at 144 - 145. 
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Provision of cultural services 
Three charitable purposes are concerned with the provision of cultural services: (i) the 
advancement of education, (ii) the advancement of religion and (iii) the advancement 
of the arts and heritage. The classification here of the last of these is self-explanatory. 
In relation to the others, it is clear that the first is not limited to traditional educational 
establishments, such as schools and universities, but can include the furtherance of 
cultural activities - in the words of Lord Greene MR: 
235 
a body of persons established for the purpose of raising the artistic taste of the 
country and established by an appropriate document which confines them to 
that purpose, is established for educational purposes, because the education of 
artistic taste is one of the most important things in the development of a 
civilised human being. 
As far as the advancement of religion is concerned, it is clear that religious 
ceremonies, writings and buildings may form part of a particular society's culture and 
so it is appropriate that their promotion be included here. 236 
The advancement of the arts and heritage would appear to be virtually synonymous 
with the provision of cultural services. Therefore, it is likely that the only civil society 
activity which falls outside the charitable sector will be that which is denied charitable 
status for lack of public benefit - hence, whilst public museums and art galleries are 
inherently charitable, private museums and art galleries are not. 237 
Facilitation of seýf-determination 
As with the redistribution of wealth, every charity which accepts donations facilitates 
self-determination by providing a channel for altruistic expression. Certain charities 
may also facilitate mutual support, although we have already considered that certain 
235 Royal Choral Society v Commissioners ofInland Revenue [1943] 2 All ER 101 at 104; cited 
with approval by Vaisey J in Re Shaw's WT [ 1952] Ch 163 at 17 1. 
236 Each of these have been specifically accepted as charitable under the third head by the 
courts: see Re Hetherington's WT [ 1990] Ch I (on the charitable nature of the saying of public 
masses); Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14 (on the charitable nature of religious texts); and 
the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 (on the charitable nature of the repair of 
churches). 
237 Charity Commission, RRIO: Museums andArt Galleries (London, Charity Commission, 
2002), para 7. 
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types of mutual support would deny an organisation charitable status for lack of public 
benefit. 238 Three charitable purposes fit quite neatly under this head: (i) the 
advancement of religion, (ii) the advancement of citizenship or community 
development, and (iii) the advancement of moral or spiritual welfare each provide 
outlet for ideological expression. 
There would appear to be three key areas of civil society activity outside the charitable 
sector which facilitate self-determination. First, there is the advancement of human 
rights - encouraging legal systems to provide for fundamental rights such as 
freedom 
of speech and association in turn enables ideological expression without the fear of 
reprisal. Second, there are a number of non-traditional religions, the most high profile 
of which is the Church of Scientology, 239 which are denied charitable status on the 
ground that they fail to satisfy charity law's definition of what constitutes a religion 
(namely, belief in, and reverence of, a supreme being) . 
240 Finally, it may also be that a 
case can be made for including the advancement of amateur sport in this category if we 
take a holistic approach towards the development of the autonomous personality. 
241 
Support for this approach may be found in the caselaw relating to the second head of 
charity, where it has been held that sport practised under the auspices of an educational 
establishment advances education, 242 as may an organisation which promotes sport for 
children without any nexus with an educational establishment. 
243 However, this 
argument is somewhat weakened by the fact that sporting organisations for adults are 
not deemed to be inherently educational in the same way. 
244 The Prime Minister's 
Strategy Unit report suggests that sport may also facilitate self-determination by 
ýencouraging participation and forging stronger communities'. 
245 
238 See above Ch 3 at 103 - 104. 239 Most recently denied charitable status in 1999: see Decisions of the Charity Commissioners, 
17 November 1999; also Rv Registrar General, exparte Sedergal [1970] 2 QB 697. See 
below at 195. 
240 See e. g. exparte Sedergal, above n 239; Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 
1565. 
241 See above Ch 3 at 98. 
242 Re Mariette [1915] 2 Ch 284; Inland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen [1981] AC 1. 
243 Inland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen, above n 242. 
244 See Inland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen, above n 242 at 18 per Lord Hailsham. 
245 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 118, para 4.35. 
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Facilitation of entrepreneurship 
We have already noted that the facilitation of entrepreneurship is concerned with the 
processes through which the other functions of organised civil society may be 
achieved. Hence, all charitable purposes may be concerned with this final function to 
some extent. In terms of the facilitation of entrepreneurship as an end in its own right, 
charities that advance citizenship or community development may achieve this aim. 
Outside the charitable sector, the provision of social enterprise would seem to also tend 
towards this. Also the provision of social housing must be mentioned here: both 
charitable and non-charitable housing associations have been identified by Kendall as 
being characterised by innovative practices, 246 which we noted in Chapter Three will 
attract entrepreneurship. 247 
246 In particular, relating to use of technology, financing and diversification (Kendall, above n 
10 at 145 - 146; see also at 148). 247 See above Ch 3 at 106 - 108. 
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Function Charitable purposes Wider civil society activity 
Market support Education; citizenship; science; agriculture, Professional association 
industry & commerce Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Public goods Environment; national security; protection Human rights 
of life; public works; relief of rates; benefit Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; of locality 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Intangible services Relief of poverty; education; health; relief Sport 
of need Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Redistribution of Relief of poverty; relief of need; relief of Non-traditional religion; social enterprise; 
wealth rates; resettlement; care of children; relief housing associations with non-charitable 
of prisoners; education purposes 
Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Political action All purposes but only so long as subsidiary All purposes; political self-determination 
and ancillary Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Cultural services Education; traditional religion; arts and Non-traditional religion 
heritage 
Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Self-determination Traditional religion; citizenship; moral and Non-traditional religion; non-welfare-based 
spiritual welfare; welfare-based recreation recreation; sport; mutual support; human rights 
Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Entrepreneurship All purposes to an extent; specifically Social enterprise; professional association; 
citizenship mutual support; housing associations with non- 
charitable purposes 
Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Table 1: Summary of the relationship between socialfunction, 
the charitable sector and organised civil society prior to current reforms 
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Function Charitable purposes Wider civil society activity 
Market support Education; citizenship; science; agriculture, Professional association 
industry & commerce Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Public goods Environment; national security; protection of Residual 
life; public works; relief of rates; benefit of Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; locality; human rights pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Intangible services Relief of poverty; education; health; relief of Residual 
need; sport Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Redistribution of Relief of poverty; relief of need; relief of Non-traditional religion; social enterprise; 
wealth rates; resettlement; care of children; relief of housing associations with non-charitable 
prisoners; education purposes 
Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Political action All purposes but only so long as subsidiary All purposesý political self-determination 
and ancillary Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Cultural services Education; traditional religion; arts and Non-traditional religion 
heritage Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Self-determination Traditional religion; citizenship; moral and Non-traditional religion; non-welfare-based 
spiritual welfare; welfare-based recreation; recreation; mutual support 
sport; human rights Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Entrepreneurship All purposes to an extent; specifically Social enterprise; professional association; 
citizenship mutual support; housing associations with 
non-charitable purposes 
Plus political pursuit of charitable purposes; 
pursuit of charitable purposes with private 
benefit 
Table 2: Summary of the relationship between socialfunction, 
the charitable sector and organised civil society under the Charities Bill 2004 
Current reforms 
It is apparent from the preceding analysis, summarised in Table 1, that a number of 
areas of civil society activity fall outside the scope of legal charity, despite sharing a 
functional basis with those that fall within it. This is ameliorated to some extent by 
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the current reforms, as both the Charity Commission's review of the register and the 
Charities Bill 2004 recognise the charitable status of (i) the advancement of human 
rightS248 and (ii) the advancement of amateur sport. 249 Taking this into account, Table 
2 reveals that a modernised charitable sector is primed to dominate two social 
functionS250 _ the provision of public goods and intangible private services - but that 
there are still significant areas that fall outside the charitable sector, and hence, in some 
cases, 251 outside the ambit of regulation, despite that the fact that they are functionally 
similar to those areas of activity which fall within the charitable sector. These are: (i) 
the advancement of non-traditional religion; (ii) the facilitation of political self- 
determination and the political pursuit of charitable purposes; (iii) the facilitation of 
professional association; (iv) social enterprise and the pursuit of otherwise charitable 
purposes for private benefit; (v) the advancement of non-welfare based recreation; (vi) 
the provision of social housing by means of purposes which are not considered 
charitable by virtue of lack of public benefit; and (vii) the facilitation of mutual 
support. There are several reasons why these areas of organised civil society fall 
outside legal charity. The exclusion of non-traditional religions can be explained 
partly by charity law's definition of religion and partly by reference to the need, in 
novel cases falling under the fourth head, to draw an analogy with an existing 
charitable purpose. The exclusion of the facilitation of political self-determination can 
be explained by reference to the rule against political purposes. The exclusion of the 
other areas can be explained by reference to the public benefit requirement. We shall 
consider each explanation in turn. 
248 Specifically, 'the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the 
promotion of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity' (Charities Bill 2004, s 
2(2)(h)); see also Charity Commission, RR12: The Promotion ofHuman Rights (London, 
Charity Commission, 2003). 
249 Charities Bill 2004, s 2(2)(g); Charity Commission, RRI L- Charitable Status and Sport 
(London, Charity Commission, 2003). 
2'0 This is technically immediate: all CSOs with exclusively relevant purposes (and public 
benefit) are now charities. In practice, they will not fall within the reach of regulation by the 
Charity Commission until they go through the registration process, which the newborn charity 
trustees are required to do under the Charities Act 1993, s 3(7)(a). 
251 Certain CSOs will of course fall under other regulatory regimes by virtue of the area in 
which they operate (e. g. housing associations) or the legal forms they adopt (e. g. community 
interest companies). 
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Regulation and the law's attitude towards non-traditional religion 
According to caselaw, religion for the purpose of the third head of charity requires (i) 
belief in a supreme being 252 and (ii) worship of that being. 253 Accordingly, in 1999 the 
Charity Commission refused an application for charitable status under this head by the 
Church of Scientology because, although it recognises the existence of a supreme 
being, 254 
the core practices of Scientology, being auditing and training, do not constitute 
worship as they do not display the essential characteristic of reverence or 
255 
veneration . 
The issue of whether or not the Church of Scientology deserves to be recognised as a 
religion is one which falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, for our purposes 
it is important to note that, whatever its official status, the church falls within both our 
structural and functional definition of organised civil society - being voluntary, 
256 
organised, 257 non profit distributing, independent and established for the facilitation of 
self-determination. It would therefore be logical to assume that the church could have 
been deemed charitable under one of the other purposes connected with self- 
determination, the most obvious being the advancement of moral and spiritual welfare 
under the fourth head. In fact, the Charity Commission rejected this possibility on the 
ground that despite the public availability of some Scientology literature, its principles 
of Scientology were not sufficiently 'accessible' to the general public without joining 
the organisation. 258 We shall consider the issue of public benefit in more detail below. 
252 Ex parte Segerdal, above n 23 9. 
253 Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565. 
25' The Commission was clearly uncomfortable even with this, concluding merely that 'it could 
be accepted that Scientology claims to profess belief in a supreme being' (Decisions of the 
Charity Commissioners, 17 November 1999 at 25, italics added). 
255 Decisions of the Charity Commissioners, 17 November 1999 at 1,26. 
256 The church is staffed partly by volunteer ministers and funded in part by organised 
donations from members. The Charity Commission notes that donations are made in return for 
participation in the organisation's core practices (above n 255 at 36) and that the size of 
donation varies across the membership (at 5- 6); this could therefore be seen as an example of 
voluntary price discrimination discussed earlier in context of cultural services (see above Ch 3 
at 97- 98). 
257 Taking the form of a company limited by guarantee (above n 255 at 2). 
258 Above n 255 at 36. 
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Regulation and the ban on political purposes 
We have already considered the extent to which it is appropriate to restrict 
campaigning by CSOs. 259 However, we can make a number of further points here in 
relation to whether it is appropriate to treat political action by charities any differently 
to that of other CSOs, specifically: (i) whether the constraints of charity law 
necessitate the prohibition and (ii) whether it is appropriate to exclude political CSOs 
from regulation (as a separate issue from the need to limit the conduct of any political 
campaigning). 
Constraints of charity law 
In relation to the first issue, the prohibition on charities having political purposes, or 
engaging in political activities above and beyond those which are in furtherance of, 
and secondary, to their charitable objects, 260 is explained in the caselaw as being a 
necessary consequence of the requirement of public benefit. In the words of Lord 
Parker: 261 
a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid, not 
because it is illegal, for everyone is at liberty to advocate or promote by any 
lawful means a change in the law, but because the court has no means of 
judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public 
benefit, and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable 
gift. 
To the extent that public benefit is the stumbling block which requires charities to be 
treated differently to the rest of organised civil society, we can say three things. First, 
despite the words of Lord Parker, the courts seem to have proved on more than one 
occasion that they are quite comfortable with the notion of judging whether a change 
in the law would be for the public benefit. For example, in National Anti- Vivisection 
259 See above Ch 4 at 129 - 13 1. 
260 Charity Commission, n 143, para 10. 
26 1 Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [ 1917] AC 406 at 442; cited with approval by the House of 
Lords in National Anti- Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31 at 
61 per Lord Simonds (with whom Viscount Simon concurred at 40), at 50 per Lord Wright, at 
77 per Lord Normand; also McGovern v Attorney General [1982] Ch 321 at 334 per Slade J. 
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Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners, 262 where Lord Parker's comments were 
expressly cited with approval by the House of Lords, the court nonetheless denied the 
Anti-Vivisection Society charitable status not only because the object of securing a 
total ban on vivisection required a change in the law and was therefore inherently 
political, but also because on balance it would be to the detriment of the public. In the 
words of Lord Simonds: 263 
where on the evidence before it the court concludes that, however well- 
intentioned the donor, the achievement of his object will be greatly to the 
public disadvantage, there can be no justification for saying that it is a 
charitable object. 
Similarly, the courts have held other purposes to be unquestionably beneficial to the 
public in one respect and yet felt unable to find any public benefit by virtue of their 
political nature - for example, the 'philanthropic purposes of an excellent character' 
contained in the Amnesty International Trust in McGovern v Attorney General. 264 It 
seems, then, that the courts feel competent to hold that organisation x- whose object is 
to pursue charitable purpose z through non-political means - satisfies the public benefit 
test, but that organisation y- whose object is also to pursue z, but through political 
means - is not charitable because they are no longer able to find public benefit. In 
each of these situations, the end result - the implementation of z- is the same, so 
where does the public benefit go? With no other variables, the only way of reconciling 
these two positions is to say that must be something about the political process itself 
that potentially negates the public benefit inherent in z. This explanation is consistent 
with the approach of the House of Lords in the Anti- Vivisection case, where it was held 
that a purpose could simultaneously benefit the public in some regards yet be 
detrimental in others, and be denied charitable status if the detriment outweighed the 
benefit. 265 In this situation, though, it appears that the courts are not saying that 
engaging in the political process necessarily outweighs the public benefit, simply that 
262 Above n 261. 
263 Above n 261 at 65; see also at 47 per Lord Wright: 'There is not, so far as I can see, any 
difficulty in weighing the relative value of ... the material benefits of vivisection against the 
moral benefit which is alleged or assumed as possibly following from the success of the 
a pellant's project'. 
22 Above n 261 at 329 per Slade J. 
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it may do so; hence they conclude that they are unable to find public benefit, rather 
than find a clear lack of public benefit. 
There are certainly a number of ways in which pursuing an otherwise valid charitable 
purpose by political means could be viewed as detrimental to the public. For example, 
we can draw an analogy with the administrative law cases where the courts have been 
reluctant to interfere with decisions involving the allocation of finite resources, on the 
ground that when there is sufficient money only to fund activity a or b, but not both, it 
would inappropriate to take the decision out of the hands of the body charged with 
making it. 266 In the same way, it could be argued that, if purpose z requires a change in 
the law (or in government policy), then, because parliamentary time (or the time of the 
relevant govermnent department) is finite, the courts are not in a position to decide that 
z will lead to greater public benefit than the purpose which would otherwise occupy 
the legislators. On the other hand, preventing a change in the law does not necessarily 
involve parliamentary time, 267 yet a CSO formed for this purpose would also be 
deemed political. 268 In any event, the leading cases do not appear to consider the 
problem to be one of process. 269 
In fact, if the courts were of a mind to tolerate greater political action by charities, it is 
submitted that it would be a simple matter to find that there is significant public benefit 
inherent in pursuing a charitable purpose (or some other social good, for that matter) 
through political means. We have already noted in detail the benefits of political 
action, both generally and in relation to organised civil society: 270 if charitable purpose 
z is inherently beneficial and is pursued through political means, it could be argued 
that a greater public benefit will accrue than if the pursuit of z were undertaken in 
another way. 271 
265 Above n 261 at 60 per Lord Simonds. 
266 E. g. Rv Gloucestershire CC, exparte Barry [1977] AC 584; applied in Rv Sefton MBC, ex 
parte Help the Aged [1997] 4 A] I ER 532. 
267 Although it might: e. g. a CSO's campaign against the introduction of a particular bill, and a 
hence a change in the law, may provoke extended debate in Parliament. 
268 Re Hopkinson[ 1948] 1 All ER 346. 
269 It is the end product, the change in the law, which is deemed problematic: see the Anti- 
Vivisection case, above n 261 at 50 per Lord Wright. 
270 See above Ch 3 at 91 - 96. 271 Of course, there may be alternative processes through which z could be pursued which 
would also increase the element of public benefit. 
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We should also briefly note at this point the words of Lord Wright in the Anti- 
Vivisection case, who was concerned about 'usurping the functions of the 
legislature'. 272 In fact, the notion that approving the charitable status of a CSO with 
political objects would involve the court stepping into the shoes of Parliament is 
misguided for two reasons. First, the decision whether to grant an organisation with 
political objects charitable status is, in itself, unlikely to be determinative of whether 
the organisation in question goes on to pursue them, 
273 unless the organisation is 
structured around a testamentary purpose trust, which would fail if denied charitable 
status. 274 More importantly, even if an organisation were to pursue such objects, it 
does not follow that this would result in the desired change in the law or government 
policy: permitting a charity to pursue a political purpose would in no way tie the hands 
of the legislature and compel them to carry out its bidding. 
One final problem inherent in the existing system of charity law stems from the fact 
that the Attorney General has a general responsibility for the enforcement of charitable 
trusts (and, by extension, the purposes of charitable companie S). 
275 If a political trust 
were upheld as charitable and its trustees defaulted or acted in breach of trust, this 
might place the Attorney General in a somewhat awkward position - in the words of 
Lord Simonds: 276 
... my Lords, is it 
for a moment to be supposed that it is the function of the 
Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown to intervene and demand that a trust 
shall be established and administered by the court, the object of which is to 
alter the law in a manner highly prejudicial, as he and His Majesty's 
Government may think, to the welfare of the state? 
Such a situation would clearly give rise to a conflict of interest and there would be 
strong incentive for the Attorney General either to refuse to intervene or mount a 
272 Above n 261 at 50. 
273 Although it may determine the resources which the organisation is able to make available 
for said objects. 
27' Although an inter vivos purpose trust would also fail, the settlor would of course be in a 
position to select an alternative vehicle, such as a company, to carry out the desired objects. 275 See below Ch 6 at 211 - 212. 276 Above n 261 at 62 - 63. 
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ineffectual action for the sake of appearance. 277 A similar problem may arise with the 
Charity Commission, although here there is at least some degree of political insulation 
from the central government that is lacking in the case of the Attorney General, in that 
the Commissioners are not members of the government. 278 It is suggested that, whilst 
this problem is insurmountable by the courts, it would be a relatively straightforward 
legislative matter to transfer the Attorney General's role in relation to charities to an 
officeholder outside central government. Therefore, it should not be an insuperable 
barrier to recognising political purposes as charitable. 
Exclusion ofpolitical CSOsftom regulatory strategy 
The prohibition of political purposes is sometimes regarded as being linked with the 
fiscal benefits afforded charities by the state: 279 some commentators criticise what is 
seen as a trade-off whereby the state buys political 'silence' in return for tax relief . 
280 
Therefore, the prevailing attitude amongst those who call for reform tends to be that 
charities are over-regulated with respect to political action. Calls for charities to be 
277 Luxton notes that the relator action is now 'obsolete' following the creation of charity 
proceedings under s 33 of the Charities Act 1993 (above n 24 at 512), which enable interested 
members of the public to bring actions to enforce the due administration of a charity (see 
below Ch 8 at 250 - 25 1). Use of charity proceedings would certainly resolve the conflict of 
interest issues; however, the Attorney General still has jurisdiction to bring actions on behalf 
of the Crown or the Charity Commission (see below Ch 6 at 211); further, although obsolete, 
the jurisdiction to bring a relator action remains. 
278 Charity matters are dealt with at governmental and cabinet level by the Home Secretary. 
Although the Home Secretary is responsible for appointing Commissioners (Charities Act 
1993, Sched 1, s 1(3), the Commission is not responsible to him on a day-to-day basis except 
in relation to its organisational efficiency (Charity Commission, CC2: Charities and the 
Charity Commission (London, Charity Commission, 2002), para 4). 
279 See e. g. Woodfield Committee, Charities: A Frameworkfor the Future (1989, Cm 694) at 
11; 6, P. and Randon, A., Liberty, Charity and Politics: Non-Profit Law and Freedom of 
Speech (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995) at 152; Sprince, A., 'Political Activity by Charitable 
Organisations' (1997) 11 TLI 35 at 3 5. Note also the United States approach to political 
activity, whereby campaign funds are excluded from the tax benefits available to charities: on 
which see generally Chisolm, L., 'Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence' 
(1990) 58 George Washington Law Review 308. Interestingly, the Prime Minister's Strategy 
Unit report makes no connection in its discussion of the restrictions on campaigning (above n 
118, paras 4.49 - 4.5 6), although it may be that less attention was given to this issue than other 
potential areas of reform, as it appears that there is little demand for legislative action in this 
area at the moment (the Home Office records that there was 'no general desire among 
respondents [to the Strategy Unit report] for changing the law to allow charities either more or 
less freedom to campaign than the law gives them at present' (Home Office, Charities and 
Not-for-Profits: A Modern Legal Framework (London, Home Office, 2003), para 3.35). 
280 Sprince, above n 279 at 37. 
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treated in the same way as other CSOs accordingly argue towards the removal of the 
restraints placed on charities. 
From a regulatory perspective, however, this approach is misguided. Under the current 
law, the effect of finding that x is too political, by virtue of its objects or activities, is 
immediately to place it outside the scope of regulation. More specifically, it is clear 
from the preceding analysis that politically active CSOs are structurally and 
functionally synonymous with charitable CSOs, 281 and thus the problems which may 
affect the charitable sector such that regulatory intervention is warranted are just as 
likely to affect to political CSOs. 282 Therefore, if it is appropriate to regulate charities, 
it would also seem appropriate to regulate those other CSOs, regardless of whether we 
can find any public benefit in promoting a political purpose. 283 Focusing regulation on 
the charitable sector, where this is defined so as to exclude political purposes, is 
therefore untenable. 
(3) The government position 
It is clear from the preceding analysis that there are no theoretical grounds on which to 
differentiate between the charitable sector and organised civil society when justifying 
and designing a regulatory strategy. Nevertheless, the existing regulatory strategy and 
the current reforms focus on the charitable sector. The government position is that: 
The regulation of charities as a specific class of non-for-profit organisation is 
justified by three factors: (1) The basic legal requirement that charities Operate 
for public, not private benefit. (2) The fact that public confidence in charities 
derives from a knowledge that charities are altruistic in purpose ... and the 
belief that there is regulatory oversight which will identify and deal robustly 
with misconduct and mismanagement. (3) Tax and business rate reliefs. "' 
28 1 E. g. the political activities more traditionally associated with pressure groups are 'a natural 
and almost inevitable extension' of certain charitable activities such as the provision of public 
goods (Douglas in Powell, above nI at 5 1); cf the Charity Commission's policy decision to 
allow charities to undertake a limited amount of political activity so long as it is 'incidental or 
ancillary to' otherwise charitable objects' (Charity Commission, above n 143, para 23). 
282 See generally Ch 4, especially at 119 - 121. 
283 A similar argument exists in relation to those CSOs which are unable to demonstrate public 
benefit: see below at 203 - 204. 284 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 118, para 7.1 (numerals added). 
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As the second factor stems from the first, we shall consider the first two justifications 
together. 
Public benefit, altruism and public confidence 
The requirement that charities demonstrate public benefit means that a charity must 
show (i) that its purpose will bring about a benefit for a sufficient cross-section of 
society 285 and (ii) that any benefit that accrues to private individuals is either 
'legitimately incidental' to or 'in direct pursuit of its legally charitable purposes. 286 
The public benefit test is clearly a useful way of delineating between the private sector 
and organised civil society, as it excludes all organisations operated on a for-profit 
basis, which formed the basis of our definition of the private sector in Chapter Two. 
287 
However, the test is under-inclusive, as the line around the charitable sector is drawn 
in such a way that certain CSOs are also excluded. For the purposes of sector 
definition, the public benefit distinction manifests itself in two ways. First, it excludes 
from the charitable sector those CSOs with certain objectives . 
28 8 The objectives in 
question cannot be considered charitable purposes (namely, those listed in the right 
hand column of Table 2) because they necessarily involve a significant element of 
private benefit. Second, it excludes from the charitable sector those CSOs with 
charitable objectives but which choose to pursue those objectives in a manner that 
involves a significant element of private benefit (again, listed in the right hand column 
of Table 2). Thus, social enterprises, mutual organisations such as support networks, 
business associations and trade unions, and recreational societies all fall outside the 
scope of charity, and, hence, outside the scope of sector-based regulation. 
289 
285 The test for what constitutes a sufficient cross-section varies across the heads of charity: see 
above Ch 2 at 43 - 44. 211 Charity Commission, RR8. - The Public Character of Charity (London, Charity Commission, 
2001), para C2. 
287 See above Ch 2 at 39. 
288 It would seem apparent from Table 2 that it is certainly not an inability to draw analogy 
with existing charitable purposes that prevents these purposes from being charitable - every 
purpose in the right hand column is inherently analogous to those charitable purposes which 
fall under the same social function: e. g. the promotion of professional association is analogous 
with the promotion of agriculture, industry and commerce in the sense that they both provide 
market support. 
289 They may of course still be regulated by virtue of their choice of organisation. 
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It is suggested that the distinction between CSOs which provide a public benefit and 
those which provide a private benefit is not sufficient to justify excluding the latter 
from our regulatory strategy, despite the concern that extending regulation to cover 
other CSOs 'would risk stifling socially-beneficial activity for little gain' . 
290 First, the 
government notes that the altruism resulting from the public benefit requirement means 
that 'accountability in the charity sector can be less direct than that to shareholders and 
consumers in the private sector'. 29 1 This is undoubtedly true, for those CSOs which 
facilitate altruism are necessarily involved in the redistribution of wealth. The nature 
of wealth redistribution is that the consumer (or beneficiary) of a good or service is not 
the same person as the financer (or donor), and hence the natural position is one of 
information asymmetry. 292 Without some form of regulation, there is clear potential 
for abuse in this situation. However, there are issues of accountability in relation to 
non-charitable areas of organised civil society. We have already noted that at least 
four of the sector's social functions - the provision of public goods, complex private 
services and cultural services, and the facilitation of political action - are premised on 
the same basis as the redistribution of wealth; namely, the fact that CSOs are thought 
to be more trustworthy than the private sector. Information asymmetry is also a key 
feature of each of these functions - hence the need for a trustworthy service provider - 
and so it is surely at least as important to regulate CSOs operating for mutual benefit in 
these areas of civil society activity as it is to regulate those based on altruistic 
endeavour. Indeed, regulation may be even more pressing here, as the presence of 
private benefit may operate as an additional corrupting influence. 
An important issue also arises in relation to those organisations that provide a 
combination of public benefit and private benefit. The requirement that charities have 
exclusively charitable purposes 293 means that, unless the private benefit is limited to 
294 the 'legitimately incidental' , such organisations will 
be excluded from regulation. 
The paradigm example of such an organisation is the social enterprise, which cannot 
be charitable unless its profits are reinvested in the enterprise as a matter of course. It 
290 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 118, para 7.2. 
291 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 1] 8, para 7.2. 
292 See above Ch 3 at 89 - 90. 293 Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves 522. 
294 See above n 286 and related text. 
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is not at all clear that regulation of social enterprises is not warranted - although 
investors will certainly have incentive to monitor the way in which a social enterprise 
is run, and so there is an additional check lacking in charitable CSOs, this would seem 
to be balanced out by the additional concern that the same investors have an incentive 
to abuse their position so the balance between the organisation's pursuit of profit and 
its social objectives is tipped in their favour. 
The second reason why it is inappropriate to exclude from regulation those CSOs that 
operate for private benefit is that there are justifications for regulating organised civil 
society beyond the need to remedy information deficits. Specifically, regulation may 
also be required to prevent anti-competitive practices, 295 co-ordinate resources 296 and 
control the conduct of campaigns. 297 Again, these are issues which also affect CSOs 
regardless of function and structure, and regardless of public or private benefit. 
Tax relief 
Finally, we must address the use of tax relief as a justification for regulation. The 
desire to 'safeguard the interests of taxpayers' 298 is certainly understandable. If the 
state is going to devote public funds to the charitable sector by excepting constituent 
organisations from liability for certain taxes, it will naturally want to ensure that 
mechanisms are in place to ensure the funds are being used appropriately. '" Some 
treat tax relief as being linked inextricably to the concept of public benef1t300 - in the 
words of O'Halloran and Cormacain: 
The moral basis enabling the state to exempt a charitable trust from certain tax 
and other financial impositions rests on the premise that a donor has chosen 
295 See above Ch 4 at 124 - 125. 296 See above Ch 4 at 138 - 140. 297 See above Ch 4 at 129 - 13 1. 298 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 118, para 7.2. 
299 The state's general concern for obtaining 'value for money' when devoting funds to 
organised civil society is explicit: Parliamentary Select Committee on Public Accounts, 
Distribution ofLottery Funds by the English Sports Council (HC 873,1998), para 4(xi). See 
also Parliamentary Select Committee on Public Accounts, Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions: Grants to Voluntary Bodies (HC 15 8,1999), para 26. 
300 See e. g. Dingle v Turner [1972] AC 601 per Lord Cross at 29 - 30, although His 
Lordship's comments were explicitly rejected by the rest of the House of Lords (with the 
exception of Lord Simon): see at 614 per Viscount Dilhorne, Lord MacDermott and Lord 
Hodson; noted by Luxton, above n 24 at 30; see also Picarda, above n 79 at 25. 
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not to confer a private benefit upon a personally selected recipient but to 
instead make an altruistic gift for the public good. 301 
If this is correct, then prima facie it seems entirely proper to focus regulation on the 
charitable sector. However, there are three issues which suggest otherwise. First, 
although it may well be that, as a matter of political pragmatism, it is necessary to 
justify tax relief on this ground, 302 there are in fact other sound justifications for giving 
fiscal benefits to CSOs - for example, as a response to voluntary failure by virtue of 
philanthropic insufficiency. 303 Second, justifying regulation in this way (i) assumes 
that it is appropriate to grant assorted tax breaks to the charitable sector and (ii) 
assumes that it is inappropriate to grant other CSOs the same. Although it will be 
argued in Chapter Six that financial support from the state may have a role to play in a 
regulatory strategy, it will hopefully be apparent from our functional and structural 
comparisons that, where financial aid is appropriate, there is no reason to restrict this 
to the charitable sector. In any case, as Luxton notes, the current tax relief for which 
charities are eligible is not such that the sector as a whole is benefited. Rather, 304 
[t]he reliefs themselves are very specific, and changes in general taxation can 
cause charities to lose reliefs they had previously enjoyed. 
Finally, even if we agreed that tax relief in itself warranted regulation, it does not 
follow that the remainder of organised civil society does not need regulatory support 
for the reasons discussed above. 305 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to highlight some of the practical problems that may arise 
when designing regulation based, at least in part, upon a sector-based analysis of 
society, through an analysis of the relationships between organised civil society and 
301 O'Halloran, K., and Cormacain, R., Charity Law in Northern Ireland (Dublin, Round Hall 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2001) at 29. 
302 Interest groups are quick to raise objects if they believe that charities are receiving an unfair 
advantage over the private sector: consider the government response to the Prime Minister's 
Strategy Unit proposal to amend the rules on trading via a subsidiary company, noted above at 
168. 
"' See above Ch 3 at 79 - 80; also above Ch 4 at 138. 304 Luxton, above n 24 at 30. 
305 See above at 204. 
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the market, the state, the informal sector and the charitable sector. As part of this 
analysis, we have attempted to demonstrate that focusing regulation on the charitable 
sector alone, even in light of the current reforms to the definition of the sector, is not 
theoretically sound in the absence of any evidence demonstrating philanthropic 
insufficiency or particularism specific to the charitable sector. With these issues in 
mind, along with the theory of regulation proposed in the previous chapter, we are now 
in a position to consider in the final three chapters how the implementation of civil 






Models of Regulation 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having considered in the previous two chapters (i) the justifications for regulating 
organised civil society and (ii) the problems inherent in treating the sector as a 
cohesive unit for the purpose of regulation, we can now turn to the issue of how 
regulation might best be implemented. Accordingly, in this and the next two chapters 
we shall examine the range of regulatory models and strategies available to the state, 
and consider whether there are any specific issues in relation to organised civil society 
that might favour the use of certain models or strategies, or a combination thereof, over 
others. This chapter considers the advantages and disadvantages of the various state 
institutions that might be charged with regulation, namely: (i) the legislature; (ii) the 
courts; (iii) the executive; (iv) executive agencies; and (v) office-holders. 
Simon suggests that, so long as a regulatory body is well-trained, has only limited 
discretion and applies clear rules, ' then 'it does not seem to matter much who the 
regulator... is'. 2 However, there are good reasons for thinking that some bodies make 
better regulators than others, and it will be argued here that an executive agency is the 
body best suited to regulate organised civil society, particularly given the blurred 
nature of the sector's boundaries that we discussed in Chapter Five. 
3 However, we 
shall also suggest that the need to ensure the trustworthiness Of CSOS4 means that a 
secondary role for the judiciary may be appropriate, withstanding the limitations of 
regulation by the courts. Finally, the role of self-regulation, as a supplement to state 
regulation, is considered. 
' See further below Ch 7 at 234 - 238. 2 Simon, K., The Role of Law in Encouraging Civil Society (www. icnl. org, International 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 1999) under 'Who are the regulators'. 
3 See above Ch 5 at 153 - 158. 4 See above Ch 4 at 132 - 137. 
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B. REGULATION BY THE LEGISLATURE 
It is generally accepted that the legislature is not a body suited to sector-specific 
regulation. In the words of Ogus: 5 
Uncontroversially, it may be assumed that the legislature has [not] the time 
to engage in detailed regulatory rule-making. 
Although regulation by the legislature will obviously have a democratic mandate, 6 and 
may therefore be considered more legitimate than regulatory rules made by other 
78 bodie S, the legislature is inherently inexpert, as it must deal regularly with rule- 
making in relation to all areas of social, political and economic life. Its size and 
organisational structure mean that passing a new piece of regulation would be a 
lengthy process, 9 making it difficult to respond quickly to changes in the regulated 
sector; this would be exacerbated by the fact that there would be competition for 
Parliamentary time from other areas requiring legislation. 10 Baldwin and Cave also 
5 Ogus, A., Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) at 
105. 
6 See generally Baldwin, R., Rules and Government (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) at 43; 
Baldwin, R., and McCrudden, C., Regulation and Public Law (London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1987) at 35. 
7 Baldwin, R. and Cave, M., Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999) at 73. Of course, a democratic mandate is not the only yardstick against 
which the legitimacy of a regulator may be measured and Baldwin identifies four others: 
accountability, due process, efficiency and expertise (see above n6 at 43 - 46). 8 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 66; Baldwin and McCrudden, above n6 at 35; Ogus, above n 
5 at 105. 
9 This is well- iI lustrated by recent charity law primary legislation: the Charities Act 1960 
received Royal Assent on 26 July 1960, eight and a half years after the publication of the 
report on which it was based (Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts 
(Nathan Committee), Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable 
Trusts (Cmnd 8710,1952)); the Charities Act 1993 received Royal Assent on 27 May 1993 
(previously the Charities Act 1992, on which much of the 1993 Act is based, received Royal 
Assent on March 16 1992), four years after the publication of the white paper on which it was 
based (Home Office, Charities: A Frameworkfor the Future (London, HMSO, Cmnd 694, 
1989)), which can in turn be traced back to the Woodfield Committee report two years 
previously (Woodfield Committee, Efficiency Scrutiny of the Supervision of Charities 
(London, HMSO, 1987)); the current Charities Bill has its origins in the review undertaken by 
the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and 
the Wider Not-For-Profit Sector (London, HMSO, 2002)), published over two years before the 
Bill was introduced to the House of Lords on 20 December 2004. 
'0 Consider, for example, the infrequency of primary legislation relating to the charitable sector 
(see above n 9). 
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note that there are problems of 'coherence and consistency', " in that every piece of 
legislation is considered at bill stage by its own Parliamentary committee, and not by 
those responsible for the previous regulatory provisions. The justifications for 
regulating organised civil society do not suggest in themselves that the legislature 
might be an appropriate regulator. Of course, the legislature will still have an 
important part to play: for example, by authorising the creation of a regulatory 
agency, 12 or legislating so as to set in place the bare structure of a regulatory regime to 
be fleshed out by a more appropriate body in the future. 13 Indeed, one of the ways in 
which a regulator may seek legitimacy for its actions is by reference to a mandate from 
the legislature. 14 
C. REGULATION BY THE COURTS 
Regulation by the courts is also usually considered inappropriate on the ground that it 
is difficult for the courts to reflect policy considerations in a manner that is consistent 
with those of the incumbent administration. This is largely due to three reasons: (i) 
constitutional arrangements whereby the courts operate, in theory at least, 15 
independently of both the executive and the legislature; ' 6 (ii) the fact that the judiciary 
11 Above n7 at 66. 
12 As it did with the Charity Commissioners and is set to do with the newly established Charity 
Commission: see below nn 76 and 77. 
13 Such fleshing out could be undertaken by a regulatory agency (consider, for example, the 
Charity Commission's interpretation of its broad legislative mandate under the Charities Act 
1993, ss 1(3), 3(l) and 3(4), on which see above Ch I nn 39 - 46 and associated text), the 
executive (for example, the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 
2004, ss 58 and 62(l), provides that the Secretary of State may use statutory instruments to 
implement the general principles of the Act (see below n 80)) or even the courts (for example, 
the courts' interpretation of the scope of the existing four heads of charity effectively 
determines the reach of the current regulatory regime; this will continue to be the case under 
the proposed reforms). See further below at 216 - 220. 14 See generally Baldwin, above n6 at 43; Baldwin and McCrudden, above n6 at 35; Baldwin, 
and Cave, above n7 at 73. 
15 It is a trite observation that the current system in England, whereby the senior judiciary sit in 
the House of Lords and the Lord Chancellor is also a member of the executive, clearly flaunts 
the principle of the separation of powers (although the current incumbent, Lord Falconer, has 
publicly agreed never to sit in a judicial capacity for this reason: see Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: Reforming the Office of Lord Chancellor (CP 
13/03, London, DCA, 2003) at 5- 6). At the time of writing, the current Labour government 
plans to remedy both of these anomalies: on the former, see Department for Constitutional 
Affairs, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Courtfor the United Kingdom (CP 11/03, London, 
DCA, 2003). 
16 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 67. 
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will tend to lack expertise in the sector's operation; 17 and (iii) the fact that any policy 
decisions can only be made on a 'sporadic' basis as and when regulated organisations 
appear before the courts 18 - for example, as parties to a dispute 
19 or as applicants for 
entry into the sector where entry is controlled. 20 
(1) Separation of Powers 
There are a number of ways of addressing the first two problems. A degree of policy 
co-ordination can be achieved by giving a government representative the right to be 
joined as a party in those actions that are of regulatory concern. Indeed, this approach 
forms part of the regulatory strategy in England: the Attorney General is entitled to 
bring court actions (i) on behalf of the Crown as parens patriae and (ii) in his own 
name at the request of a relator, 21 in order to protect the interests of charity. 22 He is 
also entitled to be joined as a party where it is necessary that the court should be 
addressed on 'the general system and principles that ought to govern charities'. 23 
Before the court he is variously able to represent (i) the public interest, 24 (ii) the 
objects of the charity in question (in essence standing in the same position as the 
25 beneficiaries would in the case of a private trust) , (iii) the 
interests of the charitable 
sector in general26 and (iv) the Charity Commission '27 and so there 
is clearly scope for 
17 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 68. 
18 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 74. 
19 Any policy pronouncements must be relevant to the dispute in hand - e. g. an action for 
breach of trust may throw up any number of policy ramifications relating to the good 
administration of a charitable trust, whilst an action for breach of contract where the fact that 
one of the parties is a CSO is wholly immaterial would be an inappropriate forum for policy- 
making. Of course, the distinction between obiter dicta and rationes decidendi means that a 
court can discuss issues that do not relate directly to the case in hand, but convention requires 
that there is some connection between the two. 
20 See e. g. when the High Court is called upon to determine whether a CSO is charitable. 
Outside the context of organised civil society, the courts are responsible for granting licences 
that enable entry into several industries - e. g. liquor licences and gambling licences (both dealt 
with by the Magistrates' Court). 
21 Being anyone who is concerned as to the administration of the charity in question: unlike 
charity proceedings (on which see below Ch 8 at 250 - 25 1) there is no requirement that the 
relator have any interest in the charity as such (Attorney General v Vivian (1826) 1 Russ 226). 
22 See Ware v Cumberland (1855) 20 Beav 503; Re King [ 1971] 2 Ch 420. 
23 Ware v Cumberland, above n 22 at 511 per Sir John Romilly MR. 
24 Re Sekeford's Charity (1861) 5 LT 488. 
25 See Attorney General v Wright [ 1988] 1 WLR 164 at 165 per Hoffman J. 
26 Ware v Cumberland, above n 22 at 511 per Sir John Romilly MR. 
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policy issues to be addressed. The Attorney General's role is likely to be consolidated 
in the proposed reforms in relation to actions involving the Charity Appeal Tribunal. 
The original draft bill of the Charities B ill, 28 if enacted, would have inserted a new 
clause into s2 of the Charities Act 1993, providing that where the Attorney General is 
not already a party to proceedings, the Tribunal could require that 'all necessary 
papers' are sent to him, 29 and that he may either 'intervene ... 
in such manner as he 
thinks necessary or expedient' 30 or address the Tribunal on 'any question ... which the 
Tribunal ... considers 
it necessary to have fully argued' .31 However, the relevant 
clause was dropped in the version of the Bill presented to Parliament, following 
concerns from the Attorney General with regard to its resource implications. 32 The 
extent of the Attorney General's role in relation to proceedings before the Charity 
Appeal Tribunal is now unclear, as the formulation of the rules relating to the practice 
and procedure of the Tribunal are to be delegated to the Lord Chancellor, 33 and at the 
time of writing draft rules are yet to appear. However, we can note that the 
Government's response to the Joint Committee's report recognises that the Attorney 
General should be able to refer cases to the Tribunal, and, pursuant to this, make 
representations before it. 34 
27 This is only appropriate where the Commission and Attorney General are in agreement; 
when they are not, the Charity Commission should be made a party and represent its own 
interests (Jones v Charity Commissioners ofEngland and Wales [1972] 1 WLR 784 at 785 per 
Ungoed-Thomas J). 
28 Cm 6199 (2003 - 2004). 29 Charities Act 1993, s 2D (2), inserted by Charities Bill 2004, s 6(1). 
30 Charities Act 1993, s 2D (4)(a), inserted by Charities Bill 2004, s 6(l). 
31 Charities Act 1993, s 2D (4)(b), inserted by Charities Bill 2004, s 6(l). All these provisions 
also apply to appeals to the High Court from the Tribunal: Charities Act 1993, ss 2D(l), 2D(2) 
and 2(D)4, inserted by Charities Bill 2004, s 6(l). 
32 See Letter to Lord Phillips of Sudbury from the Attorney General, The Rt Hon The Lord 
Goldsmith QC (DCH 362), reprinted in House of Lords and House of Commons Joint 
Committee on the Draft Charities Bill, Draft Charities Bill Volume ]. - Report, Formal Minutes 
and Evidence (HL Paper 167-i, HC 660-i, London, HMSO, 2004) at 200 - 20 1; note also the 
Joint Committee's report, ibid, para 24 1; Home Office, The Government Reply to the Report 
from the Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill Session 2003 - 2004 (Cm 6440, London, 
HMSO, 2004), para 27. 
33 Charities Act 1993, s 2B(2), inserted by the Charities Bill 2004, s 8(1). 
34 Home Office, above n 32, para 27. 
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(2) Lack of Expertise 
Two points can be made in relation to the courts' perceived lack of expertise. First, 
regulation by a dedicated court or tribunal will clearly tend toward expertise more than 
regulation by a court that routinely deals with other matters as well. For example, in 
addition to hearing charity law cases, the Chancery Division of the High Court deals at 
first instance with a wide range of other matters. 35 Second, expertise can also be 
drafted in by using expert witnesses, as in Poplar Housing and Regeneration 
Community Association Ltd v Donoghue where the Court of Appeal considered 
witness statements from academic lawyers at the Universities of Bristol and Newcastle 
in order to determine whether a charity was a public authority for the purpose of the 
Human Rights Act 1998.36 
(3) Sporadic nature ofpolicy decisions 
The third problem cannot be resolved solely within the judicial system, i. e. without 
recourse to additional regulatory mechanisms. It is intrinsic to the operation of any 
court or tribunal that judgments can only be made upon the application of a party, 
whether this is an action against another party, an application for a licence or a 
application for a declaration of the court. Hence, policy decisions can only be made as 
and when a case featuring the relevant issues comes before the court. As a 
consequence, it would be difficult to argue for any sector-specific regulatory strategy 
consisting entirely of regulation by court or tribunal. 
A good example of this in the context of charity law is the status of organisations that 
promote skill in shooting. For most of the twentieth century it was accepted that such 
organisations were charitable on the strength of the High Court decision in Re 
Stephens, 37 which upheld a bequest to the National Rifle Association 
35 Namely, matters involving private trust law, the sale of land, mortgages, the administration 
of estates, bankruptcy, company and partnership law, the rectification of documents, probate, 
trademarks and patents, and the appointment of guardians for minors (Supreme Court Act 
1981, sched 1, para 1). 
36 [2002] QB 48 at 66 - 68. 37 [1892] 8 TLR 792, subsequently applied in Re Good [1905] 2 Ch 61 and Re Driffill [1950] 1 
Ch 93. A trust which promoted shooting in combination with 'fishing, cricket, football and 
polo' was also upheld as charitable in Re Gray [1925] Ch 362. 
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for the teaching of shooting at moving objects in any manner they may think 
fit, so as to prevent as far as possible a catastrophe similar to that at MaJuba 
Hill 
on the ground that this was in the interests of the defence of the realm. 38 However, in 
1993 the Charity Commission considered applications for charitable status from two 
rifle clubs and concluded that the promotion of 
skill in shooting by providing instruction and practice in the use of firearms to 
Her Majesty's subjects so that they will be better fitted to serve their country 
... in times of peril 
was not a charitable purpose. 39 The main reason for thiS40 was that there had been a 
shift in social circumstances in the hundred years since Re Stephens was decided and it 
was now considered 'anachronistic' to suggest that rifle clubs tended towards national 
security. 41 If the courts had sole responsibility for regulation - i. e. if the Charity 
Commission did not exist - and the High Court had been faced with this issue, then the 
result would have been less than satisfactory: precedent would require that all rifle 
clubs be refused charitable status in the future, 42 but all those clubs already on the 
register of charities would be unaffected. As it was, over the course of the next five 
years the Commission was able to negotiate the voluntary deregistration of those gun 
38 The reference to the Battle of Majuba Hill, South Africa (27 February 1881) is significant 
here as the Boers defeated the British by virtue of their superior fire tactics; thus there is a 
close analogy with the 'setting out of soldiers' in the Preamble to Statute of Charitable Uses 
1601. 
39 (1993) 1 Decisions of the Charity Commissioners 4. This was the stated purpose of the City 
of London Rifle Club; the purpose of the other applicant, the Burnley Rifle Club, was not 
ýiven but was described 'almost identical' (at 4). 
0 The alternative ratio was that Re Stephens could be distinguished on the ground that the 
bequest in the earlier case was limited to instruction in the specific weapons used by the 
Armed Forces at that time; there was no such restriction on the objects of the two rifle clubs in 
the instant case (above n 39 at 9). 
41 Above n 39 at 10. 
42 At the very least until another shift in social circumstances required otherwise. 
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clubs on the register that were not otherwise charitable, 43 and thus policy was applied 
uniformly across the sector. 44 
D. REGULATION BY THE EXECUTIVE 
Given the limitations of the legislature and the courts as regulatory bodies, regulation 
by the executive is generally accepted as being the most suitable method of state 
intervention in a particular market or social sphere. Being a smaller body, the 
executive is more institutionally efficient than the legislature, 45 and is in a better 
position to take policy considerations into account than the judicature. Further, the 
executive has a wider range of tools at its disposal with regard to enforcement 
compared with the other branches of government. Whereas the legislature and the 
courts are both concerned essentially with either the setting or interpretation of legal 
rules, the executive is also in a position to utilise 'education, advice, persuasion and 
negotiation' in pursuit of its regulatory objectives. 46 
(1) Regulatory Agency 
Although the executive can take a broader range of policy issues into account, and has 
at its disposal a broader range of regulatory tools than the legislature or the courts, it 
still suffers from certain limitations as a regulatory body. In particular, it will typically 
lack expertise, 47 as it is necessarily concerned with a wide range of governmental 
matters across all areas of society. Accordingly, regulation by the executive is 
typically carried out not by the Cabinet or by a Department with multiple functions, 
but by specialist regulatory agencies that are charged with the sole task of regulation 
43 The process would appear to have been completed by the publication of the 1999 version of 
Charity Commission, RRI: The Review of the Register of Charities (London, Charity 
Commission, 1999), Annex B3. This annex does not appear in the amended 2001 version. 
44 Of course, if the decision with regard to the status of the City of London and Burnley rifle 
clubs had been made by the High Court under the current regulatory regime, there would not 
be a problem, as the court and the Commission are able to work in tandem. A decision by the 
High Court to deny these organisations charitable status would not affect the status of charities 
already on the register, but the Commission could use the decision to justify persuading 
affected organisations to be voluntarily deregistered in the manner described above. 
45 Baldwin, above n6 at 62. 
46 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 97. On the range of regulatory tools available to the 
executive, see generally below Ch 7. 
47 Baldwin, above n6 at 85; Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 69; Ogus, above n5 at 105. 
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and which are able to develop expertise. 48 Indeed, this is the model of the Charity 
Commission and many other regulatory bodies in the UK. 49 Using an executive 
agency also enables a balance to be struck between (i) insulating regulation from the 
4mercurial tempers of political fortune' on the one hand '50 and (ii) ensuring a 
degree of 
policy co-ordination with central government on the other; it also allows for some 
'continuity of policy' when the executive is replaced following an election. 51 
Furthermore, the smaller size of an agency compared with the executive is likely to 
enhance institutional efficiency. 
Boundaries of a regulatory regime 
The institutional efficiency of executive agencies in comparison with other state 
institutions makes them particularly well-suited to the regulation of organised civil 
society given the blurred nature of the sector boundaries. 52 On the strength of the 
analysis in Chapter Five, it will be clear that, although the structural and functional 
definitions of organised civil society are essential to our understanding of the nature 
and operation of CSOs, it would be inappropriate to define the scope of any regulatory 
regime solely by reference to them. For example, if it were provided that rule x 
applied only to those organisations that (i) exhibit some or all of the shared 
characteristics identified by Salamon and Anheier 53 and (ii) carry out one or more of 
the eight overlapping social functions discussed above in Chapter Three, 54 it would not 
always be easy to determine whether the rule applied to any given organisation. We 
4' Baldwin, above n6 at 85. 
49 Single remit agencies operating in areas that may affect civil society organisations include 
Companies House (an executive agency of the Department of Trade and Industry) and the 
Housing Corporation (an non-departmental public body sponsored by the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister). 
50 Freedman, J., Crisis and legitimacy: the administrative process andAmerican government 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1978) at 60. See also Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 70; Prosser, T., Law 
and the Regulators (Oxford, Clarendon, 1997) at 3. 
51 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 70. 
52 See above Ch 5 at 153 - 158. 53 See Salarrion, L., and Anheier, H. (eds), Defining the nonprofit sector. - A cross-national 
analysis (Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1997) at 33- 34; 39- 42; 
also Kendall, J., and Knapp, M., 'A loose and baggy monster: boundaries, definitions and 
typologies' in Davis Smith, J., Rochester, C., and Hedley, R. (eds. ), An Introduction to the 
Voluntary Sector (London and New York, Routledge, 1995) at 85 - 88. See above Ch 2 at 48 - 
54. 
54 See generally Ch 3 above. 
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have already noted that, whilst there will always be paradigm organisations that fall 
squarely inside or outside organised civil society, 55 there may be a question mark over 
organisations that operate on the fringes of the sector. 56 This means that it will not 
always be possible for an organisation to know whether or not it is bound by rule x. In 
addition to, and as a result of, the lack of a clear boundary, which will make it difficult 
for certain organisations to order their affairs according to whether they are subject to 
the regulatory regime, 57 defining the scope of regulation in this fashion would 
inevitably lead to a significant amount of litigation. Accordingly, the interests of 
sound regulatory practice require that the scope of any regulatory regime is more 
tightly defined. 
However, it is still likely to be difficult to draw a bright line around the CSOs falling 
within the scope of the regime. There are three possible ways of achieving this: (i) 
controlling entry to the sector; (ii) drawing up a complete list of regulated 
organisations; and (iii) defining the sector by reference to conceptually clear criteria. 
We shall consider each in turn. 
Controlling entry to the sector 
First, we could ensure clarity by (i) sticking with our relatively imprecise structural 
and operational definition, but (ii) controlling entry to the sector. The effect of this 
would be that, whilst an organisation at the edge of the sector might not be able to tell 
in advance whether it will be officially accepted into the sector, it would always know 
whether or not it was bound by the rules of the regime at any given point in time. This 
effectively describes the English position in relation to charitable CSOs, whereby the 
Charity Commission exercises a 'gate-keeping' function, by deciding whether to enter 
a CSO on the register of charities upon request. 58 Although the definition of charity is 
imprecise, as with our structural and functional definition of organised civil society, 
55 Consider the examples given in Ch 5 of the government department, the bookshop and the 
reading group (see above Ch 5 at 152). 
56 See above Ch 5 at 169 - 170. 
1"' 
57 See above Ch 5 at 155 - 158. 58 See Charity Commission, Giving Confidence in Charities: Annual Report 2001 - 2002 
(London, Charity Commission, 2002) at 10. 
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there is never any doubt about which organisations are subject to the rules relating to 
registered charities. 59 
However, this approach is unlikely to be an effective way of regulating organised civil 
society as a whole, as, in order to be effective, it requires that organisations apply to 
'join' the regulated sector. What would happen to those organisations that decide not 
to apply? Assuming that they satisfy our structural and functional definition, then, for 
the reasons given in Chapter Four, we would still wish to regulate them, and yet by 
controlling entry to the sector, we would have excluded them from the scope of our 
regulatory regime. 
Complete list of regulated organisations 
The second way of tightening the definition of organised civil society for regulatory 
purposes is simply to list, in advance, all those organisations that we have decided will 
be regulated. However, this is also of only limited utility, for, as we have already 
60 noted , the topography of the sector and 
its boundaries are unlikely to remain static 
over time - accordingly, the list of organisations is unlikely to provide an accurate map 
of the sector for long. 
Conceptually clear criteria 
The third option is provide conceptually clear criteria 61 that can be applied to any 
given organisation in order to determine whether it is subject to regulation, as and 
when we need to know. The use of criteria is more flexible than a complete list, as it 
enables us to take account of the fact that some organisations will enter or leave the 
sector once our regulatory regime is in place. Further, if our criteria are conceptually 
certain - i. e. we will know for certain whether an organisation meets them or not - 
then any given organisation will be able to determine whether or not it is subject to the 
rules of our regime. However, it is clear from the preceding discussion that 
conceptually certain criteria will not be able to reflect the sector, as defined by 
'9 Of course, the wider picture is not quite that straightforward, as the Commission also has 
certain regulatory powers in relation to charities which are excepted from regulation, and in 
respect of which there is no gate-keeping (see Charities Act 1993, s 3(5)(b)). 
60 See above Ch 5 at 154. 
6' By 'conceptually certain' we mean that we can say of any given organisation that it either 
does or does not satisfy the criteria: we will never answer 'don't know' - cf the structural and 
functional definition derived from Chs 2 and 3, which is not conceptually certain. 
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structure and function, with complete accuracy. If we draft conceptually certain 
criteria that account for every organisation that might fall within organised civil 
society, then it is likely that they will be over-inclusive, and we will find that we have 
inadvertently included within our regime some organisations that fall the sector. 
However, if we draft conceptually clear criteria that exclude every organisation that we 
believe falls outside the sector, then it is likely that our criteria will be under-inclusive 
and inadvertently exclude some CSOs as well. 62 Problems of this type are particularly 
likely to occur when a new regulatory regime is introduced, especially where there is a 
lack of empirical evidence to back up the theories behind regulation, as any criteria 
will be 'anticipatory' rather than 'reactionary'. 63 
These problems could be mitigated in practice if we provided for the periodic review 
and, where necessary, revision of the boundaries of our regulatory regime. In the short 
term, this would enable the development, through trial and error, of a robust working 
boundary that brings the inevitable problems of over- or under-inclusion to an 
acceptable level, whilst in the long-terin topographic changes to the sector could also 
be taken into account. A regulatory agency is the body best suited to this task in light 
of both its institutional efficiency, which will be help to ensure changes can be made 
with relative ease, and its expertise, which will improve the chances of discovering 
workable criteria sooner rather than later. 
Of course, we must be wary of allowing any institution to define the limits of its own 
jurisdiction, lest it abuse this power. However, it would be a relatively straightforward 
matter to limit the scope of the regulatory agency's discretion in this regard - the 
legislature could lay down a set of broad general principles, based on our structural 
and functional definition, to which the agency must adhere but which it can develop 
and elaborate. The regulator could then amend its own rules from time to time with 
relative ease and without departing from, or requiring a new, legislative mandate. 
Indeed, rule-making of this kind - where the legislature provides the outline for a 
62 Indeed, it is clear from our analysis in the second half of Ch 5 that the current regulatory 
regime in England, under both the current law and the proposed reforms, is under- inclusive. 
For example, the public benefit requirement operates to exclude private sector organisations 
from the sector, but also excludes some CSOs based on mutuality. See generally above Ch 5 
at 202 - 204. 63 Black, J., Rules and Regulators (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 8. 
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regulatory regime, to be fleshed out by the regulator itself - could be viewed as lying 
at the heart of modem regulation. In the words of Baldwin and McCrudden: 64 
As government expands into unfamiliar territory it is often hard to set fixed 
criteria that will adequately anticipate marginal cases. Sometimes it is simply 
not possible to foresee what circumstances will arise. in these cases a greater 
or lesser degree of discretionary power may need to be left to the 
administrator. ... Delegation of rule-making powers may also be needed where 
constant fine-tuning of the rules and quick changes to meet new circumstances 
are required, ... [T]hese factors ... represent advantages of agencies over the 
traditional central government department. 
In fact, this form of rule-making already characterises the relationship between the 
Charity Commission and the legislature both under the current law and the proposed 
reforms: we have already noted the imprecise nature of the Commission's existing 
legislative mandate under s 1(3) of the Charities Act 1993 and the more detailed 
provisions to inserted into that Act by s7 of the Charities Bill 2004.65 Of course, this 
formula is not without its problems - as evidenced by the criticisms relating to the 
scope of the Commission's powers and the legitimacy of its review of the register 
noted by Mitche, 166 - which is one reason why regulation is frequently justified by 
reference to factors other than a legislative mandate. 67 However, where there is 
concern that a regulator has acted ultra vires and made a rule that is arguably outside 
the scope of its general mandate, then the availability of judicial review, 68 or, a right of 
appeal '69 Will go some way to ensuring that the 
discretion of the regulator does not go 
unchecked. 
64 Above n6 at 5. 
65 See above Ch I at 22. 
66 Mitchell, above n 98 at 198. 
67 See above n 7. 
68 It is trite to note that executive agencies are public bodies and, as such, amenable to judicial 
review (on the meaning of 'public body' for the purposes of judicial review, see above Ch 5 at 
163 - 164); the Commission itself was subject to review by the courts in Rv Charity 
Commissioners for England and Wales, exparte Baldwin [2001] WTLR 137. 
69 For example, under the current law there is a right of appeal to the High Court from a 
decision of the Commission regarding an organisation's entry on the register of charities or 
lack thereof (Charities Act 1993, s 4(3)) and in relation to charity proceedings (Charities Act 
1993, s 16(11 - 13)). We have already noted that the Charities Bill provides for the creation of 
a new appellate body, the Charity Appeals Tribunal, to hear appeals relating to the registration 
process (Charities Bill 2004, s8 and Sched 4: see above Ch I at 22). 
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(2) Regulation by an Official 
We should note also that it is possible to charge one official, rather than an agency, 
with the task of regulation. Baldwin and Cave note that this has the advantage of 
reducing bureaucracy 70 and may also provide an advantage from the perspective of 
fostering the sector generally, in that the public may have greater confidence in a 
recognised figure as opposed to a 'vague commission of faceless persons'. 71 However, 
this must be weighed against the risk that regulation will be influenced by the 'cult of 
personality'. 72 Further, whereas a regulatory agency is able to provide continuity 
during changes in government, placing regulation in the hands of one person risks that 
continuity when that person is replaced. 73 It would appear that nothing in the 
justifications for regulating organised civil society that we considered in Chapter Four 
suggests that regulation by a single individual is particularly desirable. Nevertheless, it 
is prudent to mention this model of regulation for two reasons. First, although the de 
facto regulator of charitable CSOs under the current law is the Charity Commission, 74 
it is strictly speaking the five 75 Charity Commissioners who are charged with 
regulation. 76 However, the dejure position will soon represent reality, as the Charities 
Bill proposes to abolish the office of Charity Commissioner and transfer the 'property, 
rights and liabilities' to the Commission, which will be formally established as a 
corporation. 77 Second, the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community 
Enterprise) Act 2004 establishes the office of Regulator of Community Interest 
70 Above n7 at 7 1. 
71 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 7 1. 
72 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 75. 
73 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 75. 
74 For example, the Review of the Register, guidance publications and decisions with regard to 
charitable status are all published in the name of the Commission, rather than the 
Commissioners. 
75 Under the Charities Act 1993, Schedule I there must be a minimum of three Commissioners 
in place (para l(l)) and no more than five (para 1(5)). The Charities Bill, if enacted in its 
current form, will provide for a minimum of five members of the Commission and a maximum 
of nine (Charities Act 1993, Sched I A, para I (I), inserted by the Charities Bill, Sched 1). 
76 Charities Act 1993, s 1. 
77 Charities Act 1993, sI A(4) inserted by the Charities Bill 2004, s 6. 
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Companies, 78 to be held by a single individUa179 charged with the regulation of those 
80 CSOs that adopt this corporate form . 
E. SUPPLEMENTING REGULATION BY THE EXECUTIVE 
(1) The Courts Revisited: Controlling Maladministration 
Although we have concluded that an executive agency is the body best suited to 
regulating organised civil society, it does not follow that the courts can play no part in 
a regulatory strategy. In fact, there are a number of reasons why the judiciary might 
still have an important role to play in relation to one particular form of regulation: the 
control of maladministration. 
We have already noted that two interrelated justifications for regulating organised civil 
society are (i) the general need to promote public confidence in its constituent 
organisations, 81 and (ii) the need to minimise the adulteration of trust - particularly in 
relation to CSOs that operate primarily on the basis that they are more trustworthy than 
their private sector counterparts (i. e. those that engage in the provision of public goods, 
intangible services, the redistribution of wealth and, to a lesser extent, political 
action). 82 One way of achieving these aims is to require CSOs to disclose relevant 
operational information, in order that people can make an informed choice when 
deciding whether to engage with a particular organisation. However, as we consider in 
the following chapter, 83 disclosure regulation will be limited in its effectiveness in 
situations where it is impossible or impractical for donors to judge the accuracy of the 
information made available to them. Baldwin and Cave suggest that, where this is so, 
it may be appropriate for a regulator to set operational standards to which regulated 
bodies must adhere. 84 From the perspective of organised civil society, the most likely 
threat to a CSO's trustworthiness is when there is some abuse of power on the part of 
" Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, s 27(l). 
'9 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, s 27(2). 
8' Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, s 27(3). Draft 
regulatory provisions (The Community Interest Company Regulations 2005) were laid before 
Parliament on II October 2004. See also Department for Trade and Industry, Consultation on 
Draft Regulations for Community Interest Companies (www. dti. gov. uk, DTI, 2004). 
81 See above Ch 4 at 132 - 137, 
82 Ibid. 
83 See below Ch 7 at 243- 244. 
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its managers. 85 Accordingly, it may be desirable to regulate CSOs in order to prevent 
maladministration. 
There are a number of reasons why the courts would be suited to this task, despite the 
limitations noted earlier. 86 In particular, the courts (i) can be used when there are no 
alternative means of controlling abuses of power, (ii) have proven expertise in this area 
and (iii) encourage civic participation. 
Lack of an adequate alternative remedy 
The main advantage of review of maladministration by the courts is that it enables 
there to be a check on abuses of power in situations where there would otherwise be no 
adequate remedy. If x commits a civil wrong, there will normally be someone else, y, 
whose legal right has correspondingly been infringed. It will be up to y, rather than 
anyone else, to pursue the matter: consider the law relating to contracts or private 
trusts. However, in the context of organised civil society, there are a number of 
situations where relying on y to take action might not be an effective means of 
ensuring due administration. 
First, it is feasible that a CSO might commit an abuse of power but, in doing so, not 
infringe another's legal right - in other words, there will be no-one to play the part of 
y. In many situations, the people who engage with the sector could keep a CSO in 
check: donors have an incentive to ensure that their donations are spent in an 
appropriate manner, whilst beneficiaries have an incentive to ensure that they are being 
treated in an acceptable fashion. Accordingly, by providing donors and beneficiaries 
with rights in the due administration of a CSO, much maladministration will be 
checked. However, there may be situations where there are no identifiable donors or 
beneficiaries - the former might occur where a CSO is not reliant on donations for 
funding, 87 whilst the latter might occur in the case of public goods provision. Where 
this is the case, it is not clear that there is an alternative actor whom we could give an 
equivalent right to enforce due administration. 
84 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 50. 
85 See above Ch 3 at 69 - 70 and Ch 4 at 132 - 137. 86 See above at 210 - 215. 87 E. g. because it is funded by its own trading activities (see above Ch 5 at 168) or by an 
endowment fund. 
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Even where y's rights have been infringed, y may be unaware that that the 
infringement happened. First, we have already noted that much civil society activity 
requires CSOs to operate in circumstances where it will be impossible, or impractical, 
for donors to find out how their money is actually spent. 88 Similarly, it may be equally 
difficult for y to find out whether any maladministration has occurred. Furthermore, 
even if y is in a position to investigate a potential abuse of power, it does not follow 
that it will be in his interest to pursue the matter. Those who donate the loose change 
in their pockets to a CSO will be unlikely to consider it an effective use of their 
resources to concern themselves with the organisation's administration, whilst those 
who benefit from a CSO's activity may have a strong incentive not to bite the hand 
that feeds them. 
With this in mind, what should happen if z-a third party who has access to 
information regarding the administration of a CSO - has reason to believe that 
maladministration has occurred, but either does not know who y is and so cannot 
inform him, or (ii) cannot persuade y to take up the matter? There are two ways of 
ensuring that abuses of power do not go unchecked in this situation. The most obvious 
solution is to give our executive agency the power to hear complaints from the general 
public and then to respond accordingly. 89 A second, more complicated, option would 
be to give z, as well as y, the right to enforce the due administration of the CSO. 
Using our executive agency to enforce due administration enables policy 
considerations to be taken into account, utilises the expertise of the agency and enables 
decisions to be taken as part of a long-term regulatory strategy based on repeated 
dealings with the wrongdoer organisation. 90 However, every investigation of potential 
maladministration must either be funded from the public purse 91 or by the sector 
88 See above Ch 3 at 65 - 68,88 - 90,92 - 94. 89 On the range of responses open to a regulator, see generally below Ch 7. 
90 In other words, the general benefits of using regulatory agencies apply here: on which see 
above at 215 - 220 and below Ch 7 generally. 91 See, for example, the 28"' Report of the Select Committee on Public Accounts, which, 
although critical of the Charity Commission's perceived lack of activity in this area, 
recognised the significant resource implications of this form of regulation (Parliamentary 
Select Committee on Public Accounts, Charity Commission: Regulation and Support of 
Charities (HC Paper No. 408,1998) paras 51 and 6 1). 
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itSelf. 92 Enforcement by individual legal persons through the courts - i. e. judicial 
review - necessarily sacrifices agency expertise, and may also, without an integrated 
regulatory strategy, jeopardise policy considerations and long-term strategy. However, 
this method has the advantage that once a potential transgression is discovered, the 
cost of enforcement falls upon the aggrieved individual - if he wishes to resolve the 
matter he must initiate court proceedings at his own expense. Although, as suggested 
above '93 the limitations of the 
judiciary would suggest that it is unsuitable as a stand- 
alone means of preventing abuse of power, it is not difficult to conceive of a situation 
in which it would be advantageous that it be added to the regulatory armoury - 
typically where z brings a complaint to the relevant regulatory body only to be told that 
lack of resources prevents it from taking action. 94 
Expertise 
We noted above that Baldwin and Cave suggest that one of the problems with using 
the judiciary as a regulatory tool is their lack of expertise. 95 This is true at one level: 
even taking into account the ways in which this problem can be ameliorated, 96 the 
jurisdiction of the courts is broad, dealing as they do with the whole spectrum of legal 
issues, and individual judges (even taking account of specialisation) will regularly deal 
with problems involving different areas of law and social spheres. Thus there is 
clearly less likelihood of their developing the same depth of expertise as might be 
achieved with a sector-specific regulator whose jurisdiction is more narrowly defined. 
However, the courts are expert in determining whether any given act or omission 
constitutes a breach of a legal rule; and more specifically, they have developed 
expertise in determining whether any act or omission is made outside the authority of 
the organisation or office in question - this is evidenced in the body of private law 
relating to the powers and duties of company directors, trustees and other fiduciaries 
and in the body of public law concerned with the due administration of public bodies, 
92 E. g. by means of fiscal penalties for those organisations that are found guilty of 
maladministration. 
93 See above at 210 - 215. 94 There are also wider social advantages in the fact that this may encourage participation in 
civic life (on which generally see above Ch 3 at 95 - 96). This in turn must be balanced with 
the need to discourage officious intermeddling, which we consider below Ch 8 at 253 - 254. 95 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 68. 96 See above at 213. 
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judicial review. It may be desirable to utilise this expertise so as to minimise the abuse 
of power by CSOs. 
It must be noted that justifying the review of maladministration by the courts solely on 
the ground of expertise assumes that abuses of power can be dealt with in isolation 
from other regulatory matters. Otherwise, we must overcome the problems relating to 
policy co-ordination discussed above. 97 Whether we think that these problems can be 
dealt with in isolation depends very much on whether we consider due administration 
to be an inviolate principle of CSO management. 98 If we do, then it would be 
unnecessary - indeed, inappropriate - to consider individual cases in a wider context; 
the opposite is clearly true if we are prepared, in certain circumstances, to trade due 
administration for other regulatory goals - for example, overlooking an isolated breach 
of rule x in order to secure long-term compliance with rule y. 
Civic participation 
We have already noted that one of the social functions of organised civil society is the 
facilitation of civic participation. Hence it seems appropriate at this juncture to draw 
attention to the fact that engaging the courts in the review of CSO maladministration 
can itself facilitate civic participation at the same time as pursuing other regulatory 
goals. From a regulatory perspective, encouraging citizens to become involved in 
'policing' the sector would assist in reducing the problems of information asymmetry 
in relation to those CSOs that function as intermediaries between purchasers of 
services and their users. 99 Of course, this must be balanced with the need to prevent 
CSOs from being hampered unnecessarily by officious intermeddling, but 
appropriately drafted rules of standing should be able to minimise this. 100 
" See above at 213 - 215. 9' Certainly the Charity Commission has attempted to make due administration a prerequisite 
of charitable status, with little success: see Mitchell, C., 'Reviewing the Register' in Mitchell, 
C., and Moody, S. (eds. ), Foundations of Charity (Oxford, Hart, 2000) at 190. See also 
generally Charity Commission, The Hallmarks of an Effective Charity (London, Charity 
Commission, 2004). 
99 See above Ch 4 at 135 - 137. 100 See below Ch 8 at 249 - 254. 
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(2) Seýf-Regulation 
The final form of regulation we must consider is self-regulation, a model that currently 
has a strong presence in organised civil society with examples at both nationallol and 
international levels. ' 02 It is outside the scope of this thesis to consider this model in 
any detail, as self-regulation covers a wide range of activity ranging from the very 
formal to the informal, 103 and the label is also used to describe regulatory action taken 
at the level of individual organisations. 104 At the formal end of the spectrum are 
organisations such as the Jockey Club and the Football Association, in the private 
sector, or CSOs such as the Law Society or the Bar Council, which are not only 
responsible for establishing professional standards but also control entry to the 
professions in question. Organisations such as the National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations or the Society of Socio-Legal Scholars, on the other hand, regulate on a 
less formal basis - their primary purpose is not regulatory but they produce codes of 
practice to which their members are expected to adhere. 105 In addition, the boundary 
between state regulation and self-regulation is not a bright line but a gradual shifting 
from one paradigm to another 106 - for example, Black notes one model whereby the 
state formulates regulatory policy which is then applied by the self-regulator. 107 
Nevertheless, it important to be aware of the potential advantages and disadvantages 
that self-regulation might have for organised civil society. 
101 E. g. the National Council for Voluntary Organisations in England (formed in 1964, with 
sister organisations throughout the rest of the UK); the National Charities Information Bureau 
and the Charitable Advisory Service of the Council of Better Business Bureaus in the United 
States and the Better Business Bureaus Wise Giving Alliance in the United States (the former 
formed in 1984; the latter in 2001, the result of a merger of the National Charities Information 
Bureau and the Charitable Advisory Service of the Council of Better Business Bureaus); the 
Charter Committee on Professional Ethics in France (formed in 1989). CSOs may find also 
themselves regulated by non sector-specific self-regulators: e. g. CSOs that engage in 
campaigning involving any form of advertising are regulated by the Advertising Standards 
Authority in the UK (formed in 1962). 
102 E. g. the European Foundation Centre (formed in 1989). 
103 Baldwin and McCrudden, above n6 at 306; Ogus, above n5 at 108 - 109. 104 See Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 133 - 136. 105 See e. g. National Council for Voluntary Organisation, Good Governance Action Plan 
Workbook (London, NCVO, 2004); Society of Socio-Legal Scholars, First Restatement of 
Research Ethics (www. kent. ac. uk/slsa, SLSA, 2005 web version); also Baldwin and Cave, 
above n7 at 126. 
106 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 41 and 124. 
107 Black, above n 63 at 50. 
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Advantages of self-regulation 
There are four perceived advantages that self-regulation in general has in comparison 
with regulation by the state: (i) greater expertise; 108 (ii) greater efficiency; 109 (iii) 
independence from central government; 110 and (iv) cheaper cost, III combined with the 
fact that this cost is borne by the sector itself as opposed to the state and, ultimately, 
the taxpayer. 1 12 From the perspective of civil society regulation, sector-specific 
expertise is desirable when we consider that the co-ordination of the sector was one of 
the justifications for regulation that we considered in Chapter Four. 113 We have 
already noted that, according to Salamon's theory of voluntary failure, the sector is 
better able than the state to determine social need; ' 14 it follows that it is also likely to 
be better able to recognise philanthropic insufficiency and particularism and thus to 
108 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 40,64 and 126; Ogus, 'Rethinking Self-Regulation' in 
Baldwin, R., Scott, C., and Hood, C. (eds. ), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford, OUP, 1998) at 
375. It has also been suggested that, because of the increased expertise in the affairs of the 
regulated sector, self-regulation is less likely to result in 'over-regulation' and the proliferation 
of rules leading to juridification (Blundell, J., and Robinson, C., Regulation Without the State 
(London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1999) at 18 - 21; see also Baldwin and Cave, above n 
7 at 40; on juridification, see above Ch 4 at 150) whilst it is certainly true that lack of expertise 
in the sector will increase the chances of poorly-designed and over-inclusive rules, it would 
seem highly probable that lack of expertise in rule-making itself - as will likely be the case 
with a self-regulator, at least when regulation is first implemented - will carry a similar risk. 109 Advertising Standards Authority, Self Regulation: Advertising Under Control 
(www. asa. org. uk, Advertising Standards Authority, 2001 web version); Baldwin and Cave, 
above n7 at 40,65 and 127; Baldwin and McCrudden, above n6 at 306; Ogus, above n5 at 
107; Ogus, above n 108 at 375. 
110 Baldwin and McCrudden, above n6 at 305. 
111 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 40; Ogus, above n 108 at 3 74; 
112 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 128; Ogus, above n5 at 107; Ogus, above n 108 at 375; 
noted specifically in the context of civil society regulation by Tayart de Borms, L., and Faure, 
E., 'Transparency and Accountability' in Schlater, A., Then, V., and Walkenhorst, P. (eds. ), 
Foundations in Europe: Society Management and Law (London, Directory of Social Change, 
2001)at4l5. Of course, there may still be some cost to the state: Baldwin and Cave note that 
the state may need to spend resources approving the rules of the regulator (above n7 at 40) - 
e. g., detailed consideration will be necessary if the regulation is of a type that, were it not for 
satisfactory self-regulation, the state would wish to step in and regulate itself (this being one of 
the criteria for determining whether a self-regulatory body is classed as 'public' for the 
purposes of judicial review - on which, see above Ch 5 at 163 - 164); further, the regulator 
itself may require regulating by the state - e. g. through judicial review (though not every self- 
regulator will be amenable to judicial review - see above Ch 5 at 163- 164); indeed, several 
commentators note the comparative lack of accountability of self-regulation when compared 
with the state alternative: see e. g. Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 40; Ogus, above n 108 at 
375). 
113 See above Ch 4 at 138 - 140. 114 See above Ch 3 at 76 - 78. 
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know when regulation will be appropriate. Furthermore, when a sector is regulated by 
expert peers, we might expect that the regulated organisations will be more likely to 
respect, and accordingly adhere to, the regulations. 115 A regulator that is independent 
from the state is also, in turn, less likely to compromise the independence of CSOs in 
its attempts to manipulate the sector, ' 16 although it should be noted that self-regulation 
is, in itself, no guarantee of autonomy - even in the situation where this is the only 
form of regulation, as opposed to supplementing state activity, the threat that the state 
might decide to intervene and take over the task may influence regulatory behaviour. 117 
The 'compact' model of seýf-regulation 
The advantages in detailed the previous paragraph presuppose a form of self-regulation 
based on what we might term the 'regulator' model - in other words, a system of 
regulation which consists of a formal body enforcing regulatory rules'18 in relation to 
those organisations falling under its jurisdiction. However, at this juncture it is 
perhaps important to acknowledge the significance of an alternative model which 
might broadly be seen as a form of self-regulation, which we might term the 'compact' 
model: an agreement between representatives of the state and the regulated sector that 
sets out in broad terms a set of 'soft' principles or standards that are expected of each. 
In the context of organised civil society, the four Compacts between the sector and the 
state in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are the most high-profile recent 
examples of such an arrangement. ' 19 Agreements of this nature encourage adherence 
by virtue of the fact that they are based on a perceived 'common interest' and 'shared 
115 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 40; Ogus, above n5 at 107; Ogus, above n 108 at 375. 
116 On the significance of independence, see above Ch 2 at 50 - 51 and Ch 4 at 146. 117 Baldwin and McCrudden, above n6 at 130. 
118 On the nature of enforcement in the context of self-regulation, see immediately below. 
"9 See Home Office, Getting it Right Together: Compact on Relations between Government 
and the Voluntary and Community Sector in England (Cm 4100,1998); Scottish Executive, 
The Scottish Compact: The Principles Underpinning the Relationship Between Government 
and the Voluntary Sector in Scotland (Cm 4083,1998); Secretary of State for Wales, A Shared 
Vision: Compact Between the Government and the Voluntary Sector in Wales (Cm 4107, 
1998); Northern Ireland Government's Department for Social Development, Building Real 
Partnership: Compact Between the Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector in 
Northern Ireland (Cm 4167,1998). Note also the European Commission, European 
Governance: A White Paper COM(2001) 428 (on which see above Ch 4n 192; also 
Armstrong, K., 'Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the White Paper on 
Governance' (2002) 8 European Law Journal 102) at a European level. 
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aims and values', 120 as opposed to a set of rules imposed by the regulator upon the 
regulated. The four UK Compacts are particularly significant for our purposes in that 
they do not adhere to a narrow definition of the sector based on notions of legal charity 
- rather, they are targeted at the 'voluntary and community sector'. 
12 1 Furthermore, no 
attempt is made to define this sector. Accordingly, the problems relating to regulatory 
design which applies to both 'hard' law regulation by government agency and to self- 
regulation based on the 'regulator' model - namely, the difficulty in achieving an 
appropriate conceptually certain boundary around the regulated sector 122 _ are 
sidestepped. However, the nature of this model of regulation is such that it falls 
outside our definition of regulation, in that it does not provide for 'sustained and 
focused control ... by [an] agency'. 
123 Accordingly, whilst the rhetoric contained in 
them is certainly important at a symbolic level, and as such warrants detailed 
consideration, 124 this is outside the scope of this thesis. 
Disadvantages of self-regulation 
There are, however, a number of disadvantages with this regulatory model. Despite an 
increased likelihood that regulated organisations will voluntarily adhere to the 
regulator's rules, the available sanctions should any organisations fail to do so will be 
limited compared with those wielded by the state - ultimately, a self-regulator can do 
nothing greater than terminate an organisation's membership or otherwise withdraw its 
seal of approval. Whilst the threat of the 'adverse publicity' that might ensue cannot 
be ignored, 125 this clearly lacks the weight of other sanctions available only to the 
state, such as the withdrawal of tax exemptions or criminal sanctions. 126 It is for this 
reason that self-regulation is here considered as a supplement to state regulation as 
opposed to an alternative. However, we should note that where a regulator controls 
120 Morison, J., 'The Government-Voluntary Sector Compacts: Governance, Governmentality, 
and Civil Society' (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 98 at 125 - 126. 121 See above n 119. 
122 See above at 216 - 220. 123 Selznick, P., 'Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation' in Noll, R. (ed. ), 
Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (Berkley and LA, University of California Press, 
1985) at 363. See above Ch I at 17. 
124 See further e. g. Morison, above n 120; Kendall, J., The Voluntary Sector (London, 
Routledge, 2003) at 66 - 73 (note also ibid, Ch 4 on the lead-up to the Compacts). 125 Advertising Standards Authority, above n 109 at 3. 
126 On the regulatory tools available to the state, see below Ch 7. 
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entry into the sector in question, 127 the threat of expulsion will become highly 
significant, for it will amount, for all practical purposes, to forcing the organisation in 
question out of business. 
A further disadvantage of self-regulation is the increased likelihood of regulatory 
capture. 128 As a working relationship develops between the regulator and the regulated 
sector, there is a risk that the regulator may end up exercising its discretion so as to 
satisfy the regulated organisations - or at least those with the most economic power 
129 
or the loudest voices - rather than pursuing its official regulatory goals. When a 
regulator is constituted from representatives of the sector itself, the likelihood of such 
sector-friendly regulation is clearly increased, particularly as the flipside of the cost of 
regulation falling on the sector is the fact that the regulator's 'purse strings' are 
controlled by the very organisations it is trying to keep in order. 130 
From the point of view of civil society regulation, the threat of capture is particularly 
interesting. Whereas many regulators are concerned primarily with operating in the 
public interest - consider, for example, the utility regulators in the UK 
131 
- five of our 
six specific justifications for regulation (namely, preventing anti-competitive 
practices, 132 ensuring accountability, 133 co-ordinating the sector, 134 rectifying 
philanthropic failures 135 and preventing challenges to organisational quiddity), 136 plus 
the general notion of fostering the sector, 137 are in the interests of organised civil 
127 See, for example, the bodies detailed above at 227. We have already considered that 
controlling entry to organised civil society as a whole would not be appropriate (see above at 
217-218). 
128 See e. g. Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 129; Blundell and Robinson, above n 108 at 23 - 
24; Charity Commission and Home Office, Charity Registration: When Should It Be 
Voluntary? (www. charity-commission. gov. uk, Charity Commission, 2000 web version), para 
26; Ogus, above n 108 at 108. 129 Baldwin, above n6 at 36. 
130 Baldwin and Cave, above n7 at 130. 
13 ' E. g. Ofcom, the regulator of television, radio and telecommunications providers, states that 
it 'exists to further the interests of citizen-consumers' (Ofcom, About Ofcom 
(www. ofcom. org. uk, Ofcom, 2005 web version)); Ofgem, the regulator of gas and electricity 
suppliers, states that its role is 'to protect and advance the interests of consumers' (Ofgem, 
Qfgem's Work (www. ofgem. gov. uk, Ofgem, 2005 web version) under 'Ofgem's role'). 132 See above Ch 4 at 124-125. 133 See above Ch 4 at 132-137. 134 See above Ch 4 at 138 - 140. 135 See above Ch 4 at 138,143 - 145. M See above Ch 4 at 145 - 148. 117 See above Ch 4 at 148 - 149. 
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society itself. Only the control of campaigning relates directly to the interests of actors 
outside the sector, being concerned with minimising externalities. 138 Therefore, one 
might assume, prima facie, that even if some form of capture were to occur, the 
interests of the regulated organisations would be virtually synonymous with the 
original goals of the regulator, thereby minimising any problems. However, the short- 
or long-term interests of individual CSOs as perceived by their trustees or members 
might not coincide with the interests of organised civil society as a whole: for 
example, it might be in the short-term interests of x to engage in anti- competitive 
practices in order to force local rivals y and z to disband; this will clearly not be in the 
wider interests of the sector if it has a negative impact on the overall provision of 
certain goods or services. 
Whether regulatory capture is a problem is open to argument. It presupposes that there 
is a 'sphere of public regulatory authority which ought to be inviolate from private 
influence', 139 and whether or not one agrees with this assumption depends upon one's 
political leanings. Furthermore, it should be noted that the other models of regulation 
discussed above are not immune from capture, as, in the words, of Freedman: 140 
Harmony with one's formal adversary is for many regulators a more 
comfortable and rewarding way of professional life than engaging in perpetual 
combat. 
Equally, it may be possible for a self-regulator to minimise the chance of capture. For 
example, whilst the Advertising Standards Authority is the organisation responsible for 
the regulation of the advertising industry, a separate body - the Advertising Standards 
Board of Finance - is responsible for collecting the subscriptions that fund its 
endeavours. Some commentators advocate multiple self-regulatory bodies operating in 
the same industry or social sphere, in order to minimise cartels between regulator and 
138 Although, as will be apparent from the social functions discussed above (see generally Ch 
3), a significant indirect benefit to society as a whole accrues from civil society activity and, 
hence, from the other justifications for regulation. 
139 Hancher, L., and Moran, M., 'Organising Regulatory Space' in Baldwin et al, above n 108 
at 150. 
140 Freedman, J., Crisis and legitimacy: the administrative process and American government 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1978) at 59. 
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regulated, 141 which may arise where the regulator is captured by a small group of 
regulated organisations (again, most likely those with the greatest resources or loudest 
voices). However, this may have ramifications for the sector's public support, as a 
surfeit of regulatory bodies is likely to leave those interested in interacting with a CSO 
with 'no clear idea for where to look' for information regarding its credibility. 142 
A further problem particular to organised civil society that we might briefly note is 
that, just as the blurred nature of the sector's boundaries will make it difficult to 
determine the reach of a regulatory regime, 143 so too do they make it difficult to decide 
which types of organisations are eligible to contribute to any given self-regulatory 
model. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have argued that, despite a number of limitations, a dedicated 
executive agency is likely to prove the best practical choice of regulator for organised 
civil society, just as it is with many other sectors. However, we have also noted that 
there are strong grounds for exploiting the judiciary's expertise in controlling abuses of 
power, as well as for utilising some form of self-regulation in order to improve the 
effectiveness of any attempt to co-ordinate the sector. Accordingly, these different 
models 'should be seen not as antithetical but complementary', and it seems likely that 
all three will have some function within a sophisticated regulatory regime. 144 
"' See Ogus, above n 108 at 108 -I 10; also Stephen, F., and Love, J., 'Regulation of Legal 
Profession' in Bouckaert, B., and de Geest, G. (eds. ), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1999), para 3. See also above Ch 4n 51 and associated text. 
142 Charity Commission and Home Office, above n 128, para 3 1. 
143 See above at 216 - 220. 144 Black, above n 63 at 50 (in the context of self-regulation). See also Voluntary Sector 
Roundtable Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector, Building on 
Strength: Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada's Voluntary Sector (www. vsr- 
trsb. net, Voluntary Sector Roundtable, 1999) at 41. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Regulation by the Executive 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having considered in the previous chapter the range of bodies that might be suitable 
regulators of organised civil society, we can now examine the range of weapons 
available to our regulator of choice - the executive agency - and assess their relevance 
in light of the reasons for regulating the sector detailed in Chapter Four. Baldwin and 
Cave identify five paradigm forms that regulation by the executive can take: (i) 
command and control regulation, (ii) incentive-based regulation, (iii) disclosure 
requirements, (iv) public ownership and (v) the creation of rights and corresponding 
liabilities. ' To these we can add (vi) regulation by means of education and advice. 2 
As Breyer notes, 'different rationales [for regulation] may suggest different remedies', 3 
and so we would expect that certain problems that affect CSOs, and which prima facie 
require regulation, will be better tackled by some strategies over others. Specifically, 
in this chapter we shall argue that the prevention of anti-competitive practices, the 
control of campaigning and the prevention of challenges to organisational quiddity 
lend themselves to regulation by way of command and control, whilst regulation to 
enable sector co-ordination (and with it the rectification of philanthropic insufficiency 
and particularism) suggests that some form of incentive-based regulation might be 
appropriate. We will also discuss the limitations of disclosure regulation in ensuring 
the trustworthiness of the sector. 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Command and control regulation - the idea of (i) laying down standards to which 
regulated organisations must adhere, coupled with (ii) sanctions as a means of 
enforcement - is perhaps the regulatory strategy most familiar to charity lawyers, as 
this forms the basis of the law regarding trustee duties: standards of care relating to 
1 Baldwin, R., and Cave, M., Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy, and Practice 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999) at 34 - 62. 2 Noted above Ch 6 at 215. See also Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 97. 
3 Breyer, S., 'Typical Justifications for Regulation' in Baldwin, R., Scott, C., and Hood, C. 
(eds. ), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford, OUP, 199 8) at 8 1). 
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managerial activities such as investment, delegation and remuneration, as well as the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty, are laid down by the relevant authorities (in this case, a 
combination of the courts and the legislature)4 and if a charity trustee acts in breach of 
these standards he suffers the penalty of being held to account for any unauthorised 
profit or loss caused to the charity. The great advantage of this form of regulation, 
aside from its familiarity, is the 'immediacy' with which it can take effect 5- the only 
limitation is the speed at which a regulator is able to put out rules; 6 this is particularly 
apparent in comparison with incentive-based regulation. 7 Furthermore, the regulator 
can be given a discretion to apply a wide range of sanctions depending on the 
seriousness of the rule breaking in any given situation - at one end of the scale, formal 
sanctions such as fiscal penalties or criminal liability may act as a strong deterrent 
against breaching those rules that the regulator regards as inviolable, whilst, in other 
situations, it may be more efficacious to employ softer tactics such as 'persuasion and 
negotiation' in order to secure compliance. 8 Indeed, the fact that the regulator will 
typically have a continuing relationship with the organisations under its jurisdiction 
may mean that in some circumstances it will be desirable to withhold sanctions 
altogether - for example, by agreeing not to penalise the breach of rule x the regulator 
might secure compliance with rule y. Baldwin notes that laying down general 
standards may also help to ensure that like cases are treated alike, 9 although the extent 
to which this is true in practice will obviously depend on the consistency with which 
sanctions are applied by the regulator. 10 This may in turn be influenced by the range 
of sanctions. 
4 See e. g. the Trustee Act 2000. 
5 Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 35. 
6A regulator may be empowered to give its rules retrospective effect, in which case, the 
desired effect of a piece of regulation may be such that, if a rule is retrospective, the speed 
with which it is issued may be inconsequential: for example, regulation designed to make 
organisations liable for their externalities by providing compensation for those affected (on 
externalities generally, see above Ch 4 at 127 - 13 1). However where the sanction for rule- 
breaking is intended as an admonition to discourage rule-breaking in the first instance, speed 
may be an important factor; although it is of course desirable that 'knee-jerk' measures are 
avoided. 
7 Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 35. On incentives, see below at 238 - 243. ' Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 97. 
9 Baldwin, R., Rules and Government (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) at 13. 
10 See Black, J., Rules and Regulators (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 9 ('flexible 
application at the "site-level"'). 
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There are two main disadvantages with command and control regulation. First, 
wherever a regulator has discretion to make or apply rules, there will be a danger that 
it will be 'captured' by the sector, a phenomenon we noted in the previous chapter. II 
The second problem with command and control regulation is that it is dependent on 
sound rule-making. It is outside the scope of this thesis to consider the nature of 
different rule types in any detail, 12 although we have already noted the need to ensure 
that rules are proportionate and targeted, 13 and the concerns relating to over- or under- 
inclusion noted earlier in the context of the scope of a regulator's jurisdiction 14 have 
equal relevance to the design of individual rules. 
(1) Prohibitory versus Compulsory Commands 
It would seem that, prima facie, command and control regulation would be better 
suited to those regulatory goals that require CSOs to refrain from certain activities 
rather than those that require CSOs to perform certain activities. The effect of the 
phenomenon of juridification, as noted above, 15 is that formal rules may have 
detrimental effects on the sector where they require organisations to carry out activities 
that, in an ideal world, they would be doing naturally and of their own volition. In the 
words of Knapp, Robertson and Thomason, 16 too many rules of this kind are 
'anathema to the concepts of volunteerism and mutual aid'. However, this level of 
artificiality is not present where a rule prevents a particular activity - in other words, is 
prohibitory rather than compulsory. Here, the rule-maker is not required to determine 
exactly how something should be done: rather, he simply needs to declare that 
something should not be done. 
Prohibitory command and control regulation would seem suited to (i) preventing anti- 
competitive practices, 17 (ii) controlling campaigning 18 and (iii) maintaining 
11 See above Ch 6 at 231 - 233. 12 On which see generally Baldwin, above n 9; Black, above n 10. 
13 See above Ch 5 at 155 - 158. " See above Ch 6 at 216 - 220. 15 See above Ch 4 at 150. 
16 Knapp, M., Robertson, E., and Thomason, C., 'Public Money, Voluntary Action: Whose 
WelfareT in Anheier, H., and Seibel, W. (eds. ), The Third Sector Comparative Studies of 
Nonprofit Organisations (Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1990) at 211. 
" See above Ch 4 at 124 - 125. 18 See above Ch 4 at 129 - 13 1. 
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organisational quiddity, ' 9 as these regulatory goals are likely to require that certain 
activities are prohibited. In relation to the first of these, for example, regulation might 
simply require that CSOs must not engage in anti-competitive practices and perhaps 
expand on this by providing a list of prohibited activities. In relation to the second, an 
unsophisticated attempt at regulation might require, as does the current law in England 
in relation to charities, 20 that CSOs must not promote political purposes, although, as 
we have already noted, the benefits inherent in political purposes mean that such a 
blanket approach is unlikely to be desirable. 21 In relation to the third, regulation might 
provide that CSOs must not formally affiliate themselves with organisations outside 
the sector. 22 This kind of rulemaking may also play a part in relation to (iv) ensuring 
the trustworthiness of the sector, if we consider it desirable to require more than 
accountability in the purest sense 23 and require that organisations do not abuse their 
position in situations of information asymmetry - for example, by requiring that the 
trustees of CSOs do not make an unauthorised profit from their office. 24 
By comparison, command and control regulation might not be our first choice of 
strategy in respect of sector co-ordination and the rectification of philanthropic 
failure, 25 as the nature of problems such as insufficiency and particularism is such that 
they will require some positive action and, hence, a rule that carries with it a positive 
obligation. For example, responding to philanthropic particularism by requiring CSOs 
to provide services to wider demographic or geographic areas, 26 or requiring CSOs that 
provide a service with cyclical demand to maintain their activities during troughs as 
well as peaks, 27 would effectively compel affected CSOs to act in a particular way. 
Compulsory command and control regulation such as this exposes the sector to the risk 
19 See above Ch 4 at 145 - 148. 20 See above Ch 5 at 196. 
21 An alternative approach which also utilises command and control regulation to prevent an 
activity would be the rule relating to the political activities of charities, which requires that an 
organisation does not perform such activities except insofar as they are ancillary to, and in 
support of, non-political charitable purposes (see Charity Commission, CC9: Political 
Activities and Campaigning by Charities (London, Charity Commission, 2004), para 23). 
22 Consider, for example, the rule preventing charities from supporting a political party - see 
Charity Commission, above n 21, para 41. 
23 See further below at 244. 
24 See e. g. Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46. 
25 See above Ch 4 at 138 - 140. 26 Ibid. 
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of juridification, and a more fitting solution in these kinds of situation might be to 
employ incentive-based regulation to reward appropriate behaviour. 28 This is not to 
suggest either (i) that command and control regulation could not be utilised in pursuit 
of these regulatory goals or that (ii) the four goals in the previous paragraphs can be 
achieved solely by reference to command and control regulation that restrains 
behaviour, rather than regulation that makes certain acts compulsory. However, a 
regulator must be aware of the risks that positive obligations carry. 
C. INCENTIVE-BASED REGULATION 
As an alternative to penalising those organisations that fail to adhere to certain 
standards, a regulatory regime instead may try to manipulate the behaviour of 
regulated organisations by rewarding those that do comply with a particular rule. Two 
forms of incentive-based regulation are of particular interest to the regulation of 
organised civil society - (i) tax incentives and (ii) regulation by contract or grant. We 
shall consider each in turn. 
(1) Tax Relief 
The quintessential form of incentive-based regulation is rewarding organisations with 
tax relief in return for performing positive obligations or refraining from particular 
activities. 29 This is particularly useful in situations where it is undesirable, for the 
reasons discussed above, 30 to give rule-making discretion to a regulatory body. Under 
incentive-based regulation, there is less scope for harmful unintended consequences: 
the worst that can happen as a result of over-inclusive tax relief is that an unintended 
organisation receives a windfall, and the worst that can happen as a result of under- 
inclusion is that an organisation fails to be rewarded .3' This 
form of incentive-based 
regulation is therefore likely to be particularly useful from the perspective of CSOs, in 
" Ibid. 
28 See the following paragraph onwards. 
29 Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 42. 
30 See above at 235,236 - 238. 31 Of course, this may have serious consequences, both from the perspective of the 
organisation in question, which might be relying upon anticipated relief as part of its financial 
planning and from a regulatory perspective, in that there is no incentive for a relevant 
organisation to carry out (or, where appropriate, refrain from carrying out) the act upon which 
relief is predicated. 
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that it provides the state with a means of directing the range of activities pursued by 
the sector, and may therefore enable the state to remedy certain instances of 
philanthropic insufficiency or particularism. For example, let us assume that, in a 
particular social sphere, CSOs that carry out activity x attract more funding than those 
that carry out activity y, and that the state regards x and y as being of equal importance 
and so wishes to redress the balance so that more CSOs engage in the performance of 
activity y. It is clear that neither positive nor negative command and control regulation 
would be an appropriate means of achieving this goal. Requiring certain CSOs to 
engage in activity y would compromise the sector's volunteerism, whilst preventing 
certain CSOs from engaging in activity x, in the hope that they turn their attention to 
activity y would probably be viewed as stifling the entrepreneurial nature of the 
sector, 32 whilst at the same time offering no real guarantee that the CSOs in question 
would turn to activity x as opposed to activity z. 
If, instead, the state provided that those organisations that engage in activity y are 
eligible for tax relief, organisations would have a strong incentive to pursue this over x. 
Moreover, unlike the command and control examples, this would not compromise the 
sector's voluntary nature as organisations would still have a free choice over their 
activities, and it would not impact negatively on the autonomy of individual 
organisations, thereby leaving 'managers free to manage'. 33 Therefore it seems to be a 
suitable method of co-ordinating the sector so as to minimise philanthropic 
insufficiency and philanthropic particularism without posing a threat to the sector's 
organisational quiddity. However, one disadvantage of using this form of incentive- 
based regulation is that, unlike command and control regulation, the effects will not be 
instant, 34 as it will take time for existing organisations to shift the focus of their 
activities, 35 or for new organisations to be established. Accordingly, this is a method 
of regulation best suited to long-term regulatory goals, and is unlikely to be an 
" See above Ch 3 at 108 -I 11. 33 Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 42. 
34 See Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 43. 
35 The timescale will depend in part on the institutional efficiency of individual CSOs: we have 
already noted that smaller organisations are generally better able to change direction quickly 
(see above Ch 3 at 73 - 74); further, the organisational type may affect the ease with which 
such changes can be effected (we have already noted some of the technical difficulties in 
changing an organisation's purpose in the context of shifting sector: see above Ch 5 at 159 - 
162). 
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effective way of remedying an unanticipated short-term dip in service provision. 36 We 
should also note that, although they give little discretion to the regulator, rules 
concerning tax exemption are typically complex 37 and so there may be unintended 
compliance costs for CSOs - for example, extra resources may need to be spent by 
organisations on tax returns and auditing. 38 
(2) Regulation by Contract 
A more controversial form of incentive-based regulation is regulation by contract, 
whereby the state encourages organisations to favour certain activities by offering 
contracts of service provision, or grants, 39 to those CSOs prepared to carry them out. 
Much has already been written on the general advantages and disadvantages, 
particularly the latter, of the 'contract culture' that has come to characterise the 
relationship between many CSOs and the state in recent years, 40 and it would be 
inappropriate to discuss these in any detail at this juncture. However, there are a 
number of things we can say in relation to the contract as a regulatory tool. First, 
much of the criticism levelled at the contract culture relates to what Taylor and Lewis 
refer to as 'goal distortion': 41 the fact that CSOs may be tempted to alter their 
purposes, 42 or the focus of their activities, 43 in order to secure funding. Indeed, the 
36 Indeed, we have already noted that short-term dips would best be dealt with by allowing 
CSOs to maintain reserve funds: see above Ch 4 at 139 - 140. 37 See Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 43. 
38 The significance of the cost of compliance in regulatory design has been recognised in 
numerous official publications: see, e. g. Cabinet Office Better Regulation Task Force, 
Principles of Good Regulation (London, Better Regulation Task Force, 2003) at 4; Cabinet 
Office Regulatory Impact Unit, Better Policy Making: A Guide to Regulatory Impact 
Assessment (www. cabinet-office. gov. uk, Cabinet Office, 2003) at 18 - 20. 39 Much has been written on the blurred distinction between contracts and grants in the context 
of state funding of CSOs (see e. g. Morris, D., Charities and the Contract Culture: Partners or 
Contractors? Law and Practice in Conflict (Liverpool, University of Liverpool Charity Law 
Unit, 1999) at 14). For regulatory purposes, the key distinction is the nature of the sanctions 
available - with both arrangements, probably the most significant sanction for sub-standard 
performance is non-renewal; however, if the performance or lack thereof amounted to breach 
of a contract then the contracting authority would be able to sue the CSO for damages, whereas 
there would be no similar recourse under a grant. 
40 See above Ch 2n 73 and associated text. 
41 Taylor, M., and Lewis, J., 'Contracting: What does it do to voluntary and non-profit 
organisationsT in 6 and Kendall, above n 40 at 34. 
42 Leat, D., 'Funding matters' in Davis Smith, J, Rochester, C., and Hedley, R. (eds. ), An 
Introduction to the Voluntary Sector (London and New York, Routledge, 1995) at 171 - 172; 
Morris, D., Charities and the Contract Culture: Partners or Contractors? Law and Practice in 
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Charity Commission itself disapproves of this and its practice is to withhold consent to 
a change in purpose if (i) the only reason for doing so is to secure funding and (ii) the 
change takes the organisation 'some way outside' its current purposeS. 44 Whilst it is 
certainly possible that this might have negative consequences - Morris notes that 
trustees might act outside their powers in order to secure a contract and thus fall foul of 
the IaW45 - from a regulatory perspective goal distortion is, in fact, the very reason for 
entering into such contracts. As with the fiscal benefits of tax relief, the state is able to 
co-ordinate the sector and counter perceived philanthropic insufficiency and 
particularism by luring CSOs towards areas of particular need with the temptation of 
funding. Service contracts may also be used as a response to philanthropic 
amateurism, 46 as, unlike the promise of tax relief, an individual contract can ýpertain to 
inputs, rather than outputs' and make detailed provision for the standards or methods 
of delivery. 47 Furthermore, the tendering process will require CSOs to demonstrate 
that they are the most attractive service providers if they are to secure contracts, which 
is also likely to encourage professionalization. 48 
Conflict (Liverpool, University of Liverpool Charity Law Unit, 1999) at 27; see also Voluntary 
Sector Roundtable Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector, Building 
on Strength: Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada's Voluntary Sector 
(www. vsr-trsb. net, Voluntary Sector Roundtable, 1999) at 14. 
43 Morris, D., 'Paying the Piper: The "Contract Culture" as Dependency Culture for Charities' 
in Dunn, A. (ed. ), The Voluntary Sector, the State and the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2000) at 128; 
Taylor and Lewis, above n 43 at 34. 
44 Charity Commission, CC37: Charities and Contracts (www. charity-commission. gov. uk, 
Charity Commission, 2003), para 18. In many cases, it is true that the Commission's 
permission is required to effect a change in purpose (see Charity Commission, CC36: 
Amending Charities' Governing Documents: Orders and Schemes (London, Charity 
Commission, 2004), para 16; also Charities Act 1993, s 13). However, this is not always the 
case (e. g. where a charitable trust gives its trustees an express power to amend its purposes and 
does not restrict this by requiring that the permission of the Commission is sought first), 
something that is not made explicit in the Commission's guidance on contracting. 
45 Morris, above n 43 at 129. 
46 See above Ch 3 at 81. 
47 James, E., 'Economic Theories of the Nonprofit Sector: A Comparative Perspective' in 
Anheier and Seibel, above n 16 at 25. 
48 See Lewis, J., 'What Does Contracting do to Voluntary AgenciesT in Billis, D., and Harris, 
M. (eds. ), Voluntary Agencies Challenges of Organisation and Management (Basingstoke and 
London, MacMillan, 1996) at 104; Robinson, M., 'Privatising the Voluntary Sector: NGOs as 
Public Service Contractors' in Hulme, D., and Edwards, M., (eds. ), NGOs, States and Donors: 
Too Closefor Comfort (Basingstoke and London, MacMillan, 1997) at 63; Taylor and Lewis, 
above n 41 at 33. 
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However, regulation by contract has a number of serious weaknesses that render it a 
largely unsuitable form of regulation in the context of organised civil society. First, 
unless a single authority is charged with the responsibility of negotiating and entering 
into all contracts with CSOs, there will be a lack of regulatory co-ordination across the 
sector. At present a large number of state institutions, ranging from local authorities to 
central government departments, have the power to enter into contracts with CSOs. 
Under this system, individual contracts would, at best, tend towards only the 
regulatory goals of the individual contracting bodies; at worst, regulatory aims would 
either be 'incidental to the main purpose' of service provision, 49 or would fall by the 
wayside entirely. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the state is not, of 
course, the only sector to contract with organised civil society 50 _ every private firm 
that enters into a service arrangement with a CSO in effect becomes a regulatory body. 
These may, in turn, require regulating by the state in order to ensure a degree of co- 
ordination and prevent abuses of power. 51 
Second, and perhaps most important from the perspective of civil society regulation, is 
the fact that, unlike tax relief, which rewards a particular action (i) without specifying 
which organisations must carry it out and (ii) without prescribing the means by which 
it must be carried out, regulation by contract enables the state to influence the internal 
management of individual CSOs directly, thus posing a serious threat to the 
independence of the sector. 52 This will in turn have ramifications for organisational 
quiddity 53 and the ability of CSOs to fulfil any political functions which they might 
49 Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 46. 
50 See above Ch 5 at 167. 
51 Leat, above n 42 at 174 - 177. 52 See e. g. Clark, J., 'The State, Popular Participation and the Voluntary Sector' in Hulme and 
Edwards, above n 48 at 56; Leat, above n 42 at 172 - 174; McGown Jnr, J., 'Major Charitable 
Gifts - How Much Control Can Donors Keep and Charities Give Up? [ 1999] Journal of 
Taxation 279 at 279; Morris, above n 43 at 128; Morris, above n 42 at iv; Salamon, L., 
Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State 
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) at 103 - 105. The National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations notes that it is possible to provide for rules to ensure that the 
independence of individual organisations is not compromised, such as the fiduciary duties of 
loyalty that bind the trustees and directors of charities (National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations Charity Law Reform Advisory Group, For the public benefit? (London, NCVO, 
2001), para 2.2.3). 
53 See above Ch 4 at 146. 
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have. 54 Third, with regard to the use of contracting as a response to philanthropic 
amateurism, we have already noted the fact that any attempt to regulate so as to 
counter this phenomenon j eopardises the voluntary nature of the sector. 55 
Finally, we might also note that the nature of the contract culture is such that there will 
frequently be a number of compliance costs for CSOs that we must be careful not to 
overlook - for example, the costs of tendering 
56 and of obtaining legal advice prior to 
entering into a contract. 57 
D. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
Regulating so as to require CSOs to disclose certain data about their activities - for 
example, annual accounts, details of products or services provided and of those 
responsible for the organisation, such as the trustees - is the paradigm method of 
tackling the information asymmetry that is inherent in CSO provision of (i) public 
goods, (ii) complex private services and (iii) the redistribution of wealth . 
58 This form 
of regulation works by providing those parties interested in participating in the sector 
with sufficient information to make a rational choice about the organisations that they 
will patronise. It is significant from the perspective of organised civil society that 
disclosure requirements, in contrast to proscriptive rules requiring adherence to a 
particular standard, do not have a negative impact on the independence of the sector. 59 
Under this form of regulation, organisations are free to act as they please on the 
condition that they inform people exactly what they are doing. Disclosure regulation 
has a long heritage in the charitable sector - in England, the Charity Commission's 
54 See above Ch 3 at 92 - 96; also Morris, above n 43 at 134 - 135. 55 See above Ch 4 at 147 - 148; see also Leat, above n 42 at 166 & 173, who notes the risk of 
'coercive isomorphism', whereby a CSO adopts the administrative practices of the funding 
body (at 173); also Powell, W., and Friedkin, R., 'Organizational Change in Nonprofit 
Organizations' in Powell, W. (ed. ), The Nonprofit Sector A Research Handbook (New Haven 
and London, Yale University Press, 1987) at 182; Taylor and Lewis, above n 41 at 32; 
Salamon, L., 'Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit 
Relations' in Powell (ibid) at 114 - 115. 56 Leat, above n 42 at 168; 
57 Morris, D., 'Charities in the contract culture: survival of the largest? ' (2000) 20 LS 409 at 
420. 
58 See above Ch 4 at 132 - 137. 59 Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 49. 
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register of charities 60 provides free access, either in person or via the Commission's 
website, to details such as an organisation's stated objects, the names of its trustees and 
an overview of its recent financial history; all charities must also keep accounts, to be 
made available to the public upon request. 61 
However, disclosure regulation has a number of limitations. Whilst it should, in 
theory, remove any information asymmetry between CSO and donor, this depends 
upon donors having the time and inclination to make use of the infon-nation available 
to them. 62 It is not clear that this will always be the case - for example, whereas a 
corporate donor considering making a sizeable charitable donation will have a clear 
incentive, and ready resources, to seek out relevant information about the recipient, the 
average citizen, when proffered a collecting tin by a volunteer in the street, is less 
likely to consider it a worthwhile endeavour to check an organisation's credentials 
before handing over a few pennies. Furthermore, disclosure regulation will be 
effective only when the information provided by a CSO is accurate: a corrupt or ill- 
managed organisation will have strong incentive either (i) to withhold relevant 
information or (ii) to provide false information. The former problem can be 
discouraged with relative ease by using adverse publicity and 'naming and shaming' 
guilty organisations. 63 So, for example, in 2004 the Charity Commission published a 
list of all charities that failed to submit their annual accounts on time. 64 However, the 
latter problem may go unchecked in the absence of an investigation into a corrupt 
CSO. It is for this reason that we suggested earlier that some form of judicial control 
of maladministration may also be desirable if we are to ensure the sector's 
trustworthiness. 65 
60 The Commission is required to maintain a register 'in such manner' as it sees fit (Charities 
Act 1993, s 3(l))). 
61 Charity Commission, CC61: Charity Accounts: The Framework (London, HMSO, 2002), 
para 10. 
62 Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 49. 
6' Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 49. 
64 Charity Commission, Enforcing Submission ofAnnual Returns and Accounts (www. charity- 
commission. gov. uk/investigations/enforce. asp, Charity Commission, 2005 web version). 
65 See above Ch 4 at 137; Ch 6 at 222 - 223. 
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E. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
Baldwin and Cave note that regulation can be achieved by nationalising the industry or 
sphere in question. 66 This will clearly not be an appropriate response to civil society 
regulation, as it would compromise the independence of the sector 67 and, as a result, 
jeopardise those social functions that rely on this structural characteristic, namely (i) 
68 69 
the provision of public goods, (ii) the redistribution of wealth , (iii) the 
facilitation 
of political action, 70 (iv) the facilitation of self-determination 71 and (v) the facilitation 
of entrepreneurship. 72 
F. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES 
The final73 regulatory strategy noted by Baldwin and Cave consists of providing those 
who deal with the regulated industry or sphere with various rights against the 
organisations with whom they deal. 74 We have already considered the role that such 
rights can play in the context of checking maladministration in the previous chapter, 75 
and we shall return to consider the form that these rights might take in Chapter Eight. 
G. EDUCATION AND ADVICE 
From the perspective of civil society regulation, the ability to employ education 
programmes will be particularly useful; indeed we have already considered two 
justifications for regulation where this would be an appropriate strategy. First, we 
have noted the problem of philanthropic paternalism in the context of those CSOs that 
76 facilitate the redistribution of wealth , whereby those who 
benefit from a CSO's 
66 Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 50; also Breyer, S., Regulation and its Reform (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1982) at 18. 
67 See above Ch 2 at 50 - 51. 68 See above Ch 3 at 61 - 88. 69 See above Ch 3 at 89 - 90. '0 See above Ch 3 at 91 - 96. 71 See above Ch 3 at 98 - 105. 72 See above Ch 3 at 105 -I 11. 73 In fact, Baldwin and Cave suggest a further strategy, based upon a model requiring 
organisations to provide compensation for sub-standard performance (above nI at 53 - 55); 
however, by their own admission this is simply a form of command and control regulation 
(ibid at 55) and so we shall not consider it separately here. 
74 Baldwin and Cave, above nI at 51 - 53. 75 See above Ch 6 at 222 - 226. 76 See above Ch 3 at 80. 
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activities feel stigmatised or debilitated by virtue of their reliance on the altruism of 
others. Campaigning by a regulator so as to changes attitudes towards charity and 
philanthropy is one way in which this problem could be alleviated without interfering 
in the sector itself, although we might question whether this can strictly be considered 
ýregulation' in any meaningful sense. 77 Second, we also have noted that regulation is 
frequently justified by reference to the general aim of fostering the sector. 78 The use of 
csoft' tools such as education and the giving of advice may be viewed as an acceptable 
means of achieving this, particularly as active intervention in the sector on this general 
ground alone is difficult to justify objectively, i. e. without reference to one's political 
preferences. 79 This tactic is one that is frequently employed by the Charity 
Commission - for example, in pursuit of its statutory function of 'promoting the 
effective use of charitable resources', 80 the Commission maintains a list of publications 
intended to provide guidance and support in relation to 'best practice, the duties of 
charity trustees and charity law'. 81A number of sources have expressed concern that 
that such advice or guidance may conflict with a regulator's more traditional 
'regulatory' functions - for example, the Commission has been criticised in the past 
for failing to adequately distinguish between (i) telling charities that certain conduct is 
required of them as a matter of law, and (ii) advising charities that certain conduct 
constitutes suggested good practice. 82 The current reform package, recognising the 
'tensions that have sometimes arisen out of this "dual role" of regulator and advisor', 83 
concluded that the Commission should retain its advisory role over charitable CSOs, 84 
" See above Ch 4 at 143 - 144. Note also our working definition of regulation in Ch I at 17. 78 See above Ch 4 at 148 - 149. 79 See above Ch 4 at 149. 
80 Charities Act 1993, s 1(3). 
81 Charity Commission, CCL- Charity Commission Publications (London, Charity 
Commission, 2004) at 1. 
82 See Mitchell, C., 'Reviewing the Register' in Mitchell, C., and Moody, S. (eds. ), 
Foundations of Charity (Oxford, Hart, 2000) at 190. 
83 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Private Action, Public Benefit. - A Review of Charities and 
the Wider Not-For-Profit Sector (London, HMSO, 2002), para 7.47; note also the House of 
Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill, Draft Charities 
Bill Volume 1: Report, Formal Minutes and Evidence (HL Paper 167-i, HC 660-i, London, 
HM SO, 2004), paras 193 - 207. 84 Joint Committee on the Charities Bill, above n 83, para 207; Home Office, The Government 
Reply to the Reportfrom the Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill Session 2003 - 2004 
(Cm 6440, London, HMSO, 2004), para 20. 
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but that it should take steps to ensure that the distinction between 'advice and 
instructions' is made clear in all communications. 85 
H. CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the preceding analysis that it will not be appropriate to rely on one 
single strategy when regulating organised civil society. Rather, these are tools that 
must be used in combination in order to manipulate the sector so as to achieve the 
objectives detailed in Chapter Four. Specifically, the prevention of anti-competitive 
practices, the control of campaigning and the prevention of challenges to 
organisational quiddity lend themselves to regulation by way of command and control, 
whereas regulation to enable sector co-ordination (and with it the rectification of 
philanthropic insufficiency and particularism) suggests that some form of incentive- 
based regulation might be appropriate. Finally, although disclosure regulation will go 
some way towards ensuring the trustworthiness of the sector, some form of control 
over CSO maladministration will be necessary in order to minimise abuses of power. 
We shall consider the form that this might next in the next chapter. 
85 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, above n 83, para 7.26. 
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Regulation by the Courts 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, we argued that disclosure regulation aimed at preventing 
information asymmetry between donors and CSOs will not, by itself, ensure the 
trustworthiness of organised civil society. In addition, some means of controlling the 
administrative discretion of trustees, and others who act in a managerial capacity, is 
likely to be necessary. We have also already noted that, despite the drawbacks of a 
tribunal as the primary vehicle for regulation, the courts might be a suitable regulator 
of maladministration. ' However, the form that this regulation might take has largely 
escaped the attention of regulation theorists, who prefer to focus on the executive 
agency as regulator. Accordingly, in this final substantive chapter we consider how 
this might best be implemented. To this end, it is useful to consider in outline two 
existing forms of judicial control of maladministration: 2 the public law principles of 
judicial review and the private law principles of charity proceedings under s 33 of the 
Charities Act 1993 .3 This necessitates a rather more black-letter analysis than has been 
undertaken in the preceding chapters. As we shall see, there are 'obvious though not 
exact' parallels between judicial review and charity proceedings, 4 and between judicial 
review and the rules of trust law more generally. 5 Comparing the two side-by-side is 
See above Ch 6 at 222 - 226. 
An exhaustive comparative analysis is outside the scope of this thesis, although would 
certainly be of regulatory interest - if nothing else, it would enable us to determine whether the 
classification of certain charitable activities as 'public functions' will be of significant practical 
consequence (see above Ch 5 at 163 - 167). Although such classification would render a 
charity amenable to judicial review, the fact that charity proceedings already provide a means 
of challenging abuses of power will minimise the impact of this. 
3 This section provides that 'charity proceedings may be taken with reference to a charity ... by any person interested in the charity, ... 
[meaning any proceedings] brought under the 
court's jurisdiction with respect to charities, or ... to trusts in relation to the administration of a 
trust for charitable purposes' (Charities Act 1993, ss 33(l), 33(8)). Note that the Charities Bill 
2004 leaves s 33 intact. 
4 Scott v National Trust, below n8 at 714 per Robert Walker J. 
5 Edge v Pensions Ombudsman [2000] Ch 602 at 628 per Chadwick LJ: 'It seems to us no 
coincidence that courts, considering the exercise of discretionary powers by those to whom 
such powers have been entrusted (albeit in different contexts), should reach similar and 
consistent conclusions; and should express those conclusions in much the same language. ' See 
also Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) v Barr [2003] 1 All ER 763, paras 29 - 30 per Lightman J, 
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useful as it provides a starting-point from which we can begin to develop a system of 
reviewing maladministration that is specific to organised civil society. 6 
The following analysis considers the way in which charity proceedings and judicial 
review have dealt with the twin issues of (i) the standing of applicants and (ii) the 
grounds on which a decision may be challenged, 7 in order to determine whether similar 
principles ought to govern the regulation of maladministration within organised civil 
society. 
B. THE STANDING OF APPLICANTS 
In order for an individual to bring an action for maladministration against an 
organisation, both public law and charity proceedings require that he must demonstrate 
an interest in securing its due administration beyond that of the man in the street. 
Primafacie, these rules are quite different, although both are, at heart, concerned with 
the need to strike a balance between objectives that pull in different directions: the 
prevention of abuses of power and the protection of organisations from unwarranted 
harassment. 8 
on which see Nugee, E., 'Re Hastings-Bass Again - Void or Voidable? and Further 
Reflections' (2003) 3 PC13 173. For an opposing view, see Davern, R., 'Impeaching the 
Exercise of Trustees' Distributive Discretions: "Wrong Grounds" and Procedural Fairness' in 
Hayton, D. (ed. ), Extending the Boundaries of Trusts and Similar Ring-Fenced Funds (The 
Hague and London, Kluwer, 2002) at 454. 
6 Although charity proceedings themselves are specific to organised civil society, the 
administrative rules enforced by s 33 are very much the creation of private law (as indeed is all 
charity law): most of the rules which we shall consider below have their origins in trust law 
and company law and apply with equal force to private sector organisations (specifically, 
private trusts and non-charitable companies). 
'A comparative analysis of the remedies available under each system is outside the scope of 
this thesis. However, this is certainly a matter worth further consideration, given the fact that 
injudicial review proceedings the court have a wide discretion to refuse to interfere even when 
it has been shown that an illegal decision has been made, whereas in charity proceedings the 
courts may only withhold a remedy if the illegal act in question is voidable as opposed to void 
ab initio (see e. g. Lightman J in Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) v Barr, above n 5, paras 29 - 
30). 
8 Further, in certain circumstances the two may work in tandem: in the light of Rv National 
Trustfor Places ofHistoric Interest or Natural Beauty, ex parte Scott [ 1998] 1 WLR 226 it 
seems that the judicial review of a charity will fall under the definition of charity proceedings 
for the purpose of s 33, and will thus operate as a 'double filter' requiring applicants 
demonstrate standing for both proceedings before the court will grant leave for judicial review 
(Luxton, P., The Law of Charities (Oxford, OUP, 200 1) at 528). Tucker J held that where 
judicial review of a charity is available it will satisfy the definition of charity proceedings 
(Charities Act 1993, s 33(8)). In light of this, and the fact that s 33(l) of the Charities Act 
249 
8: REGULATION BY THE COURTS 
(1) Charity Proceedings 
In order to bring charity proceedings a person must either be a trustee of the charity, or 
a local inhabitant in the case of a local charity, 9 or otherwise 'interested in the 
charity'. 10 There is no definitive test to determine whether or not somebody is 
interested, and there are only a handful of reported cases where the issue has been 
considered. In Haslemere Estates v Baker, " Megarry V-C, having rejected the 
submission that the rules were intended simply to prevent 'officious intermeddlers' 
from bringing actions, 12 held that only a claimant with: 13 
some good reason for seeking to enforce the trusts of a charity or secure its due 
administration ... [will] be readily accepted as having an interest. 
When determining what will constitute a good reason, the Vice-Chancellor drew a 
distinction between a person who has an interest adverse to the charity (e. g. a 
contractual claim against the organisation or the trustees) and one who has an interest 
in the charity (e. g. a beneficiary). 14 According to Megarry V-C, only the latter has a 
sufficiently good reason for the purposes of s 33.15 Judicial attempts post-Haslemere 
1993 states that charity proceedings must be only brought by those with an appropriate interest 
and 'not by any other person', it follows that in order to bring proceedings for judicial review 
it must be necessary to demonstrate standing for both sets of proceedings. This was 
timorously approved in Scott v National Trust [1998] 2 All ER 705 where the applicants of the 
earlier case applied for a second time for leave to pursue judicial review proceedings. 
Comparing Tucker Fs analysis to that of the Charity Commission, which had granted leave for 
charity proceedings but not judicial review on the ground that the two were quite separate, 
Robert Walker J stated that the learned judge's opinion was to be 'preferred' (at 715). 
9 There must be at least two such inhabitants to bring an action. 
10 Charities Act 1993, s 33(l). 
11 [198211 WLR 1109 (concerning an equivalent provision contained in the Charities Act 
1963, s 28(l)). 12 Above nII at 1121. 13 Above nII at 1122. 14 Ibid. 
15 It should be noted that the two interests are not mutually exclusive. In Gunning v Buckfast 
Abbey Trustees [19941 TLR 42 a couple who paid for their children to attend a school run by 
charitable trust were held to be sufficiently interested to bring charity proceedings, as, although 
they had a contractual relationship with the trustees, they were not seeking to enforce any 
contractual right; rather, they were seeking the due administration of the charity on behalf of 
their children as beneficiaries (at 42 per Arden J). Similarly, in Scott v National Trust [19981 
2 All ER 705 (above n 8) the Devon and Somerset and the Quantock staghounds, and a 
number of tenant farmers, were able to challenge a decision of National Trust to ban fox hunts 
on its land, as they were held to be partners of the trust 'in a loose, but nevertheless, a real 
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to define what it means to have an interest in a charity have failed to produce a 
definition capable of general application. In Bradshaw v University College of 
Wales, 16 Hoffman J stated: 17 
Without... in any way wishing to essay a definition... I do not consider that a 
person who could not in any circumstances be a beneficiary of the charity or 
take any interest under the trusts applicable to the property can be within that 
expression. 
This was regarded as 'unsatisfactory' by the Court of Appeal in Re Hampton Fuel 
Allotment Charity, 18 for two reasons. First, the court rejected the notion that it is 
necessary to be a beneficiary in order to bring an action. In particular, Nicholls U was 
reluctant to rule out the possibility that the settlor of a charitable trust might have 
standing - for example, where the charity is for the relief of his poor relations or he 
retains some administrative control over the trust such as the power to appoint 
trustees. 19 Second, the court was keen to stress that not every actual or potential 
beneficiary will have standing, as this class is potentially vast. 20 However, beyond this 
their Lordships were reluctant to provide a definitive test and instead could only offer 
two further observations, namely that those who merely (i) have a 'sentimental or 
altruistic' concern for the charity or (ii) provide it with 'modest financial support' will 
not have standing. 21 
sense' in relation to the management of the land in question and the animals contained thereon 
(at 714 per Robert Walker J). 
16 [19881 1 WLR 190. 
17 Above n 16 at 194. 
18 [1989] Ch 484 at 493 per Nicholls LJ. 
19 Above n 18 at 493. However, even where the founder of a charity is sufficiently interested, 
it is clear that the interest does not extend to his executors, who 'succeed to the property of the 
deceased; not to [his]... spirit and disembodied wishes' (Bradshaw v University College of 
Wales, above n 16 at 194 per Hoffman J; unchallenged by the Court of Appeal in Re Hampton, 
above n 18). 
20 Above n 18 at 493 per Nicholls LJ. 
21 lbid. This would suggest that in Scott v National Trust, above n 8, had there been no 
partnership between the staghunts and the charity, the members of the hunts would not have 
been sufficiently interested as mere contributors to the charity's funds through the purchase of 
hunting licenses. 
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(2) Judicial Review 
Whereas it would seem that in order to bring charity proceedings one must have a 
sufficient interest in the organisation, standing for judicial review requires a sufficient 
interest in the subject matter of the review. 22 The leading case is Rv Inland Revenue 
Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of SeV-Employed and Small Businesses 
Ltd, 23 where it was held that standing is not an issue to be determined in isolation: 
rather, it must be considered alongside the merits of the applicant's case as whole 
unless the claim is 'frivolous or vexatious'. 24 In the words of Lord Wilberforce: 25 
the question of sufficient interest can not... be considered in the abstract, or as 
an isolated point: it must be taken together with the legal and factual context. 
The rule requires sufficient interest in the matter to which the application 
relates. This ... necessarily involves the whole question of the 
duties of the 
[public body] ... and the breaches or failure of the duties. 
This is reinforced by the fact that, in all but the most straightforward cases, standing is 
not to be decided at the same stage as leave to apply for judicial review but during the 
main hearing. 26 Thus standing may be partly determined by the seriousness of the 
particular breach of duty by the public body - such is the 'flexibility' of the sufficient 
interest requirement. 27 By comparison, in the few reported charity proceedings, 
standing has each time been treated as a separate stand-alone issue. 
Luxton suggests that one of the key differences between the two sets of proceedings is 
that, in contrast to the rules on standing for charity proceedings, the rules on standing 
for judicial review provide that only a 'person aggrieved' will be allowed to bring 
proceedings, and that someone merely interested in due administration will not. 28 In 
fact, it is now settled that it is not always be necessary for an applicant to demonstrate 
22 Supreme Court Act 1983, s 31(3). 
23 [1982] AC 617. 
24 Above n 23 at 634 per Lord Diplock. 
2' Above n 23 at 630 (original italics). Though note the rather less enthusiastic words of Lord 
Fraser of Tullybelton, who notes that 'the question whether the respondents have a sufficient 
interest to make the application at all is a separate, and logically prior, question which has to 
be answered affirmatively before any question on the merits arises, though accepting that it 
may sometimes be 'Impractical' to separate the two, above n 23 at 645. 26 Above n 23 at 630. 
27 Above n 23 at 658 per Lord Roskill. 
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a 'direct financial or legal interest' to establish standing. 29 Whilst there must, in 
theory, be something to distinguish the applicant from the world at large, 30 this can be 
as little as 'sincere concern for constitutional issues'. 31 The courts have also become 
increasingly tolerant of judicial review proceedings being brought by pressure groups 
with no direct interest in the decision that is being challenged. Despite the general rule 
that: 32 
the fact that some thousands of people join together and assert that they have 
an interest does not create an interest if the individuals did not have an interest 
the courts will recognise standing where an organisation has an expertise in the 
relevant area, 33 or where there is no other likely candidate to commence proceedings 
and so potential administrative malpractice would otherwise go unchecked. 34 In the 
case of charity proceedings, on the other hand, only those with a financial or legal 
interest will have standing. Those with a financial interest include: (i) a donor of more 
than 'modest' sums, (ii) an actual or potential beneficiary and (iii) a settlor who 
continues to give financial support. Those with a legal interest include: (i) a trustee, 
(ii) a settlor who retains some administrative control and (iii) someone with interest 
under the same trust and which is dependent on the charitable element. 
(3) Review of CSO Maladministration 
Despite both procedural and substantive differences, the rules of standing for charity 
proceedings and judicial review share two key principles. First, both are concerned 
with shielding organisations from barrages of claims. In Scott v National Trust, 
Robert Walker J considered the authorities on s 33 and concluded that: 35 
2' Luxton, above n8 at 529. 
2" Rv Secretary ofStatefor the Environment, exparte Rose Theatre Trust Co [1990] QB 505 
at 520 per Schiemann J. 
3" Lest the requirement of sufficient interest lose all meaning: Ex parte National Federation of 
Seýf-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd, above n 23 at 661 per Lord Roskill. 
"Rv Secretary ofStatefor Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Rees-Mogg [ 1994] 
QB 552 per Lloyd LJ at 562 (though the issue of standing was not disputed before the court). 
32 Exparte Rose Theatre Trust Co, above n 29 at 520 per Schiemann J. 
33 Rv HMInspectorate of Pollution, exparte Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329. 
34 Rv Secretary ofState for Foreign Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement Ltd 
[ 1995] 1 WLR 386. 
3' Above n8 at 713. 
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The purpose of the filter is ... to protect charities 
from being harassed and put 
to expense by a multiplicity of claims, which may or may not be well-founded, 
by persons who may or may not fairly be described as 'busybodies'. 
A similar sentiment was expressed in the Seýf-Emplqyed case, where Lord Wilberforce 
noted that the right to find lack of standing at the application stage, in certain cases, 36 
is 'an important safeguard against the courts being flooded and public bodies harassed 
by irresponsible applications'. 37 Second, the potential harshness of the standing 
requirements is mitigated by the fact that both the Court of Appeal in Re Hampton 
Fuel Allotment Charity 38 and the House of Lords in the Self-Employed case 39 stressed 
that : 40 
the question of interest is not simply a bare question of law, but depends on all 
the circumstances of the particular case, 
which should in theory ensure that the rule against official intermeddling does not 
operate to prevent the review of maladministration where this would otherwise go 
unchecked - for example, where no-one with appropriate standing is prepared to 
mount a challenge. 41 From the point of view of reviewing maladministration within 
organised civil society, these two principles appear to be a useful means of balancing 
two competing regulatory goals: on the one hand, any regulation designed to foster the 
sector will wish to keep legal challenges to a minimum in order to conserve CSO 
resources and ensure that time and money is not diverted away from a CSO's social 
function and put towards defending an action; on the other, the need to minimise 
challenges to the sector's trustworthineSS42 suggests that a degree of flexibility is 
required, so that abuses of power are never neglected by the courts. 
36 We have already considered that judicial review will usually deal with standing at the main 
hearing: see above n 26 and associated text. 37 Above n 23 at 630. 38 Above n 18. 39 Above n 23. 
40 Scott v National Trust, above n8 at 713 per Robert Walker J. 
41 See above Ch 6 at 223 - 225. 42 See above Ch 4 at 132 - 137. 
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C. GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING THE ABUSE OF POWER 
In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, 43 Lord Diplock 
summarised the existing 44 grounds on which a decision may be challenged by way of 
judicial review as folloWS: 45 
Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating 
any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can 
conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative 
action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 
'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. 
There is no similarly comprehensive list for charity proceedings. However, the 
following taxonomy was provided by Robert Walker J (extra-judicially) in the context 
of reviewing the decision of any trustee, charitable or otherwise, to exercise a power of 
appointment: 46 
An appointment made by the trustees may be open to challenge on any of the 
following grounds: ... 
because the trustees ... 
have failed to satisfy some 
procedural condition; ... 
because they have gone beyond the permitted scope 
of the power; [or] ... 
because they have failed to address their minds properly 
to the exercise of their discretion. 
It would seem from this that, prima facie, decisions are amenable to challenge for the 
same reasons under both sets of proceedings, 47 and there would seem to be no reason 
43 [1985] AC 374. 
44 His Lordship notes that the following list is not exhaustive and suggests that additional 
grounds, such as lack of proportionality, may be added on an incremental basis (above n 43 at 
410). To date, the introduction of this particular ground in a purely domestic context has been 
rejected by the House of Lords: see Rv Home Secretary, ex parte Brind [199 1]I AC 696; 
however, there is considerable overlap between proportionality and the existing ground of 
irrationality - see below at 258 - 260. 4' Above n 43 at 410. 
46 Robert Walker J, 'The Limits of the Principle in Re Hastings Bass' [20021 PC13 226 at 226. 
47 It should be noted at this point that the duties that are imposed upon charity trustees in 
relation to decision-making vary depending on the organisational structure of the charity in 
question - whilst certain rules apply regardless of organisational structure (e. g. references to 
charity trustees in the Charities Act 1993), others only apply to trustees of a charitable trust 
(e. g. references under the Trustee Act 2000); see generally, Luxton, above n8 at 336 - 339. 
However, the duties that compel trustees to (i) act within their powers, (ii) take proper 
considerations into account, and (iii) satisfy procedural conditions, apply to all fiduciaries, and 
thus apply to all those who act in a managerial capacity in relation to a charity, regardless of its 
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why CSO maladministration should not be kept in check by reference to similar 
principles. 
(1) Illegality 
According to Lord Diplock, judicial review may be sought on the ground of illegality 
if the decision maker fails to 'understand correctly the law that regulates his decision- 
making power and ... give effect to it'. 
48 The rules of charity law operate on a similar 
basis. In the words of Hayton: 49 
Any act or neglect on the part of a trustee which is not authorised or excused 
by the terms of the trust instrument or by law ... 
is a breach of trust. 
Much of the caselaw regarding illegality is concerned with ensuring that decision- 
makers take all relevant considerations into account, and do not take account of any 
irrelevant factors, when making a decision. The fact that private law and public law 
both independently arrived at this position would suggest that it might also be 
appropriate to review CSO decisions on this basis. As far as relevant considerations 
are concerned, we can say three things at this juncture. 
First, it is important to note that both judicial review and charity proceedings require 
that an overlooked relevant consideration (or an irrelevant consideration that was taken 
into account) must have affected the outcome of the decision before the courts will 
intervene. 50 It would seem desirable for a similar approach to apply to the challenge of 
structural form. It is trite law that all trustees and directors are fiduciaries. The executive 
committee of an unincorporated association are also fiduciaries in that they have the capacity 
to affect the use of the association's funds which, in the case of a charity, will held on trust: 
either (i) on bare trust for the members (see Re Recher's WT [ 1972] Ch 526) or (ii) on trust for 
the organisation's charitable purpose. 48 Above n 43 at 410. 
49 Hayton, D., Hayton and Marshall Commentary and Cases on the Law of Trusts and 
Equitable Remedies (London, Butterworths, 2001) at 792. 
5' For judicial review authority, see above Woolf, H. (Lord Woolf), Jowell, J., and Le Seur, A., 
de Smith, Woolf & Jowell's Principles ofJudicial Review (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1999) 
at 211; Rv Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex parte Owen [19851 QB 1153 at 1176 per 
May U (taking account of an irrelevant factor is acceptable when coupled with numerous 
legitimate concerns); Rv Bishop of London (1890) QBD 213 at 226 per Lord Esher MR 
(taking account of an irrelevant factor is acceptable when it does not influence the final 
decision). For trust law authority, see Re Hastings-Bass (Deceased) [ 1975] Ch 25 at 41 per 
Buckley J; Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [ 199011 WLR 1587 per Warner J: 'the court 
will interfere ... if it is clear that [the trustee] ... would not 
have acted as he did' (italics 
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CSO decision-making, as otherwise CSOs may find themselves forced to defend futile 
action that, if successful, would not lead to a different outcome. Furthermore, Lord 
Walker notes that, in the context of Hastings-Bass, to hold otherwise would mean that 
'it will be hard for trustees to be confident ... that their decisions may not 
be open to 
challenge, perhaps years later'. 51 This is particularly significant if we wish to ensure 
that regulation does not emasculate the entrepreneurial spirit of CSO administration, 52 
as allowing too many decisions to be challenged in this way may tend towards 
anodyne management. 
Second, it is clear from Green v Cobham 53 that financial considerations are relevant 
factors to be taken into account when trustees exercise their administrative 
discretion: 54 in this case, the relevant consideration that the trustees of a private trust 
failed to take into account was the capital gains tax consequences of their decision to 
exercise their power of appointment. This would seem entirely correct, as trustees have 
a duty to act in the financial best interests of the beneficiaries (in the case of a private 
trust) or the charitable purpose (in the case of a charity). 55 Public law, by comparison, 
is not settled in this area: in Rv Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex parte Owen 
the Court of Appeal held that the Broadcasting Complaints Commission should not 
have taken the financial ramifications of hiring extra staff into account when making a 
decision. 56 However, financial considerations were held to be relevant in Rv Essex 
CC, ex parte C, where a local authority was at liberty to refuse free school transport to 
added). Though note that in the case of pensions trusts, the rule may be more relaxed, such 
that the court may intervene if it shown merely that the decision might have been different: see 
AMP (UK) plc v Barker [2001 ] PLR 79; Hearn v Younger [20021 WTLR 1317; Stannard v 
Fisons Pensions Trust [1992] IRLR 27. For a defence of this exception see Hayton, D., 
Underhill and Hayton. - Law Relating to Trustees (London, Butterworths, 2002) at 696; for 
criticism see Hilliard, J., 'Limiting Re Hastings-Bass' [2004] Conv 208 at 222. 
51 Walker, R., 'Some Trust Principles in the Pensions Context' in Oakley, A. (ed. ), Trends in 
Contemporary Trust Law (Oxford, OUP, 1996) at 129. Noted with approval by Hilliard, 
above n 50 at 222. 
52 See above Ch 3 at 105 -I 11. 53 [20021 WTLR I 10 1. 
54 Cf Hayton, who suggests that the rule in Hasting-Bass should only apply when the trustees 
are mistaken as to the effect of a decision, not its consequences (above n 50 at 697); Green v 
Cobham would not have been able to take financial considerations into account if this were the 
case. 
55 Buttle v Saunders [1950] 2 All ER 193 (private trust); Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch 270 
(pension trust); Harries v Church Commissioners for England [1992] 1 WLR 1241 (charitable 
trust). 
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the parents' choice of school when there was an equally suitable school closer to the 
child's home (in respect of which the council was happy to provide transport). 57 So far 
as CSOs are concerned, it would seem appropriate, in the light of the limited resources 
available to the sector, 58 to permit financial considerations to play a part in any 
decision-making except insofar as this is prohibited by the governing document in 
relation to specific areas of discretion. 
Finally, it is important to note that judicial review may require that the government 
policy on a particular issue is taken into account as a relevant consideration when 
reaching a decision. In certain circumstances, government circulars (not legally 
binding in themselves) have been held to be relevant to the decisions of public 
bodies. 59 It would clearly be inappropriate to require that CSOs take government 
policy into consideration, as this would have obvious ramifications for the 
independence of the sector. 60 
(2) Irrational Decisions 
A decision may be challenged under judicial review if it is: 61 
so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no 
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could 
have arrived at it. 
62 According to de Smith et al, a decision may be held up as irrational if it (i) is made in 
bad faith ; 63 (ii) is made arbitrarily or with inappropriate reasoning; (iii) violates the 
56 Above n 50. 
5' The Times, December 9,1993. 
58 See above Ch 3 at 71 - 72; Ch 4 at 113. Though it must be noted that in many situations 
public bodies will also be operating from budgets which are as limited as those CSOs, if not 
more so - consider the Charity Commission itself, which in 2003 has gross administration 
costs of around f 25M (Charity Commission, Departmental Report - 2003 (Cm 5909,2003), 
table 2); by way of comparison, in the same year the National Trust spent E241M on 'the work 
of the trust' (National Trust, Annual Report andAccounts 200212003 (http: //www. national 
trust. org. uk/ main/nationaltrust/agm/2003 /report 
- 
accounts. htmi, National Trust, 2003) at 25. 
59 See e. g. Dinsdale Developments Ltd v Secretary of Statefor the Environment [1986] JPL 
276; Richmond-upon- Thames LBC v Secretary of Statefor the Environment [1984] JPL 24. 
60 See above Ch 2 at 44 - 45. 61 Council of Civil Service Unions v Ministerfor the Civil Service, above n 43 per Lord 
Diplock at 410. 
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rule that like cases be treated alike; or (iv) is unduly oppressive in its impact. Trust law 
also prohibits all four of these transgressions: as Hayton notes, in this respect 'the 
application of the traditional principles [of trust law] seems to cover the same ground' 
as judicial review. 64 First, the trustees or directors of a charity are under a general duty 
to act in good faith by virtue of their status as fiduciaries. 65 Second, the rule against 
the capricious exercise of a fiduciary power or duty - defined by Templeman J in Re 
Manisty's Settlement as being that which is 'irrational, perverse or irrelevant to any 
sensible expectation' 66 _ prevents fiduciaries from acting arbitrarily. 
67 Third, under 
charity law: 68 
The income and property of the charity must be applied ... with complete 
fairness between persons who are properly qualified to benefit from it. The 
trustees of charities with permanent endowment must ... maintain a fair 
balance between the interests of present and future potential beneficiaries. 
Finally, although there are no reported cases that suggest that trustees are under a 
specific duty not to act in an unduly oppressive manner, it is suggested that any action 
on the part of the trustees that might infringe such a rule would probably fall foul of 
the rule against capriciousness. 
62 Above n 50 at 449 - 450. In addition to the following list, de Smith et al include defying 
reasonable expectations under this head (at 450); a discussion of this is outside the scope of 
this thesis, though note that such expectations will normally be deemed to be satisfied by a fair 
hearing on the matter (on which, see below at 262 - 263). 63 Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578; Mayor and Corporation of Westminster v London and 
North Western Railway Company [ 19051 AC 426 at 43 0 per Lord MacNaghten. 
64 Above n 50 at 581. See also Worthington, S., Equity (Oxford, OUP, 2003) at 133. 
65 Moody v Cox and Hat [ 1917] 2 Ch 71 at 83 per Warrington LJ; Bristol and West Building 
Society v Mothew [ 1998] Ch I at 18 per Millett U. 
66 [ 1974] Ch 17 at 26. 
67 In re Hodges (1878) 7 Ch D 754 at 762per Malins VC; McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 
at 442 per Lord Hodson; at 449 and 456 per Lord Wilberforce; Re Manisty's Settlement, above 
n 66 at 26 per Templeman J; Re Hay's ST [ 198211 WLR 202 at 209 per Sir Robert Megarry 
VC. 
68 Charity Commission, CC3. - Responsibilities of Charity Trustees (London, Charity 
Commission, 2002), para 58. The position comes from general trust law; see e. g. Nestle v 
National Westm inster Bank plc [ 1993 ]I WLR 1261 at 1279 per Staughton LJ: 'The obli gation 
of a trustee is to administer the trust fund impartially, or fairly (I can see no significant 
difference), having regard to the different interests of beneficiaries'; also, in the context of 
pensions trusts: Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch 270; Milhenstedt v Barclays Bank International 
Ltd [1989] IRLR 522; Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587; Edge v 
Pensions Ombudsman [2000] Ch 602. 
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So far as the review of civil society maladministration is concerned, it seems 
reasonable that these four principles should apply to CSOs as well. Certainly it is 
difficult to see how they would unduly fetter the administrative discretion of CSO 
decision-makers in any serious way. 
(3) Procedural Impropriety 
There are substantial differences between charity law and judicial review when it 
comes to the final category of maladministration: namely, procedural impropriety, 
which is defined in Council of Civil Service Unions v Ministerfor the Civil Service as 
being the: 69 
failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural 
fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision ... 
[and] 
failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are 
expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is 
conferred. 
Two of the key elements of natural justice are (i) the duty to give reasons for any 
exercise of discretion and (ii) the duty to hear representations from affected parties 
before exercising discretion. 70 We shall consider each in turn. 
Duty to give reasons 
Primafacie, an action for judicial review will not lie simply by virtue of the fact that a 
decision-maker has failed to disclose the reasons behind his decision to an affected 
person. 71 However, the issue is inextricably linked with that of relevant considerations 
69 Above n 43 at 410. 
70 A comprehensive analysis of all procedural impropriety is outside the scope of this thesis. 
However, we should note that other elements include the principles that decision-makers 
should act (i) without bias and (ii) without having previously fettered their discretion. Both 
these principles operate to a greater or lesser extent in both public and private law, and so it is 
likely that we would expect them to have application in relation to organised civil society as 
well. 
71 McInnes v Onslow-Fane [ 1978] 1 WLR 1520 at 1531 per Megarry VC: 'it is clear that there 
is no general obligation to give reasons for a decision'. See also: Cannock Chase Council v 
Kelly [ 197 8] 1 WLR I at 8 per Megaw LJ; Antaios Compania Navrica SA v Salen Rederiema 
AB [ 1985] AC 191 (where the House of Lords held that even j udges should not always provide 
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and irrationality, 72 for, in the absence of reasons proving otherwise, a claimant may try 
to assert that a decision was taken illegally or irrationally. According to the House of 
Lords in Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 73 lack of reasons 
could lead to an inference that the decision was made ultra vires, an approach which 
the Court of Appeal followed in Rv Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte 
Cunningham, 74 where it was held that a decision-maker may be required to provide 
reasons in order demonstrate a decision's legality. However, in the more recent case 
of Rv Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Lonrho, 75 the House of 
Lords held that unless the other evidence is 'overwhelming', 76 silence alone will not 
implicate a decision-maker. In other words, no negative inference should be made 
from a failure to give reasons even in the face of challenge by judicial review. 
So far as charity proceedings are concerned, it is necessary to distinguish between 
charitable companies and charitable trusts (and unincorporated associations based on 
the trust mechanism). As far as the directors of charitable companies are concerned, 
there is no general requirement to give reasons for their actions. Although companies 
are required to minute 'all proceedings at meetings of its directors', 77 there is no 
requirement that these minutes be made available for the members to inspect. 78 The 
position under trust law, however, is more complicated. Although the position with 
regard to a beneficiary's right to view specific documents is unsettled, 79 it is clear, 
following the decision of the Privy Council in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd, 80 that 
the right to call their trustees to account is an essential characteristic of the trust 
reasons for their decisions); Rv Secretary of Statefor Social Services, ex parte Connolly 
[19861 1 WLR 421 at 431 per Slade U. 
72 See above at 256 - 258 and 258 - 260 respectively. 73 [ 1968] AC 997. 
74 [ 1991] 4 All ER 310. 
75 [1989] 1 WLR 525. 
76 Above n 75 at 540 per Lord Keith. 
77 Companies Act 1985, s 382(l). Where a company also has managers, minutes of managerial 
meetings must also be minuted by virtue of the same section. 
78 See Companies Act 1985, s 383(l) which only requires the minutes of general meetings 
'9 Compare Wilson, R., and Labes, H., 'Schmidt v Rosewood: A Closer Inspection' [2004] 
PC13 161 at 168 - 169; Lightman, G., 'The Trustees' Duty to Provide Information to 
Beneficiaries' [2004] PCB 23 at 3 1. 
80 [2003] 2 AC 709. 
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mechanism. Without this right, it is difficult to see how the trustee's position would 
differ, in any meaningful sense, from that of the absolute owner of property. 81 
Right to a fair hearing 
Despite a somewhat chequered history, 82 it is clear following Ridge v Baldwin 83 that 
the position today is that public law primafacie requires a fair hearing to be conducted 
before making decisions that 'affect to their detriment the rights of other persons or 
curtail their liberty to do as they please'. 84 Previously it had been thought necessary to 
demonstrate that a decision was judicial or quasi-judicial, and not administrative, 
before a hearing was required. 85 However, the nature of what constitutes a fair hearing 
or whether it may be appropriate to deny any form of hearing (for example, if time is 
of the essence) depends upon the circumstances of any given case. 86 If the decision 
determines an individual's 'civil rights and obligation' then, in addition to any 
common law requirements of procedural fairness, the Human Rights Act 1998 requires 
81 See Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 at 253 -254 per Millett LJ; also Hayton, D., "The 
Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship" in Oakley, A. J. (ed), Trends in Contemporary Trust 
Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1996) at 47; Hayton, D., "The Irreducible Core Content of 
Trusteeship" (1996) 5J Int P 3. 
82 On which see Wade, H., and Forsyth, C., Administrative Law (Oxford, OUP, 2004) at 476 - 
496. 
83 [ 1964] AC 40. 
84 Rv Commissionfor Racial Equality, ex parte Hillingdon LBC [1982] AC 779 at 787 per 
Lord Diplock. Note also the attempt at categorisation by Megarry VC in McInnes v Onslow 
Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520 at 1528 - 1529. 85 See e. g. Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne [195 1] AC 66 and Rv Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 
ex parte Parker [1953] 1 WLR 1150, both of which held that the revocation of a trading 
licence should not be subject to the rules of natural justice because it is an administrative act, 
rather than a judicial or quasi-judicial one: the decision-maker 'is not determining a question: 
he is taking executive action to withdraw a privilege' (Nakkudi Ali v Jayaratne, ibid at 78 per 
Lord Radcliffe). In Ridge v Baldwin the House of Lords confirmed that 'persons acting in a 
capacity which is not on the face of it judicial but rather executive or administrative have been 
held by the courts to be subject to the principles of natural justice', above n 83 at 130 per Lord 
Hodson. 
86 See Russell v Duke of Norfolk [ 194911 All ER 109 at 117 per Tucker LJ; cited with 
approved in Ridge v Baldwin, above n 83 at 132 per Lord Hodson. See also the words of Lord 
Denning MR in Rv Gaming Boardfor Great Britain, ex parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 
QB 417 at 439: 'It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural 
justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent'. 
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that it is informed by a 'fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law'. 87 
Trust law, by comparison, does not require charities to give a fair hearing to those 
affected by the decisions of its trustees. In Rv Charity Commissioners for England 
and Wales, ex parte Baldwin, 88 the High Court was asked to consider whether the 
trustees of an almshouse were under a duty to warn the applicant that her position as 
almsperson was likely to be terminated in order that she could make representations in 
her defence. Deciding that the trustees were under no such duty, Beatson QC89 
explicitly recognised the difference between the position under public law and trust 
law thus: 90 
The problem [with recognising that the trustees were under such a duty] is that 
this involves a move from a concept focusing on information available to the 
person making the decision, the trust concept, to one focusing on the 
individual's opportunity to be heard, the public law concept. 
Review of CSO maladministration 
With regard to the duty to provide reasons, there are clearly strong arguments both for 
and against the application of this principle to CSOs. On one hand, some 
maladministration will inevitably pass unchecked if it is not always necessary to 
explain one's actions. On the other, it is clearly in the interests of efficient 
management that CSOs are not compelled to disclose all paperwork, from 
'advertisements for pink pills to blackmailing letters from people who think they have 
grudge against the trustees'. 91 If unrestricted, the duty to provide reasons may also 
leave CSOs open to undue interference from trivial claims, although it is to be hoped 
that appropriately drafted rules of standing would minimise the threat of officious 
meddlers. 92 
87 European Convention on Human Rights, Art 6(l); applicable to 'public authorities' by virtue 
of the Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(1). 
88 (2001) 33 HLR 48. 
89 Sitting as a Deputy Judge. 
90 Above n 88, para 53. 
91 Re Londonderry's Settlement [1964] 3 All ER 855 at 935 per Danckwerts U. 
92 See above at 253 - 254. 
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With regard to the duty to give a fair hearing, it would seem reasonable that this 
principle should have general application for the sector, even where it might seem that 
such a hearing will not affect the outcome of a particular decision. In the words of 
Megarry J in John v Rees: 93 
"When something is obvious ... why force everybody to go through the 
tiresome waste of time involved in framing charges and giving an opportunity 
to be heard? The result is obvious from the start. " Those who take this view 
do not, I think, do themselves justice. As everybody who has anything to do 
with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn with examples of open 
and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in 
the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully 
explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered 
a change. 
Although requiring CSOs to give effect to this principle would have an impact on 
resources, it should be borne in mind that what constitutes a fair hearing will vary 
according to circumstance - for example, allowing an affected party to make written 
submissions to be considered by a decision-maker will clearly be less onerous than 
requiring that they be heard in person. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a brief comparative analysis of the key principles that 
underpin judicial review and charity proceedings, in order to understand the form that 
the judicial control of maladministration within organised civil society might take. 
Together with the analysis in the previous chapter of the tools of regulation associated 
with regulation by executive, it provides an overview of the various strategies that we 
might wish to employ when regulating organised civil society for the reasons discussed 
in Chapter Four. 




A. UNDERSTANDING CIVIL SOCIETY 
This thesis has discussed when it might be appropriate to regulate organised civil 
society and how this might best be implemented. In order to answer these questions, 
the first part of the thesis examined the constitution and social functions of the sector, 
with the intention of determining: (i) the objectives that we might reasonably expect 
the sector to fulfil; (ii) the characteristics of CSOs and other features of the sector that 
facilitate the pursuit of those objectives; and (iii) the characteristics of CSOs and other 
features of the sector that hinder their pursuit. In Chapter Two, we argued that it is 
inappropriate to focus on either existing legal definitions or financial definitions of the 
sector - legal definitions are problematic in that definitions vary from state to state and 
in many cases predate academic scrutiny of civil society, while financial definitions 
fail to reflect the fact that CSOs are frequently funded from multiple sources. Instead, 
we adopted the structural definition articulated by Salamon and Anheier, on the ground 
that the characteristics which this definition highlights - volunteerism, independence, 
organisation and non-profit distribution - go some way towards explaining why CSOs 
are suited to certain social functions. 
In Chapter Three, we categorised and critically evaluated the different activities carried 
out by CSOs by reference to their underlying social functions. We argued that there 
are eight of these: (i) the provision of market support; (ii) the provision of public 
goods; (iii) the provision of intangible private services; (iv) the redistribution of 
wealth; (v) the facilitation of political action; (vi) the provision of cultural services; 
(vii) the facilitation of self-determination and (viii) the facilitation of 
entrepreneurialism. We noted in particular that much organised civil society presence 
is predicated on the notion that the sector is better suited to certain activities than the 
public and private sectors. In relation to the public sector, we argued that CSOs are 
likely to be more efficient, expert and insulated from political considerations. In 
relation to the private sector, we argued that CSOs are likely to be more trustworthy, 
and also provide different ways of rewarding entrepreneurialism. However, we also 
noted a number of weaknesses which prevent the sector from maximising its potential 
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- such as the philanthropic failures identified by Salamon and the challenges to 
trustworthiness noted by Ortmann and Schlesinger. 
B. TOWARDS A THEORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY REGULATION 
The second part of the thesis built upon the analysis in Part One in order first to 
consider when it might be appropriate for the state to intervene and regulate organised 
civil society as though it were a collective unit. In Chapter Four, we evaluated the 
traditional economic and social justifications for regulating the private sector, and 
considered their relevance to CSOs. Accordingly, we argued that regulation of 
organised civil society may be justified by reference to four grounds: (i) preventing 
anti-competitive practices, (ii) controlling campaigning, (iii) ensuring trustworthiness 
and (iv) co-ordinating the sector. We also considered that, in light of the analysis in 
Chapters Two and Three, regulation may also be justified when it is necessary to (v) 
rectify philanthropic failures or (vi) prevent challenges to organisational quiddity. 
Chapter Five then highlighted some of the practical problems that arise when we treat 
organised civil society as a collective unit for the purposes of regulation. Specifically, 
we argued that there is no discretely defined, fixed boundary around the sector which 
might form a natural limit for the jurisdiction of a regulatory regime. We then 
considered the nature of the boundary between organised civil society and the 
charitable sector in England and Wales, and argued that, in the absence of any 
philanthropic insufficiency or particularism specifically affecting charities, there are no 
theoretical grounds for focusing regulatory attention solely on the latter. 
C. IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 
In the final part of the thesis we considered how the rudimentary theory of civil society 
regulation developed in Chapter Four might best be implemented. In Chapter Six, we 
noted that an executive agency is traditionally viewed as the most appropriate 
regulatory body, although we noted that secondary roles may be available for both the 
judiciary (specifically, in relation to the regulation of maladministration) and self- 
regulation. In particular, we argued that the institutional efficiency of executive 
agencies makes this model particularly well-suited to regulating organised civil 
society, as the blurred and shifting nature of the sector's boundaries, discussed in 
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Chapter Five, means that it will be necessary to periodically redraw the boundaries of a 
regulatory regime. 
Having concluded in Chapter Six that the two state institutions that we might charge 
with regulating the sector are an executive agency and the courts, the final two 
chapters consider how the regulatory strategies available to them might best be used in 
order to successfully regulate for the reasons given in Chapter Four. Chapter Seven 
focused on regulation by the executive, and suggested, in particular, that (i) the 
prevention of anti-competitive practices, (ii) the control of campaigning and (iii) the 
prevention of challenges to organisational quiddity, lend themselves to regulation by 
way of command and control, whereas regulation to (iv) enable sector co-ordination 
and (v) rectify philanthropic failure is better carried out by way of incentive-based 
regulation. We also noted that, whilst disclosure regulation will go some way towards 
(vi) encouraging trustworthiness, some form of control over CSO maladministration, 
possibly to be undertaken by the courts, will also be necessary. Chapter Eight 
developed this last thought further and provided, in outline, a doctrinal analysis of 
public law judicial review and private law charity proceedings in order to better 
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